JUDGMENT
Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Rule.
The learned Advocate General urges that since on account of the interim order passed by this Court, the trial of the applicants has been stayed and submissions canvassed by Mr. Gupte, learned Counsel for the applicants, are purely legal, the Rule be made returnable forthwith. Mr. Gupte has no objection.
In the circumstances, rule issued earlier is made returnable forthwith. The learned Advocate General waives service for respondent.
2. Through this application preferred under section 482 Cr.P.C. the applicants seek to impugn the order dated 18-7-1995 passed by the learned Joint District and Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, in Exhibit 14 and 21, in Sessions Case No. 446 of 1994 and pray that this Court be pleased to direct that Sessions Case No. 446 of 1994 be transferred for trial to the appropriate Court.
3. A narration of the facts in brief, which give rise to the present application is necessary for the proper appreciation of the issues involved in this petition. On 3-11-1993, on the basis of an anonymous letter, a raid was carried out in the house of applicant No. 2 Rahim Shaikh Chand Pinjari situate in the town of Jalgaon of this State. During the course of the raid, some incriminating photographs were seized. On the basis of the raid, an offence at C.R. No. 183 of 1994 under section 120-B/292 read with section 34 I.P.C. was registered by the Zilla Peth Police Station of District Jalgaon against the eight applicants. On 17-9-1994, after completion of the investigation, a charge sheet under sections 120-B I.P.C. and 292 I.P.C. read with 34, I.P.C. was submitted in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalgaon, against the applicants. Similar raids were conducted at a large number of other places also and photographs of nude girls in compromising postures were seized. Some other incriminating material like films etc. were seized. A large number of cases were registered; some pertained to these sections and some were under section 376 I.P.C. All these cases came to be known by the class of cases known as Jalgaon Sex Scandal.
On 14-11-1994, the Government of Maharashtra by its Notification (Exhibit A to the petition) was pleased to direct “that the class of cases connected with or arising out of Jalgaon Sex Scandal which are committed for trial in the Sessions Division of Jalgaon shall be tried in the Sessions Division of Pune.” Vide Notification dated 25-11-1994 (Exhibit B to the petition) this Court was pleased to appoint Smt. M.R. Bhatkar, Joint District and Additional Sessions Judge, Pune for trial of the cases connected with or arising out of Jalgaon Sex Scandal. Vide letter dated 30-11-1994 (Exhibit C to the petition) the Registrar of this Court requested the Sessions Judge, Jalgaon to send record of such cases to the Sessions Judge, Pune.
4. On 1-12-1994, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalgaon by virtue of the powers vested in him under section 323 of Cr.P.C. was pleased to commit the case of the applicants, under section 292 I.P.C. read with section 120-B and 34 I.P.C. to the Court of Sessions.
It may be mentioned that although in the aforesaid order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has all along mentioned that he was committing the case to the Court of Sessions under section 323 of the Cr.P.C., in the operative part, presumably on account of a typographical error, it has been mentioned that the committal order has been made under section 209 of Cr.P.C. There was no question of the committal order being made under section 209 Cr.P.C. for that provision pertains to committal of a case to a Court of Sessions where the offences are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions. This is not the case here. Here, the offences were exclusively triable by a Magistrate.
5. The applicant Nos. 7 and 8 namely Afaroz Khan Usman Khan and Usman Khan Abdul Karim Khan respectively filed Criminal Application No. 1653 of 1994 in the Aurangabad Bench of this Court, challenging the committal order dated 1-12-1994. The burden of their song was that in as much as the offences for which they had been committed to the Court of Sessions were not triable by a Court of Sessions, the aforesaid committal order was bad-in-law. That submission, at that stage, did not find favour with my learned brother Dani, J., who vide order dated 20-1-1995 was pleased to reject the application of the applicants. He however, observed that the applicants may approach the Special Judge, under section 228 of the Cr.P.C. in case they felt that the offences against them were not exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions.
6. On 6-6-1995 and 4-7-1995, two applications Exhibit 14 and Exhibit 21 respectively were filed before Smt. M.R. Bhatkar, Joint District and Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, Special Judge, who after the receipt of record sent by the Sessions Judge, Jalgaon commenced trial in this case. A two-fold objection was raised in them on behalf of the applicants:-
(a) On facts, this case can neither be said to be connected with nor arising out of Jalgaon sex scandal; and
(b) The offences for which the applicants were being tried were triable by the Court of Magistrate and not exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and hence the case should be sent back to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, either at Jalgaon or at Pune.
Vide order dated 18-7-1995, Smt. Bhatkar the learned Additional Sessions Judge, was pleased to reject both the contentions canvassed on behalf of the applicants.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 18-7-1995, the applicants have come up before me; invoking my jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C.
8. I have heard Mr. Shirish Gupte, learned Counsel for the applicants and Mr. C.J. Savant, the learned Advocate General of Maharashtra at a considerable length.
Mr. Gupte has canvassed a two-fold submission before me. His first submission is that the Notification issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under section 185 Cr.P.C. transferring any cases or class of cases committed for trial in a district for trial in any Sessions Division can only be issued in respect of cases or class of cases which have already been committed to the Court of Sessions prior to the date of its issue and in as much as in the present case, the Notification was issued on 14-11-1994 and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 1-12-1994, the trial of the applicants in the Sessions Division of Pune would not be legally permissible by virtue of it and hence, would be without jurisdiction and a nullity in law.
The second contention raised by Mr. Gupte is that the case of the applicants could not have been committed for trial to the Court of Sessions because, the offences in question (292-I.P.C. read with 120-B IPC and 34-IPC) were triable by a Magistrate and hence, on this score too, the Additional Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to try the case and in case she proceeds with the trial, the same would be a nullity in law.
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions canvassed by Mr. Gupte. In my view, there is no merit in them and they appear to be pregnant with substance only on the first blush.
10. I propose taking up the first submission canvassed by Mr. Gupte, first: Section 185 of Cr.P.C. reads thus:-
Power to order cases to be tried in different sessions divisions:-
Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this chapter, the State Government may direct that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any sessions division.
Provided that such direction is not repugnant to any direction previously issued by the High Court or the Supreme Court under the constitution or under this code or any other law for the time being in force.
As mentioned earlier, in exercise of the powers vested in it by section 185 Cr.P.C. the State Government was pleased to issue the Notification dated 14-11-1994, annexed as Exhibit ‘A’ to the petition. The aforesaid Notification reads thus:-
“NOTIFICATION”
Law and Judiciary Department, Mantralaya, Bombay, 400032. Dated the 14th Nov. 1994.
No. SPJ 2094/1153/(152)-VII in exercise of the powers conferred under section 185 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Government of Maharashtra hereby directs that the class of cases connected with or arising out of Jalgaon Sex Scandal which are committed for trial in the Sessions Division of Jalgaon shall be tried in the Sessions Division of Pune.
By order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra.
Sd/-
(Ashokraj Mohad).
Deputy Secretary to Government.”
11. The crucial question requiring adjudication is as to what does the expression “any cases or class of cases committed for trial” used in section 185 Cr.P.C. mean? Does it only refer to any cases or class of cases committed for trial prior to the date of the notification, as contended by Mr. Gupte, or it also includes any cases or class of cases which are committed for trial after the notification has been issued.
Judicial precedent is silent on the scope of the expression “any cases or class of cases committed for trial” as used in section 185 Cr.P.C. Hence, it has to be construed bearing in mind, the time-honoured principles of interpretation of statutes.
12. The Apex Court in paragraph 7 of its decision, Polester and Co. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, New Delhi, has very comprehensively summed up the principles which courts should keep in mind while interpreting statutes.
It would be appropriate to quote the observations made in the aforesaid paragraph which read thus:—
Paragraph 7 :
“Now, if there is one principle of interpretation more well settled than any other, it is that a statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to the plain natural meaning of its language & that no word should be added altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. This rule of literal construction is firmly established and it has received judicial recognition in numerous cases. Crawford in his book on “Construction of Statutes” (1940 ed) at page 269, explains the rule in the following terms:
“Where the statute’s meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolate. In the first place, in such a case they are not needed. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the stature.”
Lord Parker applied the role in R. v. Oakes, (1959)2, All E.R. 92, to construe “and” as “or” in section 7 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and stated:
“It seems to this Court that where the literal reading of a statute, and a penal statute, produces an intelligible result, clearly there is no ground for reading in words or changing words according to what may be the supposed intention of Parliament. But, here we venture to think that the result is unintelligible.”
Lord Reid also with great clarity and presion which always characterise his judgments enunciated the role as follows in Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, (1974)2, All.E.R.97:
“Cases where it has properly been held that a word can be struck out of a deed or statute and another substituted can as far as I am aware be grouped under three heads where without such substitution the provision is unintelligible or absurd or totally unreasonable; where it is unworkable; and where it is totally irreconilable with the plain intention shown by the rest of the deed or statute”.
This rule in regard to reading words into a statute was also affirmed by this Court in several decisions of which we may refer only to one, namely Narayanaswami v. Punnerselyam, , where the Court pointed out that:
“……addition to, or modification of words used in statutory provision is generally not permissible…..” but “courts may depart from this rule to avoid a patent absurdity.”
13. It is keeping in mind the principles pertaining to interpretation of statutes mentioned in the preceding paragraph that the expression” any cases or class of cases committed for trial” as used in section 185 Cr.P.C. has to be interpreted.
In my view, the expression “committed for trial” includes any cases or class of case, which have been committed to the Court of Sessions prior to the date of notification and also which are to be committed to the Court of Sessions subsequently. It would be unreasonable to restrict the meaning of the expression “committed for trial” to the cases which have been committed to the Court of Sessions prior to the date of notification. There is nothing in the language of section 185 Cr.P.C. to warrant such an inference. Had the legislative intent been only to include cases which had been already committed to the Court of Sessions prior to the date of the notification, then the language of section 185 Cr.P.C. in place of “any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district” would instead have been any cases or class or cases which have already been committed for trial in any district.
It would be presumptuous to suggest that the Legislature was oblivious of the distinction between the expression any case or class of cases committed for trial in any district and any case or class of cases which have already been committed for trial in any district.
Mr. Gupte submitted that had the Legislature also intended to cover the cases which were likely to be committed for trial in section 185 Cr.P.C. then section 185 Cr.P.C. would have been more comprehensively worded and in place of its present form, would instead have included the expression: cases or class of cases which have been committed for trial or are likely to be committed for trial. I regret that I cannot accede to Mr. Gupte’s contention. If the Legislature despite being frugal in the use of words used in the section has explicitly conveyed its intention the learned Counsel for the applicants can have no grouse on that score.
For the aforesaid reasons, the first contention of Mr. Gupta fails.
14. This leaves us with the second contention of Mr. Gupte namely that the case of the applicants could not have been committed for trial to the Court of Sessions because, the offences in question were under sections 292 I.P.C. r/w 120-B and 34 I.P.C. which are triable by any Magistrate and hence on this score too, the Additional Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to try the case and in case she proceeds with the trial, the same would be a nullity in law. I regret that I cannot accede to this submission also.
15. Section 323 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:
Section 323:
“Procedure when, after commencement of inquiry or trial, Magistrate finds case should be committed-If, in any inquiry into an offence or a trial before a Magistrate, it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings before signing judgment that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Sessions, he shall commit it to that Court under the provisions hereinbefore contained (and thereupon the provisions of Chapter XVIII shall apply to the commitment so made)
A perusal of the aforesaid section 323 of Cr.P.C. would show that a Magistrate during the course of any inquiry or trial at any point of time before signing of the judgment is of the opinion that the case in question ought to be tried by a Court of Session, he can commit the same to the Court of Sessions. In the instant case, it was before the commencement of trial that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalgaon by virtue of the powers vested in him under this section committed the case of the applicants for trial to the Court of Sessions. (As mentioned in paragraph 4, on account of a typographical error in the committal order, it has been mentioned that the case is committed to the Court of Sessions under section 209 Cr.P.C.). The cases connected with or arising out of Jalgaon Sex Scandal were transferred for trial to the Sessions Division, Pune by virtue of the notification of the State Government dated 14-11-1994 issued under section 185 Cr.P.C. This was one such case. By virtue of notification of this Court dated 25-11-1994, Smt. M.R. Bhatkar, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court and Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay was appointed as Joint District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Pune “for the trial of cases connected with or arising out of Jalgaon Sex Scandal” under which class this case falls. The trial of this case is pending before her. Hence, she has jurisdiction to try the case.
Hence, I reject this submission of Mr. Gupte also.
16. For the aforesaid reason, I find this petition to be devoid of substance and the same is accordingly rejected. Interim order dated 14-8-1995 is vacated.
Rule is discharged.