JUDGMENT
Mullick, J.
1. The property of the judgment debtors having been sold in execution, they Sled an application to set aside the sale and the 12th April 1919 was fixed for hearing. On that day the judgment-debtors, some of whom were minors and were represented by their guardian ad litem, informed the Court by petition that the decree-holder had agreed to the sale being set aside upon the payment of Rs. 37,283 by the 27th May. The Court thereupon passed the following order:
The cases are, therefore, adjourned to 27th May 1919 for disposal as agreed to by the parties.
2. On the 27th May the judgment-debtors were not ready with the full a meant; they asked to be permitted to deposit Rs. 15,000 and informed the Court that the decree-holder had agreed to grant two months further time. The Court directed a copy of the application to be served upon the decree-holder and adjourned the case till the 7 th June. On the 30th May the judgment-debtors filed a further petition, This time they alleged that on the 3rd May the decree-holder had agreed to take Rs. 15,000 by the 27th May and Rs. 15,400 within two months thereafter. The Court fixed the hearing of this petition for adjustment for the 7th June also.
3. On the 7th June the adult judgment, debtors through their Pleader took a new point. They objected that the compromise of the 12th April was not binding, as the guardian ad litem of the minors had not obtained the express sanation of the Court required by Order XXXII, Rule 7, Civil Procure Code.
4. The Subordinate Judge has given effect to this objection and though he has found that the compromise was not modified by any subsequent adjustment either on the 3rd May or any other date, he has remitted the parties to the position which they occupied before the compromise.
5. The decree holder urges that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the order certifying the adjustment and that even if he had jurisdiction, he has acted with material irregularity in much as Order XXXII, Rule 7, does not apply to execution proceedings.
6. I think it is clear that the order of the 12th April is an order certifying an adjustment, which the Court had full jurisdiction to make. Even if it is assumed that, Order XXXII applies to execution proceedings, the Court’s omission to record its sanation to the adjustment, so far as it affected the minors, was an error of law which did not affect its jurisdiction.
7. The only remedy of the minors was to apply for a review. They could not, by reason of the provisions of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, bring a separate suit, nor would the principle of Laduram Nathmull v. Nandalal Karuri 55 Ind. Cas. 747 : 31 C.L.J. 150 : 47 C. 555 be applicable for the purpose of giving them a right to apply by motion, as the order sought to be set aside was not an interlocutory order.
8. There being no application for review, the Subordinate Judge bad no jurisdiction to vacate his order, unless his inherent powers justified his doing so.
9. It is contended that as he transgressed an express provision of the law, justice, equity and good conscience required that be should correct his error.
10. Now Virupakshappa v. Shidappa 26 B. 109 : 3 Bora. L.R. 565 and Arunachelam Chetty v. Ramanadhan Chetty 29 M. 309 are authorities for the view that Order XXXII, Rule 7, applies to execution proceedings, but in the view that we take it is not necessary to decide how far we are bound by Bhutaneswar Prasad Singh v. Tilakdhari Lal 49 Ind. Cas. 617 : 4 P.L.J. 135 : (1919) Pat. 75.
11. Whether Order XXXII, Rule 7, is directly’ applicable or not, its principle must apply that the question in either event is whether in this case the Court’s omission to give effect to it can he cured by a resort to its inherent jurisdiction. I think I should have answered the question in the affirmative if I had been satisfied that the minors had really been prejudiced, and following Subbaji Rau v. Srinivasa Rau 2 M. 234 : 4 Ind. Jur. 505 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 455, should have held that the Court was right in declining to confirm the sale.
12. But the merits are altogether against the opposite party. The minors were represented by a Pleader, and presumably he is satisfied that it is not to the interest of his clients to set aside the compromise. He perhaps took a risk in not obtaining the Court’s sanation and rendered himself liable to a suit by the minors, but upon the evidence at present before us, I think, we must hold that the compromise was one to which the Court would have given its sanation. The adult members of the joint family were all satisfied that the compromise was to their benefit and the minors, if they were getting no other advantage, were at least obtaining time to pay off the decretal sum.
13. In my opinion the inherent powers of the Court ought not to be exercised in a case of this kind and, therefore, it follows that the Subordinate Judge acted without jurisdiction. The compromise, therefore, of the 12th April 1919 stands. The sale must be confirmed, unless by reason of any orders passed either by the Subordinate Judge or any superior Court subsequent to the 27th May 1919 other than the order of the 10th June 1919, the Subordinate Judge is precluded from confirming it.
14. The application is allowed with costs. Hearing-fee five gold mohurs.
Sultan Ahmed, J.
15. I agree.