JUDGMENT
B.N. Kirpal, J.
(1) The challenge in this writ petition is to the notification which has been issued under Sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of land in Village Kakrola.
(2) The land is proposed to be acquired for planned development of Delhi for the Dawarka (Papankala) Project. It has been explained by the respondents that the land is required for Phase-II of the said project and despite the award having been made on 2nd April, 1993, the entire possession of the land has not been taken over by the respondents because of the obstructions which have been put in the way of the same. It is contended by the petitioner that the notification under Section 4 of the Act is bad in law because there was no justification for invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Act.
(3) We find no merit in this contention. The Dawarka Project has been underway for quite sometime. Allotments have been made to a large number of co-operative societies in Phase-I as is evident from the judgment of Shri Bhagwan & another v. Union of India 1991 Vol.II Delhi Lawyer 59. The present land is required for Phase-II and the project is integrated. The land in question has been declared as a development area and in order that the project should be completed expeditiously the respondents have invoked the provisions of Section 17 of the Act which in our opinion is valid.It has been contended that the respondents do not have any money to pay and the acquisition of the land be quashed. We find no merit in this.On the last date of hearing, the Land Acquisition Collector had appeared in Court and made statement that approximately Rs.75 crores have already been distributed. There is no admission by the respondents that they have no money to pay for the acquisition of the land. A bare assertion in this behalf made by the petitioner is without any basis. We have no manner of doubt that compensation will be paid in accordance with law.
(4) It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the payment must be made before the possession of the land is handed over. He submits that once the award is made the Land Acquisition Collector is bound to make the payment irrespective of the fact whether the possession has been taken over by him or not. Looking at the ground reality where despite award having been made persons including erstwhile owners continue to remain in unauthorised occupation of the land.we see no justification for the public funds to be distributed and the possession not taken, nor is it desirable and advisable that the compensation should not be paid at the time when possession is taken over by the respondents.
(5) Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the provisions of Section 17(3)(a)of the Act have not been complied with and the Land Acquisition Collector did not have 80% money with him. We find this allegation to be without any basis. The question of payment of money will arise only when possession is taken over and in the present case there is no basis for contending that the Land Acquisition Collector had no money and the said allegation has been denied by the respondents in the affidavit of Shri P.C. Chaturvedi, Land Acquisition Collector dated 10th July. 1993.
(6) It has also been contended by Mr. Vashist appearing on behalf of some of the petitioners, that the land in question is shown as agricultural in the Master Plan and, therefore, it cannot be acquired for planned development of Delhi. The notification under Section 4 of the Act in the instant case was issued on I 1th June, 1991 and Section 6 notification was issued on 6th December, 1991. Notices under Sections 9 and 10 were issued in December 1992/ January 1993. In our opinion the writ which is filed in 1993 is highly belated insofar as it seeks to challenge the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 oftheAct. There is also a challenge to the invoking of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 has been invoked in the notification of 6th June, 1991 and the present writ petition has been filed long thereafter. In the matter relating to acquisition of land where the land is required for development there should not be any delay in challenging the 327 acquisition. The project is already underway and a delay of a few months, as in the present case, would amount to the petitioner being guilty of laches.
(7) The land has been-admittedly acquired for a public purpose and we see no justification for interferingin exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a view to quash the acquisition of the land.
(8) It is also contended that Master Plan does not permit the land to be used for a project like the present and that the acquisition is bad. There is no force in this contention. Master Plan only indicates the land use and it prohibits the land use for a purpose different than what is stated in the Master Plan. As is evident from the judgment of this Court in the case of Shri Bhagwan and another (supra) the integrated project of Dwarka contains green areas as well as residential areas, therefore, it is not that the entire land which is going to be acquired is to be built upon. We do not expect from Dda to use any land contrary to the provisions of the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan. If the land use is to be changed the Central Government is empowered to do so and Mr. Sethi submits that there will be no use of the land in any way contrary to the Master Plan. Therefore there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
(9) It is submitted by the learned counsel for the. petitioner that the petitioner can approach the Court after the issuance of notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and therefore this is not the case where the petitioner has been found guilty of laches. Whether the petitioner is guilty of laches will depend upon the facts of each case and where the challenge is to the notifications under Section a 4 and 6 primarily on the ground that Section 17 could not have been invoked, that challenge should have been made at the very earliest so that the acquiring authority has an opportunity,if it was satisfied, not to invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In the present case when there had been no challenge to the invoking of Section 17 within a reasonable time after Sec.4 notification acquiring authority can thereupon issue Section 6 notification without fear of challenge . In our opinion, therefore, even though the notices under Sections 9 and 10 have been issued in December, 1992/January 1993, there would be no excuse or ground for challenging the issuance of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 after more than 12 months by filing a writ petition. Counsel for the petitioner also cited The State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial Singh and others wherein it has been held that if the acquisition does not brook the delay of more than 30 days then Section 17 should not be invoked. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents,regarding pre-notification delay, cited Deepak Pahwa etc. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others wherein it has been held that such a delay does not ipso facto render the invocation of the urgency provisions as void. This is followed by another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi wherein it has been held that delay of one year between publication of notification under Section 4 and publication of the declaration under Section 6 was not fatal and that by itself was not sufficient to render decision of the State Government taken under Section 17 as being improper or illegal. That apart, the challenge on this ground is highly belated.
(10) We find no merit in this writ petition. Dismissed.