High Court Kerala High Court

Rajit vs The State Of Kerala on 16 July, 2009

Kerala High Court
Rajit vs The State Of Kerala on 16 July, 2009
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C).No. 27114 of 2008(C)


1. RAJIT, GEORGE, S/O. K.C.GEORGE,
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED
                       ...       Respondent

2. THE COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SUPPLIES,

3. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, IDUKKI DISTRICT.

4. THE DISTRICT SUPPLY OFFICER,

5. FRANCIS VADAKKEL, VADKKEL HOUSE,

                For Petitioner  :SRI.N.RAGHURAJ

                For Respondent  :SRI.C.K.PAVITHRAN

The Hon'ble MR. Justice S.SIRI JAGAN

 Dated :16/07/2009

 O R D E R
                             S. Siri Jagan, J.
               =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
                      W. P (C) No. 27114 of 2008
               =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
                    Dated this, the 16th July, 2009.

                            J U D G M E N T

By Ext. P1 notification, the 3rd respondent invited applications

for appointment of Authorised Wholesale Ration Depot No. 12, which

is in Ward I of Chinnakanal Panchayat in Udumbanchola Taluk. The

petitioner, the 5th respondent, one Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma and five

others submitted applications. The petitioner was not invited for a

hearing pursuant to his application. He filed W.P(C) No. 24356/2005,

presuming that his application was summarily rejected without any

notice. That writ petition was disposed of by this Court with a

direction to the 3rd respondent to issue a copy of the order, if any,

passed by him on the application submitted by the petitioner as well

as others to the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was

supplied with Ext. P3 order dated 9-9-2005 of the 3rd respondent.

From the same, he understood that his application was not considered

for two reasons, namely, he had not produced any documentary

evidence to prove the validity of ownership of building proposed by

him and that his application was incomplete, he having left column no.

16 of the application blank. The petitioner filed Ext. P4 appeal before

the 2nd respondent. The same was considered by the 2nd respondent

as directed by this Court in Ext. P5 judgment in W.P(C) No.

7036/2006 filed by the petitioner. Ext. P6 order was passed by the 2nd

respondent rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner

filed Ext. P7 revision petition before the 1st respondent. Since there

was delay in disposing of the same also, the petitioner filed W.P(C)

No. 2062/2008 for a direction to the 1st respondent to dispose of that

revision petition . Pursuant thereto, by Ext. P8 order, the 1st

respondent rejected the revision petition submitted by the petitioner.

The petitioner is challenging Exts.P3, P6 and P8 orders in this writ

petition.

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 2 :-

2. The petitioner raises several contentions. First is that both

the reasons mentioned in Ext. P 3 order for refusing to consider his

application on merits are unsustainable. As far as the 1st reason is

concerned, according to the petitioner, that reason is not sustainable

in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Varkey v.

State of Kerala, 1984 KLT 567. According to him, the second

reason is also not sustainable for several reasons. The first is that it is

not correct that the petitioner has left column no. 16 blank. Column

16 requires the applicant to state as to whether the applicant has paid

any income-tax and sales-tax for the last three years preceding the

year of application. The petitioner submits that he had, in fact, filled

up that column by entering his PAN card number issued by the

income-tax authorities. Therefore, the statement in Ext. P3 order that

he had not filled up that column is patently wrong. He would further

submit that the fact that he had not filled up that column is of no

consequence at all, insofar as if he is not an income tax payee, his

application cannot be refused to be considered and even if he is an

income tax payee, that would not give him any advantage in his

application. Thirdly, he would contend that Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma,

who was also an applicant, did not fill up the column no. 16 as is

evident from Ext. P9 copy of application obtained by the petitioner

through proceedings under the Right to Information Act, despite

which as is evident from Ext. P3 order, the application of Smt. P.G.

Bharathiamma was considered on merits and the 5th respondent was

preferred to Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma on the ground that the storage

capacity of the godown proposed by her is less than the storage

capacity required for ration wholesale business. Learned counsel for

the petitioner points out that in Ext. P3 order, there is a specific

finding that Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma satisfied all the stipulations laid

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 3 :-

down in the notification. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the

3rd respondent has adopted different standards for different applicants

for deciding as to whether their applications are in order, which itself

is discriminatory and unsustainable.

3. The petitioner further contends that in Ext. P4 appeal, the

petitioner had specifically raised a ground, namely, Ground (x) that

the 5th respondent, who was ultimately selected for issue of licence

was a benami of M/s. Sam & Co., the erstwhile AWD, whose licence

was cancelled on account of serious misconducts. That contention

was not even referred to in Ext. P6 order of the 2nd respondent. He

adds that in Ext. P7 revision petition also, in ground (H), he again

raised that contention in respect of which there is not even a

reference in Ext. P8 order of the 1st respondent also. Lastly, the

petitioner would contend that one of the essential conditions for issue

of licence as an AWD as per the Kerala Rationing Order is that the

applicant should be a resident of the locality for which the licence is

to be issued. According to the petitioner, as is evident from Ext. P1

notification inviting applications, the AWD is intended for Ward I of

Chinnakanal Panchayat, Udumbanchola Taluk. Therefore, according

to the petitioner, the licensee should have been a resident of the

Chinnakanal Panchayat, whereas the 5th respondent is a resident of

another Panchayat. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that

in the counter affidavit of the 5th respondent, he has stated that he is

a resident of Bisenvalley Panchayat in Udumbanchola Taluk. But,

according to the petitioner, as is evidenced by Ext. P11 issued by the

Secretary of the Bisenvalley Grama Panchayat, the 5th respondent is

not an ordinary resident of the said Panchayat. In the reply affidavit

filed by the petitioner, he has submitted that AWD no. 12 of

Chinnakanal Panchayat is only one of the five AWDs of Udumbanchola

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 4 :-

Taluk, the others being Ponmudi, Nedumkandam, Kattapana and

Vandanmedu. Therefore, according to the petitioner, it is not

sufficient that the 5th respondent is a resident of the Udumbanchola

Taluk, but he should further prove that he is a resident of the locality

to which AWD 12 caters. For all the above reasons, the petitioner

contends that the impugned orders are patently unsustainable.

Therefore, the petitioner seeks the following reliefs:

(i) to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or such other
writ, order or direction, calling for the records leading to Exts.P3,
P6 and P8 proceedings /orders and quash the same.

(ii) to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or such other
writ, order or direction, commanding respondents 1 to 3 to cancel
the appointment of 5th respondent as the licensee of AWD at
Chinnakanal and to issue a fresh notification calling for
applications for appointment as authorized wholesale
distributorship of AWD No. 12 at Chinnakanal from eligible
persons except the 5th respondent;

(iii) to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or such other
writ, order or direction, declaring that the rejection of the
application submitted by the petitioner for appointment as AWD
No.12 at Chinnakanal is illegal, arbitrary and that he is eligible to
be considered for the appointment as authorized wholesale
distributor.”

4. A counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the 1st respondent

refuting the contentions of the petitioner. According to 1st

respondent, the decision of the Division Bench in Varkey’s case

(supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. It is contended that

in this case, in Ext. P1 notification inviting the applications, one of the

requirements is that the applicant should produce ownership

certificate of the building in which he intends to run the AWD and if

such building is not owned by the applicant, the consent letter issued

by the owner in stamp paper worth Rs.50/- should accompany the

application. It is also stated in Ext. P1 that the applications not

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 5 :-

accompanied by all the documents referred to in Ext. P1 notification

would not be considered. In view of the specific stipulation in Ext. P1

notification inviting applications, the reliance on Varkey’s case

(supra) is patently misplaced, is the contention raised by the the

learned Government Pleader. Regarding the failure to fill up column

no. 16 of the application form, the learned Government Pleader does

not now dispute the fact that the petitioner has stated his PAN card

number in column no. 16 and therefore the statement in Ext. P3 order

that he has left the column blank is not correct. But, he seeks to

uphold Ext. P3 on this ground also taking the contention that what

has been required by the petitioner to state in column no. 16 is as to

whether he has paid income-tax or sales-tax for the previous three

years, which was not stated by the petitioner. Regarding the

relevancy of the same, he would submit that, that is a relevant factor

insofar as that would give an indication as to the financial stability of

the applicant to be appointed as AWD. Regarding the reference to

the petitioner to Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma’s case, the learned

Government Pleader frankly admits that Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma

had left the column blank. But, he contends that it is of no relevance

as far as the grant of licence is concerned insofar as Smt. P.G.

Bharathiamma was not ultimately selected and the person selected

does not incur the said disqualification. It is further contended by the

learned Government Pleader that the petitioner cannot raise a case of

negative discrimination based on the irregularity committed by Smt.

P.G. Bharathiamma and the fact that the 3rd respondent may have

overlooked that fact should not give the petitioner an advantage on

the basis of an illegality overlooked by the 3rd respondent

inadvertently.

5. Regarding the contention of the petitioner that the 5th

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 6 :-

respondent was a benami of the erstwhile disqualified AWD, the

contention of the 1st respondent is that the petitioner has not

produced any evidence to prove the same. But the learned

Government Pleader frankly admits that in Exts. P6 and P8 orders, the

specific contention raised by the petitioner in his appeal and revision

petition has not even been referred to in the orders.

6. Regarding the last contention, the learned Government

Pleader would contend that the AWD is sanctioned for the whole

Taluk and therefore the residence qualification need be in the Taluk

itself which qualification the 5th respondent has. The contention is

that since the 5th respondent is a resident of that Taluk, he had

fulfilled the residence qualification as laid down by this Court in the

Full Bench decision in O.P.No. 12652/1996.

7. The 5th respondent has filed a counter affidavit denying the

contentions of the petitioner. In the same, he admits that he was an

employee of M/s. Sam & Co. and while cancelling the licence of M/s.

Sam & Co., there is no allegation of misappropriation against the 5th

respondent and that the respondent is not at all a benami of M/s. Sam

& Co.

8. I have considered the rival contentions in detail.

9. As is clear from Ext. P3 order, the application of the

petitioner was refused to be considered for the two reasons that he

has not produced the documentary evidence to prove validity of

ownership of the building proposed by the applicant for the AWD at

the time of submitting application and that since the petitioner has

not filled up column no. 16 of the application form, it was an

incomplete application. It is not disputed before me that the

petitioner had produced a document evidencing ownership of the

building proposed as the AWD after filing the application but before

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 7 :-

consideration of the applications by the 3rd respondent. The question

as to whether the application not accompanied by solvency certificate

or certificate of consent of ownership of the building is a reason for

rejecting the application summarily was considered by a Division

Bench of this Court in Varkey’s case supra. That question was

answered by the Division Bench thus in paragraph 2 thereof thus:

“2. Sri. M.I. Joseph, the counsel for the appellant-petitioner,
submitted that the notification issued by the 3rd respondent
required the application to be submitted in the prescribed form;
and in the form it was stated that incomplete applications would be
liable to be rejected. According to him, the application from the 4th
respondent was not accompanied either by the solvency certificate
or the certificate of consent by the owner of the building in which
the 4th respondent proposed to conduct the depot in case the
licence for that purpose was granted to him. His argument was
that the 2nd respondent had found that the 4th respondent’s
application was not accompanied by these certificates, and it was
sufficient reason for rejecting his application summarily, and
therefore, was no valid reason why the Government in exercise of
its power of revision should have interfered with Ext. P4 order
passed by the 2nd respondent.

3. The question before us is whether we should, in exercise
of the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution, interfere with the
decision of the Government. We have not been shown any
provisions in the relevant Rules which requires that an application
should be accompanied by solvency certificate or certificate of
consent from the owner of the building. Even in the application
form, which is not a statutory form, but only a form prescribed by
the executive authority, there is no mention that the solvency
certificate or the consent certificate is to accompany the
application. The only requirement in term of the application form
itself is that if the answer to the question whether the applicant
was solvent was in the affirmative, the certificate in proof of the
extent of the solvency was to be produced. It would serve the
same purpose even if the certificate is produced any time before
the Collector takes up the matter for decision. There is not only no
non-compliance with the requirements of the relevant provisions,
but also no prejudice caused to any of the parties by the fact that
the application was not accompanied by the certificates, but were
made available before the Collector took up the matter for
consideration.

4. The counsel for the appellant-petitioner cited a decision

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 8 :-

of the Supreme Court and three decisions of this Court in support
of his contention that where there was non-compliance with the
provisions in the rules governing the grant of the licence, the
application ought to have been rejected summarily. The decision
are: (1) Tara Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1975 S C 1487; (2)
Kerala Public Service Commission v. Saroja Nambiar, 1978 (2)
ILR, Kerala 241); (3) Kerala Public Service Commission v.
Johnson,
(1979 KLT 665); and (4) Lalithambika v. Secretary,
K.P.S.C. [1981 KLT 98 (SN)]. We have gone through these
decisions. We find none of these decisions is applicable to the
facts of the case. If there is a mandatory requirement under the
statutory rule that certain particulars are to be furnished, or
certain certificates are to accompany the application, the failure to
comply with those requirements would result in the summary
rejection of the application, particularly where the rules
themselves make it clear that failure to comply with the
requirements would result in the summary rejection of the
application. In this case, we have already noticed that there is no
statutory rule which requires that the certificates referred to
above were to accompany the application, or that the failure to do
so would result in the summary rejection of the application. The
decisions cited could easily be, therefore, distinguished on facts.”

I am of opinion that this decision is squarely applicable to the facts of

this case. The attempt of the learned Government Pleader to

distinguish the same on facts stating that in Ext. P1 notification

inviting application, such a specific condition has been incorporated

also does not find favour with me. The District Collector cannot on his

own, include in the notification inviting applications conditions, which

are not stipulated by the rules and thereafter reject an application on

the ground that the conditions stipulated in the notification inviting

applications have not been complied with. The applicant for AWD is

expected to comply only with the statutory requirements in the matter

of filing of applications for AWD, in respect of which the Division

Bench decision in Varkey’s case (supra) becomes squarely

applicable. In the above circumstances, I am satisfied that the first

reason mentioned in Ext. P3 for rejecting the application of the

petitioner is clearly unsustainable.

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 9 :-

10. My finding on the first point would to some extent be

applicable to the second point also. The learned Government Pleader

could not point out to me any provision in the Rules that an applicant

for AWD should be an income tax or sales tax payee or that an

income tax or sales tax payee would be preferred in the matter of

grant of licensee as an AWD. He also does not have a case that non-

payment of tax is a disqualification. Further, as pointed out by the

learned counsel for the petitioner, as is evidenced by Ext. P10

application of the 5th respondent, he is not a tax assessee at all. When

the Rules do not prescribe any special consideration for an income tax

or sales tax assessee, it defies logic as to why a column regarding

the same should be included in the application form at all. Added to

that, the application of Smt. P.G. Bharathiamma, who did not fill up

column no. 16, as evidenced by Ext. P9, had been considered by the

3rd respondent on merits despite the alleged defect. Further, the

finding in Ext. P3 that the petitioner did not fill up column no. 16 is

also not sustainable since the petitioner had filled up that column with

PAN card number. PAN card would be issued to only an income tax

assessee. In the above circumstances, the second reason mentioned

in Ext. P3 for rejecting the application of the petitioner is also

unsustainable.

10. In view of my above findings, insofar as the 3rd respondent

had not considered the petitioner on merits for unsustainable reasons,

Ext. P3 order is liable to be quashed and therefore strictly speaking, I

need not consider the other contentions in the writ petition. But,

since those contentions have relevance in the mater of re-considering

the applications of the eligible applicants, and since arguments were

advanced by both sides in respect of the same also, I shall consider

the same also in this writ petition .

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 10 :-

11. The petitioner’s contention is that Ext. P10(a) solvency

certificate produced by the 5th respondent was issued by one Smt.

Baby Abraham. Baby Abraham is the maiden name of that allottee

and after marriage, she became Smt. Baby Mammen. Smt. Baby

Mammen and Smt. Santha George were the partners of the

erstwhile AWD, viz. M/s. Sam & Co., who were disqualified for

misconducts. The other partner of M/s. Sam & Co. Smt. Santha

George issued Ext. P10(d) consent deed agreeing to lease the building

proposed by the 5th respondent for the AWD to the 5th respondent.

Further, by Ext. P10(c), ownership certificate was issued by M/s. Sam

& Co. themselves. According to the petitioner, despite specific

allegations in this regard raised in the appeal and revision petition

filed by the petitioner, there is absolutely no consideration of the said

contentions either by the 2nd respondent or by the 1st respondent in

Exts.P6 and P8 orders respectively. I find considerable merit in that

contention. Therefore, while reconsidering the applications, the 3rd

respondent is bound to consider this contention of the petitioner also.

12. Lastly, the petitioner has raised a specific contention that

the 5th respondent is not a resident of the locality for which the AWD

was to be appointed. Although the 5th respondent claimed himself to

be a resident of the Bisenvalley Panchayat. The Secretary of the

Bisenvalley Panchayat by Ext. P11 certificate certified that the 5th

respondent is not a permanent resident of that Panchayat. Of course,

going by the Full Bench decision in O.P.No. 12652/1996 on that

point, what is relevant is whether the applicant is the resident of the

locality for which the licence is to be granted. If the AWD was to be

appointed for the Taluk as a whole, the Government Pleader’s

contention would be very correct. But, it is not disputed before me

that for Udumbanchola Taluk, there are five AWDs. Therefore,

W.P.C. No. 27114/08 -: 11 :-

necessarily, the area of operation of these five AWDs has to be

separately earmarked. That being so, only if the applicants are

residents of the locality to which the AWD 12 is to cater, the

applications would be valid. I am of opinion that this matter is also to

be considered by the District Collector while deciding the matter

afresh.

13. In view of my above findings, the writ petition is allowed

quashing Exts.P3, P6 and P8. The District Collector is directed to

consider the applications including that of the petitioner afresh on

merits, in accordance with law and pass fresh orders regarding the

selection of the AWD pursuant to Ext. P1 notification. The same shall

be done after hearing all eligible applicants including the petitioner

and the 5th respondent as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within

two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. I

make it clear that the District Collector shall specifically address

himself to all the contentions referred to above and enter specific

findings in respect of each of the same while passing fresh orders.

Sd/- S. Siri Jagan, Judge.

Tds/