JUDGMENT
N.K. Kapoor, J.
1. This appeal is against the order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhatinda (for short ‘the Tribunal’) whereby the claim petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed on the ground of limitation.
2. Briefly, put, the appellant filed an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘the Act’) for award of compensation on account of death of her only son. Since this application was not within time, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application for compensation was also filed. The condonation of delay in filing the application was sought on the ground that she was illiterate. She was under mental shock on account of death of his only son Kali and had no source of income nor was aware of the time within which such an application is to be filed. Not only this, she remained under treatment of a doctor for a considerable period and her health became so weak that she was unable to move about and it is only thereafter that she happended to consult Mr. B. S. Pitho, Advocate, in the month of June, 1987, that he assured her that such a petition lay under the Motor Vehicles Act in which she can get monetary compensation for the death of her son. Since the courts were closed between 16 6. 1987 to 15.7,1987 on account of summer vacations, the application under Section 110-A of the Act and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were filed on 16.7.1987.
3. The respondents put in appearance, opposed this application and urged that there was no sufficient cause for condoning this inordinate delay ; that the applicant was negligent in not fling the application within the prescribed period and the reasons assigned seeking condonation of delay are false.
The tribunal framed the following issue.
1. Whether there are sufficient grounds to condone the delay in filing the application ? OPA.
4. Smt. Ram Piari alone appeared in support of her contention. No evidence was led by the respondents The Tribunal did not find the reason assigned by Smt Ram Piari for filing the petition much after the expiry of period of limitation as to come within the scope of ‘sufficient cause’ as envisaged under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and so dismissed the application.
5. Before dealing with the matter on merits, it is worthwhile to refer to the observations of the apex Court in the case reported as The Trustees of Port of Bombay v. The Premier Automobilies Ltd., A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 923. “We are of the view, in reiteration of earlier expression of the same lines, that public bodies should resist the temptation to take technical pleas or defeat honest claims by legally permissible but marginally unjust contentions, including narrow limitation.” These observations of the Apex Court are in fact, . addressed to insurance companies or other organs of the State i.e. to say they should not take a plea of limitation especially in the context of a beneficient legislation like the Motor Vehicles Act
6. Examining the case on merits, there is no rebuttal to the sworn testimony of Smt Ram Piari that she is a poor, illiterate Harijan lady. The only bread winner, her son, expired on account of accident for which claim is made under the Motor Vehicles Act. On account of the tragic death of her son she almost lost balance of mind and was, in fact, under a severe mental shock and agony leading her to take the advise of the doctor for few months. This statement indeed has not been controverted by the respondents.
7. Merely for the reason that she was unable to give the name of the doctor or place it on record the prescription slip is, in fact, no ground to discard her sworn testimony. Similarly, no filing of affidavit of Mr. B. S. Pitho is too technical objection in view of the stated position that she is an illiterate lady. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the approach of the Courts in examining these matters i.e. with regard to condonation of delay etc has undergone a sea change and the principles governing exercise of discretion in such matters have acquired a somewhat new dimension. The hyper-technical approach which once required satisfactory explanation for each day of delay has now yielded place to the broad approach which enjoins the Courts not to treat the statutory provisions more stringently ; rather to construe such a provision in a manner which would advance the cause of substantial justice.
8. In the light of the factual aspect of the case and the legal aspects highlighted above, in my view, the Tribunal erred in law in refusing to condone the delay. The fact that the only bread winner of the family died at a young age leaving behind his mother, an illiterate lady, who on account of this tragic death was in a state of mental shock and agony could not knock the door of the Court for a just relief within the stipulated period, ought in the circumstances taken as sufficient cause’ and delay so caused condoned After all condonation of delay is merely granting an opportunity to the parties to place their view point before the Court ; who thereafter has to decide the matter.
9. For foregoing reasons, I set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 4.1.1990, The delay in filing the claim petition is condoned and the case is remitted, back to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhatinda. Accident took place on 8/9.7.1986 and the case for obvious reasons is at the initial stage and so the Tribunal will take expeditious steps to dispose of the petition, preferably within six months. No costs.