JUDGMENT
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Both these writ petitions can be disposed of by
common order a sit pertain to the same land and arising
from the tenancy proceedings between the same parties.
These writ petitions take exception to the common order
passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, at Camp
Kolhapur dated July 29, 1985 in Revision Nos.
MRT/KP.315/1977 and MRT/KP.316/1977. The suit land is
situated at survey No. 227 admeasuring 8 Acres 21
Gunthas at Village Banage, Tal Kagal, Dist. Kolhapur.
Undisputedly, the suit land was the Inam land i.e. Hujur
Sanadi Inam governed by the provisions of the Bombay
Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition
Act, 1955. The Petitioners was inducted in the said land
as tenant and, as he was lawfully cultivating the suit
land in that capacity on the tillers day i.e. 1st
April, 1957, proceedings under Section 32G of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 were initiated.
In that proceedings, the Petitioner unambiguously stated
that he was unwilling to purchase the suit land. The
unwillingness has been so recorded. The record also
indicates that the consequence of that statement were
also explained to the Petitioner but he maintained his
position that he was unwilling to purchase the suit land.
Accordingly, the tenancy authority declared the purchase
having become ineffective, by order dated 21st
October, 1960. Thereafter, the respondent landlord moved
an application under Section 32P of the Act. That
application was granted and an order was passed directing
the Petitioner to hand over possession of the suit land.
Subsequent to the above said order under Section 32P of
the Act, the suit land which was held as Inam land was
re-granted to the Respondent. After the said regrant,
once again enquiry under Section 32G of the Act were
initiated in the year 1974. Even in this proceedings the
Petitioner expressed his unwillingness to purchase the
suit land and it is so recorded by the authority. In
view of the said statement once again Tenancy Authority
held that the purchase has become ineffective.
Consequently to the said order, proceedings under Section
32P were initiated and same were decided in favour of the
Respondent Landlord on 23rd March, 1974. Pursuant to the
said order possession of the suit land was made over to
the Respondent landlord on 16.3.1975. Kabja Pavati
reflecting this position was prepared in the presence of
the Petitioner and with his full consent and knowledge.
However, thereafter the Petitioner filed two separate
appeals before the Collector, Kolhapur bearing Tenancy
Appeal Nos. 15/76 and 16/76, challenging both the orders
passed in 32G as well as 32G proceedings. The Collector
decided both the appeals by separate orders. The
Collector took the view that proper procedure under
Section 32G(3) was not complied with and, therefore, the
order passed under Section 32G and under Section 32P were
invalid. Accordingly, the Collector set aside those
orders and remanded the matter to the tenancy Authority
for reconsideration. This order of the Collector was
challenged by the Respondent before the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal by way of two separate Revision
Application Nos. MRT.KP.315/77 and MRT.KP.316/77. The
Tribunal, after examining the rival position and the
record held that the Collector was wrong in holding that
proper procedure has not been followed under Section
32G(3). Whereas, according to the Tribunal, the
Petitioner tenant had made conscious statement before the
authorities on more than one occasion that he was
unwilling to purchase the suit land. According to the
Tribunal, therefore, in view of the consistent stand
taken by the tenant expressing his unwillingness to
purchase the land, the ground or challenge to over come
the said position was unavailable. The Tribunal,
therefore, allowed both the revision applications
preferred by the Respondent. Against the said order the
Petitioner preferred two separate Writ Petitions bearing
Nos. 491 of 1979 and 492 of 1979. This Court, however,
was of the view that the authorities have overlooked the
crucial aspect of the matter that the land was Inam land
and the same was admittedly regrated in the year 1971 to
the Respondent and as such the previous proceedings under
Section 32G which had terminated in favour of the
Respondent landlord prior to regrant were without
authority of law. For taking this view the learned
single Judge of this Court placed reliance on the
decision of this court in the case of Sripati Balwant
Konde v. Shaikh Karim 1982 Tenancy Law Reporter Page
24. This Court, therefore, by order dated December 9,
1983 remanded the matter to the Tribunal to reconsider
the controversy afresh. Pursuant to the remand order
passed by this Court, both the Revision Applications were
restored to the file of the Tribunal. The Tribunal
examined the question as to whether the previous
proceedings between the parties under Section 32G and 32P
of the Act prior to the date of regrant can be said to be
invalid and without authority of law. The Tribunal has
held that having regard to the provisions of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 read with the
provisions of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous
Alienation Abolition Act, 1959, neither the authorities
nor the parties were precluded from maintaining or
continuing the proceedings under Section 32G or Section
32P of the Act before the date of regrant. For taking
this view the Tribunal has placed reliance on a direct
decisions of this Court in the Case of Sripati Mane v.
Shamrao Jagdale in Special Civil Application No. 981 of
1966 decided on 25.9.1968 reported in 1970 Tenancy Law
Reporter 135 as well as another unreported decision in
Special C.A.No. 374 of 1965 decided on 30th November, 1967.
The Tribunal has noted that the decision in Sripati
Balwant Konde 1982 TLR 24 concerns the provisions of the
Maharashtra Revenue Patel (Abolition of Office) Act, 1962
which are materially different than the Abolition Act of
1955 applicable to the present case. The Tribunal
further held that no other question was required to be
considered in view of the limited remand order passed by
this Court. Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the
revision applications and was pleased to set aside the
order of remand passed by the Collector which was the
subject matter of challenge and, instead, restored the
order passed by the first court. It is this decision of
the Tribunal which is the subject matter of challenge in
the present writ petitions.
2. Mr. Pandit appearing for the Petitioner contends
that the Tribunal was completely in error in taking the
view that the proceedings under Section 32G and 32P of
the Act could be instituted and continued even before the
date of regrant in favour of the Respondent. He has
placed reliance on the decision of this court in Sripati
Balwant Konde’s case to support that submission. He has
also placed reliance on Section 32G(6) of the Act to
contend that no proceedings could be initiated or
continued before the date of regrant. He further submits
that in any case the Tribunal has clearly misread the
remand order of this Court by confining the enquiry only
to one question, whereas the Tribunal ought to have
examined the matter on merits with regard to the
challenge in relation to the factum or correctness of the
alleged statement recorded on behalf of the Petitioner in
32G and 32P proceedings. According to him, it is
inconceivable that the tenant would express unwillingness
to purchase the land when such a valuable right had
crystallized in his favour by operation of law.
According to him, the Petitioner is a rustic person and
obviously could not have realized the consequence of the
statement recorded in the said proceeding which would
eventually disrobe him of his right to purchase the
subject land.
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
Respondent has supported the view taken by the Tribunal
and, he further contends that, there is no reason to
interfere with the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal on
the earlier occasion.
4. Having considered the rival contentions, to my
mind, the first point raised by Mr. Pandit is no more
res integra, for it is fully covered by the decision in
the case of Sripati Mane v. Shamrao Jagdale (Supra).
Even in that case, the land was Sanadi Inam land. And
before the date of regrant, Section 32G proceedings were
initiated. This specific question was agitated even in
that case-that proceedings under Section 32G initiated
prior to the date of regrant were without authority of
law. This Court on examining the relevant provisions of
the Abolition Act of 1955 as well as the Tenancy Act, 1948
has held that such proceedings can be resorted to by the
parties as the same have been expressly saved by Section
28 of the Abolition Act of 1955. Even in the present
case the land was Hujuri Sanadi Inam land which was
governed by the provisions of the said Abolition Act of
1955. This fact is not in dispute. In the
circumstances, the above decision of this Court will
squarely apply to the present case and it will have to be
held that the previous proceedings initiated under
Section 32G and 32P, which culminated in favour of the
Respondent landlady even prior to the date of regrant,
will be binding on the Petitioner as they are legitimate
proceedings between the parties. It is not in dispute
that orders passed in those proceedings have attained
finality as the same have not been challenged at all;
whereas the present Petitions emanate from the subsequent
action initiated under Section 32G in the year 1974 after
the regrant in year 1971. If that is so,then there is
no reason to examine the correctness or otherwise of the
decision in the subsequent proceeding as the same could
not have been resorted to in view of the finality of
adjudication of the issue between the parties in the
earlier proceedings, albeit prior to regrant. Indeed,
the correctness of the orders passed in proceedings prior
to regrant cannot be reopened or allowed to be assailed
in the subsequent proceedings after regrant initiated on
an erroneous basis. Besides the above decision of this
Court, it will be useful to advert to a decision of the
Apex Court in the case
Pandurgan D. Lad v. Dada Rama Methe and Ors. The
Apex Court had an occasion to consider the efficacy of
the provisions of the Abolition Act of 1955. In Paragraph
5 of the said decision the Apex Court has observed that
there is no inconsistency in the provisions of the
Tenancy Act, 1948 and that of the Abolition Act of 1955.
The Apex Court has observed that Section 28 of the
Abolition Act, 1955 provides that nothing contained in
that Act shall affect the application of any of the
provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1948. Understood thus,
the earlier proceedings between the parties under Section
32G and 32P which culminated in favour of the Respondent
prior to the regrant which have attained finality, cannot
be reopened in this manner.
5. Be that as it may, the Tribunal has rightly
distinguished the Judgment of this Court in Sripati
Balwant Konde’s case (supra) by pointing out that the
provisions of the Maharashtra Revenue Patel (Abolition of
Office) Act, 1962 are materially different from the
Abolition Act of 1955 with which we are presently
concerned. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in
following the direct decision of this Court which deals
with the provisions of the Abolition Act, 1955.
Accordingly, the Tribunal cannot be faulted with the
view that the previous proceedings under Section 32G and
32P were validly maintained and continued even prior to
the date of regrant in favour of the Respondent.
6. The next grievance made on behalf of the
Petitioner is that the Tribunal has not adverted to the
other questions on merit though the High Court had
remanded the case for examination of all the questions
afresh. There is no substance in this grievance. The
Tribunal was right that the remand was mainly to decide
the question as to whether proceedings under Section 32G
commenced in 1968 were valid in absence of regrant. No
other enquiry was necessary or for that matter could have
been examined by the tribunal, having regard to the
limited nature of remand made by this court. In the
earlier round, the Tribunal has adverted to all the
relevant materials and contentions and has answered the
issues on merit against the Petitioner. The Tribunal has
held that the earlier proceedings were valid and in
conformity with the requirements of law. It has been
also found that the Petitioner was given ample
opportunity on more than one occasion- but on every
occasion, he consciously made statement that he was
unwilling to purchase the land. The circumstances would
clearly show that there was no confusion in the mind of
the Petitioner at the time of making that statement of
unwillingness to purchase. The Tribunal has rightly
discarded the argument of fraud practised on the
Petitioner in the earlier proceedings. If the tenant had
willingly made such statement then it was not open for
the Authority to ignore the same just because the tenant
had given up his statutory right to purchase the land,
unless there were positive circumstances to show that
such a statement was made under mistaken belief, coercion
or fraud etc. On the other hand, the present case the
Authorities have recorded that the Petitioner was
explained about the consequences of his statement but he
preferred to maintain his stand. There is no reason to
doubt the correctness of the said record.
7. The next grievance made on behalf of the
Petitioner is that the earlier proceedings were void on
account of non compliance of mandatory procedure
prescribed by the proviso to Section 32G(3) of the Act.
However, the learned counsel was not in a position to
demonstrate as to what was the non compliance in this
case that would vitiate the earlier order. On the other
hand, it is seen from the record and, it has been so held
by the first authority as well as the Revisional
authority that, the tenant had appeared before the
authority and he voluntarily made statement that he was
unwilling to purchase the land. After that statement was
made by the Petitioner, the same was read over and
explained to him including its consequences. Inspite of
that he maintained his statement and only thereafter, the
the Tribunal passed the order in writing declaring that
the purchase had become ineffective. Whereas, the
proviso would apply only when the tenant had remained
absent before the authority. This is obvious from the
plain language of the said proviso to Section 32G(3),
which reads thus:
“Provided that if such order is passed in default
of the appearance of any party, the Tribunal shall
communicate such order to the parties and any
party on whose default the order was passed may
within 60 days from the date on which the order
was communicated to him apply for the review of
the same”.
In the present case, however, it is not the
Petitioner’s case that he was not personally present when
the statement is stated to have been recorded. But, he
admits that he was present during the enquiry and made
that statement. Suffice it to point out that no case of
non compliance of the mandatory procedure has been
established. The Tribunal was right in holding that the
Collector was manifestly wrong that there was non
compliance of the procedure under Section 32G of the Act.
In any case, illegality or irregularity of the earlier
proceedings cannot be allowed to be set up in this manner
when those orders have been allowed to attain finality.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, both these writ
petitions would fail and the same are being dismissed
with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.