JUDGMENT
D.D. Sinha, J.
1. Heard Shri Manohar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the present writ petition is directed against the issuance of Charge Sheet dated 9-2-1988 issued by respondent No. 1 as well as letter dated 15-4-1989 issued by respondent No. 1 and communication dated 3-9-1990 issued by the Divisional Special Officer to the petitioner whereby the petitioner was informed that the Government has decided to hold a Departmental Enquiry against him as per Government Order Textile Section, dated 31-8-1989.
3. Shri Manohar, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the issuance of charge sheet dated 9-2-1988 itself is not sustainable in law in view of the order passed by this Court dated 24-3-1986 in Writ Petition No. 598 of 1987, which reads thus :
“Mr. V. D. Govilkar for the petitioner.
Mr. M. B. Mehere, Assistant Government Pleader for the Respondent.
The enquiry to be completed and the report to be made not later than 15th June, 1986.
Mr. Govilkar states that the petitioner will not apply adjournment at the enquiry.
In the light of the above, Mr. Govilkar applies for permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to file a fresh petition in the event of the enquiry not being completed by 15th June, 1986.
On Mr. Govilkar’s application, petition allowed to be withdrawn.”
4. Shri Manohar, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on the earlier occasion, the identical charge sheet dated 10-3-1986 was issued by the respondent and therefore, the petitioner filed the above referred Writ Petition No. 598 of 1986, challenging the validity of the charge sheet issued to the petitioner and the said writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn by this Court vide order dated 24-3-1986, which is stated as above. It is contended that since the respondent could not complete the enquiry before 15th June, 1986, they have moved a Civil Application No. 2950 of 1986, seeking extension of time to complete the enquiry. However, this Court dismissed the said civil application by observing thus :
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2950 OF 1986
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 598 OF 1986
CORAM : LENTIN AND KURDUKAR, JJ.
14th AUGUST, 1986.
Mr. M. B. Mehere, Assistant Government Pleader for the applicant.
Mr. V. D. Govilkar, for the Opponent.
P.C.
LENTIN, J. :- No case has been made out why time should be extended as prayed for, and the averments contained in the application for extension of time are cheerfully vague. Furthermore, it was because by our order dated 24th March, 1986 we directed the enquiry to be completed and the report to be submitted not later than 15th June, 1986 that Mr. Govilkar applied for permission to withdraw the petition which we allowed him to do so. If we had initially fixed the date later than 15th June, 1986 for the completion of the enquiry, Mr. Govilkar would not have applied for permission to withdraw the petition.
Hence looked at either way, we see no reason why the opponent should be placed in an invidious position to his detriment, merely because the applicant has not taken expeditious steps to even start the enquiry much less complete it within the time ordered.
Civil application dismissed.”
5. Shri Manohar, learned counsel for the petitioner states that since the application for extension of time was rejected by this Court, respondent ought to have completed the enquiry within the stipulated period i.e. on or before 15th June, 1986, however, failure to do so results in vitiating the enquiry proceedings. Shri Manohar, contended that in the instant case, the respondent issued a second charge sheet dated 9-2-1988 and the charges framed against the petitioner in the said charge sheet are totally identical in nature with that of the charges framed in charge sheet dated 3-6-1986. Not only that, the list of documents and the list of witnesses are also identical in nature which were relied by the respondent while issuing the first charge sheet dated 10-3-1986. It is, therefore, contended that in view of the above referred facts of the case, the initiation of fresh Departmental Enquiry on the basis of the said charges and for the same misconduct is not sustainable in law and therefore, the same may be quashed and set aside.
6. Shri Patel, learned AGP appearing for the respondents does not dispute the factual aspect of the matter including the order dated 24-3-1986 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 558 of 1986 as well as order dated 14-8-1986 passed by this Court whereby the application for extension of time for completing the enquiry was rejected by this Court. However, he contended that since the application for extension of time to conduct the enquiry was rejected by this Court, the respondent did not get the opportunity to complete the departmental enquiry instituted against the petitioner and therefore, the respondent thought it fit to issue fresh charge sheet to the petitioner though on the same set of facts and charges. The learned AGP contended that the issuance of fresh charge sheet dated 9-2-1988 is perfectly legal and sustainable in law.
7. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the respective parties. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the first charge sheet dated 10-3-1986 consisted of eight charges. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the same in Writ Petition No. 598 of 1986 and this Court on 24-3-1986 permitted the petitioner to withdraw the petition by specifically observing that the enquiry should be completed and the report to be submitted not later than 15th June, 1986. The application for extension of time to complete the enquiry was dismissed vide order dated 14-8-1986. On the backdrop of these undisputed facts, it was incumbent on the respondent to complete the enquiry and submit the report of such enquiry on or before 15-6-1986. Since the respondent failed to complete the enquiry within the stipulated period, the right to proceed with the enquiry after 15-6-1986 came to an end, consequently, the enquiry so initiated vide charge sheet dated 10-3-1986 stands vitiated after 15-6-1986.
8. In the instant case, the respondents have evolved a novel method for conducting the departmental enquiry against the petitioner by issuing fresh charge sheet dated 9-8-1988 wherein the alleged charges which are framed against the petitioner are totally identical with that of the charges framed in earlier charge sheet dated 10-3-1986 and the misconduct which is alleged is also the same, which was part and parcel of the earlier charge sheet dated 10-3-1986. The fact that the charges are identical in nature is not disputed by the respondent. Similarly, the list of documents and list of witnesses relied on by the respondent for proving the charges in the second charge sheet are also identical in nature with that of relied on by the respondent for first charge sheet dated 10-3-1986. On the backdrop of the above referred facts, it is evident that the respondent, by virtue of this exercise, wants to reopen the case of departmental enquiry against the petitioner on the same set of facts and for the same misconduct which, in our considered view, is not permissible in law.
9. As we have already observed hereinabove, after 15th June, 1986, the respondent lost the legal right to proceed with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner by virtue of the specific order dated 24-3-1986 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 598 of 1986 and therefore, the question of starting new enquiry by fresh charge sheet dated 9-3-1988 on the same set of charges and for the same misconduct, does not arise.
10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the charge sheet dated 9-2-1988 issued by the respondent is unsustainable in law. Similarly, the letters dated 15-4-1989 as well as 3-9-1990 which are impugned in this writ petition are also unsustainable in law.
11. In the circumstances, the charge sheet dated 9-2-1989 and letters dated 15-4-1989 and 3-9-1990 are quashed and set aside. Writ Petition is allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.