Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
Date of Decision:November 10, 2008
1. Ram Parkash alias Billu son of Suraj Bhan, resident of
Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad.
2. Vinod son of Sukhbir Singh, resident of village Pali, P.O.
Sardana, District Meerut.
.... Appellants
Versus
The State of Haryana
.... Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER
Present: Mr. Sandeep Maan,, Advocate
for Ram Parkash, appellant no.1.
Mr. Jagjeet Beniwal, Advocate
for Vinod Singh, appellant No.2.
Mr. R.S. Arya, DAG, Haryana
for the respondent.
****
Sham Sunder, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment of
conviction and the order of sentence dated 20.02.2001
rendered by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani,
vide which it convicted the accused (now appellants), for the
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
2
offence, punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to be
as the ‘Act’ only) and sentenced them to undergo RI for a period
of 10 years each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, each in
default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment, for a period of six months each, for having been
found in possession of 16 Kgs charas, which falls within the
ambit of commercial quantity, without any permit or licence.
2. The facts, in brief, are that on 28.04.2000
Darshan Kumar,Sub Inspector/ Station House Officer of Police
Station Sadar, Bhiwani, along-with other police officials, was
checking the vehicles. At about 5.30 PM, the accused came
from Chang side, in a Fiat Car. They were signalled to stop, but
they tried to speed away the vehicle. However, both the
accused were apprehended. Search of the car, was conducted, in
the presence of Anil Dhawan, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
who was called to the spot, by sending a VT message. On
search of the dickey of the car, a polythene bag, containing 16
Kgs charas was recovered. A sample of 100 grams charas was
taken out of the polythene bag, and the remaining charas, was
kept in the same polythene bag. The sample and the bag,
containing remaining charas, were converted into parcels, duly
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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sealed, and taken into possession, vide a separate recovery
memo. Ruqa was sent to the Police Station, on the basis
whereof, the FIR was recorded. The site plan was prepared.
The statements of the witnesses were recorded. The accused
were arrested. After the completion of investigation, the
accused were challaned.
3. On their appearance, in the Court, the
accused were supplied the copies of documents, relied upon by
the prosecution. Charge under Section 20 of the Act, was
framed against the accused, to which they pleaded not guilty,
and claimed judicial trial.
4. The prosecution, in support of its case,
examined Anil Kumar, DSP, (PW-1), a witness to the
recovery, Dharam Chand, HC, ( PW-2 ), a formal witness, who
tendered his affidavit Ex.PB, Ved Parkash, C.,(PW-3), a
formal witness, who tendered his affidavit Ex.PD, Ram Bilas,
S.I., ( PW-4 ), who prepared the report under Section 173
Cr.P.C., when he was posted as SHO at Police Station Sadar,
Bhiwani, and Darshan Kumar, Inspector/ SHO, ( PW-5 ), the
Investigating Officer. Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor for the
State, closed the prosecution evidence.
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
4
5. The statements of the accused, under Section 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were recorded. They were
put all the incriminating circumstances, appearing against
them, in the prosecution evidence, and pleaded false
implication.
5-A. Vinod Kumar, accused , in his statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that on 24.04.2001 he along
with Ram Parkash, accused, was going to village Sai
( Rewari ). He further stated that the police planted this false
recovery of charas against them.
5-B. Ram Parkash, accused, also took up the
similar plea, as was taken by Vinod Singh, accused, under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused, did not lead any evidence in
their defence.
6. After hearing the Public Prosecutor for the
State, the Counsel for the accused, and, on going through the
evidence, on record, the trial Court, convicted and sentenced
the accused, as stated hereinbefore.
7. Feeling aggrieved, against the judgment of
conviction, and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial
Court, the instant appeal, was filed by the appellants.
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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8. I have heard the Counsel for the parties, and
have gone through the evidence, and record of the case,
carefully.
9. The Counsel for the appellants, at the very outset,
submitted, that no independent witness, was joined, at the time
of effecting the alleged recovery, despite availability. They
further submitted that even no effort was made by the
Investigating Officer, to join an independent witness. They
further submitted that, as such, the case of the prosecution,
became doubtful. The submission of the Counsel for the
appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. There
was no secret information, against the accused, that they were
coming in a car, with a big haul of charas. It was, only in
routine, when the Police party was present, in connection with
the checking of vehicles that a fiat car, in which both the
accused, were sitting, came. It was, thus,a chance recovery.
No doubt, Darshan Kumar, Inspector/SHO, the Investigating
Officer, when appeared, in the witness box, as PW-5, during
the course of cross-examination, stated that he had tried to join
public witnesses, but they had shown their inability. It means
that an effort was made, to join an independent witness, but the
Investigating Officer did not succeed. There is nothing, on the
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
6
record, that at the time of recovery, any independent witness
was available, but he was not intentionally and deliberately
joined. If despite efforts, having been made by the
Investigating Officer, he was not successful, in joining an
independent witness, then his conduct could not be said to be
blame-worthy. In Akmal Ahmed Vs. State of Delhi, 1999(2)
RCC 297 (S.C.), it was held that, it is now well-settled that the
evidence of search or seizure, made by the police will not
become vitiated, solely for the reason that the same was not
supported by an independent witness. In State of NCT of
Delhi Vs. Sunil (2000)I S.C.C. 748, it was held as under:-
“It is an archaic notion that actions of the Police officer,
should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to
start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the
documents made by the Police. At any rate, the Court cannot
start with the presumption that the police records are
untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption
should be the other way round. The official acts of the Police
have been regularly performed is a wise principle of
presumption and recognized even by the Legislature.”
9-A. In Appa Bai and another Vs. State of Gujrat,
AIR 1988 S.C. 696, it was held that the prosecution story
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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cannot be thrown out, on the ground, that an independent
witness had not been examined, by the prosecution. It was
further held, in the said authority, that the civilized people, are
generally insensitive, when a crime is committed, even in
their presence, and they withdraw from the victims’ side, and
from the side of the vigilant. They keep themselves away
from the Courts, unless it is inevitable. Moreover, they think
the crime like a civil dispute, between two individuals, and do
not involve themselves, in it. The principle of law, laid down,
in the aforesaid authorities, is fully applicable to the facts of
the present case. In these circumstances, mere non-joining of
an independent witness, when the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, has been held to be cogent, convincing,
creditworthy, and reliable, and there was no reason, on their
part to falsely implicate the accused, no doubt, is cast on the
prosecution story. In this view of the matter, the submission
of the Counsel for the appellants, being without merit, must
fail, and the same stands rejected.
10. It was next submitted by the Counsel for
the appellants, that the dickey of the car, wherefrom the
alleged recovery, was effected, was not locked and, as such, it
could not be said that the accused were found in conscious
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
8
possession of the recovered contraband. The submission of
the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear
to be correct. Both the accused were travelling in the same
car. One of them was the driver and the other was sitting by
his side. It was not a small quantity of charas, which was
lying in the dickey of the car. It was a big haul of charas,
which was lying in the dickey of the car, of the accused. The
accused were having special means of knowledge, with regard
to the polythene bag, containing charas, lying in the dickey of
the car. It was for the accused to explain, as to how the bag,
containing charas, was lying in the dickey of the car, and to
which destination, the same was being transported. Not only
this, the conduct of the accused, is also relevant, in this case.
They instead of stopping the car, when the signal was given,
by the Police party, accelerated the speed thereof, and tried to
speed away. Ultimately, they were apprehended along with
the car. In case, there was no contraband, in the dickey of the
car, and the accused were not in the knowledge of the same,
then what was the necessity of trying to speed away the car,
was for them to explain. This material circumstance, goes
against them. Under these circumstances, it could be said that
they were in possession of, and in control over the polythene
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
9
bag, lying in the car. Once the possession of the accused, and
their control over the contraband, was proved, then statutory
presumption under Sections 54 and 35 of the Act, operated
against them, that they were in conscious possession thereof.
Thereafter, it was for them, to rebut the statutory presumption,
by leading cogent and convincing evidence. However, the
appellants, failed to rebut the said presumption, either during
the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses,
or by leading defence evidence. In these circumstances, the
trial Court was right, in holding that they were in conscious
possession of the contraband. Sections 54 and 35 of the Act
read as under :-
“Presumption from possession of illicit articles:- In
trials under this Act, it may be presumed, unless and
until the contrary is proved, that the accused has
committed an offence under this Act, in respect of:-
a) any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or
controlled substance;
b) any opium poppy, cannabis plant or coca plant
growing on any land which he has cultivated;
c) any apparatus specially designed or any group
of utensils specially adopted for the manufacture of
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
10any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or
controller substance; or
d) any materials which have undergone any
process towards the manufacture of a narcotic drug
or psychotropic substance or controlled substance, or
any residue left of the materials from which any
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled
substance has been manufactured,
for the possession of which he fails to account
satisfactorily.”
10-A Section 35 which relates to the presumption of
culpable mental state, is extracted as under :-
“Presumption of culpable mental state:- (1) In any
prosecution for an offence under this Act, which requires a
culpable mental state of the accused, the Court shall presume
the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for
the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state
with respect to the act charged as an offence in that
prosecution.
Explanation:- In this section “culpable mental state” includes
intention, motive knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason
to believe, a fact.
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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(2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved
only when the court believes it to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a
preponderance of probability.”
10-B. From the conjoint reading of the provisions
of Sections 54 and 35, referred to hereinbefore, it becomes
abundantly clear, that once an accused, is found to be in
possession of a contraband, they are presumed to have
committed the offence, under the relevant provisions of the
Act, until the contrary is proved. According to Section 35 of
the Act ibid, the Court shall presume the existence of mental
state, for the commission of an offence, and it is for the accused
to prove otherwise. In Madan Lal and another Vs. State of
H. P. 2003 SCC (Crl.) 1664 it was held as under:-
The word “conscious” means awareness about a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it,
because how he came to be in possession is within his special
knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition
of this position because of the presumption available in law.
Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where also
presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit
articles.”
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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10-C. The facts of Madan Lal’s case (supra) in
brief, were that accused Manjit Singh was driving the Car and
the remaining four accused, were sitting therein. One steel
container (dolu) in a black coloured bag, was recovered from
the said Car, which contained 820 gms. charas. All the accused
were convicted and sentenced by the trial Court, holding that
they were found in conscious possession of charas, despite the
fact, that one of the accused, admitted his conscious
possession, of the contraband. The Apex Court held that the
trial Court, was right, in coming to the conclusion, that the
accused were found in conscious possession of charas, as they
had failed to explain, as to how they were travelling in a Car
together, which was not a public vehicle. The Apex Court
upheld the conviction, and sentence, awarded to the accused.
In the instant case, the accused failed to explain, as to how, the
polythene bag, containing charas, referred to above, was
found in the dickey of the car, which was being driven by one
of them. The facts of Madan Lal’s case (supra) are similar
and identical to the facts of the present case. The principle of
law, laid down, in Madan Lal’s case (supra), is fully
applicable to the facts of the present case. In the instant case,
in their statements, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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accused/appellants, took up the plea, only of false implication.
They did not take up the plea, that they did not know the
contents of the polythene bag, lying therein. The driver of the
car, did not take up the plea, that he was directed by the owner,
to take the polythene bag, to a certain place, and obeying his
command, he was taking the same, to that destination. The
other accused, did not take up the plea, that he merely took a
lift in the car, as he knew the driver thereof, and did not know,
as to what was contained in the polythene bag. As stated
above, the accused, thus, miserably failed to rebut the statutory
presumption, referred to above. Thus, their conscious
possession, in respect of the contraband, was proved, and, as
such, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being
without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
11. The Counsel for the appellants, however,
placed reliance on Jasbir Singh alias Jassa v. State of
Haryana, 2008(3) RCR ( Criminal ) 42, decided by a Single
Bench of this Court, wherein, it was held that the accused was
not found in conscious possession of the contraband, recovered
from the vehicle. Ultimately, that appeal was accepted and the
appellant was acquitted. The facts of the aforesaid authority,
are completely distinguishable, from the facts of the present
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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case. Even otherwise, in view of the principle of law, laid down
in Madan Lal’s case ( supra ), decided by the Apex Court,
on the same point, contrary principle of law, laid down, in
Jasbir Singh’s case ( supra ), decided by this Court, shall not
hold the field. No help, therefore, can be drawn, by the
Counsel for the appellants, from the ratio of law, laid down, in
the authority, cited by them, and referred to above. In this
view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the
appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands
rejected.
12. It was next submitted by the Counsel
for the appellants, that no effort was made by the Investigating
Officer to trace the owner of the vehicle, in question, and, as
such, the accused, did not commit any offence punishable
under Section 20 of the Act. The submission of the Counsel
for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct.
No doubt, no effort was made, by the Investigating officer, to
trace the owner and to find out as to whether he ( owner )
intentionally permitted the use of the car, for transporting the
contraband. Such an irregularity or illegality, committed by the
Investigating Officer, during the course of investigation, did
not mean that the accused did not commit any offence. If, on
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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account of irregularity or illegality, during the course of
investigation,committed by the Investigating Officer, benefit of
doubt is given to the accused, then every dishonest or
negligent Investigating Officer, will certainly leave lacunae, in
the case of the prosecution, so as to create an escape route for
the accused. The Court is not to play, in the hands of the
investigating Officer. If the Court comes to the conclusion,
that such an illegality or irregularity was committed by the
Investigating Officer, with a view to help the accused, then the
same can certainly be ignored. In this case, this Court has
reached the aforesaid conclusion. At the most, if the
Investigating Officer had traced the owner of the car, after
finding that he permitted the use thereof knowingly, for
transporting the contraband, he(owner) could be challaned
under Section 25 of the Act. However, the liability of the
accused, who were found in conscious possession of the
polythene bag, containing charas, could not be diluted. No
prejudice, whatsoever, was caused to the accused, on account
of non-tracing of the owner of the car, nor it was the case of
the accused, in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., that
they were transporting the contraband, in the car, at the
instance of the owner thereof. The appellants, thus, committed
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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the offence under Section 20 of the Act. In this view of the
matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, being
without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
13. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the
appellants, that CFSL form, was not prepared, at the spot, by
the investigating officer, and, as such, the link in the chain of
prosecution evidence, became incomplete. He further submitted
that non-preparation of CFSL Form, at the spot, cast a cloud of
doubt, on the prosecution case, as also caused a prejudice to the
accused. He also placed reliance on Bhola Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2005(2) RCR 520, in support of his contention. It may
be stated here, that there is no provision in the Act, as also in
the Rules, framed thereunder, that the aforesaid form, should be
prepared, at the spot, and if it is not so prepared, then the trial,
conviction and sentence shall stand vitiated. The form is
required to be prepared, so as to send the same, along with the
sample parcel. Under these circumstances, if the same was not
prepared, at the spot, that did not transgress any provision of
the Act, or the Rules framed thereunder. Under these
circumstances, the Investigating Officer, did not commit any
irregularity or illegality, in not preparing the form, aforesaid, at
the spot, and rather preparing the same later on, at the time of
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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sending the sample parcel, to the Forensic Science Laboratory.
No prejudice has been caused to the appellant, on account of
non-preparation the said form, at the spot. The other evidence,
as stated above, is reliable and trust-worthy that none tampered
with the sample parcel, until the same reached the office of the
Forensic Science Laboratory. No help, therefore, can be drawn
by the Counsel for the appellants, therefrom. In this view of
the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants,
being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
14. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the
appellants that only one sample was taken out of the charas,
allegedly recovered, whereas, the requirement of law, was to
take two samples. They further submitted that, on account of
this reason, a prejudice was caused to the accused. The
submission of the Counsel for the appellants, does not appear
to be correct. There is no provision, in the Act, or in the
Rules, framed thereunder, that two samples, from the
contraband, should be taken. The purpose of taking the
sample, is only to send the same to the Laboratory, for the
purpose of analysis. In the instant case, the Forensic Science
Laboratory analyzed the same, and came to the conclusion, that
the same constituted charas. Had the quantity of the sample
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
18
been found to be insufficient, by the Laboratory, it would not
have been analyzed the same, and sent back the same. On
account of drawing of one sample only, from the recovered
charas, no prejudice, whatsoever, was shown to have been
caused, to the accused. The submission of the Counsel for the
appellants, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands
rejected.
15. It was next submitted by the Counsel for
the appellants, that the sample parcel was sent after about
seven days, whereas, it was required to be sent to the
Laboratory, within 72 hours. They further submitted that, as
such, the possibility of tampering with the same, could not be
ruled out. The submission of the Counsel for the appellants,
in this regard, does not appear to be correct. There is no
provision in the Act, or in the Rules, framed thereunder, that
the sample was sent within 72 hours to the Laboratory. The
instructions, issued by the concerned department, do not have
the force of law and are not binding on the Courts. Those
instructions, are only for their guidelines. Had there been any
provision of law that the sample should be sent within 72
hours, on account of non-compliance with that provision, the
possibility of tampering with the sample, until the same
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
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reached the office of the Forensic Science Laboratory, may
not have been ruled out. It is, no doubt, true that there is no
explanation, with regard to delay. However, mere delay, in
itself, is not sufficient to come to the conclusion, that the
sample parcel was tampered with, until the same reached the
office of the Forensic Science Laboratory. The other
evidence, produced by the prosecution, is cogent, convincing,
reliable and trustworthy. From the other evidence, it was
proved that none tampered with the sample, until the same
reached the office of the Forensic Science Laboratory. Even,
there is report of the Laboratory Ex.PE, which clearly proves
that the seals on the exhibits were intact, on arrival, till the
time of their analysis and agreed with the specimen
impression of the seals. The report Ex.PE of the Forensic
Science Laboratory is per-se admissible, in toto, under
Section 293 of the Code of criminal Procedure. There is no
challenge to the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, in
this case. In State of Orissa Vs. Kanduri Sahoo 2004(1)
RCR (Criminal) 196 (S.C.), it was held that mere delay in
sending the samples to the Laboratory, is not fatal, where
there is evidence that the seized articles remained in safe
custody. Since, it was proved that none tampered with the
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
20
sample, until the same was received, in the office of the
Forensic Science Laboratory, the submission of the Counsel
for the appellants, merely based on conjectures, does not hold
good. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid
authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case.
The submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this
regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands
rejected.
16. It was next submitted by the Counsel for
the appellants, that when the case property was produced, in
the Court, the same did not carry any chit, containing the
details of the FIR, Police Station etc.. They further
submitted that, under these circumstances, it could not be said
that the case property produced, in the Court, at the time of
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, was the same, as was
allegedly recovered, from the accused. They further
submitted that, under these circumstances, it could be said
that no recovery, whatsoever, was effected from the accused,
but they were falsely implicated, in the instant case. The
submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard,
does not appear to be correct. The recovery, in this case, was
effected on 28.04.2000, whereas, the case property was, in the
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
21
first instance, produced, in the Court, at the time of the
evidence of Anil Kumar, DSP, HQ, Kurukshetra, ( PW1 ) on
02.11.2000. It means that he was examined seven months
after the date of recovery. The case property remained lying
in the malkhana, where the case properties of other cases,
were also lying. On account of shortage of space, in the
malkhanas, the case properties of the cases, cannot be stacked
properly. If, on account of irresponsible handling, lapse of
sufficient time, between the date of recovery, and production
of the case property, in the Court, and during the course of
transit, the chits affixed, on the bag, containing charas,
underwent the process of decay, that did not mean that the
case property, produced in the Court, did not stand connected
with the case. Anil Kumar, DSP ( PW1 ), in clear-cut terms,
stated that the polythene bag, containing charas, produced, in
the Court, was the same, as was recovered from the car, being
driven by one of the accused. The only obligation, upon the
prosecution, is to produce the case property, in the Court, and
get it identified, from the prosecution witnesses, so as to
connect the same with the case. In the instant case, the
prosecution produced the witnesses, who identified the case
property, as the same, as was recovered from the accused.
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
22
Under these circumstances, the case property produced, in the
Court, stood duly connected with the case. In this view of
the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellants,
being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
17. It was next submitted by the Counsel for
the appellants, that the seal, after use, was handed over to Om
Parkash, ASI, a Police official, who was not examined, by the
Investigating Officer, as a result whereof, the possibility of
tampering with the sample parcel, which was sent to the office
of the Forensic Science Laboratory, after a period of seven
days, could not be ruled out. The submission of the Counsel
for the appellants, in this regard, does not appear to be correct.
As stated above, no independent witness could be joined, for
the reasons, referred to above, at the time of search and
seizure. It was, under these circumstances that the seal after
use was handed over to another Police official, a member of
the party. Thus, the possibility of the tampering with the
sample parcel, until the same reached the office of the
Chemical Examiner, did not at all arise. In Piara Singh Vs.
The State of Punjab 1982 C.L.R. (2) 447, a case decided by a
Full Bench of this Court, the seal, on the sample of illicit
liquor, recovered from the accused, was not entrusted to an
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
23
independent person forthwith. Similarly, the independent
person, though entrusted with the seal, by the Investigating
Officer, later on, was not produced as a witness. In these
circumstances, it was held that this fact alone, was not
sufficient to affect the merits of the trial, and the prosecution
case, could not be thrown out, on that score alone. It was
further held, in this case, that it was not incumbent upon the
Police Officer, to hand over the seal, to a third person
forthwith, and even, in cases, where he had done so, it was not
obligatory upon him, to produce such person, as a witness,
during trial, as there is no statutory requirement, whatsoever,
to this effect. The principle of law, laid down, in the
aforesaid authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the
present case. From the cogent, convincing, reliable, and
trustworthy evidence, produced by the prosecution, the
completion of link evidence was proved. In this view of the
matter, the finding of the trial Court, is endorsed.
18. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel
for the parties.
19. In view of the above discussion, it is held
that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence,
rendered by the trial Court, are based on the correct
Crl. Appeal No. 263-SB of 2001
24
appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. The same do
not warrant any interference. The same are liable to be upheld.
20. For the reasons recorded, hereinbefore, the
appeal is dismissed. The judgment of conviction and the
order of sentence, dated 20.02.2001, are upheld. The Chief
Judicial Magistrate, shall take necessary steps, in accordance
with the provisions of law, to comply with the judgment, within
two months, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the
same, keeping in view the applicability of the provisions of
Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and send the
compliance report immediately thereafter.
21. The District & Sessions Judge, Bhiwani, is
also directed to ensure that the directions, referred to above,
are complied with, within the time-frame, and the compliance
report is sent immediately thereafter, to this Court.
22. The Registry shall keep track of the matter,
and put up the action taken report, if received, within the time
frame. Even if, the same is not received, within the time frame,
the matter shall be put up, within 10 days, after the expiry of the
same.
10.11.2008 (SHAM SUNDER) dinesh JUDGE