ORDER
N.G. Nandi, J.
1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, who are the senior personnels of Delhi Police, known as DA- NIPS, pray for the implementation of the order of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi dated 15.9.1998, issued consequent upon the decision taken by the Cabinet of N.C.T. of Delhi in its meeting dated 10.9.1998 revising the entry grade scales of DANIPS officials and introduction of the IVth Pay Scales i.e. Rs. 4500-5700 (Pre-revised).
2. It is not disputed that Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi had taken the decision to grant the relief, which was communicated to the petitioners subject to the formal approval of the same by the Government of India. It is also not disputed that the Govt of N.C.T. of Delhi wrote to the Central Government for approval and the matter is pending consideration with the Central Government.
3. A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India as regards the maintainability of the writ petition. This contention is two fold: (i) that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court will have no jurisdiction inasmuch as the petitioners should first approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi and not directly the High Court by way of petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as the issue raised falls within the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal; and (ii) that the petition is for personal gain of the 51 petitioners only and therefore, not a public interest litigation. The other contention advanced on behalf of the Union of India is that Lieutenant Governor of N.C.T. of Delhi has no power/authority with regard to the administration of Delhi Police as the powers are with the Union of India.
As against this, it is submitted by Ms. Pinki Anand, learned counsel for the petitioners that the petition is in the nature of public interest litigation and not for the gain of any single individual; that the Central Administrative Tribunal cannot go into the prayer in the public interest litigation and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is the only remedy available to the petitioners; that in the Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench the maintainability of the writ petition directly filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not contended and, therefore, the submission that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition and that the petitioners should have first approached the Central Administrative Tribunal should not be considered.
4. Decision in the case of L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India & Others has been relied upon by the Additional Solicitor General of India for the respondents. It has been observed in paragraph 93 that “the Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislation and Rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. The Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by over-looking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned”.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to paragraph 92 and relied on the observations – “We may first address the issue of exclusion of power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded……..”.
Thus, it will be seen that the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra) has clearly held that the tribunal, which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone the High Court concerned may be approached directly and in all other cases the Tribunal will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.
Thus, it will be seen that the Central Administrative Tribunal is the only court of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which it has been constituted and it would not be open for the petitioners to directly approach the High Court by way of present petition.
6. In my opinion following the ratio laid down in the case of L. Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra) the preliminary objection, as regards the maintainability of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, directly before this High Court, without first approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi, deserves to be up-held.
7. The second fold of argument as regards the non-maintainability of the petition, as pointed out above, is that the petition is not a public interest litigation inasmuch as the same is for the benefit of the 51 officers only, who are arrayed as the petitioners in this petition. Referring to the prayer in the petition, it is quite clear that the implementation of the Cabinet Decision dated 10.9.1998 of the Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi and the implementation of the order dated 15.9.1998, issued by the Chief Secretary, Govt. of the N.C.T. of Delhi have been prayed with the revised pay scales and all consequential benefits arising therefrom. Thus, the prayer is confined only to benefit the police officers in the Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi, who are arrayed as petitioners and, therefore, the petition cannot be regarded as a public interest litigation. The preliminary objection needs to be sustained on this count also.
8. Since I am of the view that this petition directly to the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable for the aforesaid reasons, I do not propose to enter into the other contentions, namely, the powers/authority of the Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi to pass the Cabinet Decision dated 10.9.1998 and the implementation of the order dated 15.9.1998, issued by the Chief Secretary of the Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi with regard to the revision of the entry grade scale in terms of the recommendations made by the Vth Pay Commission.
9. In the result, the petition is dismissed as not maintainable.