PETITIONER: RAMNIKAL PITAMBARDAS MEHTA Vs. RESPONDENT: INDRADAMAN AMRATLAL SHETH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/1964 BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. CITATION: 1964 AIR 1676 1964 SCR (8) 1 CITATOR INFO : RF 1984 SC1890 (7) R 1985 SC 139 (3) RF 1986 SC1789 (3) F 1992 SC1696 (11) ACT: Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, s. 13(1) (g), (hh)-Premises required bonafide for occupation after carrying out repairs--sub-section if applicable. HEADNOTE: The appellant was a tenant of the ground floor of a house owned by respondent. The respondent sued for ejectment of the appellant on the ground that he required the entire house including the portion occupied by appellant, for his residential purpose. The defence of the appeRant was that respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and for carrying out repairs. The trial court decreed the suit of the respondent on the ground that respondent bona fide required the premises for his occupation. Ile appeal of the appellant was dismissed, His revision petition was -also dismissed by High Court. The appellant came to this Court by special leave. The only question for decision before this Court was whether the case of respon'dent came within the provisions of s. 13 ( I ) (g) or s. 13 (1) (hh), Dismissing the appeal, HELI):-The case of respondent fell under cl. (g) as he required the premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intended to, make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, did not affect the question of his requiring the house bonafide and reasonably for his occupation, when he had proved his need for occupying the house. There was no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence without making any alteration in it, There could be no logical reason for such a prohibition. The provisions of s. 13 are for the benefit of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlord's general right to eject his tenant. There is no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to a case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the premises and erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants. 2 Krishanial Ishwarlal Desai v. Bai Yijkor [19641 1 S.C.R. 553, Krishna Das v. Bidhan Chandra, A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 181, McKenna V. Porter Motors Ltd. [1956] A.C. 688, Betty's Cafes Ltd. v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd. [1959] A.C. 20, Manchharam Ghelabhai Pittalwala v. Surat Electricity Co. Ltd. Civil Revision Application No. 204/56 dated 1st February, 1957 by the Bombay High Court and Allarkha Fakirmahomed v. Surat Electricity Co. Ltd., Civil Revision Application No. 164/57, dated 8th October, 1957 by the Bombay High Court, referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL No. 61 OF 1964
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
October 28, 1963 of the. Gujarat High Court in Civil
Revision Application No. 697 of 1962.
Purshottam Trikamdas, M. 1. Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the
appellant.
S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.
April 28, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is
directed against the order of the Bombay High Court and
raises the question of the true construction of sub-cis. (g)
and (hh) of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act LVII of
1947), hereinafter called the Act.
The facts leading to the appeal, in short, are that the
appellant is a tenant of the ground-floor of a house owned
by the respondent. The respondent sued for the ejectment of
the appellant on the ground that he required the entire
house, including the portion occupied by the appellant, for
his residential purpose. He further stated in the plaint-.
“The whole suit bungalow is very old-built about 75 years
ago and at present its different parts are likely to give
way and collapse. Before sometime, a little portion of an
upper balcony had collapsed. In the circumstances, on find-
ing it unsafe to stay in it without making additions,
alterations and necessary changes, I, the plaintiff, am
obliged to wait till I get possession of the whole bungalow.
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1. the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said
suit bungalow vacated at present and only after the whole
bungalow is got overhauled as -stated in para above, 1, the
plaintiff can utilize it for my personal use.”
‘Me appellant contested the suit on various grounds
including the ones that the respondent did not reasonably
and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and
that he did not reasonably and bona fide require the
premises for carrying out repairs.
The trial Court found that the respondent bona fide required
the premises for his occupation. It repelled the contention
of the appellant that the provisions of s. 1 3 ( I) (g)
would not be applicable when the landlord did not wish to
occupy the premises as such but intended to occupy it after
carrying out major repairs. and decreed the respondent’s
suit for ejectment.
The defendant went up in appeal. It was dismissed. The
appellate Court, agreed with the views of the trial Court.
The defendant then presented a revision petition to the High
Court. It was rejected. It is against this order that he
has filed this appeal.
A preliminary objection has been taken that the revision to
the High Court was incompetent as no question of juris-
diction was involved. For the appellant it is urged that on
the facts found. the trial Court assumed jurisdiction which
it did not have and that therefore the revision was compet-
ent. We uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the
revision was incompetent.
The question raised was whether a decree in ejectment should
be passed on the ground of personal requirement under s. 1 3
(1) (g) of the Act where it was proved that the landlord
wanted to pull down the premises and build another and then
occupy it. It was said that in such a case he had to
proceed under cl. (hh) of s. 13(1). It is clear that the
question so raised is one of interpretation of these two
clauses. Section 28 of the Act gives jurisdiction to the
Court specified in it, to try a suit or proceeding, between
a landlord and tenant relating to possession of the
premises. That section expressely provides that no other
Court, subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2) which do not
apply to this case, has jurisdiction to entertain such
suits. It is clear from this section that the trial Court
had full jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment.
That being so, it had jurisdiction to interpret whether cl.
(g) of s. 13(1) would apply to the present case. The
appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The
High Court could not, therefore, interfere in revision with
the decision of the appellate Court, even if it had gone
wrong, on facts or law, in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
It follows that the revision application had to be dismissed
by the High Court and that this appeal too must fail.
Since the merits of the case have been argued fully before
us, we express our opinion on the law point urged before us.
The sole question to determine in this appeal is whether the
respondent’s case came within the provisions of
s. 13 (1) (g) of the Act or fell within the provisions of
s. 13 (1) (hh). We may now set out these provisions:
“13(1) Nothwithstanding anything contained in this Act but
subject to the provisions of section 15, a landlord shall be
entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court
is satisfied…
(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required
by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person
for whose benefit the premises are held or where the
landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the
premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the
trust; or
(hh) that the premises consist of not More than two floors
and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord
for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such
demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new
building on the premises sought to be demolished.”
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A landlord can sue for the ejectment of his tenant in view
of s. 13(1) for various reasons including the one that he
requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for occu-
pation by himself. The respondent alleged, and the Courts
below have found, that he bona fide required the premises in
the suit for occupation by himself. The respondent stated
in the plaint that he would take up residence in the pre-
mises after overhauling it. It is on this account that the
appellant submits that the case falls under s. 13 (1) (hh),
as the respondent wants the premises for the immediate
purpose of demolishing it and erecting a new building.
It is further contended for the appellant that the two
grounds for ejectment under cls. (g) and (hh) are matually
exclusive and therefore a landlord cannot take advantage of
cl. (g) when his case falls under cl. (hh) in view of the
immediate steps he has to take after getting possession of
the premises. We need not express an opinion on this point,
as, for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under
cl. (g) and not under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (I) of the Act.
We agree with the Courts below that the respondent’s case
falls under cl. (g) when he bona fiede requires the premises
for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends to
make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet
will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the
condition of the house, does not affect the question of his
requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his oc-
cupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the
house. There is no such prohibition either in the language
of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the
effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence
without making any alterations in it. There could at be any
logical reason for such a prohibition. Under ordinary law,
the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he
likes, after following certain procedure except in cases
where he has contracted not to eject him before the
happening of a certain event. The Act restricts that
general right of the landlord in the special circumstances
prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation
and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords
in demanding un’ustifiabl high rents.
6
The Act has provided sufficient protection to the tenants
against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they
are unable to satisfy landlords’ demands. Various restric-
tions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject
the tenant. Section 12(1) provides that the landlord shall
not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any
premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing
to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted
increases, if any, and observes and performs the other
conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent
with the provisions of the Act. Section 13 provides
exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant
even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready
and willing to pay rent. The provisions of s. 13 are for
the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for
ejectment mentioned in that .section are such which
reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the
exercise of the landlord’s general right to eject his
tenant. There is therefore no reason why restrictions not
mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not
therefore agree with the contention that cl. (g) will apply
only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the
premises without making any alteration in them, i.e., to
occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies.
There is no justification to give such a narrow construction
either to the word ‘premises’ or to the word ‘occupies’
which have been construed by this Court in Krishanual
Ishwarlal Desai v. Rai Vijkor(1) referred to later.
There are provisions in the Act which ensure that the
provisions of cl. (g) are not abused. Section 17 provides
that if the premises are not occupied within a period of one
month from the date the landlord recovers possession or the
premises are re-let within a period of one year of the said
date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court
may order the landlord, on the application of the original
tenant, within the time prescribed, to place him in occupa-
tion of the premises on the original terms and conditions.
This tends to ensure that a landlord does not eject a tenant
unless he really requires the premises for occupation by
himself.
(1) [1964] 1. S.C.R. 553.
7
We are therefore of opinion that once the landlord esta-
blishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his
occupation. he is entitled to recover possession of it from
the tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (g) of s.
13(1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the
premises without making any alterations to them or after
making the necessary alterations.
The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case
where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the
premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish
the premises and to erect a new building on them. The
provisions of cl. (hh) apply to cases where the landlord
does not require the premises for his own occupation but
requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let
out to tenants. This is clear from the provisions of subs.
(3A) which provide that a landlord has to give certain
undertaking before a decree for eviction can be passed on
the ground specified in cl. (hh). He has to undertake that
the new building will have not less than two times the num-
ber of residential tenements and not less than two times the
floor area contained in the premises sought to be demolish-
ed, that the work of demolishing the premises shall be com-
menced by him not later than one month and shall be com-
pleted not later than three months from the date he recovers
posession of the entire premises and that the work of erec-
tion of the new building shall be completed by him not later
than fifteen months from the said date. These undertakings
thus provide for a time schedule for the new building to
come up into existence and ensures atleast the doubling of
the residential tenements, i.e., rooms or groups of rooms
rented or offered for rent as a unit: vide s. 5(12) of the
Act.
Such undertakings would be unnecessary if the landlord seeks
to eject the tenant from the premises in order to occupy the
premises himself after making the necessary alterations to
suit his conveniences. Further, s. 17A provides for the
ejected tenant’s re-occupying the premises in case the land-
lord does not start the work of demolition within the period
specified in sub-s. (3A). Section 17B provides for the
ejected tenant to notify to the landlord within six months
8
from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of
the, premises of his intention to occupy a tenement in the
new building on its completion on the conditions specified
in the section. Section 17C provides that the landlord
would intimate to the tenant the date when the new building
would be complete and that the tenant would be entitled to
occupy the tenement on that date. These provisions clearly
establish that the provisions of cl. (hh) apply when the
landlord desires. to demolish the premises for the purpose
of erecting a new building on the premises for being let to
tenants.
We may mention that the provisions of clauses similar to
cls. (g) and (hh) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act have
been construed in this way in Krishna Das v. Bidhan
Chandra(‘), McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd.(‘), and Betty’s
Cafes Ltd.
v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd.(‘).
The appellant has referred us to two cases of the Bombay
High Court which tend to support him in so far as it is held
in them that in circumstances similar to the present one,
the case would come under cl. (hh) of s. 1 3 (I) and not
under cl. (g). They are : Manchharam Ghelabhai Pittalwala
v. The Surat Electricity Co. Ltdt. (4 ) and Allarkha Fakir-
mahomed v. The Surat Electricity Co. Ltd. (5). The latter
case followed the previous one. In the former case the High
Court said:
“Indeed the expression ‘occupation’ occurring in clause (g)
means ‘possession followed by actual occupation’, while for
the purpose of clause (hh) what is necessary is ‘possession
for the purpose of demolition’. ‘Occupation’ within clause
(g) would include ‘possession’, as it is obvious that one
cannot occupy unless one is able to possess. but in the case
of clause (hh) it is clear that it is not necessary to
occupy for the purpose of demolition. What is necessary is
that the land-
(1) A.I.R. 1959, Cal. 18i
(3) [1959] A. C. 20 ;
(2) [1956] A. C. 688;
(4)-Civil Revision Application NO. 204/56 decided on 1-2-57
by the Bombay, High Court.
(5) Civii Revision Application No. 164/57 decided On 8-10-
57 by the
Bombay High Court.
9
lord must possess in order to enable him to demolish and
erect a new building.”
Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erection
of a new building are only intermediate steps in order to
make the building fit for occupation by the landlord;
In Krishanlal Iswarlal Desai’s case(‘) this Court said in
connection with the provisions of s. 17(1) of the Act:
“What is, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the
possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by
an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some
overt act in that behalf…… ”
‘Occupation’ of the premises in cl. (g) does not necessarily
refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a
place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the
present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their
work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would
have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit
for their occupation.
We therefore hold that the respondent’s case came within cl.
(g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act and therefore dismiss
the appeal with costs. Three months allowed for vacating
the premises on the defendant tenant undertaking to vacate
the premises himself during this period.
Appeal dismissed.