ORDER
S.S. Subramani, J.
1. Defendants 8 and 9 in C. S. 996 of 1998 on the tile of II Additional District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli are the revision petitioners. This revision is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India.
2. Relevant facts which necessitated filing this revision may be summarised thus : One Mohanraj died on 23-11 -1997. Respondent herein is his brother. First petitioner is the widow of Mohanraj and second petitioner is first petitioner’s father. First petitioner in her marriage with Mohanraj had given birth to a female child, whose name is Varsha Dhanashri. She was born on 23-2-1991.
3. Respondent herein alleging that Mohanraj appointed him along with first petitioner as guardian of minor Varsha Dhanashri, within two weeks from the date of death of his brother Mohanraj, filed O.P. (Guardian £ Wards) to declare him as guardian of minor daughter and to have her custody and also properties which belong to Mohanraj but bequeathed under Will to his daughter. While filing Guardian & Wards Petition before District Court, Trichy, he also moved for interim injunction restraining first petitioner and her parents from interfering in the possession of properties. An ad interim injunction was also granted.
4. The matter was taken to this Court in C.R.P.No. 3575 of 1997 by first petitioner and her parents challenging the locus standi of respondent in filing suit and also in getting him
appointed as guardian, when natural guardian is alive. As per order dated 18-2-1998,1 set aside the order of District Court granting ad interim injunction and I further directed lower Court to pass orders about the maintainability of Guardian and Wards application before that Court. In my order, I wanted District Court to consider the question of territorial jurisdiction before enter-laining the application, it is not now disputed that pursuant to my direction, district Court on 21-4-1998 dismissed the Guardian and Wards application 983 of 1997.
5. Even before my order in C.R.P. 3575 of i 997, first petitioner filed complaint before Commissioner of Police on 26-12-1997 and also another complaint after the order i.e., on 25-3-1998, before the same authority. In those complaints, first petitioner wanted to investigate into the affairs stated therein. In those complaints, it was suid that respondent herein has stealthily removed moveables belonging to petitioner and minor child and it amounts to theft. It is also alleged that respondent herein has committed offence under Sections 465 and 471 of Indian Penal Code, She requested police authorities that the matter has to be investigated and the grievance must be remedied by them.
6. When Police wanted to investigate into the complaints filed by first petitioner, a suit was filed by respondent on 27-7-1998 making State as well as Police and petitioners herein as O S. 996 of 1998 In that suit, he filed following reliefs :
(a) for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants 8 & 9 from preferring vexatious complaint and thereby taxing the plaintiff doubly by defendants 1 to 7;
(b) for permanent injunction restraining the defendants 8 & 9 from removing the articles from the hands of the plaintiff with the help of defendants 1 to 7 except under due process of law;
(c) award cost of the suit; and
(d) grant such other relief or reliefs as the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and thus render justice.
7. According to petitioners, suit filed by respondent is barred and the same is abuse of process of Court, which should not be allowed to be retained on the file of Court.
8. When the matter came for admission., 1 ordered notice of motion and further proceedings
in the suit was also stayed. After service of notice, respondent also entered appearance and I heard both side counsel.
9. Copy of the plaint is placed before me by learned counsel for petitioner. From a reading of the same, it is clearthat respondent herein claims his right even now on the basis of Will alleged to have been executed by deceased Mohanraj, in his capacity as guardian of person and property of his daughter, who is still minor and continue to be in the custody of first petitioner herein. In paragraph 12 of the plaint it is stated thus,
“In the meanwhile the 8th defendant under the instigation of the 9th defendant for the reasons best known to him has been time and again preferring complaints before the defendants 1 to 7 and the plaintiff is being harassed even though explanations have been submitted in writing then and there. Fact remains the first complaint was preferred during the month of December, 1997 by the 8th defendant against the plaintiff and his brother Ayyappan and suitable reply in writing has also been tendered on 16-12 1997, Another complaint was preferred during me same month and again the Police personnel knocked at the doors of the plaintiff herein and threatened the plaintiff of dire consequences even though when the plaintiff had absolute rights to deal with property to safeguard the interest of minor Varsha Dhanashri. Again another complaint was preferred before the Director General of Police and the same was forwarded to their subordinate at Trichy and the plaintiff was harassed by dragging the plaintiff from pillar to post. Subsequently, even after the explanation submitted by the plaintiff, the attitude of the defendants 8 and 9 did not change. Their vindictive attitude continued and another complaint was preferred through the Secretary, the department of Home Affairs, Office of the Secretariat, Chermai, and the same was forwarded to the Commissioner of Police, Trichy and again the police personnel morefully the defendants 1 to 7 started to harass the plaintiff. The last but not the least the 8th defendant under the able guidance and instigation of the 9th defendant has preferred another complaint and the defendants 1 to 8, morefully the defendants 3 to 6 are harassing the plaintiffs. The complaints preferred by the 8th defendant are nothing but repetion of earlier complaints for which due explanation have been submitted and the mailer
has been closed.”‘
10. According to respondent, these petitioners though they have remedy through Civil Court have now approached police officers only to harass him and that is to be prevented by filing the suit. It is said under Article 21 of Constitution of India, he has got the fundamental right that he shall not be harassed twice.
11. According to counsel for respondent, the dispute, is of civil nature. When his personal liberties are affected, he is entitled to come to Court and putforward his grievance to be remedied, which do not warrant interference under Article 227 of Constitution of India,
12. As against the said contention, learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the effect of suit is that Police Officers should not entertain any complaint from petitioners nor they shall investigate into the same. It will amount to preventing a public officer from discharging his public duties. It is said that police officers are bound to investigate into any complaint that is brought to their notice, take immediate action and if possible to restore properties illegally detained. It is further said that when Guardian and Wards application itself is dismissed, respondent herein is having no right in those moveables, which have been unlawfully removed from their house and the same amount to theft. As a natural guardian of minor and also as legal heir of deceased Mohanraj, first petitioner is entitled to give necessary protection to minor and also get possession of stolen articles from respondent. Their action is only in accordance with law and the same cannot be prevented by filing such suits,
13. Section 41 of Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 deal with cases where injunction cannot be granted. Section 41 Clause (b) says,
“An injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings in criminal matters.”
14. Under Section 23 of the Police Act, it is the duty of every Police Officer promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him by any competent authority; to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace; to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisance; to detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorized to apprehend, and
for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists; and it shall be lawful for every Police Officer, for any of the purposes mentioned in this section, without a warrant, to enter and inspect any drinking-shop, gaming-house or other place of resort of loose and disorderly characters.
15. It is therefore clear from the above section that when a complaint is given to the Police authorities, they are bound to detect and bring the offenders to Justice and also to apprehend ail persons. If the reliefs sought for in the suit is granted, the effect will be to prevent the Police Officers from discharging their statutory duty. In fact, it will amount to preventing petitioners herein from initiating action underCriminal. Law.
16. In (Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank), their Lordships were considering Section 41(b) of Specific Relief Act. They also compared the law under old Specific Relief Act, 1887. In paragraph 10 of the Judgment, their Lordships hold thus,
“Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the respondent -Bank, contended that Section 41(b) is not at all attracted because it deals with perpetual injunction and the temporary or interim injunction is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure specially so provided in Section 37 of the Act. Expression ‘injunction’ in Section 41(b) is not qualified by an adjective and, therefore, it would comprehend both interim and perpetual injunction. It is, however, true that Section 37 specifically provides that temporary injunctions which have to continue until a specified time or until further orders of the Court are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a dichotomy is introduced by confining Section 41 to perpetual injunction only and Section 37 read with Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure being confined to temporary injunction, an unnecessary grey area will develop. It is indisputable that temporary injunction is granted during the pendency of the proceedings so that while granting final relief the Court is not faced with a situation that the relief becomes infructuous or that during the pendency of the proceedings an unfair advantage is not taken by the party in default or against whom temporary injunction is sought. But power to grant temporary injunction was conferred in aid or as auxiliary to the final relief that may be granted. If the final relief cannot be granted in
terms as prayed for, temporary relief in the same terms can hardly if ever be granted. In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted. The Court said that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceedings. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted….”
17. In AIR 1992 Gauhati 81 ( Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Purbanchal Erade Centre, Guwahati), a Division Bench followed the decision in cited supra and the principle was applied to cases under Section 41(b) of Specific Relief Act also. In paragraph 7 of the Judgment, it is held thus,
“The case in hand falls squarely under Clause (b) as well as Clause (d) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The lower Court in which the civil suit is pending and the criminal Court in which the appellant may choose to file a criminal complaint are not in the same hierarchy of Courts. The criminal Court is not subordinate to the civil Court in the instant case. That being so, Clause (b), which bars an injunction being granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought, clearly applies to the facts of the case. Since what is sought to be restrained is institution of any proceeding in criminal matter, the bar under Clause (d) is also attracted. Hence, the lower Court could not have passed the impugned order of injunction.”
18. No Court can grant a decree of Permanent Injunction to prevent the Police Officers from discharging their duties. At this juncture, learned counsel for respondent submitted that injunction is sought for only to take cognisance of frivolous complaint. The question whether they are frivolous or not also will have to be considered only by the Police after taking cognisance of same. The complaint cannot be dismissed at the threshold.
19. First petitioner herein wants to take action
against respondent for stealing moveables and under some provisions of Indian Penal Code and also for creating fraudulent documents. Allegation made in the complaint is that of criminal nature. Preventing Police Officers that they shall not investigate will mean that petitioner is prevented from instituting or prosecuting criminal complaints, and also preventing Police Officers from discharging their duties. Such a relief cannot be granted by Civil Court.
20. On going by the averments in the plaint, it is clear that the present suit is purely vexatious and the attempt of respondent is only to retain the goods admittedly belonging to minor. The intention is not bona fide. If a proceeding is filed for collateral purpose or spurious claim being made for litigation, the same will amount to abuse of process. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also have the same result. If the proceedings are absolutely groundless Court is entitled to stop the same at the threshold. Reason why Court is given such power is that the machinery of Court should not be improperly used as a means of vaxation and oppression in the process of litigation. Once Court is satisfied that there is no chance for succeeding in the Court, Court is duty bound to see that such proceedings are not to be allowed to continue. Court has power to stop the proceedings summarily and prevent the time of public and Court being wasted. (K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi).
21. In a recent decision of Calcutta High Court reported in (1998) 2 Cal LT 462 (Amzad AH v. Marfat AH) their Lordships considered the power under Article 227 of Constitution of India, and held thus,
“Power under Article 227 of the Constitution involves a duty on the part of the High Court to keep all Courts within the bounds of their authorities and to see that they do what their duty requires. This power under Article 227 can also be exercised by the High Court suo-motu and is not governed by any technical rules as applicable in cases of exercise of power under Article 226. It is also settled law that powers of High Court under Article 227 cannot be taken away or barred by any legislation short of constitutional amendment nor can it be barred by providing that the decision of an inferior tribunal shall be final.”
In paragraph 45 of the same Judgment, their
Lordships further went on and said that,
“When the High Court finds that the inferior Court, civil or criminal, has not acted according to the mandate of law resulting in gross abuse of the process of the Court, the extraordinary power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution can always be exercised.”
22. In view of my finding, suit itself is filed with an oblique motive and with an intention to retain the assets belonging to minor. When Natural guardian is alive and the effect of the suit also will amount to preventing Police Officers from discharging their statutory duties, the same shall not be allowed to be continued. It is only in the interest of justice respondent should be prevented from further prosecuting suit. Entertaining complaint and investigating the same is the duty of Police Officers. That is not to be prevented by granting injunction whether permanent or temporary. When suit is barred by law, lower Court should have considered the same before entertaining the same.
23. In the result, The Civil Revision petition is allowed. Suit O.S. 996 of 1998 on the file of II Additional District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli, filed by respondent is struck of the file. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No. 17282 of 1998 is closed.