JUDGMENT
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. This is an unfortunate long drawn litigation wherein the petitioners are claiming property rights over the subject-matter of controversy and the Government and the local body denying the same.
2. The civil revision petition is preferred by the petitioners as against an order made by the Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool in I.A. No. 245/99 in A.S.(CFR) No. 858/99, dated 10-11-2000. Though the factual details are too numerous, the question involved in the present Civil Revision Petition is simple i.e., Whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1210 days or 1178 days as the case may be, in preferring the Appeal.
3. The facts in nutshell which had paved the way for the petitioners filing the present Civil Revision Petition are as hereunder:
4. Smt. Rangamma and Smt. Lakshmamma who are no more and are being represented by the legal representatives, shown as petitioners 4 to 8 and petitioners 11 to 15 in the present Civil Revision Petition filed O.S. No. 96/73 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool against the State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the Collector, Mahaboobnagar as 1st defendant and the Secretary, Zilla Parishad, as the 2nd defendant and the Block Development Officer, Nagarkurnool as the 3rd defendant, praying for a decree of separate possession of Acs.2-02 guntas out of I r Acs.9-22 guntas of land in S.No. 369 of Nagarkurnool Town, Mahaboobnagar District. The 3rd plaintiff had purchased Ac.1-00 out of Acs.2-02 guntas from the aforesaid plaintiffs 1 and 2. The stand taken by the plaintiffs was that one late Srinivas Rao was the original owner of an extent of Acs.9-22 guntas in S.No. 369 of Nagarkurnool Town and during the year 1350 Fasli the Government had acquired an extent of Acs.7-20 guntas out of the total extent of Acs.9-22 guntas. But however the said area of Acs.7-20 guntas was not demarcated on the site and thus the plaintiffs and the defendants therein have been in joint possession of Acs. 9-22 guntas and in spite of repeated demands since the defendants had not separated the extent of Acs.2-02 guntas, the plaintiffs were left with no other option except to institute the aforesaid suit.
5. The 1st defendant in the suit filed a written statement taking a plea that Acs.2-02 guntas of land had been demarcated on 25-11-1972 itself and hence the suit as framed itself is not maintainable. The 3rd defendant also filed a separate written statement pleading that the Gram Panchayat Nagarkurnool by resolution dated 16-5-1957 had gifted Acs.2-00 to the Head Master, Junior Basic School Nagarkurnool and possession was delivered to him on 24-5-1957. The Trial Court passed a preliminary decree
on 18-3-1974 and the defendants preferred
A.S. No. 9374 on the file of Senior Civil
Judge, Mahaboobnagar and the same was
dismissed on 26-2-1976. The unsuccessful
appellants/defendants had made yet another
attempt by filing S.A. (SR) No. 33 805/76
with an application for condonation of delay
in presenting the Appeal and the delay was
condoned on terms and since the costs had
not been paid, the said Second Appeal was
dismissed on 26-12-1976, The plaintiffs filed I.A. No. 198/80 in O.S. No. 96/73 for passing
of final decree and the same was allowed on
6-5-1981. As against the said final decree,
Defendants 1 and 2 filed A.S. No. 60/82 on
the file of District Judge, Mahaboobnagar
and the learned District Judge had made an
order of remand for equitable division
making certain observations. The plaintiffs
filed C.M.A, No. 1010/84 as against the order
of remand and at this stage, it appears, a
serious attempt was made to settle this
dispute amicably. However, the fact remains
that the plaintiffs had withdrawn C.M.A.
No. 1010/84 on 14-10-1988. When the
matter was taken up by the Trial Court for
passing final decree, an objection was raised
by the defendants that the suit land is an
inam land and hence both the preliminary
decree and the final decree proceedings are
null and void. The said objections were held
to be untenable by an order dated 1-8-1995.
An Advocate-Commissioner was appointed
for separation of Acs.2-02 guntas and a
report also was filed. Though specific
objections had been raised on the ground
that the land is inam land and hence the
preliminary decree and the final decree are
null and void, the said contentions were not
accepted and the Trial Court passed final
decree on 8-3-1996. The plaintiffs aforesaid
interse had compromised the matter and filed I.A. No. 110/96 before the Trial Court for
passing final decree in terms of compromise
and the said application was rejected and
aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed
C.M.A. No. 42/96 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool wherein the defendants also were made parties and the said C.M.A. was allowed on 4-10-1996 and in view of the same, the Trial Court passed a final decree on 6-10-1996. Pending the suit, the original plaintiffs 1 and 2 died and the legal representatives were brought on record. The plaintiff No. 3 filed E.P. No. 21/97 for maintaining his possession relating to the land allotted to him in the aforesaid compromise decree. The 3rd defendant had raised an objection relating to the executability of the final decree on the same ground that these are inam lands and had been vested in the State and hence execution cannot be maintained. The executing Court by the order dated 25-9-1998 had arrived at the conclusion that the said objection is unsustainable in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Ambaji, . Aggrieved by the same, the 3rd defendant filed CRP No. 4345/98 on the self-same grounds and also had raised a ground that an order for maintaining possession cannot be sustained and this Court had declined to consider the objection relating to the validity of the decrees, but however allowed the Civil Revision Petition to the extent of confirmation of possession in the E.P. referred to supra. Hence the 3rd plaintiff again filed E.P. No. 1/99 against all the three defendants for delivery of separate possession in pursuance of the final decree and again the same objections were raised, but the executing Court had rejected those objections and directed to put the decree-holder in separate possession. The matter was again carried by way of CRP No. 3261/99 raising the self-same grounds and no doubt the said grounds were resisted both on the doctrine of merger and the doctrine of res judicata and accordingly CRP No. 3261/99 was dismissed by an order dated 1-10-1999.
6. Subsequent thereto, as against the final decree dated 8-3-1996, the defendants filed appeal on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool on 2-7-1999 with an application I.A. No. 245/96 to condone the delay of 1210 days in filing the said Appeal, but however, ultimately it had turned out to be the delay of 1178 days. Though the question involved in the said application was very simple, elaborate affidavit placing the whole historical background of the litigation had been narrated and a lengthy counter-affidavit also was filed raising all the grounds inclusive of doctrine of merger and the doctrine of res judicata. The learned Senior Civil Judge ultimately allowed the said application on certain terms and aggrieved by the same, the present petitioners had filed CRP No. 5613/2000. Though costs had not been received, the same had been deposited and in view of the said order, the Appeal was numbered as AS No. 38/2000 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool and this Court in WA No. 321/2001 on 12-3-2001 made the following order:
“Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that interests of justice will be subserved if A.S. No. 38/2000 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool and C.R.P. No. 5613/2000 are heard together by this Court. For the above-mentioned purpose we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 228 of the Constitution of India withdraw A.S. No. 38/ 2000 from the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool to this Court. In the meanwhile, the parties are directed to maintain status quo obtaining as on today. Consolidated informal paper book to be filed by the appellant. As soon as the records in A.S.No. 38/2000 are received by this Court, the parties shall be at liberty to mention for early hearing of the matter.”
Thus, the Transfer A.S. also is before this Court.
7. Sri Mahipathi Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners in a systematic way had made his submissions by taking this Court through the important dates commencing from the filing of the suit O.S. No. 96/73 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool, the series of litigations and also explained the scope and ambit of pending litigations at present. The learned Counsel would maintain that the learned Senior Civil Judge had entered into unnecessary discussion about the maintainability of the suit, the jurisdictional aspects, doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of merger. According to the learned Counsel, these aspects are in no way relevant to the simple question whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 1210 days or 1178 days in presenting the Appeal. The learned Counsel also pointed out the uncharitable allegations made by the Government and the local body against the petitioners in this regard. The learned Counsel also had taken us through the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the application, counter and the findings recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge in this regard and had contended that definitely this will not constitute sufficient cause and the learned Judge had totally erred in allowing the application on the ground of involvement of public interest. The learned Counsel also cited a catena of decisions in support of his contentions. The learned Counsel also had taken us through the additional affidavit, counter filed at Revisional stage and contended that it is not permissible and even otherwise it will not in any way improve the situation since even if reliance is placed on this material, sufficient cause is not established. The learned Counsel also had explained that costs awarded by the learned Senior Civil Judge had not been accepted and the same had been deposited in Court.
8. The learned Additional Advocate-General Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, in his usual cool way submitted that discretion had been exercised by the learned Senior Civil Judge in a particular way which needs no interference while exercising Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. The learned Counsel also would maintain that these lands being inam lands, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction at all and since it is a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction, the earlier proceedings will not operate as res judicata and since valuable property is involved and Government has an excellent case on merits, it should be taken as at least one of the grounds for condoning the delay. It is contended that at the best the opposite party may be compensated with costs and in fact that was done in the present case and costs had been deposited and the Appeal also was numbered and the same was transferred to this Court. The learned Counsel also maintained that reasons had been well explained both before the learned Senior Civil Judge and also before the Revisional Court and keeping the value of the subject-matter of the litigation and the facts and circumstances and also the stand taken by the Government and the local body and in the light of the views expressed by the Apex Court on the aspect of liberal approach and consideration in cases of condonation of delay relating to Government, the impugned order needs no disturbance at the hands of this Court. Elaborate submissions were made in relation to the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, both before the appellate Court and also before this Court. To substantiate his contentions reliance was placed on certain decisions.
9. Heard both the Counsel on record.
10. At the outset, it may be stated that this Court is concerned with the question whether the impugned order is liable to be set aside or to be confirmed. The question involved is plain and simple, i.e., whether the learned Senior Civil Judge in the facts and circumstances is justified in law in condoning the delay of 1178 days holding that there is sufficient cause.
11. At the outset, we may observe that all the other aspects may not be relevant for the present purpose. Strong reliance was placed on Lokraj and Ors. v. Kishan Lal and Ors., , to the effect that in case of inam lands, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred and hence the very suit for partition on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool is ill-advised and misconceived remedy and hence all the other proceedings are of no consequence at all. Having an excellent case on merits also may be taken as one of the grounds provided otherwise the party is able to specify some sufficient cause. The nature of delay and all other attendant facts and circumstances also may have to be looked into and on this ground alone, the Court cannot lean in favour of the party seeking condonation of delay.
12. It may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant portion of the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 245/99. It is averred at Paras 5 and 6 of the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 245/99:
“That the petitioners herein have contested all the time. After passing final decree the Counsel for the petitioners have obtained the copies of the final decree and handed over in the office of the Zilla Parishad, Mahabubnagar. There were frequent transfers in the concerned section including the officers. So the office could not peruse the matter for preferring the appeal. The affairs of the case used to lookafter by the Petitioners No. 3 but it is very unfortunate that there was no permanent officer posted to the post of MPDO Nagarkurnool and officers who were posted to the post were not placed this matter before them for taking timely action. So the delay was accrued in preferring the appeal in time. The work of the Government is sub-divided and the various officers are to take decision in preferring the appeal. So this resulted in non-coordination of the officers to take final decision in preferring the appeal in time.
That the delay caused in preferring the Appeal is not intentionally, wanton nor negligence. But the result of the procedural administrative delay only. Meanwhile the respondents herein have taken the advantage of the accidental delay when the Respondent No. 2 along with a group of people have come on the spot and to take possession of the land within the premises covered with compound wall. Then I got the knowledge and I made enquiry about the stage of the proceedings. Then I have approached the District Administrative authority and obtained copies of the final decree from the Zilla Parishad Office and subsequently consulted the Counsels at Mahabubnagar and Nagarkurnool and the Counsels advised me to prefer appeal in final decree proceedings passed by the District Munsif, Nagarkurnool.”
The delay mentioned in the affidavit is 1210 days. But, ultimately it had turned out to be 1178 days. The learned Senior Civil Judge in I.A. No. 245/99 had concluded:
“It is undisputed fact that school children are using portion of the land covered under final decree as playground and officers of Government departments. Keeping the judicial precedents cited by the learned Counsel for petitioners to cause substantial justice and avert the school boys and girls of deprivation of their basic necessities in education and to save public exchequer out of proposed demolition of the public offices, hostels of boys and girls, the Court feels that golden scale of justice would tilt in favour of the petitioners that it is a fit case to condone the delay by taking ground mentioned by the petitioner as sufficient cause under Section 5 of Limitation Act. Accordingly I.A. No. 245/ 99 is allowed and delay of (1178) days is condoned subject to condition that the petitioners shall pay sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rs. Five thousand only) to the respondents together towards costs within a period of one month from today. On payment or deposit of the said costs the appeal shall be numbered if it is otherwise in order.”
It is brought to our notice that Rs. 5,000/-costs had not been received, but the same had been deposited and the Appeal numbered thus as A.S. No. 38/2000 was withdrawn and numbered as Tr.A.S. No. 213/2002
13. The conduct of Officials and the delay caused thereby by a Government Office was made the ground for condonation of delay. The delay is 1178 days and it is needless to say that this is an inordinate delay. No doubt, serious allegations suggesting collusion had been made. The main ground of attack is that the Government and the local body have been fighting this litigation so seriously and in view of the said fact the non-filing of the Appeal in time definitely can be inferred to be due to the circumstances explained in the affidavit. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, , the Apex Court held:
“It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court – be it by private party or the State – are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/ agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay – intentional or otherwise – is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining everyday’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.”
In State of A.P. v. Sayanna, (DB), the Division Bench of this Court held:
“The State just as a private party is not relieved of its obligation to satisfy the Court of the existence of ‘sufficient cause’ in preferring the appeal belatedly. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ being a word sufficiently elastic and flexible, the approaches of the Court while considering the question of sufficiency of the cause shown could differ, depending upon the accepted position in which the litigant is placed. When the State or its agent is the applicant, the concept of ‘sufficient cause’ should be viewed, having due regard to the practical realities of Governmental functioning and peculiar handicaps afflicting the system. Strict insistence on the traditional principle of explaining every day’s delay is not warranted. A wider latitude in the matter of exercise of discretion to condone the delay in keeping in view the said peculiar features is therefore called for, otherwise, if those peculiar characteristics and features are eschewed from consideration and the Court proceeds to apply the same yardstick, it would amount to adopting a pedantic or mechanical approach and that would lead to miscarriage of justice. If would then be a case of not adopting the classification where there is a need for one -a facet of Article 14. Uniformity in approach in dissimilar situations would amount to application of law in an uneven manner. The spirit and philosophy underlying Section 5 of the Limitation Act would then be defeated. The public interest may irretrievably suffer. The Court has to properly balance the considerations of public interest on the one hand and public policy that lies at the root of the law of limitation on the other. But, there is a limit to which the Court can go. It must be remembered that the difference in approach does not mean that any explanation given by the official of the State should be glibly swallowed and the Court should stretch a point to bring the explanation within the ambit of ‘sufficient cause’ at any cost. The factors and causes contributing to the delay should bear reasonable nexus to the concept of ‘sufficient cause’ and should pass the test of reasonableness and genuineness. Where the delay is too long just as in the present case cogent and convincing reasons are expected from the petitioner-State, because the burden to satisfactorily explain the delay would then be heavier. The Governmental authorities cannot shrug off the responsibility by merely pleading endless and long winding correspondence and Office notes. There must be some end to the correspondence and interaction and decision making. The process cannot go on as in the instant case for ten years unless of course, there is a reasonable ground to believe that there was fraud or collusion on the part of Government Officials and the private party.”
In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, , the Apex Court held that at the relevant time the Advocate General’s office was fed up with so many arbitration matters pending consideration can hardly be said to be a ground or proper explanation of delay and that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour prescribed by the statute and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. In Superintending Engineer, Pellur, Ongole v. Idamakanti Chinna Koti Reddy, , it was held that no question of equities will arise in case of condonation of delay in filing Appeal or Revision and if the delay is properly explained, it will be condoned and otherwise not. In M.K. Prasad v. P. Arumugam, , the Apex Court held:
“In the instant case, the appellant tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree as is evident from his application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. Even though the appellant appears not to be a vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, the Court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. We are of the opinion that the inconvenience caused to the respondent for the delay on account of the appellant being absent from the Court in this case can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. In the interests of justice and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, we set aside the order impugned and condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside ex parte decree. To avoid further delay, we have examined the merits of the main application and feel that sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the ex parte decree as well.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the orders impugned. The appellant’s application for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree shall stand allowed subject to payment of exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the opposite side within a period of 30 days. If the costs are not paid within the time specified, this appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed and the ex parte decree passed against the appellant revived. We may clarify that the costs awarded by this order are in addition to the amount of Rs. 10,000/-deposited in this Court for payment to the respondent vide order dated 3-11-2000.”
In Gordi Sadasivan v. State of A.P., 2002 Suppl. (2) ALD 245 = 2002 (1) An.WR 552, one of us (P.S. Narayana, J.) while dealing with a similar question held:
“Having heard both the Counsel and having perused the affidavit filed in support of the application and also the counter and the impugned order made in this case, I am of the opinion that the impugned order is liable to be set aside for more than one reason. The affidavit filed in support of the application does not disclose any valid reasons constituting sufficient cause. In fact the allegations made in the affidavit are as vague as vagueness can be. Even in the case of Government, when an affidavit is filed in support of an application seeking condonation of delay, if allowed, it will virtually amount to extending period of limitation. The affidavit should disclose valid and cogent reasons constituting sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of Limitation Act. In the absence of the same I am of the opinion that mere fact that the party is Government will not make any difference as far as this aspect is concerned. In the present case, the affidavit filed in support of the application does not disclose any valid reasons for condoning the inordinate delay of 406 days and the Court below had adopted an erroneous approach in allowing such application which in my considered opinion is definitely an illegal exercise of-jurisdiction which warrants interference under Section 115 of CPC by this Court.”
14. It is no doubt true that when Government is a party, since the Governmental machinery operates through Officials and its servants, it is natural that the Courts may have to decide the applications for condonation of delay liberally, keeping in view the said aspect also. But, liberality cannot be stretched too wide and while deciding an application for condonation of delay, all the aspects are to be taken into consideration. The mere fact that the Government and the local body had been fighting the litigations cannot by itself be suggestive of explaining the inordinate delay and putting the same on the ground of sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The averments made in Paras 5 and 6 of the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No. 245/99 had been specifically denied by way of an elaborate counter. Only a vain attempt was made to suggest some collusion at the lower cadre. This, in our opinion, will not improve the case of the respondents in any way.
15. It is also pertinent to note that before this Court – the Revisional Court, additional affidavit was filed and in our considered opinion, the same is not permissible. But however, we have given our anxious consideration and had gone through the additional affidavit and the counter filed before this Court and this material also will not improve the situation any further. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool had discussed several other aspects and had ultimately allowed the application being satisfied that public interest is involved, but the reasons recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge are wholly unsustainable and totally unconvincing and thus the very approach adopted by the learned Senior Civil Judge is too a liberal approach which in our considered opinion is impermissible in law. The imposition of terms always as a matter of rule cannot be a reason for affirming an order, if otherwise the same cannot stand to the test of legal scrutiny. Viewed from any angle, the inordinate delay caused in preferring the Appeal cannot be condoned since the reasons explained definitely will not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
16. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained and consequently the petitioners are bound to succeed and accordingly the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court makes no order as to costs.
WP No. 1718 of 2001
17. The petitioners – legal representatives of Rangamma and others, filed the writ petition praying for calling of the records pertaining to proceedings No. V2/850/98, dated 18-12-2000 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad – the 2nd respondent in the writ petition, and quash the same by issuing appropriate writ, order or direction preferably one in the nature of certiorari and pass such other suitable orders.
18. The factual matrix which had been narrated in detail supra had been repeated again by the petitioners in the lengthy affidavit filed in support of the present writ petition. The 1st respondent is the District Development Officer, now the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Mahaboobnagar District and the 2nd respondent is the Commissioner (Appeals), Office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
19. The relevant facts, in short compass are as hereunder:
20. It is stated that in view of the fact that the land was recorded as inam in revenue records, the petitioners filed application before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nagarkurnool in IA/3856/75 for grant of occupancy rights certificates in their favour insofar as Acs.2-02 guntas in S.No. 369 is concerned and after due enquiry and notification, occupancy certificate was granted to the petitioners on 20-7-1977 in view of the decree of the Civil Court. Ramalakshmamma, one of the petitioners who is no more, filed appeal before the Collector, Mahaboobnagar in File No. B2/2/ 78 questioning the said occupancy rights certificate in favour of the petitioners and claiming a share. Ramalakshmamma was also given a share in the said appeal modifying the occupancy rights certificate dated 20-7-1977 and the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 20-7-1977 stood merged with the order passed by the Collector in File No. 132/2/78. As already referred to supra, the other factual details need not be repeated again.
21. Subsequent to remand and during the pendency of I.A. No. 198/80, the 1st respondent in the writ petition filed appeal on 19-8-1988 before the Collector in File No. B2/7361/88 challenging the occupancy rights certificate issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 20-7-1977 and during the pendency of the said Appeal before the Collector, Rangamma, the 1st respondent in the Appeal died and memo dated 27-10-1988 was filed before the Collector intimating the death of Rangamma and about the surviving legal heirs. Soon thereafter, Lakshmamma and Ramalakshmamma also died and the petitioners filed an application in I.A. No. 198/80 (final decree proceedings) to bring on record the legal representatives, during the year 1988 and hence it is stated that the 1st respondent was aware of the death of the said persons. Subsequent thereto, I.A. No. 198/80 was allowed on 8-3-1996. The matter was carried in revision in C.R.P. No. 3261/99 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 1-10-1999. It is further stated that the petitioners filed W.P. No. 17473/98 challenging the validity of entertaining of Appeal by the Collector, Mahaboobnagar on various grounds, but this Court by an order dated 15-7-1996 transferred the proceedings from the Office of the Collector, Mahaboobnagar to the Commissioner, Land Revenue, to decide the Appeal after hearing all the objections raised by the petitioners. The Appeal was taken up by the 2nd respondent for hearing and memo dated 18-1-2000 was filed to the effect that the Appeal stood abated totally in view of the fact that legal representatives of the deceased Respondents 1, 2 and 4 in the Appeal were not brought on record within 90 days of their death in spite of being put on notice by memo dated 27-10-1988 as well as the proceedings on civil side i.e., I.A.No. 198/80. It is further stated that the 1st respondent filed Civil Revision Petitions against the orders in E.P.No. 21/97 and E.P.No. 1/91 by knowing the death of Rangamma, Lakshmamma and Ramalakshmamma. At this stage, the 1st respondent filed an application in the month of March 2000 to implead the legal representatives without assigning any reasons and a counter was filed opposing the same. But however, ultimately, the 2nd respondent by an order dated 18-12-2000 simply allowed the application bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondents in the said Appeal on the ground that the memo dated 18-1-2000 filed by the petitioners shall be taken as the date of knowledge.
22. The 1st respondent filed a counter-affidavit in detail denying all the allegations and explaining the circumstances in which the impugned order was made.
23. Sri Mahipathi Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners had submitted that though the 1st respondent had ample knowledge about the death of these parties, having kept quiet for sufficiently a long time without filing an application for condoning the delay or an application for setting aside the abatement, when remedy is hopelessly barred by limitation, the fifing of the application to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondents cannot be sustained and hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel also made elaborate submissions about the essentials of a Court and also of a Tribunal and the learned Counsel would maintain that even in the case of a Tribunal, to these proceedings under the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as “Act” for the purpose of convenience, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable, and hence instead of recording total abatement of the Appeal the 2nd respondent totally erred in permitting the legal representatives of the deceased respondents to come on record and hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel had placed reliance on a catena of decisions to substantiate his submissions in this regard.
24. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate-General Sri Ramesh Ranganathan had submitted that it is no doubt true that the 2nd respondent-appellate authority is expected to exercise quasi-judicial functions, but however in the light of the scheme and object of the Act, it cannot be said that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Limitation Act, 1963 are to be made applicable to the Appeals under the Act. The learned Counsel in a meticulous fashion had taken us through different provisions of the Act and also the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules 1975, hereinafter referred to as “Rules” in short, and had contended that the provisions of the code of civil procedure and the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 in all rigour cannot be made applicable to the proceedings under the Act just like before the ordinary Civil Courts. The learned Counsel also had taken us through Sections 4, 10, 24 and 35 of the Act and also Rules 5 and 17 of the Rules. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the Appeal has to be heard on merits and the validity of the main certificate has to be gone into in the Appeal. The learned Counsel also submitted that in case the Government succeeds before the appellate authority, there is no question of acquisition of its own land. The learned Counsel also had taken us through the impugned order. The object of Order 22 Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure also had been pointed out in this regard. The learned Counsel further submitted that in a writ of certiorari, the Court will not sit as appellate authority and from the date of knowledge the application was filed in time and the appellate authority had recorded reasons why it was inclined to allow the application to bring on record the legal representatives and except deciding the matter on merits, nothing else will happen and no prejudice is caused to the other side and hence the impugned order is not liable to be quashed. No doubt, the learned Counsel pointed out several defects in the memos filed and also the occupancy certificates issued in this regard. Reliance also was placed on certain decisions in support of his contentions.
25. Heard both the Counsel.
26. The 2nd respondent – appellate authority in the impugned order had stated :
“On 18-1-2000, after receipt of appeal papers from District Collector a memo has been filed by Sri Narasimha Reddy, 5th respondent stating that the Respondents 1, 2 and 4 died long back and the legal representatives were not brought on record. In this memo, he has given the names of the legal representatives of Rangamma, Lakshmamma and Rama Lakshmamma. In pursuance of this memo, the present L.R. petition was filed by D.D.O. on 16.3.2000. That means within 90 days from the date of knowledge. The Collector could not do anything because the Hon’ble High Court in W.P.M.P. No. 22300/88 in W.P. No. 17473 of 88 dated 23.11.88 stayed all further proceedings. Perhaps that is the reason why no L.R. petition could be filed before the District Collector. The memo dated 18.1.2000 can be taken as the date of knowledge and the petition now filed can be treated as one within the period of limitation. Therefore, accordingly there is no question of abatement or delay. More over as I found from the memos and counters filed, the fifth respondent did not give dates of death of Respondents 1, 2 and 4. In 1996 (4) Supreme 509 (Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Gokul Narain and Anr.) it was held that:
“State is not expected to keep a watch over the survival of the respondents and lapse of the Counsel to intimate to the Counsel appearing in this Court cannot be construed knowledge of death. Even if it is assumed that abatement was caused, since application was filed under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC within 30 days from the date of knowledge, there is no delay in making ‘application to bring the legal representatives on record.”
Therefore, I feel because in WPMP 22300/ 88 in WP 17473/88 dated 23.11.1988, the Hon’ble High Court granted stay of all further proceedings and because the DDO who is the Government Official cannot be expected to keep track of death or survival of the Respondents 1, 2 and 4 and since the L.R. petition is filed within 90 days from the date of memo i.e., 18.1.2000, it can be taken as knowledge and therefore, there is no question of either abatement or delay. Therefore, the contention of the respondents is untenable and devoid of merits. The L.R petition is, therefore, allowed and the Legal representatives of deceased Respondents 1, 2, and 4 shall be brought on record.
Main appeal is posted for hearing on 5th February, 2001 at 2.30 p.m.”
The effect of this order is that the legal representatives of the deceased respondents in the appeal referred to supra are brought on record and a date was fixed for hearing of the appeal on merits. This order is impugned on the ground that there is no separate application for condonation of delay and there was total abatement of the appeal itself by virtue of the death since within the permissible period of limitation the legal representatives of the deceased respondents were not brought on record. Strong reliance was placed on Manguram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, , P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, 2002 CCC 280 (SC), Ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh, (2001) 9 SCC 717, Mukri Gopalan v. C.P. Aboobacker, , Mahendra Kumar Goyal v. Ex-Officio Joint Secretary and Additional Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Hyderabad, (DB) and also S. Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Smt. Pramod Gupta, 2003 (1) Supreme 262. In Ramnath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, , the Apex Court while dealing with “sufficient cause” for setting aside abatement of suit and condonation of delay in taking steps for substitution of heirs and legal representatives vis-a-vis liberal interpretation and balance between rights of parties held that the expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned. It is no doubt true that the memo filed had been taken as the date of knowledge and the appellate authority 2nd respondent had permitted the legal representatives to come on record.
27. Section 3 of the Act deals with Abolition of vesting inams and the consequences thereof. Section 4 of the Act deals with registration of inamdars as occupants. Section 6 of the Act deals with registration of permanent tenants as occupants. Section 10 of the Act deals with enquiry by Collector in certain cases. Section 11 of the Act deals with savings of rights in certain cases. Section 24 of the Act deals with appeals from orders under Section 10 to Prescribed Authority. Rule 5 of the Rules deals with Application for the purpose of registration of inamdar and the like and Rule 17 deals with Proceedings of the Special Tribunal to be summary, and it simply specifies that the proceedings of the Special Tribunal shall be governed, as far as practicable, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
28. It is well settled that a writ of certiorari is a discretionary writ and the same is not issued merely because it is lawful to do so. That a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the findings the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit the admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted the inadmissible evidence and the same has resulted in influencing the impugned finding.
29. At this stage, this Court is not concerned with merits or demerits of the Appeal pending before the 2nd respondent. No doubt, certain submissions were made by both the Counsel relating to those aspects and we refrain from expressing opinion relating thereto inasmuch as the Appeal is pending before the 2nd respondent-appellate authority. In view of the limitations of this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in issuing a writ of certiorari, we are thoroughly satisfied that in the light of the reasons recorded by the 2nd respondent, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, the writ petition is bound to fail and accordingly the same is dismissed, without costs. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is made clear that since the litigation is a long drawn litigation, in the interest of justice, the 2nd respondent – appellate authority is hereby directed to dispose of the Appeal after giving reasonable opportunity to all the parties concerned as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order.
WP No. 2669 of 1997
30. The petitioner filed the writ petition to declare the action of the respondent -Gram Panchayat, Nagarkurnool, Mahaboobnagar District in interfering with the construction work of the petitioner in S.No. 369 of Nagarkurnool in pursuance of the deemed permission in Record No. 184/ 96 of the respondent – Gram Panchayat as illegal and for other appropriate directions.
31. The petitioner had stated that he is the owner of an extent of Ac.1-00 in S.No. 369 by virtue of the decree of the Civil Court in O.S. No. 96/73 and with a view to construct shops on an area of 1452 sq. yards, the petitioner submitted plans to the respondent/Gram Panchayat on 26-8-1996 for according permission as required under Section 121 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, hereinafter referred to as “Act’ for the purpose of convenience. It is stated that along with the application, the petitioner had enclosed original plan and copies of ammonia prints of the plans and also copy of the decree of the Court. The respondent/Gram Panchayat though received the plans and the application as Record No. 184/96, did not issue any receipt and for sufficiently a long time, the respondent/ Gram Panchayat neither granted permission nor rejected the application and on 19-12-1996 the petitioner met the respondent and enquired about the sanction and requested the respondent to give him an acknowledgement regarding the application for permission on 26-8-1996 for construction of shops in accordance with the plans and the respondent issued acknowledgement on 19-12-1996 about the receipt of the application of the petitioner on 26-8-1996 in Record No. 184/96. The petitioner paid the necessary fee of Rs. 2,471/- by way of demand draft. It is stated that though the petitioner waited for sufficiently a long time, since absolutely there was no response from the other side, in view of the deemed permission, the petitioner proceeded with the constructions and when there was interference the present writ petition is filed.
32. A counter-affidavit and additional counter-affidavit were filed narrating all the details and explaining the circumstances under which the permission could not be granted. Specific stand was taken that a dispute is pending before the Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool and also before the Commissioner and inasmuch as these are all disputed questions of fact, the same cannot be gone into in the writ petition and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The other factual details and the internal correspondence also had been referred to. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that on receipt of the application of the petitioner seeking permission for construction, the Gram Panchayat had requested the Mandal Parishad Development Officer, Nagarkurnool vide proceeding Lr.No. 184/ 96, dated 5-9-1996 to furnish the connected documents, if any in their office, but the Mandal Parishad Development Officer had not furnished any such documents at that time and subsequently the Mandal Parishad Development Officer had furnished the particulars with regard to land vide his proceedings No. M4/210/95, dated 26-12-1996 stating that A. Narasimha Reddy, son of Papireddy has no right on the said land as since 1972 Sy.No. 369/1 is under the control of the then Panchayat Samithi, Nagarkurnool and the present Mandal Parishad Office and also requested that permission shall not be granted. It is further stated that when the petitioner made application for permission for construction of the shopping complex, the matter is placed before the Gram Panchayat and by their Resolution dated 15-11-1996 it is resolved to keep the matter in abeyance till information is received from the Mandal Parishad Development Officer and the said fact is intimated to the petitioner vide Office letter dated 18-11-1996 to his residential address at Malakpet, Hyderabad. It is further stated that the petitioner made representation to the Gram Panchayat on 26-8-1996 to accord permission for construction and the matter was placed before the Gram Panchayat and the Gram Panchayat passed resolution dated 15-11-1996 and the matter is kept in abeyance till information is received from Mandal Parishad Development Officer. The petitioner sent a letter dated 30-1-1996 by registered post along with Bankers Cheque for Rs. 2,471/- by saying that since the 60 days time is over, he is proceeding with the construction. Subsequent thereto, the Gram Panchayat by the resolution dated 25-2-1997 rejected permission on the ground that the land belongs to Mandal Parishad Office and also that the compound wall pertains to the Gram Panchayat and the same was intimated on 28-2-1997 to the petitioner to his residential address by post No doubt, the respondent had also taken a stand that there is alternative remedy available to the petitioner and hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
33. This Court in WPMP No. 3162/97 had granted interim direction and the respondent/Gram Panchayat filed WVMP No. 1368/97 and this Court by the order dated 23-9-1997 had made an order that any constructions made shall be subject to final result in the writ petition.
34. Heard both the Counsel.
35. The factual matrix relating to the litigation had been narrated supra. It is not in controversy that the petitioner filed an application before the Gram Panchayat seeking permission to take up the construction work. Section 121 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act dealing with Construction of building reads:
“No piece of land shall be used as a site for the construction of a building and no building shall be constructed or reconstructed and no addition or alteration shall be made to an existing building without the permission of the Gram Panchayat granted in accordance with the provisions of any rules or bye-laws made under this Act, relating to the use of building sites or the construction or reconstruction of buildings:
Provided that the Government may, in respect of Gram Panchayats or with the consent of the Gram Panchayat, in respect of any particular Gram Panchayat or portion thereof, exempt all buildings or any class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of any rules or bye-laws made under this Act.”
Section 127 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act deals with General conditions regarding licences and permissions and Sub-section (3) of Section 127 of the Act specifies:
“Every order of the authority competent under this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder to pass an order refusing, suspending, canceling or modifying a licence or permission shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it proceeds:
Provided that every application for a licence or permission under this Act shall be disposed of within fifteen days from the date of receipt thereof or from the date of receipt of approvals or completion of other formalities prescribed failing which it shall be deemed that licence or permission is granted.”
Whatever the reasons may be, it is not in controversy that within time stipulated by the statute, the petitioner had not received the communication and on the ground of deemed permission the petitioner proceeded with the construction. The interim direction granted by this Court referred to supra also had been made absolute, no doubt subject to the modification that the direction made will be subject to the result of the writ petition.
36. It is not doubt that the litigation before the appellate authority relating to the occupancy rights certificate is pending disposal and in view of the pendency of the Appeal, any constructions made by the petitioner will be subject to the result of the said litigation. However, in the light of the provisions of the Act, Section 121 and Section 127, Sub-section (3) proviso of the Act, the petitioner is bound to succeed, no doubt subject to the above observation i.e., the construction shall be subject to the result of the Appeal pending before the Commissioner (Appeals), Office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
37. The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.
Tr.A.S. No. 213/2002
38. In the light of the order passed today in CRP.No. 5613 of 2000, this appeal need not be heard on merits. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.
WA Nos. 231 and 321 of 2001
39. WA No. 231/2001 is filed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Mahaboobnagar against the order dated 24-3-2001 in Revision Petition No. 1404/2000 in W.P. No. 12815/99. Likewise, W.A. No. 321/2001 is filed as against the order in W.P. No. 12815/99 dated 27-12-1999.
40. No doubt, in W.P. No. 12815/99, direction was given to initiate land acquisition proceedings. It is needless to say that these writ appeals cannot be disposed of at this stage on merits for the reason that the appeal preferred by the Government is pending before the 2nd respondent in WP No. 1718/ 2001 and already a direction was issued to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of three months. Hence, liberty is given to the parties to make a mention after the disposal of the Appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals), Office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
41. Hence, no orders need be passed at this stage in these writ appeals. Liberty is given to make a mention at the appropriate stage as specified supra.