JUDGMENT
I.D. Dua, C.J.
(1) This second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act) is directed against the order dated 15/5/1968 of the Rent Control Tribunal reversing on appeal the order of the Rent Controller dated 4/1/1968 and passing an order of eviction against the appellant in this Court. The tenant was directed to deliver possession of the premises in question to the landlady on or before 15/8/1968.
(2) The landlady, by means of her application dated 21/11/1966 presented on 23/11/1966, sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that the premises were required by her bona fide for the purpose of re-building and making thereto substantial additions and alterations and that such re-building and additions and alterations could nto be carried out without the premises being vacated. It was added that the proposed re-building, alterations and additions would nto radically alter the purpose for which the premises had been let and the plans and estimates of such reconstruction had been properly prepared. The necessary funds for the purpose were, according to the averments, available with the landlady. The ntoice given by the landlady to the tenant was alleged to have been refused. The petition also averred that the tenant had nto paid rent since 1/6/1966. It was admitted in the application that the premises had been purchased by the landlady on 6/8/1966 from Shri Lachhman Dass and the tenant was in possession under the previous landlord/owner of the premises.
(3) The application was resisted by the tenant on various grounds.Amongst the preliminary objections, it was averred that the house having been purchased by the landlady on 6/8/1966 and five years having nto elapsed, no demand for eviction was competent. According to the second objection, the proceedings were premature because no ntoice had been served on the tenant. The plea of refusal of ntoice was described to be a trick, suggesting that there was collusion between the postman and the landlady. The plea of making additions and alterations was also described to be a mere cloak to have the tenant ejected from the house, it being added that such additions and alterations did nto require eviction. On the merits, apart from toher denials relating to the averment of there being sanitary fittings fixed in the premises, it was averred that the tenant had paid rent up to April, 1966 to the previous landlord and it was added that the tenant had spent Rs. 416.70 Paise with the consent of the previous landlord out of which a sum of Rs. 21.00 was adjusted towards the rent for the month of May, 1966. The tenant claimed reimbursement to the tune of Rs. 395.70 Paise which he claimed to be adjustable towards future rent. The landlady, according to the written statement, was nto entitled to claim any rent prior to 6/8/1966, which was the date of her purchase.
(4) In the reply by the landlady, it was pointed out that the preliminary objections were misconceived because the possession of the house was nto being claimed under section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act and that the ntoice had actually been refused by the tenant. An application under section 15(2) of the Act was also presented to the Rent Controller on 30/1/1967 in which the landlady prayed that the tenant be ordered to pay the rent in arrears because rent from 1/6/1966 to 31/12/1966 amounting to Rs. 147.00 at the rate of Rs. 21.00 per month had fallen due. In the tenant’s reply dated 9/2/1967 to this application, filed on 14/2/1967, it was averred that the landlady had purchased the house only on 6/8/1966 and was entitled to rent from that date at the rate of Rs. 20.00 per month only, though knowledge of the sale was denied. The tenant repeated his claim to the sum of Rs. 416.70 Paise which he alleged to have spent on repairs, additions and alterations to the house in which he claimed to have been “living since the year 1957, considering himself as the owner of the house in question”. It was added in this reply that he had also paid a sum of Rs. 2,230.00 to the previous landlord of which no receipt had been given to him and the sum was paid pursuant to a promise to sell the house to the tenant. Without payment of Rs. 416.70 Paise to the tenant, no rent could be recovered from him. Adjustment of Rs. 416.70 was claimed, though in regard to Rs. 2,230.00 said to have been paid to the previous owner, the tenant reserved his right to take legal action against him in a Court of law. On this application of the landlady, the Rent Controller directed the tenant on 14/2/1967 to deposit the rent at the rate of Rs. 20.00 per month with effect from 6/8/1966 up to the date of the deposit within one month from the said order.
(5) The Rent Controller on 4/1/1968 dismissed the application for ejectment on the ground that the landlady was nto prepared to restore possession of the premises in question to the tenant after reconstruction. It was added that since she had nto sought eviction on the ground personal bona fide requirement as an additional ground, which ground was also nto permissible in view of section 14(6) of the Act, she could nto succeed in the eviction proceedings. Ejectment on the ground of bona fide need for reconstruction was, on this ground, described to be a device to eject the tenant.
(6) On appeal, the learned Rent Control Tribunal held the landlady’s case to be fully made out on the evidence on the record. The statement made by the landlady was considered to be trustworthy and was fully believed.
(7) According to the learned Tribunal, the premises in dispute were a Government built one-roomed accommodation having asbestos sheet roof, with a verandah in front thereof and it was thus nto possible to re-construct the same without these being vacated. The testimony of Ganga Ram R. W. 2 and Ram Chand R.W. 3 that the petition was mala fide was described to be meaningless. The statement made by her that she did nto desire to re-let the premises to the tenant, but wanted to keep it for her own occupation, did nto take her case out of the provisions of section 14(1) proviso of the Act, and, according to the learned Tribunal, the Rent Controller was wrong in holding her requirement nto to be bona fide merely because she was desirous of nto letting the same out to the tenant after re-construction. On this view, the appeal was allowed.
(8) On second appeal in this Court Shri Sital A. K. Dar, the learned counsel for the appellant, has addressed very lengthy and elaborate arguments urging that section 20 of the Act is mandatory and that the claim of the landlady is nto bona fide because she frankly admits that she does nto want to re-let the house to the tenant after re-construction. He has sought assistance from the following two decisions of the Punjab High Court by R. P. Khosia, J.- BUADass v. Pare Lal Dewan Chand, and Labhu Ram v. Ram Parkash. (9) Shri Balmukand, learned counsel for the respondent has on the contrary emphasised that the case is concluded by a question of fact and nto only is there no substantial question of law involved in this appeal, there is no error either of fact or of law even made out by the appellant's counsel. According to Shri Balmukund, the case is fully covered by section 14(1) proviso and S. 14(8) of the Act. A passing reference has been made by the counsel to a decision of the Punjab High Court by Khanna J. in Tirlok Chand v. Ram Kishan Dass, 1963 P.L.R. 1019. SECTION 14, so far. as relevant, for our present purposes, may here be reproduced :- "14.Prtoection of Tenant against eviction.-(1) Ntowithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any toher law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant:
PROVIDED that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- (E)that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no toher reasonable suitable residential accommodation; that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or addition or alteration cannto be carried out without the premises being vacated; (8) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (g) of the proviso to sub-section (1), unless the Controller is satisfied that the proposed reconstruction will nto radically alter the purpose for which the premises were let or that such radical alteration is in the public interest, and that the plans and estimates of such reconstruction have been properly prepared and that necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landlord.”
SECTION 20 on which Mr. Dar has placed principal reliance may also be reproduced:-
20.Recovery of Possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry.-(1) In making any order on the grounds specified in clause (f) or clause (g) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 the Controller shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the premises or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repair or building or re-building, as the case may be.
(2)If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs of building or re-building place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof.
(3)If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work or repair or building or re-building within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work fails to place the tenant in occupation of the premises in accordance with sub-section (2), the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof or to pay the tenant such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”
(10) This section, as is clear on its plain reading, requires the Controller when he decided to make an order of eviction under clause (g) of the proviso to section 14(1), to ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the premises 01 part thereof from which he is to be evicted. If the tenant so elects, then the fact of the election has to be recorded in the order and a date to be specified therein on or before which the tenant must deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of building or re-building, as the case may be. This section has ntohing to do with the desire of the landlord or the landlady in regard to re-letting the premises to the ejected tenant, after building or re-building, and it does nto prescribe assent of the landlord to so re-let the premises as a condition precedent for an order of eviction under section 14(1) proviso (g). The Court is nto bound by and is indeed unconcerned with any such desire. It has to confine itself merely to the election by the tenant to be put back in possession of the premises, from which he is to be evicted under orders of the Controller for the purposes of building or re-building or additions or alterations as mentioned in clause (g) aforesaid. From the record, to which my attention has been drawn by the counsel at the bar, it appears that the landlady deposing as A.W. 4 was questioned in the fag-end of her crossexamination about her desire to give the house back to the tenant, to which she replied that she would nto give it to the tenant but occupy it herself. It was after the landlady’s evidence was closed that the tenant appeared as R.W. 3. According to his written statement, he is a peon in the Ministry of Home Affairs. He admitted that the premises in question consisted only of one living room and one verandah which is being used as kitchen as well. He did nto want to vacate the premises because elsewhere, he would have to pay Rs. 70.00 to Rs. 80.00 for similar accommoda tion which he could nto afford, his salary, inclusive of all allowances, being Rs. 150.00 per month only. His cross-examination may now be reproduced in extensO:- “Iam nto prepared to vacate the premises if the petitioner be ready to reconstruct the house and re-let it to me. I say so that the petitioner does nto intend to reconstruct the house but only has devised to throw me out through this petition because the husband of the petitioner had given me threats to remove from the premises with the aid of toher people.”
(11) It is obvious that the tenant did nto elect to vacate the premises so as to enable the landlady to commence the work of building or re-building and to be put back in occupation of the premises after completion of the said work. On this premise, it seems to be extremely difficult to attract the operation of section 20. It may be pointed out that section 14(1) proviso (g) and section 20 of the Act read together, are designed to strike a proper, just and equitable balance between the right of the owner of the property and the right of the tenant under the lease as safeguarded by the Act. The tenant can by no means be considered to become a co-owner along with the landlord so as to stand in his way when the premises are found to be required by him bona fide for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto substantial additions or alterations. Once the Tribunal comes to a conclusion in favor of the landlord under clause (g) aforesaid, then the eviction order cannto be declined merely because the landlord does nto desire to agree to put the tenant back into occupation after completing the work for which eviction order is sought. It is for the Controller or the Tribunal to see that the tenant, who elects to be placed in occupation of the premises from which he is evicted, is put back into occupation thereof in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act. This legal right is to be enforced by the rent control authorities and the desire of the landlord is immaterial. His desire can under the law neither govern the power of the rent control authorities nor has it, as such, anything to do with the question of the bona fides of the landlord’s requirements to get the premises vacated for the purpose of building etc. as contemplated by section 14(1) proviso (g). Such requirement is wholly independent of and unconnected with the landlord’s desire as to what he would like to do with the premises after re-building etc., because it is the law and nto the landlord’s desire which governs the situation. In the case in hand, it appears that the tenant is dominated by the feeling that if he makes a suitable alternative arrangement elsewhere for his residence on his eviction, then perhaps it would nto be worth his while to come back and re-occupy the present premises and apparently it is in the light of this approach that he expressed his disinclination to elect to vacate the premises now and to come back to occupy the same after they are re-built. This impression seems to find support from the fact that even in this Court it is nto contended by the appellant’s learned counsel that he elects to be placed in occupation of the premises from which he is to be evicted as provided by section 20 and indeed that is nto the case taken in the memorandum of second appeal here. The challenge in the grounds of appeal essentially centres round the submission that no case of bona fide requirement under section 14(1) proviso (g) is made out and that the eviction is in reality sought on the ground contained in section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act. This submission is obviously difficult to sustain. The law, it. may be remembered, has kept in view and safeguarded the right of the owner also to build or re-build his property. That right has nto been completely left at the mercy of the tenant. Now though this Court has great sympathy with the appellant tenant, who, in common with a very large number of similarly placed persons, is faced with a serious problem of securing suitable accommodation within his limited means, nevertheless, under the law, I do nto find it possible for this reason alone to deny to the owner the right to build or re-build the premises when a case under section 14(1) proviso (g) is made out to the satisfaction of the rent control authorities. The conclusion of the Tribunal in the present case is one of fact and appeal against the impugned order is competent only if it involves a substantial question of law which is nto made out on behalf of the appellant. The Act does nto completely divest the owners of their right to deal with, maintain and improve their property subject to the limitations imposed by the Act. It is, therefore, difficult for this Court to place on their rights a greater restriction or limitation than is intended by the clear language of the relevant statutory provisions. The fact that the problem of finding suitable accommodation for the inhabitants of Delhi within their means is acute, affects btoh the tenants and those owners of the property who having purchased the same, cannto get possession thereof for their own residence and have to look for rented premises for their personal use and occupation. In the present case, it appears that btoh the landlady and the tenant have justifiable grounds for pleading for sympathy from this Court, but sympathy for the appellant cannto destroy or displace the legal right of the respondent which is stronger than that of the appellant and in face of the conclusion of the learned Rent Control Tribunal, it is nto possible for this Court under the law to interfere with the impugned order. I accordingly dismiss the appeal but give to the tenant three months time from to-day for vacating the premises. The tenant is nto to be evicted before the expiry of three months; there is no bar to the execution proceedings being initiated earlier in accordance with law. The tenant being a government servant may well look to the government to provide him with government accommodation, which would presumably be cheaper than what one who is nto a government employee may have to pay in the open market. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Court.
(12) Before concluding, I should like to point out that in a welfare set-up like ours, it is legitimate for the persons in need to look up to those in power to see that construction of buildings is encouraged btoh in public and private sectors and the hardship on those, who do nto own their houses to live in, is reduced to the minimum within the shortest possible time. Government employees have greater justification to expect from the State infer alia a roof over their heads. Undue influence and neglect towards this requirement of the government employees in particular and of the citizens of Delhi in general, may tend to lead to feelings of dissatisfaction with the welfare character of our set-up. Broadly speaking, serious though its repercussions, this may be described to be amatter of policy with which this Court may nto be considered to be directly concerned. It is, however, necessary to point out that the existing acute shortage of accommodation in the fast developing town of Delhi, the populaion of which is rapidly expanding, is a source of increasingly unpleasant relations between the landlords and their tenants and nto infrequently the tension between them gives rise nto only to avoidable civil and criminal litigations but also to violent clashes disturbing the peace and tranquility of the society. At times, even respectable and educated parties are found to be involved in such un happy clashes. Feeling concerned with this state of affairs, as this Court rightly is, it is considered proper to draw the attention of the authorities to this problem which is becoming graver and graver as Delhi expands and cost of living goes up. Providing suitable residential accommodation to government servants within reasonable time, for one thing, would nto only increase their efficiency but would also contribute to their contentment and thereby strengthen their sense of integrity. Such a result is a consumation devoutedly to be wished. The sooner the importance of finding an expeditious solution of this problem is realised, the better it would be to all concerned.