PETITIONER: RAMTI DEVI Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT20/10/1994 BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BHARUCHA S.P. (J) MUKHERJEE M.K. (J) CITATION: 1995 SCC (1) 198 JT 1995 (1) 223 1994 SCALE (4)676 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
ORDER
1.This appeal by special leave arises against the judgment
and decree of the Delhi High Court in RFA No. 59 of 1978
dated 26-2-1979. The plaintiff appellant filed the suit for
declaration that she is the absolute owner and is in
possession of the house bearing old Municipal No. 5925 and
new Municipal No. 4477, Ward No. XI, situated at Plot No.
7/18, Darya Ganj, Delhi. She claimed to have purchased the
property from one Kaushalya Devi under a sale deed dated 11-
5-1946 registered on 29-5-1946 and thereby she is said to be
the owner. Shri Ratti Ram had no right title or interest to
alienate the property by the sale deed dated 29-1-1947 which
was said to have been executed to stifle the prosecution
intended to be lodged against him. The trial court
dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court confirmed it.
2.The question is whether the suit is within limitation. In
the evidence, it was admitted that she had knowledge of the
execution and registration of the sale deed on 29-1-1947.
Initially a suit was filed in 1959 but was dismissed as
withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit. Admittedly, the
present suit was filed on 30-7-1966. The question,
therefore, is whether the suit is within limitation.
Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963,
relied on by the appellant herself, postulates that to
cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the
rescission of a contract, the limitation is three years and
it begins to run when the plaintiff entitles to have the
instrument or the decree cancelled or set aside or when the
contract rescinded first became known to him. As seen, when
the appellant had knowledge of it on 29-1-1949 itself the
limitation began to run from that date and the three years’
limitation has hopelessly been barred on the date when the
suit was filed. It is contended by Shri VM. Tarkunde,
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that the counsel
in the trial court was not right in relying upon Article 59.
Article 113 is the relevant article. The limitation does
not begin to run as the sale deed document is void as it was
executed to stifle the prosecution. Since the appellant
having been remained in possession, the only declaration
that could be sought and obtained is that she is the owner
and that the document does not bind the appellant. We are
afraid that we cannot agree with the learned counsel. As
seen, the recitals of the documents would show that the sale
deed was executed for valuable consideration to discharge
pre-existing debts and it is a registered document. Apart
from the prohibition under Section 92 of the Evidence Act to
adduce oral evidence to contradict the terms of the recital
therein, no issue in this behalf on the
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voidity of the sale deed or its binding nature was raised
nor a finding recorded that the sale deed is void under
Section 23 of the Contract Act. Pleading itself is not
sufficient. Since the appellant is seeking to have the
document avoided or cancelled, necessarily, a declaration
has to be given by the court in that behalf. Until the
document is avoided or cancelled by proper declaration, the
duly registered document remains valid and binds the
parties. So the suit necessarily has to be laid within
three years from the date when the cause of action had
occurred. Since the cause of action had arisen on 29-1-
1947, the date on which the sale deed was executed and
registered and the suit was filed on 30-7-1966, the suit is
hopelessly barred by limitation. The courts below,
therefore, were right in dismissing the suit. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed with costs.
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