JUDGMENT
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. Issue rule. Ms. Renuka Arora, Advocate waives notice of rule. With consent of counsel for parties the petition was heard finally.
2. The writ petitioner seeks directions to the second respondent to hand over physical vacant possession of industrial plot i.e. No. 42, Pocket E, Sector 2, Bawana Industrial Complex, measuring 150 sq. mtrs. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was carrying on an industry in Vishwas Nagar, Shahdara. Pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court, such industrial activity was to cease with effect from 31.12.1996. In order to relocate such industrial units a scheme was formulated by the Commissioner of Industries, respondent No. 1; the same was to be implemented through the second respondent. There is no dispute that the petitioner applied for the plot, well within the time on 5.4.1996. The respondents No. 1 and 2 processed the application and pursuant to a draw of lots held on 10.12.2000, intimated the petitioner about his success on 28.10.2000, by a letter. A copy of the letter is a part of the record.
3. The petitioner entered into a Tripartite Agreement with the Delhi Financial Corporation on 22.3.2001. The Delhi Financial Corporation (hereafter called “the DFC”), the petitioner and the second respondent were parties to the said agreement. In its terms the DFC was to finance a substantial part of the consideration payable for the plot, i.e. to the tune of Rs. 4.42 lacs (including the component of stamp duty). The DFC released the said amounts in two Installments i.e. on 31.3.2001 and 12.7.2004.
4. In the above background the petitioner was intimated, by a letter of the DFC that he was in default of re-payment of loan and had to clear the outstandings by 20.2.2006, through a letter dated 14.2.2006. Subsequently, he approached this Court claiming that the respondents acted in an arbitrary manner.
5. The respondent/DSIDC in its counter affidavit has averred that the members of the public were intimated that applications of persons like petitioners, i.e. owners of units local commercial areas would be considered for allotment later. It is claimed that this was done by a public notice dated 14.7.1999. Accordingly, the second respondent alleges that the petitioner in the first instance had no eligibility for allotment. It is also claimed that on 17.1.2005 a letter was written to the petitioner stating that he was ineligible and that he could retain the earnest money deposited pending finalisation of the scheme for allotment.
6. The DFC’s stand in its counter affidavit is that the petitioner had defaulted in his commitment to repay the amounts; as a result it was constrained to recall the loan. It is claimed that after adjusting the interest liability which worked out to Rs. 1,31,000/- and recalling the principal amount, the petitioner was entitled to a refund of Rs.89,000/-. The refund of the amounts was through a cheque to the DFC, Rs. 6,21,615/-. It is claimed that the DFC could not be found fault with because under the Tripartite Agreement it could not wait indefinitely for allotment in view of the loan advanced which had to be repaid.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the question as to legality of the DSIDC’s action is no longer res integra and is covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Super Electricals v. DSIDC . In that case the court had ruled that the agencies such as DSIDC cannot deviate from the law declared by the Supreme Court in M.C.Mehta’s case. Accordingly, the units were entitled to be relocated in terms and conditions which had concluded and had to be implemented in all respects. It is contended that in any case the DSIDC has started alloting plots to units which were in commercial areas like the petitioner. In the circumstances the action of the respondents, particularly the DSIDC cannot be sustained.
8. Ms. Renuka Arora, learned Counsel for the DSIDC, contended that the petitioner was aware about his ineligibility. This is a matter of inference since the public notice dated 17.4.1999 had been widely circulated in all the newspapers. The petitioner therefore, could not claim any right on account of the mistake committed by the DSIDC in issuing the allotment letter on 26.10.2000. It is contended that the revised policy of the DSIDC in asking the applicants to await its further decision even while returning the earnest money was made known to the petitioner on 17.1.2005. In these circumstances there was nothing arbitrary and illegal in its action.
9. Learned Counsel for the DFC submitted that in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement the petitioner had to either start re-paying the amounts or ensure that the principal amount along with interest was refunded through the DSIDC which had been paid the consideration for the petitioner’s benefit.
10. The above narrative would show that the petitioner’s eligibility as an owner of an industrial unit, entitled to apply is in dispute. That he applied on 5.4.1996 with the second respondent is also a matter of record. He was subsequently allotted the plot on 23.10.2000; according to the existing policy the DFC undertook to finance the transactions by a Tripartite Agreement entered into on 31.10.2001. Subsequently, amounts to the tune of Rs. 4.42 lacs were paid to DSIDC, including consideration of Rs. 4.09 lakhs. In these circumstances the second respondent’s plea that the petitioner was ineligible, after entering into a contract with the DFC and in fact financing of the plot, cannot be sustained. It is one thing to state, before the allotment, (in an action for enforcement of what are perceived as rights) that the person is eligible and has to wait further policy decisions, but another entirely different thing to contend, after the allotment is made and the financing arrangement is put in place, that the concerned party i.e. the industrial unit holder was not entitled in the first place to such allotment at all. In such a situation the doctrine of promissory estoppel steps in and prevents the public authority from asserting about ineligibility of the applicant. In other words, whatever be the circumstances if the Commissioner or the DSIDC had contended prior to 28.10.2000 that the petitioner was ineligible such a contention would have been upheld. However after alloting the plot, and inducing the petitioner to alter his circumstances to his disadvantage it was not open to the DSIDC to say later that he was never so entitled. To disclose such ineligibility, after the petitioner contracted liabilities, is adding insult to injury. So far as DFC is concerned it cannot be really faulted because it was acting pursuant to the Tripartite Agreement by which the petitioner had to pay back the dues.
11. In view of the above findings, the action of respondents No. 1 and 2 in cancelling the allotment is hereby quashed. Consequently the action of the DSIDC in returning the amounts to the DFC is also set aside. Accordingly, the respondents No. 1 and 2 shall now restore the allotment of the plot; in case the plot has been allotted, to someone else they shall ensure that a similar plot is allotted and vacant possession to handed over to the petitioner within six weeks. The DFC shall retain the amount of Rs. 89,000/- which is sought to be repaid to the petitioner, after adjusting its liabilities. It shall now be adjusted towards interest for 2006-07. The DFC shall also pay the original value of the plotj to the DSIDC. The parties shall execute a fresh Tripartite Agreement rescheduling the terms of the loan within six weeks.
11. The petition is allowed in the above terms.