JUDGMENT
M.P. Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
1. The petitioner is an assessee under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). By an assessment order dated 20th May, 1989, he was assessed to pay tax at Rs. 7,303 on a turnover of sale of gold ornaments in the sum of Rs. 3,65,166.70. The assessment in question was from 1st April, 1987 to 31st March, 1988, i.e., the assessment year 1987-88.
2. The assessee is aggrieved by the show cause notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Dharwad Division, Dharwad, respondent 2, under section 21(4) of the Act. The power exercised to issue is a suo motu power of revision conferred on the superior officers to call for and examine the records, if any officer below their rank has committed any error which has resulted in loss of revenue to the State. The assessment order is found fault with on account of the fact that a sum of Rs. 1,60,334.60 paid for ornaments purchased from the unregistered dealers has not been included in the total turnover and therefore he proposes to add the sum to the admitted turnover of Rs. 3,65,166.70 and thereafter compute the tax due. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is preferred under article 226 of the Constitution, inter alia, contending that the show cause notice is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the purchase turnover was liable to exemption from payment of tax under a notification issued by the State Government and gazetted on 24th September, 1970, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by section 8A of the Act.
3. That notification provides for exemption from payment of tax on the purchase of the articles of gold or silver (whether set with precious stones or not) by a manufacturer of such articles subject to the condition that the said manufacturer proves to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that he has paid the tax payable either under sub-section (1) or clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act on articles of gold or silver (whether set with precious stones or not) manufactured out of the said articles so purchased by him. In other words, on the language employed in the notification exemption is available to the dealer in respect of the purchase turnover provided he fulfils the two conditions. The first condition is that the said articles must be used by the dealer-manufacturer in the manufacture of goods made out of gold or silver (whether set with precious stones or not) sold by him. In other words, the purchased articles must be consumed in the manufacture of new articles which he sells. Thereafterwards, he must further demonstrate as a second condition precedent, on those articles so manufactured and sold, he has paid the turnover tax. If the two conditions are not satisfied, the exemption is not available.
4. I have carefully gone through the assessment order in question which is at annexure-A to the petition. Though there is a reference to the purchase of gold worth Rs. 1,60,334.60, there is no discussion as to whether that should be exempted from the payment of turnover tax in view of the notification as at annexure-C. Admittedly, the assessing authority has taken the opening stock of gold of Rs. 3,05,512.88. But it has failed to add the gold ornaments purchased in the course of the relevant assessment year which is at annexure-B. Nevertheless, he has arrived at Rs. 3,65,166.70 as the total taxable turnover without any discussion or without assigning any reason. In other words, the petitioner did not make a specific claim for exemption of his purchase turnover, nor did the assessing authority independently examine with reference to the books of accounts produced the entitlement of the assessee to the exemption. What has been returned as the taxable turnover has been accepted by the assessing authority without question. If the assessment order is analysed in that manner then exclusion of purchase turnover without satisfying the conditions of the Government notification as at annexure-C is clearly an act which has caused loss of revenue and as such the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes may invoke his revisional jurisdiction under section 21(4) of the Act. I, therefore, do not see any error of law or error of jurisdiction in the impugned show cause notice.
5. Shri B. V. Katageri, learned counsel for the petitioner, drew my attention to paragraph 6 of the petition in which he has stated as follows :
“6. The petitioner submits that the identical contention was raised before the Honourable Court in Writ Petition No. 18636 of 1989 and the same was admitted on 28-11-1989 (rule issued) and the present writ petition may kindly be admitted as the same matter is involved.”
He also drew my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bir Bajrang Kumar v. State of Bihar AIR 1987 SC 1345. The decision is short and it is therefore fully extracted below :
“Heard counsel for the parties. After going through the record of the case it appears that one of the cases involving an identical point has already been admitted by the High Court but another identical petition was dismissed by the same High Court. This, therefore, creates a very anomalous position and there is a clear possibility of two contradictory judgments being rendered in the same case by the High Court. In these circumstances, we allow this appeal and set aside the order dismissing C.W.J.C. No. 163 of 1985. This appeal is remanded to the High Court to be heard along with C.W.J.C. No. 5728 of 1984 which is pending hearing.”
He, therefore, contended that this Court should not dispose of his application because the other writ petition mentioned in paragraph 6 of the petition is still pending, having been admitted. I do not see the relevance of the citation nor the binding nature of the citation on this Court. This Court has passed the order as above after notice to the respondent and after the Government Pleader was directed to take notice and was directed to be posted for further orders. Merely because one case is pending, it does not mean the Judge of the same court is disabled from disposing of a similar matter when it comes up for adjudication. No such bar is created by the decision cited, which should be understood in that fashion. In my view the Supreme Court would not in the least affect the judicial process of the High Courts by putting an embargo on the judicial discretion of the Judges of the High Court. What is implied is that no matter shall be disposed of without properly giving the reasons and without hearing the counsel. Nothing more should be read into the decision particularly where the facts are not stated. It is not unusual that conflicting decisions are rendered by different Judges of the same High Court or even the Benches of the Supreme Court; our rules of procedure and practice provide for resolution of such conflicting decisions.
6. It was also urged by Mr. Katageri that the purchase turnover is exempted from payment of tax in view of the proviso to section 6B of the Act. The first proviso to section 6B of the Act provides for exemption in respect of the articles purchased falling in the Fifth Schedule. When the learned counsel was asked to point out which entry in the Fifth Schedule covered the purchases of gold ornaments, he was unable to show the same and submitted to the court that he relied upon only the notification under section 8A of the Act. If the exemption is not available for want of entry of gold or silver ornaments in the Fifth Schedule, no exemption can be claimed under the first proviso to section 6B of the Act.
7. The petition is dismissed for the above reasons.
8. Writ petition dismissed.