ORDER
M.A.A. Khan, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking the termination of the criminal proceedings before the Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate (S.P.E. Cases) Jaipur Distt. Jaipur against the petitioner (and a few others) in Cri. Case No. 1 of 1987.
2. The relevant facts are these-
During the years 1981-82 the petitioner was working as Additional Manager (Quality Assessment) with Instrumentation Ltd. Kota, which is a Govt. of India Undertaking. On the basis of source information RC/1 -84-CBIDSPE CIU (P) the officer in charge of SPE/CBI Police Station, Jaipur Rajasthan registered on March 28, 1984 a case against the petitioner and some other officers of the said undertaking and some persons of certain firms/concerns. On investigation the petitioner and other co-accused were found to have entered into a criminal conspiracy to take the properties of the said undertaking by forging fal se documents. A police report for commission of offences under Sub-Section 120B, 417, 420, 468 and 471, IPC was accordingly submitted on 2-1 -87 in the Court of the learned Magistrate against the petitioner and three others. On 11-8-92 the petitioner moved an application before the learned Magistrate claiming discharge under Section 239, Cr.P.C. on the grounds of incompetency of the CBI to investigate the offences against him and want of sanction before the learned Magistrate for taking cognizance of offences against him. By his impugned order dated 12-8-93 the learned Magistrate held that the officer in charge of SPE Police Station, Jaipur Rajasthan was competent to investigate the offences in the case and that since the petitioner was not a Public Servant obtaining a sanction under Section 197, Cr.P.C. from the appropriate authority was not required for his prosecution. The aggrieved petitioner is now before this Court through the present petition.
3. Mr. R.S. Rathore, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the same objections before this Court as were raised before the learned Magistrate. I, however, find not the least merit’in either of the two objections.
4. In so far as the objection relating to the incompetency of the CBI to investigate the offences, alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and other alleged co-conspirators, is concerned suffice it should be to say that such objection is no more relevant as that objection hardly has any bearing now when the learned Magistrate had already taken cognizance of those offences more thari’a decade ago. Much before the learned Magistrate had proceeded as per provisions contained in Chapter XIX of the Code ot” Criminal Procedure 1973 (Cr.P.C.) and after having complied with the mandate contained in Section 238 he gave more than necessary opportunities to both the sides of being heard and had in fact heard them orally as well as through written arguments. Such an objection raised at a belated stage of the proceedings, required no more attention than to remind one that the function of the Courts begins when the function of the police ends King Emperor v. Khawaja Nazi Ahmed, AIR 1945 PC 18 : 46 Cri LJ 413 and that the concept of “Locus Standi’ was foreign to criminal jurisprudence and the police reportmade by a Police Officer, entrusted with the duty to investigate the offences complained of, could have laid the foundation for initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner and others, as the relevant statutes creating those offences carved out no exception and exclusion of jurisdiction of the Magistrate against entertaining the report and initiation of the proceedings against the alleged offenders. (See State of Tamil Nadu v. Krishna Swami Naidu, 1979 CriU 1069 : AIR 1979 SC 1255 and A R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718 : 1984 Cri LJ 647. Above all the specific provisions contained in Sections 2(2), 3 and 5(2) of the Delhi Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act of 1946) sufficiently armed the officer in charge of the SPE Police Station, Jaipur, Rajasthan to investigate the offences which had duly been notified u/S. 3 of Act of 1946 by the Central Govt. and the powers and jurisdiction of such police officer to investigate those offences in the territories of the State of Rajasthan had been extended to such territories by issuing the necessary notifications in exercise of powers conferred by the provisions contained in Section 5(2) of the said Act upon the Central Govt. (Refer to Not. No. 25-7-60 AVP dt. 12-1-61, Not. No. 25-3-60 dated 1-4-64, Order No. 25-9-64 Dt. 6-8-66 Order No. 28-3-66 AVD Dated II 10-7-70 etc.) Such being the position of the investigation conducted in this case there was absolutely no point in raising the frivolous objection in that regard. It may be observed that even evidence collected during investigation in violation of statutory provisions does not become inadmissible and the trial on the basis thereof does not get vitiated See State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh 1996 (1) SCC 288. In the instant case grave offences of criminal conspiracy, cheating and preparation of false documents which affected the interest of the Central Govt and the public in the funds and properties of the Undertaking, were suspected to have been committed by none else but those who were entrusted to deal with them honestly and not dishonestly. The officers of the SPE, who were entrusted the duty of prevention and detection of crime in the defined area covering the State of Rajasthan could have investigated the offences and submitted a report to the Magistrate. The power and jurisdiction of such officers to investigate the offences was not excepted or excluded by any provision in the Statute creating those offences. As observed by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay’s case an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law (see Section 2(n), Cr.P.C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender, therefore prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendatta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into straight-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception.’ In this view of the matter the objection raised by the petitionei;at that belated stage of the-proceedings was wholly baseless and frivolous. This objection has very rightly been rejected by the learned Magistrate’ In this behalf no more discussion is required to be made.
5. The next limb of Mr. Rathore’s argument that since the petitioner was a ‘public servant’, hence he could not be prosecuted due to the bar of Section 197, Cr.P.C. is also without any merits. Mr. Rathore’s view point is that since the Instrumentation Ltd. Kota was a wholly owned undertaking of the Central Govt. it assumes the character and status of’State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, hence a person employed by such undertaking cannot be prosecuted without the sanction of the Central Govt.
6. Article 12 of the Constitution defines “State” in the following words :-
In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “The State” includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all legal and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
7. It need not be stressed that the definition of “State”, as given in Article 12 of the Constitution is only for the purpose of the provisions contained in part III of the Constitution. It is true that the definition given is inclusive and the scope of “State” now extends to the concept of “functional state” from its original united trinity of “People plus place plus power. By habit the “State” has expended its internal and external services. The expression ‘other authorities” used in the language of Article no doubt refers to instrumentalities of the Government and Government Department but every instrumentality of the government is not necessarily a Government Department even though such instrumentality may be engaged in carrying on some activities in the nature of trade, commerce or industry. In determining whether a Corporation or a Government Company is or is not the instrumentality of “State” it needs to be known whether the entire share capital is held by the Government and it enjoys monopoly status conferred by the State, whether it enjoys any statutory powers and its functions are governmental functions or functions closely related thereto or any department of the Govt. has been transferred to it. The mere ownership of the State of an industrial undertaking would not by itself confer the status of ‘instrumentality’ or ‘agency’ of the Government on such undertaking, in the absence of statutory provisions, a commercial corporation acting on its own in terms of its Articles of Association will not be an agent of the Government even though it is wholly or partially controlled by the Government or its Department.
8. Instrumentation Ltd. Kota was incorporated as a Company under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and was noi created by any statute. In S. B: Civil Writ Petition No. 2304/1983 it was no doubt stated by the Respondent that Instrumentation Kota was a Govt. Company as defined in Sec. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 but such an admission on the part of the Respondent in the written statement filed on their beh’alf does not confer upon it the character and status of instrumentality or ‘agency’ of the Government. In the written statement it had further been stated that it was not agency or department of the Government and had a separate identity of its own and though the capital of the Company hadbeencontributedbytheCenirulGuvi.andthc executive control with regard to the appointment of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director etc. was also vested in the Central Govt. ycl that did not make the Company as an industry carrying its business activities under the authority of the Central Govt. Since it had been incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 its powers and functions are provided for and regulated by its Memorandum and Articles of Association. By Article 76(4) the Board of Director was given the power of appointment, removal or suspension of the General Managers, Managers, Secretaries, Officers, Clerks and other servants. Simply because the Instrumentation Employee’s Discipline and Appeal Rules framed by the Company were pari materia with the CCS Rules, 1965 framed by the Central Government by virtue of Article 309 of the Constitution for its employees it cannot be concluded that the employees appointed by the Board of Directors of the Company became Government or Public Servants so as to attract the provisions contained in Sec. 197, Cr. P. C. for the applicability of the provisions contained in Sec. 197, Cr. P. C. it is, apart from other ingredients, essential requirement of law that the person concerned is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government concerned. In the instant case not only the appointing authority of the petitioner buf also the authority competent to remove him from his office or position was the Board of Directors and such Board had terminated his services by delivery of a notice to him as contemplated in Clause 6 of his appointment letter issued under the aforementioned Disciplinary Rules of the Company, the provisions of Sec. 197, Cr. P. C, therefore did not stand attracted in his case and the learned Magistrate has rightly held so in the impugned order. There is thus no merits in this objection either.
9. In the result I find no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
10. On a scrutiny of the order-sheets maintained for the proceedings of this case I feel satisfied that the petitioner and/or the co-accused have adopted delaying tactics and the case has, therefore, not proceeded towards termination despite its institution as back as in the year 1987. Charges have not so far been framed. As and when the trial Court tried to make progress in the case its efforts in that direction were thwarted and marred either by absence of the accused, one or the other, or by seeking adjournment for arguing misc. application moved by one or the other accused or even by approaching this Court for unmerited reliefs. The delay caused in the trial is thus attributable to the accused. They shall get no benefit of such delay. At the same time, it is stressed that trial Court should take note of the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in (1996) 5 SCC 530 : 1996 Cri LJ 3983 to the effect that no litigant has a right to unlimited draught on Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a I icense to fi le misconceived or frivolous petitions. Taking note of the above observations from the Apex Court and keeping in mind the anxiety and dismay expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (1979) 1 SCC 380 : AIR 1979 SC 478 and (1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 Cri LJ 2935 and applying the principle laid down in the case of Tamilnadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Nadiar, (1997) 1 JT SC 486 : AIR 1997 SC 1005 to the present vexatious and frivolous petition, designedly moved to further delay the proceedings of an already delayed criminal case, I would like to dismiss the present petition with exemplary costs.
11. This petition is dismissed with costs at Rs. 5000/- (Five thousand). The amount shall be paid to the High Court Legal Aid Service Committee within three months from today and if not paid within that period the same shall be recovered treating this direction as decree of this Court by the High Court Legal Service Committees. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the High Court Legal Service Committee.