PETITIONER:
RANJIT SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1991
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
BENCH:
VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
OJHA, N.D. (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 2296 1991 SCR (3) 742
1991 SCC (4) 304 JT 1991 (3) 550
1991 SCALE (2)396
ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Ss. 427, 433A--Life
convict --Convicted of another murder--Subsequent Sentence
of life imprisonment--Whether superimposition to the earlier
life sentence-Remissions or commutation in respect of earli-
er sentence--Whether available ipso facto in respect of
Second sentence.
Indian Penal Code, 1960: S. 302--Life convict--Trial for
second murder--Conviction--Imposition Of Life
sentence--Whether both life sentences to run concurrently.
Constitution of India: Article 32--Offender--Separately
sentenced to life imprisonment for two different offences
under section 302 IPC--Court's direction that in case of
remissions or commutation in respect of earlier sentence,
the latter sentenced to run thereafter-Interpretation of-
Writ Petition challenging the sentence--Whether maintain-
able.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner who was convicted under section 302-IPC
on 6.3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment; was also
tried for a second murder committed while he was on parole
after his conviction and sentence for the first murder, and
was convicted under s. '303 IPC. Altering the conviction to
one under s. 302 IPC, for the second murder this Court
sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of death sentence
and by its judgment dated 30.9.1983 directed that in case
any remission and commutation in respect of his earlier
sentence 'was granted, the latter sentence should commence
thereafter.
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution. praying for his release on the ground that
both the life sentences had to run concurrently in accord-
ance with s. 1427(2) Cr. P.C., and as he had undergone 14
years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time
of filing the writ petition on .February 19, 1990, he was
entitled to be released.'It was contended that this Court's
direc, tion dated 30.9.83 was .contrary to s. 427(2) of the
Code of Criminal
743
Procedure, 1973 since it amounted to directing that the two
sentences of life imprisonment were to run consecutively and
not concurrently.
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the
direction of this Court, properly construed, was not
contrary to.s. 427(2) Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the question
of issuing any writ or directions as claimed by the peti-
tioners did not arise.
Disposing of the petition treating it as one for clari-
fication of the judgment dated 30.9.1983 this Court,
HELD: 1.1 A sentence of transportation for life or
imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as trans-
portation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining
period of the convicted person's natural life unless the
remaining sentence is 'commuted or remitted by the appropri-
ate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by
the Court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence
of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner
and, therefore, there can b no question of a subsequent
sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running
consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-s
(1) ors. 427, Cr. P.C. [747G; 749D-E]
1.2 The earlier sentence of imprisonment-for life being
under stood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of
life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropri-
ate authority and a person having only one life span, the
sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a
term or imprisonment for life as envisaged by s. 427(2) of
the Cr. P.C., can only be superimposed to the earlier life
sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the
life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is
beyond human might. [749F-G]
It cannot be said that a sentence of life imprisonment
is to b treated asasentence of imprisonment for a fixed
term. [748B]
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The Stateof Maharashtra & Ors.,
[1961] 3 S.C.R. 440 and MaruRam v. Union of India & Anr.,
[1981] 1 S.C.R 1196, followed.
2.1 The operation of the superimposed subsequent sen-
tence of Iife imprisonment should not be wiped out merely
because in respect of to correspondingI earlier sentence of
life imprisonment any remission or commutation was granted
by the appropriate.authority. [75lF-G]
744
2.2 In the instant case, the last sentence in the direc-
tion meant that in case, any remission or commutation was
granted in. respect. of the earlier sentence of life impris-
onment alone then the benefit of that remission or commuta-
tion would not ipso facto be available in respect of the
subsequent sentence of life imprisonment which would contin-
ue to be unaffected by the remission or commutation in
respect of the earlier sentence alone. The consequence would
be that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit
of any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier
sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen-
tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of
the subsequent sentence was also granted to the petitioner.
It was in this manner that the direction 'was given for the
two sentences of life imprisonment not to run concurrently.
[750E-H; 751A]
The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life had,
therefore, to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of
imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner. [750C-D]
3. The general rule enunciated in sub,section (1) of s.
427 Cr. P.C. is that without the Court's direction the
subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecu-
tively. [749G]
The only situation in which no direction of the Court is
needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with
the previous sentence iS provided for in sub,section (2)
which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy
based on sub,section (1) if there being no express direction
of the Court to that effect. [749G-H; 750A]
Sub,section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the
general rule enacted under sub-section (1) of section 427
0Cr. P.C. [T50A]
4.1 The mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprison-
ment prescribed by s. 433A Cr. P.C. which has supremacy over
the Remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes made by
the various States would not operate against those whose
cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th Decem-
ber, 1978 when s. 433A Cr. P.C.'came into force but the
section would apply to those sentenced by the trial court
after 18.12.1978 even though the offence was committed prior
to that date. [748D-E]
Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 1196,
followed. .
745
4.2 In the instant case, s. 433A Cr. P.C. was applicable
to petitioner in respect of both sentences of life imprison-
ment since the conviction by the trial court even for the
first murder was after 18.12.1978, the second offence itself
being committed after 18.12.1978. The mandatory minimum of
14years' actual imprisonment as required by s. 433A even for
the first sentence of life imprisonment was not served out
by the petitioner, and, therefore, irrespective of the
points raised in the instant petition on the basis of s.
427(2) Cr. P.C. the petitioner could not claim relief much
less a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution in the
absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the
Government. [748E-G]
5. The petitioner's incarceration was the result of a
valid judicial order and, therefore, there could be no valid
claim to the infringement of any fundamental right which
alone could be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of
the Constitution. [747E-F]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 116 of
1990.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
R.K. Garg, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Kr. Garg and P.C. Choudhary
for the Petitioner.
U.R. Lalit and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VERMA, J. The short question arising for decision by us
is the true meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 427 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and its effect.
For an Offence of murder committed on 17.9.1978 the
petitioner, Ranjit Singh, was convicted under Section 302
I.P.C. by the Sessions Judge on 6..3.1979 and sentenced to
life imprisonment which was confirmed by the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana. While the petitioner was on parole after
his conviction and sentence for first murder, he was tried
for the second murder committed On October 25, 1980 and
convicted under Section 303 I.P.C. This conviction was
altered to one under Section 302 I.P.C. and for the second
murder, also the petitioner was sentenced by this Court on
30.9. 1983 to life imprisonment instead of death sentence.
This Court while disposing of the. petitioner’s appeal, in
this manner, directed as under:
746
“We feel that life imprisonment would be the
proper sentence that should be imposed-upon
the appellant. We accordingly reduce the
sentence of death imposed upon him and, sen-
tence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
life. However, since the present murder was
committed by him within a span of one year of
his earlier conviction and that too when he
was released .on parole we are clearly of the
view that the instant sentence of imprisonment
for life awarded to him should not run concur-
rently with his earlier sentence Of life
imprisonment. We therefore, direct that in
case any remission or commutation in respect
of his earlier sentence is granted to him the
present sentence should .commence thereafter.”
The petitioner has now filed this Writ Petition under Arti-
cle 32 of the Constitution for issuance of a suitable writ
or direction to correct,the above direction given in the
0order dated September 30, 1983 to bring it in consonance
with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and consequently for his re-
lease on the ground that both life sentences had to run
concurrently in accordance with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and
he is entitled to relief because he has undergone fourteen
years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time
of filing the Writ Petition on February 19, 1990. This is
how the question of construction of Section 427(2) Cr. P.C.
arises in the present case.
Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as
under:
“427. Sentence on offender already
sentenced for another offence–(1) When a
person already undergoing a sentence of im-
prisonment is sentenced on a subsequent con-
viction to imprisonment or imprisonment for
life, such imprisonment’ or imprisonment for
life shall commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment to which he has been previously
sentenced, unless the Court directs that the
subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence:
Provided that where a person, who has, been
sentenced to imprisonment by an order under
Section 122 in default of furnishing security
is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced
to imprisonment for an offence committed prior
to the making of such order, the latter sen-
tence shall commence immediately.
747
(2) When a person already undergoing
a sentence of imprisonment for life is sen-
tenced on a subsequent conviction to. impris-
onment for a term or imprisonment for life,
the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous Sentence .’ ‘
Shri R.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner strenu-
ously urged that this Court’s above quoted direction in the
judgment dated 30.9.1983 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 418
of 1982 while affirming the conviction under Section 302
I.P.C. for the second murder and imposing the punishment of
life imprisonment for it ‘also amounts to directing that the
two sentences of life imprisonment are tO run consecutively
and not concurrently which is in direct conflict with Sub-
section (2) of Section 427 Cr. P.C. He ,urged that the life
‘span of a person Could be only one and therefore ,any
subsequent life sentence must run concurrently and not
consecutively which is the clear mandate :of Section 427(2).
On this basis, it was, urged that this Court’s direction in
the above manner on the petitioner’S conviction for the
second offence of murder is contrary-to Section 427(2) of
the Code 01 Criminal Procedure, 1973. This is the basis of
the reliefs claimed on behalf of the .petitioner. In reply,
Shri U.R. Lalit. appearing. on behalf of respondents, con-
tended that the direction of this Court properly construed
is not contrary to Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and, therefore,
the question of issuing any writ or directions claimed by
the petitioner does not arise.
We may straightaway mention that the question of grant
of relief under Article 32 of the Constitution does not
arise on the above facts. The petitioner’s incarceration is
the result of a valid judicial order and, therefore,’ there
can be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental
right which alone can be the foundation for a writ under
Article 32 of the COnstitution. The only question, it ap-
pears, therefore, is about the correct construction of the
direction given by this Court in its judgment dated
30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 in the fight of
the true meaning of Section427(2) Cr. P.C.
The meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for life is no
longer res integra; It was held by a Constitution Bench in
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra and Others,
[1961] 3 S:C.R. 440 that a sentence of transportation for
life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as
transportation Or imprisonment for the whole of the remain-
ing period of the convicted person’s natural life. It was
further held:
748
“Unless the said sentence is commut-
ed or remitted by appropriate authority under
the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal
Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is
bound in law to serve the life term in
prison.”
The contention that a sentence of life imprisonment was to
be treated as a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term
was expressly rejected. This view was followed and reiterat-
ed in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ant., [1981] 1 S.C.R.
1196 while considering the effect of Section 433A introduced
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with effect from
18.12.1978. The Constitution Bench in Maru Ram summarised
one of its conclusions as under:
“We follow Godse’s case (supra) to hold that
imprisonment for life lasts until the last
breath, and whatever the length of remissions
earned, the prisoner can claim release only if
the remaining sentence is remitted by Govern-
ment.”
Another conclusion in Maru Ram was that the mandatory mini-
mum of 14 years’ actual imprisonment prescribed by Section
433A which has supremacy over the Remission Rules and
short-sentencing statutes made by the various States will
not operate against those whose cases were decided by the
trial court before the 18th December, 1978 when Section 433A
came ‘into force but Section 433A would apply to those
sentenced ‘by the trial court after 18.12.1978 even though
the offence was committed prior to that date. From these
decisions it is obvious that the mandatory minimum of 14
years’. actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A is
applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of
life imprisonment since the conviction by the trial court
even for the first murder was after 18.12.1.978, the second
offence itself being committed after ‘18.12.1978. There is
no dispute that the mandatory minimum of 14 years’ actual
imprisonment, as required by Section 433A even for the first
sentence of life imprisonment, has not been served out by
the petitioner and, therefore, irrespective of the points
raised in this petition on the basis of Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. the petitioner cannot claim relief much less a writ
under Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the
remaining sentence being remitted by the Government. This
alone is sufficient to refuse any relief under Article 32 of
the Constitution.
The question now is of the meaning of Section 472(2) Cr.
P.C, and its effect, in the present case, in view of the
above quoted direc-
749
tion Of this Court in its judgment dated 30.9.1983.
Sub-section (1) of Section 427Cr. P.C. provides for the
situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words, Sub-
section (1) of Section 427 Cr. P.C. deals with an offender
who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is’ subse-
quently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for
life. In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a
fixed term, expires on a definite date which is known when
the subsequent conviction is made., Sub-section (1) says
that in’ such a situation, the date of expiry of the first
sentence which the offender is undergoing being known,
ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the
expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the
Court .directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently
with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases’ covered by
Sub-section (1)where the sentence is for a fixed’ term, the
subsequent sentence Can be consecutive unless directed to
run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, pro-
vides for an offender “alreadly undergoing sentence of
imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is
well-settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal
Vinayaka Godse and reiterated in Maru Ram that imprisonment
for life is a sentence for the remainder or the life of the
offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remit-
ted by the appropriate authority. This being so at-the.stage
of sentencing by the Court On a subsequent conviction, the
earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood
in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question of a
subsequent sentence of. impriosnment for a term or for life
running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in
Sub-. section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended’by
Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier
sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean
as sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless
commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a
person having only one life’ span, the sentence on a subse-
quent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment
for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sen-
tence and certainly not added to it since extending the life
span of the offender or for that ‘matter anyone is
beyond .human might. It is this obvious situation which is
stated in sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the general’
rule enunciated in sub-section (1) thereof is that without
the Court’s direction the subse-. quent sentence will. not
run concurrently, but consecutively. The only situation in
which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subse-
quent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence
is
750
provided for in Sub-section (2) which has been enacted to
avoid any possible controversy based on Sub-section. (1) if
there be no express direction of the Court to that effect.
Sub-section (2) is in the nature of anexCeption to the
general rule enacted in Sub-section (1) of Section 427
that’a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry
of the first sentence unless the Court directs it to run
concurrently. The meaning and purpose of Sub-sections (1) &
(2)of Section 427 and the object of en,acting Sub-section
?)is, therefore, Clear..
We are not required to say anything regarding the practical.
effect of remission or commutation of the sentences since
that question does not arise in the present case. The
limited controversy before us has been indicated. The only
question now is of ‘the meaning and effect of the above
quoted direction in this Court’s judgment dated 30.9.1983 It
is obvious that the direction .of this Court must be con-
strued to harmonise with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. which is
the statutory mandate apart from being the obvious truth.
The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life has, there-
fore, to run concurrently with the read as sentenceof
imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner. Thed
exercise is to construe the last sentence in the direction
which re under:
“We, therefore, direct that in case any remission
or commutation .in respect of his earlier sentence is grant-
ed to him the present sentence should commence thereafter.”
It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the
proceeding portion has to be read. This last sentence in the
direction means that in case, any remission or commutation
is granted in respect of the earlier. sentence. of life
imprisonment alone then the benefit of that remission
or .commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect
of the sub. sequent sentence of life imprisonment which
would continue to be unaffected by the remission or commuta-
tion in respect of the earlier sentence alone. In other
WordS, the operation of the superimposed subsequent sen-
tence, of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out .merely
because in respect of the corresponding earlier sentence of
life imprisonment any remission or commutation has been
granted by the appropriate authority. The consequence is
that the petitioner would not ‘get any practical ‘benefit
of any remission or commutation respect of his earlier
sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen-
tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of
the subsequent sentence. is also .granted tO the petitioner.
It is in this manner that the direction is given for the,
two Sentences of life impri-
751
sonment not to run concurrently.
The ultimate direction contained in the last sentence is
obviously for this purpose. So construed the direction of
this Court in the judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal
Appeal No. 418 of 1982 fully harmonises with Section 427(2)
Cr. P.C. This is the clarification we make of this Court’s
judgment dated 30.9. 1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 18 of
1982.
We have already stated that this petition ‘for the
issuance of a writ Under Article 32 of the Constitution is
untenable. We have, there-
‘ fore, treated it as a petition for clarification of the
judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982.
Accordingly, the petition is disposed of with this clarifi-
cation.
R.P. Petition disposed
of.
752