JUDGMENT
S.K. Agarwal, J.
1. The petitioners in this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.P.C.) have prayed for quashing the order dated 25th December, 1996 passed by the Court Ms. Raj Rani Mitra, M.M., New Delhi directing the police to investigate the complaint against petitioners, by respondent No. 2, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the order dated 3rd February, 1997 dismissing the application praying for recalling the said order, holding that the petitioner has no locus standi. It is alleged that petitioner No. 1 (here-in-after the petitioner) had been doing business of garments and the same was closed in 1995. Consequently claims of all the creditors were settled against written discharge. One of the parties with whom the petitioner had settled the accounts was the family concern of respondent No. 2. Copy of the alleged settlement has been placed on record. It is alleged that the complainant, with an intent to harass the petitioner and to blackmail him, lodged a false report with Crime Branch of Delhi Police. The petitioner on receipt of notices filed a petition Crl. M(M) 2441/96
under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for anticipatory bail and on 9.10.1996 it was ordered that if the petitioner is sought to be arrested he would be given 7 days’ clear advance notice. The petitioner participated in the investigations and the Investigating Agency found no substance in the complaint. Thereafter respondent No. 2 filed a complaint in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi on the same facts. The Magistrate acting mechanically on 24.12.1996 ordered directing SHO, P.S. Lajpat Nagar, to investigate the matter. The order reads as under:
“24.12.1996: Fresh challan received today. It be checked and registered. Present complainant with counsel. Facts of the case are disclosed. Commission of offence cognizable SHO P.S. is to investigate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and report put up on 3.2.1997”.
Sd/-M.M., New Delhi
2. The petitioner filed another petition Criminal Misc.(Main) 106/97, praying for quashing of the above said order dated 24th December, 1996 and the investigations thereon. The Investigating Agency was directed to look into all documents which were collected by the CID, Grimes including the earlier compromise between the parties and to and thereafter to submit its report to the Court. It was further ordered that in the event of arrest the petitioner be released on bail. Petition was thus disposed of.
3. The petitioner then moved an application before Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate praying for dismissal of the complaint. The Trial Court declined to hear the petitioner holding that the petitioner has no locus standi. The order reads as under:
“3.2.1997 : Present complainant in person.
Report not received.
Put up on 9.4.1997 for report.”
Sd/- M.M. 3.2.97
Counsel Sh. Randhir Jain Advocate present for accused No. 1. However at this stage he has no locus standi. Therefore he has not been heard.
Sd/-M.M. 3.2.97
4. Admittedly on 24th December, 1996, the SHO was directed to investigate the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and to submit the report on 3rd February, 1997. The report was not submitted on 3rd February, 1997 and the matter was ordered to be listed on 9th April, 1997. The trial court declined to hear the petitioner on the ground that he has no locus standi. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in 1995 the petitioner had, settled the matter and respondent No. 2 lodged false report with the Crime Branch, Delhi Police with the intent to harass and blackmail the petitioners: the Crime Branch after investigation found that no case against the petitioners was made out. It is alleged that in back drop of these facts complaint filed by the respondent No. 2, is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and same is liable to be quashed alongwith orders thereon.
5. At the outset learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner had no locus standi to be heard at the pre-summoning stage. There cannot be any dispute about the same. Reference in this regard can be made to the Supreme Court decision in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 397 wherever it was held:
“Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation, . he has no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to the Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. Of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that; he cannot go.”
6. The object of an enquiry under Section 202 Cr. P.C. is to ascertain whether the allegations made in the complaint are intrinsially true and worthy of credence. The Court acting under Section 203 Cr.P.C has to satisfy himself whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding in the matter or not. For this purpose the Court is entitled to consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in the enquiry or the statements made during investigation while deciding whether the process should be issued or not. The Court has to be satisfied whether there is ^sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Admittedly, the matter is at pre-summoning stage and petitioner has not yet been summoned. Therefore, trial court was right while holding that the petitioner has no locus standi to participate in the proceedings and declined the application of the petitioner on 3rd February, 1997. It is true that order dated 24.12.1996 appears to have been passed mechanically as no challan filed and it was the complaint on which magistrate ordered investigations but that by itself is not enough to warrant quashing of the order passed by the Court. After the accused summoned, he is entitled to place before the Court relevant material and pray that the process ought not to have been issued; the Court is entitled to drop the proceedings if on re-consideration of the complaint and the material he finds that no case is made out for which the accused is to be tried. The order of issuing process is interim order and is not a judgment. It can be varied and recalled at any stage. Reference in this regard can be made to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 2207 wherein it was held:
“It is open to the accused be plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint or the very fact of it does not disclose any offence against the accused.”
The apprehension of the petitioner is misplaced; firstly, there is nothing on the record to presume that the investigating officer, who is public servant acting in discharge of duties would not act fairly or would not take into consideration earlier settlement between the parties, or the earlier report of Crime Branch on the complaint of the respondent No. 2 particularly after the orders of the Court in Cr. Misc. (M) No. 106/97. Secondly, the trial court is not bound to accept the report and is required under the law to find out independently whether there is sufficient material to proceed in the matter or not. Lastly if the petitioners are summoned and they are not satisfied they would be well within their right to approach the trial court for recalling the order; they have already been granted anticipatory bail, therefore is no question of harassment. The petition at this stage is not maintainable.
For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in the petition. The same is dismissed. No order as to the cost.