JUDGMENT
K.M. Agarwal, J.
1. This Second Appeal by the defendants No. 2 3 in the suit against his reversing judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court was admitted for bearing on 23.1 79 on the following questions of law :–
“1. Whether the learned lower Appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeal even though the Civil Courts Act does not provide for the Court of Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Addl. District Judge ?
2. Whether the Court below was right in awarding mesne profits to the plaintiffs ?
3. Whether Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is conclusive or under the special circumstances in the life time of the father, the mother could act as guardian of the minor and his property ? If so, whether the suit is maintainable ?
2. It has come on record and also does not appear to be in controversy that the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and his defendant No. 3 (respondent No. 3) are wives of one Bapusingh. The plaintiff/respondent No. 2 is the son of Bapusingh and the respondent No. 3 is his real mother. The appellants are purchasers of the suit land from the minor respondent No. 2. The sale deed was executed by his mother Bhanwarbai as his guardian, which was challenged by filing the said suit by the respondents No. 1 and 2. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, but decreed by the lower Appellate Court. Being aggrieved, the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit have preferred this second appeal.
3. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 have attained majority and, therefore, they are now competent to conduct their cases themselves. Accordingly he had moved an application for amendment in cause title. It was also argued that unless the respondent No. 2 was noticed again the appeal could not be heard or decided.
4. The aforesaid argument deserves to be rejected. After attaining majority, a minor may elect to represent his case personally otherwise, he will continue to be represented by the guardian without there being any legal infirmity in that regard. Accordingly, it is not necessary to give fresh notice of appeal to the respondent No. 2 after his attaining the age of majority. So far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, if the learned Counsel has filed a Vakalatnama on his behalf as contended, the same be accepted. His argument on his behalf was the same as on that of the appellant No. 2. Hence, here also I find no legal infirmity in deciding the appeal after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties.
5. The argument that the respondent No. 2 having not come forward to oppose this appeal after attaining the age of majority, must be deemed to have consented to the execution of sale deed by his mother in favour of the appellants also deserves to be rejected as misconceived.
6. Now so for as first two questions of law are concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellants did not address the Court. Even otherwise, I find the questions to be not of any substance. Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge virtually means the District Judge and, therefore, all powers of a District Judge may be exercised by such an Additional Judge. Similarly, if the defendants were in wrongly enjoyment of the suit land, they could not avoid their liability for payment of mesne profits. For all these reasons, the first two questions of law are decided against the appellants and in favour of the respondents No. I and 2.
7. The respondent No. 3 was neither the Manager of the family nor the guardian appointed by the Court for the person and property of the minor, though she happened to be his mother of the respondent No. 2. On the date of sale, the respondent No. 2 was about 11 or 12 years of age and, therefore, in the life time of father, the mother could not act as the natural guardian of the minor even for purpose of the custody, of the child. Further, no legal necessity for sale was proved, nor permission of District Judge taken before selling the minor’s land. Accordingly, the third question of law also deserves to be decided against the appellants.
8. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and accordingly it is hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs of this second appeal.