JUDGMENT
Choudhary, J.
1. A common question of law is involved in these two cases. They have, therefore, been heard together and are being disposed of by one judgment.
2. Civil Revision NO. 1145 of 1959 arises out of Money Suit No. 151 of 1956 instituted by the petitioners against the, opposite parties of that case for recovery of a sum of Rs. 46,240/- based on a document alleged to be a handnote, dated the 31st of August, 1953 executed for a sum of Rs. 34,000/-. Civil Revision No. 871 of 1960 arises out of Money Suit No. 152 of 1956 instituted by the petitioners against the opposite parties Of that case for recovery of a sum of Rs. 43,520/-based on a document alleged to be a handnote dated the 31st of August, 1953 executed for a sum of Rs. 32,000/-.
Both these suits were transferred to the Court of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga, and were numbered as Money Suit no. 151/3 of 1956/58 and Money Suit No. 152/5 of 1956/58 respectively. The hearing of Money Suit no. 151/3 of 1956/58 commenced before Sri S.P. Sinha, Second Additional Subordinate Judge, and that of Money Suit No. 152/5 of 1956/58 before Sri S.R. Shukla, another Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga. At the hearing of these cases a point was raised on behalf of the defendants in the two suits that the documents in question were bonds, and not promissory notes, within the meaning of the Indian Stamp Act (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’), and, not being duly stamped as bonds, were inadmissible in evidence. Both the learned Additional Subordinate Judges accepted this contention and held that both these documents were bonds within the meaning of the Act, and passed orders in the two suits for assessment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty payable under the Act. Being thus aggrieved, the plaintiffs of the two suits have presented these civil revision applications.
3. The documents in question bear stamps requisite for promissory notes, and, if they are held to be promissory notes, no question of any deficit stamp duty to be paid on these two documents arises. It is also an undisputed position in the case that, if these documents are bonds within the meaning of the Act, the stamp duties paid are deficit and the orders of the learned Additional Subordinate Judges for assessment of the deficit stamp duty and penalty cannot be questioned. The real contest between the parties, however, is as to the nature of these documents, namely, whether they are bonds, as alleged by the defendants, or promissory notes, as alleged by the plaintiffs, within the meaning of the Act.
4. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced in support of the respective contentions, it may perhaps be necessary to reproduce the terms of the two documents which are couched mostly in similar language. The document which is the subject-matter of Money Suit No. 151/3 of 1956/ 58 is marked as Annexure ‘C’ to the civil revision application, No. 1145 of 1959, and runs as follows:
“Nakalsahi Radha Mohan Singh, pesar Rai Bahadur Sunder Singh, moblig 34000/- Choutis hazar rupia karj sudi ek rupia saikra mahbari ke lia aur indul talab chithi likha Ba. Khas tarikh 31-6-53 so sahi Ba, Khas. Nakal Radha Mohan Singh 31-8-53. Witness: Nageshwar Misir, pleader, 31-8-53.
Swasti Shri Ram Narain Rhagat wo Shri Ramchandra Bhagat woldan Baijnath Rhagat motafa jat Nagbansi Tamoli pesha Kastkari wo zamindaro wo mahajani sakin Mahalla Chowk Pergana Haveli Darbhanga ke likhtam Shree Radha Mohan Singh peshar Rai Saheb Sundar Singh haiyul kayajn jat Rajput pesha kastkari sakin mauza Muktapur pergana Kasma, elake thana wo sub-division Samastipur, zila Darbhanga ka yatho uchit age apse moblik 34000/- (chauntis hazar) rupia karj sudi bahisab moblik ek rupia fee saikra mahbari ke waste abadi kastkari wo kharach khanedari banazar parbaras ijmal khandan ke lia, wo wada karte hain wo likh dete hain ke ap jis wakht talab karenge us bakht asal main sud nakad ekmust adai karke handnote heja wapas kar lenge. Is baste yah chithi indultalab likh dia ke bakht per kam abe. Tarikh 31-8-1953 isbi”.
Similarly, the document which is the subject-matter of Money Suit No. 152/5 of 1956/58 is marked Annexure ‘C’ to Civil Revision No. 871 of 1960, and runs as follows:
“Nakal Sahi Brajnandan Singh moblig 32000/-rupya karz sudi dar 1/- saikra mahwari ke lia so sahi ba: kha: wo chithi indul talab likh dia so sahi ba: kha: Sd- Brijnandan Singh 31-8-53.
Witness:- Sd. Nageshwar Missir, Pleader, 31-8-53. Swasti Sri Lakhshmao PraSad Bhagat wo Sri Ramchandra Bhagat, waldan Babu Baijnath Bhagat matofa, jaat Nagbansi Tamoli, pesha zamindari wo kashtkari, wo mahajani sha: Mahalla Chowk, perg. Haveli Darbhanga, thana Munsifi Zila Darbhanga ko likhtam Rrajnandan Singh pesar Rai Saheb Sundar Singh haiul kaim jaat Rajput pesha Kashtkari, sha: Mouje Muktapur, perg. Kasma, thana wo Subdivision Samastipur, Zila Davbhanga, ka jatha uchit agey apse mo: 32000/- rupya karz sudi bahisab mo: 1/- rupya fi saikra mahwari waste abadi kashtkari wo kharch khanedari banazar parwaras ijmal khandan apne ke lia wada karta hain wo likh dete hain Ki ap jis wakht talab karenge us wakht asal mai sud nakad ek must adai karke handnote haja wapas lenge. Is wastey yah chithi indul talab likh dia ke wakht par kam abey ta: 31-8-1953″.
Both these documents, are described towards the end as being “chithi indul talab” meaning “handnote payable on demand”. In the body portions of the documents also, it is mentioned that the money, principal with interest, will be payable on demand. They are, however, witnessed by a pleader, Sri Nageshwar Missir. The sums covered by the two instruments, together with interest, are payable On demand to the respective creditors named therein, and there is nothing to show in these two documents that the sums due are payable to order or bearer. On these facts, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that these documents must be held to be promissory notes, whereas the contention on behalf of the defendants opposite parties is that they are really bonds within the meaning of the Act.
5. According to Section 2(5)(b) of the Act, ‘bond’ includes any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another. Section 2(22) of the Act defines ‘promissory note’ to mean a promissory note as defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and it also includes a note promising the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happen.
The definition of promissory note under the Negotiable Instruments Act is given in Section 4 of that Act, which says that a ‘promissory note’ is an instrument in writing (not being a banknote or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. Illustration (b) given under that section shows that, if A signs an instrument stating “I acknowledge myself to be indebted to B in Rs. 1,000/-, to be paid on demand, for value received.”, it is a promissory note. Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act lays down that a ‘negotiable instrument’ means a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer. Explanation (1) to that section states that a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque is payable to order which is expressed to be so payable or which is expressed to be payable to a particular person, and does not contain, words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it shall not be transferable.
6. Mr. Prem Lall, appearing on behalf of the petitioners in both these cases, has pressed an argument that, on a reading of Section 2(22) of the Act, along with Sections 4 and 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the documents in question must be legally held to be promissory notes, and the definition of ‘bond’, as given in Section 2(5) of the Act, does not in any sense apply to these documents. His contention is that, in order that the documents in question should be held to be bonds, they must not be payable to order or bearer, as required by Section 2(5)(b) of the Act. It is urged that these documents, read in the light of the provisions of Sections 4 and 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, are payable to bearer, and they are, therefore, promissory notes within the meaning of the Act. It has been further urged on behalf of the petitioners that, in order to ascertain whether these documents are bonds or promissory notes, they must be read as a whole with the aid of the provisions referred to above; and, if on such reading they are documents under which the liability to pay the amount due is to a person named therein or to order or bearer on demand, they must be held to be promissory notes.
Mr. K.B.N. Singh, appearing for the defendants opposite parties, on the other hand, has contended that, for the purpose of the Stamp Act, a document itself, as it stands, must be read, and if, on such reading, the due under it does not appear to be payable to order or bearer, it cannot be held to be a promissory note, and if it is attested by a witness, it must come under the definition of ‘bond’ within the meaning of Section 2(5)(b) of the Act. With respect to the documents in question, therefore, he has submitted an argument that, though these documents are described as being handnotes payable on demand, yet on the terms thereof they are not payable to order or bearer, and they having been witnessed by Sri Nageshwar Missir, Pleader, come within the definition of ‘bond’ as given in Section 2(5)(b) of the Act, Several authorities have been cited by counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions, and, on a careful consideration there of, I feel inclined to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the opposite parties and reject that advanced on behalf of the petitioners.
7. Mr. Prern Lall has, firstly relied on illustration (b) to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which defines a promissory note. This definition is accented as the definition of a promissory note under Section 2(22) of the Act. He, therefore, contends that a document similar to the document in illustration (b), referred to above, must be held to be a promissory note. Illustration (b) shows that if the executant of a document has acknowledged himself to be indebted to a person named therein for a certain sum of money to be paid on demand for value received, it is a promissory note. His contention is that, though under the definition of a promissory note, as given in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the amount is to be paid only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument, illustration (b) shows that, without there being any express term as to the amount being payable to the order of a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument, the document is a promissory note.
Prima facie, on the above illustration, the argument seems to be of some substance, but on a closer examination of the provision, it appears that this argument cannot ultimately succeed. As has been pointed out in Satya Priya Ghoshal v. Gobind Mohan Roy Chowdhury, 14 Cal WN 414 it is an established principle of law that illustrations cannot control the plain meaning of the words of a statute, and, accordingly, in that case no importance was attached to illustration (b) under Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order to find out the nature of the document in question in that case. It was next contended on behalf of the petitioners that explanation (1) to Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act has made it perfectly clear that if a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque is expressed to be payable to order or to a particular person and does not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it shall not be transferable, it is payable to order.
Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, read along with the above explanation, therefore, makes it manifest that if an instrument in writing contains an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker to pay certain sum of money Only to a certain person and does not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it shall not be transferable, it is a promissory note within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act; and as this definition has been accepted, under Section 2(22) of the Act, to he the definition of a promissory note under the Act, the documents in question, which contain an unconditional undertaking to pay the amount due to the creditors named therein and in which there are no words prohibiting their transfer or indicating an intention that they shall not be transferable, are promissory notes within the meaning of both the Act as well as the Negotiable instruments Act. I am unable to accept this contention also.
8. The present Section .13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was introduced in that Act by the Negotiable Instruments Amending Act (VIII of 1919). Before the introduction of this section in that Act, an instrument could not be negotiable unless it contained operative words of negotiability, such as, ‘order’ or ‘bearer’, or any other term expressing an intention on the part of the drawer or the maker to render it negotiable. The definition of ‘promissory note’, for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was confined to the provisions of Section 4 of that Act, and, accordingly, the definition of that expression under the Act, as laid down in paragraph (1) of Section 2(22) of the Act, was also confined to the provisions of Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under the provisions of the Act, read along with those of the Negotiable Instruments Act, prior consistent view appears to have that, for the purposes of the Act, an instrument has to be considered as it stands and if, On the terms thereof, the due under it is not payable to order or bearer, it is a ‘bond’, and not a ‘promissory note’, within the meaning of the Act.
In Ramen Chetty v. Mahomed Ghouse, ILR 16 Cal 432 it was held that, in determining whether a document is sufficiently stamped for the purpose of deciding upon its admissibility in evidence document itself as it stands, and not any collateral circumstances which may be shown, in evidence, must be looked at. The same view was taken in Sakharam Shankar v. Ram Chandra, ILR 27 Bom 279 (FB), in which it was held that, in determining the question whether a particular instrument is sufficiently stamped, the Court should only look at the instrument as it stands. In Ref. under Stamp Act, Section 46, Reference case 5 of 1884 : ILR 8 Mad 87 (FB) two documents were under consideration. One document, which purported to be a promissory note, was attested by three witnesses, and the executant promised to pay to the creditor named therein certain amount before a certain date. The other document, which also purported to be a promissory note was attested by two witnesses, and the executant promised to pay a certain sum of money to the creditor named therein or order on demand. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that the first document being attested and not payable to bearer or order, was a “bond”, as defined in the Stamp Act; and the second document, which was payable to order was, therefore, n “promissory note” although, it was attested. Thus, the second document was held to be a promissory note because, on the terms of the instrument itself, the amount was payable to order whereas the first document was held to be a bond as the amount was not payable to order or bearer.
In another Full Bench of that High Court, in Ref. under Stamp Act. Section 49, Referred Case 4 of 1886: ILR 10 Mad 158 (FB) the same view was taken- In that case, A executed a document by which he promised to pay 011 demand a certain sum of money to B and the writer of the document signed the document as a writer for the purpose of attesting A’s signature. This document was held to be a bond within the meaning of the Act as it did not contain any expression of the amount being payable to order and was attested by a witness.
This view was reiterated in a subsequent Full Bench of that High Court in Ref. under Stamp Act Section 49, Reference Case No. 7 of 1889: ILR 13 Mad 147 (FB) in which case a certain person executed a document by which he promised to pay on demand a certain sum with interest to another person named therein, and the writer of the document and Some others signed the same as witnesses. It was held that the document was a bond and liable to stamp duty as such. The same view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Venku Bamchandrashet v. Sitaram Pandurang, ILR 29 Bom 82 (FB). In that case, the defendant executed a document in favour of the plaintiff that on the date of i(s execution he (the defendant) had taken from him (the plaintiff) in cash a certain sum of money which he would repay, without taking any objection, on demand. This document was attested by two witnesses and it bore an adhesive stamp as required for a promissory note. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that, as the document in question was attested by witnesses and was not payable to order or bearer, it was a bond within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Act.
On behalf of the petitioners, however no case has teen brought to our notice which took a contrary view prior to the introduction of Section 13 in the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is therefore, obvious that, prior to the amendment of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as stated above, the accepted view had been that, if an instrument as it stands does not show that the amount is payable to order or bearer and is attested by a witness, it is a “bond”, and not a “promissory note” within the meaning of the Act.
9. The question, however, is whether the authority of these cases has in any way been shaken after the amendment of the Negotiable Instruments Act in 1919. If Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act does, not in any way affect the definition of promissory note, as given in the Act, there is no reason why their authority should not be accepted as correct and why this Court should make a departure from the principle of law laid down in those cases, prior to the introduction of Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as already observed above, an instrument could not be negotiable unless it contained operative words of negotiability. The object of introducing Section 13 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, was to make certain documents negotiable which prior to the amendment were not negotiable according to the earlier definition of a negotiable instrument.
This section, however, does not introduce any change in the definition of a promissory note as given in Section 4 of that Act, though, in effect, for the purposes of that Act the scope of a document coming within the definition of promissory note is enlarged as being negotiable even in absence of express terms as regards their negotiability. But it does not, in my opinion, in any way introduce any change or enlarge the scope of the expression ‘promissory note’ as defined in Section 2(22) of the Act. Section 2(22) of the Act has borrowed the definition of a promissory note from its definition in the Negotiable Instruments Act, us laid down in Section 4 of that Act. But it does not include for its meaning any other provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act in that regard. Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, therefore, in my opinion, could have no application to the definition of a promissory note, as laid down in Section 2(22) of the Act.
10. The above view gains support from various decisions of the different High Courts, which have been relied upon by learned counsel for the opposite party. In Khetra Mohan Saha v. Jamini Kanta, ILR 54 Cal 445: (AIR 1927 Cal 472) the documents in question contained unconditional promises to pay On demand certain sums borrowed from the creditor named therein with interest and they were also attested by some witnesses. An argument was advanced that these documents were promissory notes, and not bonds within the meaning of the Act.
It was contended that the definition of promissory note, as given in Section 2(22) of the Act, adopted the definition as given in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, and, as these documents were all dated subsequent to 1919, the amendment introduced by Act VIII of 1919 to Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 had to be taken into account in reading that definition, and, if so read, those documents would be instruments payable to order as they did not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that they shall not be transferable. The petitioners in that case contended that those documents would thus be instruments attested by witnesse but payable to order and consequently, would not satisfy the definition of “bond” as given in Section 2(5)(b) of the Act.
This argument was repelled, and it was held that explanation (1) which, amongst other amendments) was introduced by Act VIII of 1919 to Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, was meant to enlarge the definition of a negotiable instrument, and by this amendment a promissory note not payable to order, which previously was not negotiable, was brought within the class of negotiable instruments. It was further held that the amendment could not be rea3 into the definition of a bond as contained in Section 2(5)(b) of the Act so as to make an instrument, which on the face of it was not payable to order one payable to order by virtue of the said explanation and thus to take it out of the said definition. It was pointed out that for the purposes of the Stamp Act, the documents as they appeared on the face of them had to be considered, and as they were attested by witnesses and were not payable to order or bearer they were bonds within the meaning of the Act.
The same view was taken in Dashrath Tukaram v. Kashiram Raoji, AIR 1937 Nag 61 where following the above Calcutta decision ILR 54 Cal 445: (AIR 1927 Cal 472) it was held that the amendment of the Negotiable Instruments Act contained in explanation (1) to Section 13(1) of that Act could not be read into the definition of bond as contained in Section 2(5)(b) of the Act so as to make an instrument, which on the face of it was not payable to order, one payable to order by virtue of the said explanation and thus to take it out of the said definition.
11. In Govinda Ramakistiah, v. Yellappa, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 653 the question under consideration was whether a certain document read in the light of explanation (1) to Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act was, under the Hyderabad Stamp Act, a promissory note or a bond. The provisions in regard to the definitions of ‘bond’ and ‘promissory note’ in the Act are similar to the provisions in the Hyderabad Stamp Act. It was held in that case that explanation (1) to Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act could not be read along with the definition of a bond as contained in Section 2(4) of the Hyderabad Stamp Act, which is equivalent to Section 2(5) of the Act, so as to make the instrument a promissory note, which on the face of it was not payable to order, by virtue of the said explanation. Accordingly, it was held in that case that the document in question, which was not payable to bearer or order and was attested by a witness, clearly fell under the definition of a bond, and not a promissory note.
The same view has been taken in a majority decision of a Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Mohammad Mustafa Ali Khan v. Raj Rajeshwari Devi, AIR 1959 All 583 (SB). In that case, a document was duly stamped as a promissory note and was signed by the executant and attested by two witnesses. The view taken in the majority judgment was that the effect of explanation (1) to Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as introduced in that Act by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act 1919, was to bring within the class of negotiable instruments certain promissory notes not payable to order which previously were not negotiable, and that the fact that a promissory note which was not expressed to be payable to order was now a negotiable instrument did not make it an instrument payable to order within the meaning of the Act.
12. Mr. Prem Lall, appearing for the petitioners however, has relied on the view taken in the minority decision in the Special Bench, referred to above, which, applying the explanation (1) to Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the definition of a promissory note in Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, took a contrary view that the document in question was not a bond within the meaning of Section 2(5)(b) of the Act. As was pointed out by Srivastava, J. in that case, what appeared to have weighed greatly with his Lordship JR. Dayal, J. in giving a dissentient judgment was that the definition of the term “bond” did not require that the non-payability of the instrument to order or bearer should be expressed in the instrument itself. But, as was pointed out by Srivastava, J., keeping in mind the purpose for which the explanation was added in 1919, the explanation makes the instrument payable to order only for the limited purpose of negotiability, and not for all purposes. In my opinion, therefore, the majority view in that Special Bench case is the correct view on the point in question.
13. Reliance was placed by Mr. Prem Lall, appearing for the petitioners, on the cases of Hansraj v. Lachmi Narain, AIR 1923 Lah 388, Sheikh Pudai v. Mt. Bilasi, AIR 1939 Oudh 107, In the matter of Kuppmsami Chettiar, Ref. Case No. 42 of 1953: AIR 1955 Mad 652 (FB) and Mt. Bibi Kazmi Begam v. Lachhman Lal Sao, ILR 9 Pat 717; (AIR 1930 Pat 239). In the Lahore case, AIR 1923 Lah 388, the question was whether a pronote, which contained an express term to pay the money to a particular person and did not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that the same shall not be transferable, was negotiable or riot, and, on the basis of explanation (1) of Section 13(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it was rightly held in that case that the said document was negotiable. The question as to its being promissory note under the Act was not the subject-matter of contention in that case.
In the Oudh Case, AIR 1939 Oudh 107 also, the question was whether a document, attested toy a witness, but the amount under it not being expressly payable to order or bearer, would be negotiable or not. In that connection, it was held that the said document was a promissory note within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the decision in ILR 54 Cal 445: (AIR 1927 Cal 472), to which a reference has already been made, was not applicable to that case as that was a case under the Stamp Act with which that Court had nothing to do in that case.
In the Madras case, AIR 1955 Mad 652 (FB), there is an observation that the mere omission of the expression “to the order of” would not render a document any the less a promissory note, if otherwise it fulfilled the terms of the definition of a promissory note, that actually a promissory note need not contain this expression, and that it is sufficient if there is an unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum of money to a certain person. In that case, the document in question did not contain an unconditional undertaking to pay the amount covered by it. It was, therefore, held that the document was a “bond” as defined in Section 2(5)(b) of the Act. The above observation made in that case, therefore was a mere obiter. Apart from that, no reasons have been given in support of the said observation.
In the Patna case, ILR 9 Pat 717: (AIR 1930 Pat 239) also, the question was whether a bill of exchange, which was expressed to be payable to a particular person and did not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it shall not be transferable was a negotiable Instrument or not and it was decided that, by reason of explanation (1) to Section 13 (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, that document was a negotiable instrument. The question whether such a document can be a “bond” or a “promissory note” within the meaning of the Act was riot the subject-matter of consideration in that case.
These cases therefore, are no authority for the proposition that an instrument which contains an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money to a particular person named therein and does not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it shall not be transferable is a promissory note within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Act.
14. On a careful consideration of the authorities, referred to above, my view is that the documents in question in these cases, having been attested by a witness, but there being nothing in them to show that the amounts covered by them were payable to order or to the bearer, come within the term “bond” as defined in Section 2(5) (b) of the Act. The view of the learned Additional Subordinate Judges in the two cases, therefore, is perfectly correct. There is thus no merit in these applications.
15. The result, therefore, is that both these applications fail and are dismissed; but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The deficit stamp duty and penalty on these two documents, will now be assessed, as directed by the Orders under revision.
Ramaswami, C.J.
16. I agree.