PETITIONER: RAJKUMAR DEVINDRA SINGH & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT11/09/1972 BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN SHELAT, J.M. PALEKAR, D.G. DWIVEDI, S.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. CITATION: 1973 AIR 66 1973 SCR (2) 166 1973 SCC (1) 51 CITATOR INFO : D 1981 SC 670 (4) ACT: Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act 1959, Section 3 and Section 4 (1)-Unauthorised occupation of public premises-Possession before the premises became public premises-Eviction cannot be ordered under the Act. HEADNOTE: The appellants, along with their brothers, were residing in an ancestral property. The eldest member of the family sold the property to the State Government as property belonging to him. After the sale, the State Government issued notice of eviction to the appellant under Section 4(1) of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery Act, 1959. The writ petition, challenging legality of the eviction order was rejected by the single Judge, and then on appeal by the Division Bench of the Punjab High Court. Before this Court the appellants contended that they were in possession under a legal title and that the impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction. HELD : The appellants were in possession of the property before the date of sale to the State Government, when it was not public preprocess. The word "thereof" in Sec. 3(1) makes it clear that the person must have entered into possession of public premises before or after the commencement of the Act in order that he may be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation. Unless the premises are public premises on the date of possession, Section 3(a) is not applicable., [170A-B] HELD, further, that Section 3(b) is attracted only where the person continues in possession after the cancellation or determination of allotment, lease or grant from Government. The appellants were not in unauthorised occupation of public premises and therefore the notice under Section 4(1) was issued without jurisdiction. [171A] Appeal allowed. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 69 of 1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated
October 15, 1963 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in
L.P.A. No. 330 of 1963.
A. Subba Rao, Bhuvansesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain for the appellant.
V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey for respondents Nos. 1 to
3.
Ramamurthi & Co. for the Intervener (State, of Jammu and
Kashmir).
S. C. Majumdar for the Intervener (Megalal Chhaganlal (P)
Ltd.).
Vinod Kumar, Krishan Lal Mehta and Veneet Kumar for the
intervener.
167
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. The appellants filed a writ petition before the
High Court of Punjab for the issue of an appropriate writ or
order quashing a notice dated June 21, 1961, issued under s.
4(1) of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and
Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, hereinafter called the ‘Act’,
directing the 2nd appellant to show cause why an order of
eviction should not be passed against him in respect of the
premises in question.
The appellant’s case was as follows. On the demise of the
late Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, his eldest son, Maharaja
Yadavindra Singh succeeded to the gaddi of the erstwhile
State of Punjab which subsequently merged with the State of
Punjab. Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, along with his sons
including the appellants, constituted a joint Hindu family.
The appellants along with the other sons of Maharaja
Bhupinder Singh had an interest, by virtue of their being
coparceners, in all the properties of Maharaja Bhupinder
Singh. The appellants, along with their brothers, were in
occupation of a property known as “colonel Mistry’s House”,
Moti Bagh Palace, Patiala, in their own right as the sons of
Maharaja Bhupinder Singh. It was an ancestral property in
the hands of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh and they were residing
as members of the family in the said property. On March 10,
1958, Maharaja Yadavindra Singh sold Moti Bagh Palace to the
Government of Punjab, as property belonging to him, and
delivered actual possession of certain portion and agreed,
to deliver possession of the rest subsequently. The State
Government was not competent to evict them under the
provisions of the Act as’ they were not in unauthorized
occupation of any public premises and that the impugned
notice was issued without jurisdiction.
The counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 was
filed by Sri S. P. Jain, Deputy Secretary to the Government
of Punjab, and it stated that there was no proof that the
appellants were the sons of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, that
Bhupinder and his sons were not members of a Hindu Undivided
Family; that the Maharaja and his progeny being Jats, did
not constitute a Joint Hindu Family and that the appellants
never acquired any interest by birth in the property. The
counter-affidavit did not admit the allegation of the
appellants that they were in possession of the property as
coparceners.
The learned single judge came to the conclusion that since
the case raised complicated questions of law and fact, it
was not meet that they should be resolved in a petition
under Act. 226 and that, even if the appellants were in
possession before the date
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of the sale of the property to the Government, they were in
unauthorised occupation of public premises since the
appellants were not holding the property under any
allotment, lease or grant from the Government after the date
of the sale deed and dismissed the writ petition. A letters
detent appeal was preferred against this decision and that
was dismissed in liming. This appeal, by certificate, is
against the decision of the High Court in the letters patent
appeal.
The appeal as originally filed, challenged the correctness
of the order of the High Court, on the basis of the decision
of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. and
Another v. State of Punjab and Another(1). But the Punjab
Legislature amended the Act by passing the Punjab Public
Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Amendment
Act, 1969. By s. 102 of the Amendment Act, the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court, among other things, to entertain a suit
or proceeding for ,eviction of any person who is in
unauthorised occupation of any public premises, was taken
away. On their motion, the appellants were permitted by
this Court to amend the appeal petition and challenge the
validity of the relevant provisions of the Amendment Act,
and the appeal petition was amended accordingly.
Before us, the appellants raised two contentions : (1) that
they were in possession of the property in their capacity as
coparceners with Maharaja Yadavindra Singh, or at any rate,
they were residing in the property with a right of residence
in the property as junior members of the family and the
Government cannot, by resorting to the provisions of the
Act, summarily ,evict them from the property on the ground
that they were in, unauthorised occupation of public
premises within the meaning ,of s. 3 of the Act; (2) that s.
10E of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and
Rent Recovery) Amendment Act, 1969, which barred the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for
recovery of possession of public premises is constitutio-
nally bad.
The first question, therefore, is whether the appellants
were in unauthorised occupation of public premises. S. 2(d)
of the Act defines ‘public premises’ as under
.lm15
“public premises means any premises belonging to, or taken
on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State
Government. or requisitioned by the competent authority
under the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1953, and
(1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399.
169
includes any premises belonging to any district board,
municipal committee, notified area committee or pan-
chayat.”
S. 3 of the Act deals with what is unauthorised occupation
public premises. That section says :
“For purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in
unauthorised occupation of any public premises :-
“(a) where he has whether before or after the commencement
of this Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise than
under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or
” (b) where he, being an allottee, lease or grantee, has, by
reason of the determination or cancellation of his
allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in
that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether before or
after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy
or hold such public premises.
” (c) where any person authorised to occupy any public
premises has, whether before or after the corn.us Act;
(i) sublet in contravention of the terms of allotment,
lease or grant, without the permission of the State
Government or of any other authority competent to permit
such sub-letting the whole or any part of such public
premises;
(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms
express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy
such public premises.
Explanation : For purposes of clause (a), a person shall not
merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be
deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee
or grantee.”
S. 4(1) of the Act provides that, if Collector is of
opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of
any public premises situate within his jurisdiction and that
they should be evicted, the Collector shall issue, in the
manner provided in subsections (2), (3) and (4), a notice in
writing, calling upon all persons concerned to show cause
why an order of eviction should not be made.
A person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of
public premises for purposes of s. 3 (a) where he has,
before
170
or after the commencement of the Act, entered into
possession thereof, otherwise than under and in pursuance of
any allotment, lease or grant. The word ‘thereof’ makes it
clear that the person must have entered into possession of
public premises before or after the: commencement of the Act
in order that he may be deemed to be in unauthorised
occupation. If the appellants were in possession before the
date of the sale of the property to the Government, it could
not be said that the appellants entered into possession of
public premises, for, at the time when they were in
occupation of the property, the property was not public
premises. Then it was either the joint family property or
the property of the Maharaja, namely, Yadavindra Singh.
The property was not public premises before it was sold to
the Government. So if the appellants were in possession of
the property before it was sold to the Government, it could
not be said that they entered into possession of public
premises before or after the commencement of the Act and
clause (a) of s. 3 of the Act cannot obviously apply and the
appellants were not in unauthorised occupation of public
premises within the meaning of clause (a) of s. 3.
Therefore, the question is, whether the appellants were in
possession of the property before it was sold to the
Government.
It was alleged in paragraph 2 of the affidavit in support of
the writ petition that the appellants were in possession of
the property in their own right for a number of years as
sons of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh; paragraph 2 of the
counter-affidavit stated that the allegation is admitted to
the extent that the appellants “are, at present residing in
Colonel Mistry’s House, Moti Bagh, Patiala. Rest of the
para is not admitted”. There was no denial of the
allegation that the appellants, were in possession of the
property in their own right as sons of Maharaja Bhupinder
Singh. It is difficult to understand how a Deputy Secretary
to the Government of Punjab could have personal knowledge
about the actual possession of the property in question
before the sale deed was executed in favour of the
Government.
The appellants were admittedly in possession of the property
on the date of the issue of the-impugned notice. The
respondents lad no case that the appellants entered into
possession of the property after the date of the sale. We
are not very much concerned with the title under which the
appellants were in possession; what is really relevant for
this case is whether the appellants were in possession of
the property before the date of sale, to the Government. We
think that the case of the appellants that they were in
possession of the property before it was sold to the,
Government must be taken as true. The learned single judge
also appears to have proceeded on the same basis.
171
Clause (b) of s. 3 of the Act speaks of an allottee, lessee
or, grantee, who has, by determination or cancellation of
his allotment, lease or grant, in accordance with the terms
in that behalf, ceased, whether before or after the
commencement of the Act to be entitled to occupy or hold
such public premises. It is clear that for this clause to
apply, the person must be an allottee, lessee or grantee
from the Government. We do not think that this clause can
apply in this case as the appellants were not allottees,
lessees grantees of the Government.
Clause (c) of s. 3 of the Act can obviously have no
application to the case.
The appellants, were not, therefore, in unauthorised occupa-
tion of public premises within the meaning of s. 3 of the
Act. It is only if the appellants were in unauthorized
occupation of public premises that the Collector would get
jurisdiction to issue a notice under s. 4(1) of the Act.
We, therefore, hold that, the notice was issued without
jurisdiction and it has to be quashed and we do so.
In this view, we have no occasion to reach the question
whether the impugned provisions of the Amendment Act are
constitutionally valid and we do not express any opinion
upon that point. We set aside the order of the High Court
and allow the appeal with costs throughout.
S.B. Appeal allowed.
172