JUDGMENT
Sudhir Narain, J.
1. The petitioner seeks to quash the order dated 14.11.2002 passed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, U.P., Lucknow, respondent No. 2, holding that the petitioner is not entitled to continue on the post of Chairman of District Cooperative Bank, Gorakhpur (in short the ‘Bank’) on the ground that he was involved in an offence involving moral turpitude.
2. The brief facts are that the petitioner was elected as Chairman of the District Co-operative Bank, Gorakhpur in the year 1999. He was convicted in Sessions Trial No. 225 of 1995 and the Sessions Judge convicted him under Section 302 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code and awarded him sentence of life imprisonment on 7th July, 2000. The petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2000, against the said order. In the appeal, this Court has granted him bail and the execution of sentence has been suspended.
3. Respondent No. 5 was also one of the Directors of the Bank, it is alleged that he submitted resignation from his post and it was accepted by the Committee of Management on 29.5.2002. Respondent No. 5 filed writ petition against the decision of the Committee of Management of the Bank accepting his resignation. In the said writ petition, the Court passed an order restraining the petitioner from functioning as Chairman of the Bank. The petitioner preferred special leave petition against the order of this Court in the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court disposed of the matter with the direction that the Registrar Co-operative Societies shall decide the two questions as to whether the petitioner is entitled to function after his conviction under Section 302 by the Sessions Court and secondly, as to whether respondent No. 5 had in fact submitted resignation and its effect. The Registrar, respondent No. 2, after hearing both the parties passed the impugned order dated 15.11.2002, holding that the petitioner is not entitled to continue in the office as Chairman of the Bank under Rule 453 (1) (d) of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1968 (in short the Rules) as he has been convicted in an offence involving moral turpitude and the necessary action can be taken in this regard under Rule 454 of the Rules. It was further held that respondent No. 5 had submitted resignation and there is no infirmity in the decision of the Committee of Management accepting his resignation.
4. The core question in this writ petition is as to whether the petitioner is disqualified from continuing as member of Committee of Management under Rule 453 (1) (d) of the Rules which provides that if a person has been convicted in an offence involving, in the opinion of the Registrar, moral turpitude he is not eligible to continue as member of Committee of Management. The Rule reads as under :
“453 (1) No person shall be eligible to be or to continue as a member of the Committee of Management of a Co-operative Society, if :
(a) …..
(b) …..
(c) …..
(d) he has been convicted in an offence involving, in the opinion of the Registrar, moral turpitude, such conviction not having been set aside in appeal.”
5. The prosecution case against the petitioner and other accused persons in the Sessions Trial was that a written report was lodged by the informant Satyabrat Tiwari on 20.3.1992 at 6.55 a.m. at police station Gola, district Gorakhpur, with
the allegations that on 20.3.1992 at 6.30 a.m. he along with his brother Prafful Tiwari, one Bindeshwari Tiwari, Brij Nath Tiwari and Chakradhari Yadav was going to Gorakhpur from his cinema hall, situate in town Gola, in his own jeep and when his jeep reached near the turning of the road for Guest House in town Gola, one Bansidhar Dubey stopped the jeep and requested Prafful TJwari who was driving the jeep to take him also in the jeep in case it was going to Gorakhpur. Prafful Tiwari told him that he may come at the residence of Ram Shakal Yadav as he was intending to drink water there and thereafter he shall take him in his jeep, Prafful Tiwari reached at the residence of Ram Shakal Yadav and asked him to bring water for drinking. It is alleged that in the meantime one Gypsy No. U.P. 53/9192 which belonged to M.L.A. Markandey Chand came and stopped there and the accused Raj Narain Chand got down from the Gypsy and exhorted that Prafful Tiwari was sitting there and he should be murdered. On his exhortation Ranvijay Chand the petitioner and Devendra Pratap Chand both armed with guns, Ashok Singh and Arun Singh both armed with country made pistols, Ram Bhajan Singh armed with revolver got down from the Gypsy and they opened fire on Prafful Tiwari by their arms and he received various injuries and died on the spot.
6. The motive assigned by the prosecution in the sessions trial was that there was enmity in connection with competition of theka (contract) for taking out sand in respect of Lot No. 3 taken by Gorakhnath Yadav with whom it is said that Prafful Tiwari was doing that business as partner and they were on one side whereas Ram Sewak and his partner Ram Narain Chand who had taken theka of Lot No. 4 were on another side and the taking of theka was the cause of this incident. The Sessions Judge noted that apart from being motive assigned for committing the offence, there had been political rivalries in between the two families and there was sufficient evidence on the record to show that the parties had bad blood. The
Sessions Judge on evidence found that the petitioner had participated in firing and he was convicted of offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code and awarded him sentence of life imprisonment.
7. The question is whether the petitioner can be said to be guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude. The word “moral turpitude” has not been defined under the Indian Penal Code or anywhere else. In Black’s Law Dictionary the meaning of ‘moral’ has been given as under :
“Moral.–Pertains to character, conduct, intention, social relations :
(1) Pertaining or relating to the conscience or moral sense or to the general principles of right conduct.
(2) Cognizable or enforceable only by the conscience or by the principles of right conduct, as distinguished from positive law.
(3) Depending upon or resulting from probability, raising a belief or conviction in the mind independent of strict or logical proof.
(4) Involving or affecting the moral sense ; as in the phrase “moral insanity”.”
8. The meaning of “moral turpitude” has been given as under :
“Moral turpitude.–An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.
Conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
9. Different persons may have different views in regard to baseness, vileness or depravity in conduct of a man. One may take a narrow view and
the other may take a liberal view. The broad principle may be when the conduct of a man shocks the conscience of people in regard to action or conduct of a man. If the law prohibits to do an act and it is violated, such violation may be with a deliberate intention or it may be under certain circumstances which may not amount to “moral turpitude”. It depends upon the facts of each case. It has been subject to discussion in various decisions.
10. In Sita Ram v. District Magistrate, Pilibhit, 1957 ALJ 383. the Court held that making of a false charge knowing to be false with the object that the accused should be prosecuted and punished, is an act which involves serious type of moral turpitude. The Court observed :
“The making of a false charge knowing it to be false with the object that the accused should be prosecuted and punished is certainly an act which involves a serious type of moral turpitude. The gist of the offence is that the person who brings the charge knows it to be false and still in order to injure some other person for more improper motive of his moves the prosecution authority in order to injure that person. The gist being a false statement to the knowledge of the person such an act clearly involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is clearly an ingredient of the offence when the offence consists of an act of giving false information knowing it to be false in order to injure somebody else.”
11. This decision was followed in Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras and Ors., AIR 1959 All 71, where the accused was charged of an offence under Section 182, I.P.C. on his giving false information to a public servant. It was held that such deliberate wrong information was a moral turpitude on the ground that it is the duty of a man to give correct information to a public servant and if he gives false information it is moral turpitude. The Court observed as under :
“The expression “moral turpitude” is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man.”
12. The above decisions were explained in Mangall v. Chhakki Lal and Ors., AIR 1963 All 527, where the respondent therein had filed an application to the post of Pradhan of Gaon Panchayat. His application was rejected on the ground that he was convicted in an offence under Section 60 of U. P. Excise Act. His nomination paper was rejected. The election petition filed by him was allowed and it was held that where the respondent belonging to a district where prohibition was not imposed purchased lawfully in that district small quantity of bhang under medical advice and carried it with him where he had to go to the district in which prohibition was imposed and there he was convicted under Section 60 of the Excise Act, he had no motive leading to the crime. The judgment was upheld holding that the Court has to examine the circumstances under which an offence was committed.
13. A. P. Srivastava, J., was of the opinion that some of the observations made in Sita Ram’s case (supra) was too widely stated and if any offence under an enactment for violation of provisions of law is treated as
involving moral turpitude, then every such offence shall be taken as involving moral turpitude which would not have been the intention of the Legislature. When the Legislature uses the word offence involving moral turpitude, tt means that violation of law under penal provisions itself would not amount to moral turpitude unless some of the ingredients of moral turpitude is existing. The Court laid down three tests to find out whether the offence involves moral turpitude :
(1) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general.
(2) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one, and
(3) Whether on account of the act having been committed, the perpetrator could be cqnsidered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.
14. In Aijaz Ahmad v. Niyaz Ahmad Khan and Anr., 1975 ALR 476, the Court relying upon the observation made in Mangali v. Chhakki Lal and Ors., AIR 1963 All 527, held that the conviction under Sections 3 and 8 of U. P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act does not involve moral turpitude so as to disqualify a person to hold the office of Pradhan because the element of wickedness or debasement of character of a person, which is necessary ingredient of an offence to constitute moral turpitude, was not existing.
15. The question is as to whether if a person takes life of another person by killing him, can it be taken as offence involving moral turpitude. The matter was considered by the Apex Court in Pavan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors., JT 1996 (5) SC 155, and it was held that moral turpitude is an expression which is used in legal as also societical parlance and describes the conduct which is inherently base, vile, deprave or having any connection
showing depravity. Killing a person per se may not come within the periphery of “moral turpitude” but subjecting a woman to cruelty or killing her for, or in connection with demand of dowry, would certainly be an offence involving moral turpitude. The person who was convicted under Section 295 Indian Penal Code on its own would not involve moral turpitude depriving him the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances which led to the conviction met the requirements of the policy decision. In this case, a person was not convicted of an offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code but it was observed that killing a person itself is not sufficient to establish that such an act Involves moral turpitude.
16. In Hikmat Ali Khan v. Ishwar Prasad Arya and Ors., 1997 (2) AWC 851 (SC) : AIR 1997 SC 864, where an advocate assaulted the opponent with knife in Court room, was held an offence involving moral turpitude which disqualified him from being enrolled as an advocate. In Rajendra Prasad Pandey v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 1998 (3) AWC 2349 : (1998) 3 UPLBEC 2088, where the petitioner was prosecuted for an offence derogatory to the dignity of woman was held that it was an offence involving moral turpitude. In Mahak Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors. 1999 (3) AWC 1858 : (1999) 2 UPLBEC 1336, the petitioner was removed as Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat under Section 195 (1) (g) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, on one of the grounds that he was convicted of the heinous offence of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court in para 13 of the judgment recorded a finding that the crime of murdering the step-mother was shocking one and offence involves moral wickedness. His conviction under Section 302/34 of Indian Penal Code Involving moral turpitude was sufficient enough to earn disqualification within the meaning of provision of Section 5A (g) of the Act.
17. In Harsufch Rama v. Sarnam Singh, 1964 ALJ 1118, the question as to whether a conviction under
Section 302/149 of Indian Penal Code could be deemed a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude was considered in detail. The Court laid down the following legal proposition :
“‘Turpitude’ is a word of high emotional significance, suggesting conduct of such depravity as to excite feelings of disgust and contempt. The crime of simple hurt does not normally provoke any such reaction and consequently, cannot be classed as an offence involving moral turpitude ; and it seems to me that there is no logical reason why the offence of murder, which in a sense is only an aggravated form of hurt, should be held necessarily to involve moral turpitude. I am willing to concede that murders which are premeditated and planned in cold blood, those which are perpetrated for some base motive and those which are carried out with extreme ferocity and cruelty do involve moral turpitude, as they naturally evoke spontaneous feeling of repulsion and condemnation in the mind. But a murder committed in the heat of a fight or in response to serious provocation could hardly be placed in the same category.”
18. In that case, it was found that the accused committed murder by way of retaliation for a talk by the complainant’s party on a member of accused party. There was a degree of provocation which to a certain extent mitigated the heinousness of the crime.
19. The offence of murder is a heinous crime. It shows deprave mentality of a man and shocks conscience of any sane person. The society looks at such heinous crime as an act of vileness, mental depravity and wickedness. However, there may be mitigating circumstances which reflects that killing was not an act of moral turpitude, e.g., (1) the person had no intention to kill, e.g., he wanted to kill ‘A’ but ‘B’ was killed by mistake, (2) wanted only to beat but the person died under certain circumstances, (3) there was a grave
provocation and he lost mental balance, (4) it was done in self-defence, and (5) any other circumstances from which it can be gathered that it was not an act of mental depravity, wickedness or vileness.
20. Normally an act of a man is result of his mental attitude and the Court can examine the relevant factors which led a man to commit crime of murder.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Punjab High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7488 of 1992, Man Stngh v. Dharamjit Singh and Ors. In that case, the finding was that the murder was committed by the accused to take revenge from Harchand who had also murdered Hazara Singh, father of Dalip Singh who was an accused along with the petitioner there and taking this fact into account the Court took the view that the offence did not indicate inherent wickedness of the petitioner therein. The case was decided on its own fact.
22. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the offence was committed by the petitioner on provocation by the deceased or any of his family member. The motive assigned to the prosecution was that there was a dispute in relation to contract and the murder was committed in that respect. The Sessions Judge found that even if that part be ignored, admittedly there was a rivalry between two families and bad blood. The murder cannot be said to be in a grave provocation. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, the offence committed by the petitioner involves moral turpitude.
23. In these circumstances, the petitioner shall be disqualified to continue in office unless the conviction is set aside in appeal as provided under Rule 453 (1) (d) of U. P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1968.
24. We do not find any merit in the writ petition, it is accordingly dismissed.