JUDGMENT
Aftab Alam, J.
1. This appeal is directed against an order dated 16.11.1991 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Godda in Title (Claim) Suit No. 11/1987. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has rejected a claim made by the appellants under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, even before the case was taken up for trial, on the ground that in the claim petition there was no allegation of negligence on the part of the driver of the bus causing the fatal accident.
2. The claim for compensation arose from an accident in which one Ashwani Kumar Jha, the husband of appellant No. 1 was run over by a bus bearing registration No. BHJ 3877. The accident took place at Gorsanda Chowk between Godda and Pathargawan on 3.6.1987 at about 2.45 p.m. The husband of the appellant No. 1 died on the spot.
3. A claim application was filed under Section 110A of the Act on behalf of the widowed wife and the minor children of the deceased. The claim application, as required, was in the statutory form as prescribed under the Bihar Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1961. It is no one’s case that the claim application (in the statutory form) was not properly filled up or there was any other lacuna in the making of the application.
4. After the filing of the claim application, the petition, it was stated as follows:
That the petitioner No. 1’s husband died due to rash, negligent driving by the driver of the bus BHJ 38757 on 3.6.1987 at Gorsanda Chowk.
By order dated 23.12.1987 the Tribunal directed the owner of the bus, respondent No. 1 in this appeal to pay to the petitioner the fixed amount of Rs. 15,000/- in accordance with Section 92(A) of the Act.
5. On 4.10.1991, the case was fixed for hearing on 16.11.91. However, on 16.11.91 the claimants were to present in Court and in their absence their claim application was rejected by a very brief order on the ground that there was absolutely no allegation of negligence on the part of the driver of the bus causing the fatal accident.
6. The law stands settled on the point that the liability of the owner of the motor vehicle to compensate the victim in an accident would arise only on proof that the accident was caused due to any rash and negligent act of the driver and unless the negligence or rashness of the driver is proved, the question of payment of an compensation would not arise (see the decisions of the Supreme Court in Minu B. Mehta and Anr. v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Anr. and in Bishan Devi and Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh and Anr.
7. In this case, however, the learned Tribunal rejected the appellants’ claim even before the trial was taken up and before the appellants could lead evidence to show and establish that the accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver and for this reason alone I find that the order coming under appeal is illegal and unsustainable in the eye of law.
8. I am not unconscious that it may be argued that in the absence of the plea of negligence having been made in the claim application, it would not be open to the claimants to lead any evidence on that point and hence it may further be argued that in the absence of such a plea in the claim application, it would be an exercise in futility to take up the case for trial. To my mind such an objection in a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the rules framed thereunder, would be quite misconceived and without substance.
9. It is to be noted that Sub-section (2) of Section 110A of the Act provided as follows:
Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred and shall be in such a form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.
Rule 3 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1961 deals with the applications to be made under Section 110 of the Act and provided as follows:
3: Applications.-Every application for payment of compensation made under Section 110A of the Act shall be made in the form appended to these rules and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed thereof in Rule 22.
At the end of the Rules, there is a form of application for compensation. Informations are to be furnished in this application against 23 captioned columns. It is to be noted that there is no column in this form against which the claimant might indicate as to whether the accident was caused due to the rashness and negligence of the driver. It is indeed true that the last column of the form (column No. 23) relates to any other information that may be necessary or helpful in the disposal of the claim but it would be too much to expect the claimant to say that the accident was due to the negligence of the driver against that column.
10. This aspect of the matter has been considered in detail in a Division Bench decision of Mysore High Court in Nacharamna v. The Chairman of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banglore and Ors. AIR 1973 Mysore 10. In para 4 of the judgment it is stated as follows:
4. Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for making an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 110. Sub-section (2) of that Section provides.
Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred and shall be in such a form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.
The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1963 were framed by the State Government under the powers vested by virtue of the Section 11 of the Act. The form of the application is Form No. 82 of the Rules. In the said form the applicant is required to furnish specific particulars with respect to 21 matters enumerated in columns 1 to 21. In addition thereto, under Column 22 the applicant is free to furnish any other information that may be necessary or helpful in the disposal of the claim. It is quite clear that the particulars that the applicant may furnish against Column 22 and not facts that constitute the cause of action. Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not govern applications for compensation under the Act. Similarly, Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code does not apply. If the Rule making authority had intended that the application shall contain all particulars as in a plaint nothing would have been easier than to state so. It is also necessary to observe that the Tribunal is not competent to find fault with the form prescribed by the Rule making authority. If the application is made in the form prescribed, the Tribunal is bound to enquire into the claim.
I find myself in respectful agreement with the view expressed by their Lordships of the Mysore High Court.
11. As shown above, a claim application is to be made in a statutory form as the claimant is not allowed to make his averments and statements of facts. In that view, it cannot be argued that in the absence of any pleading in the claim application the applicant must be precluded from leading any evidence in support of the case that the accident was caused due to the rashness and negligence of the driver. In fact, the present case stands on a much better footing inasmuch as in the petition under Section 92A of the Act (which incidently is not to be made in any statutory form) it was specifically pleaded, as quoted above, that the husband of appellant No. 1 died due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver of bus No. BHJ 3877. Thus, in this case it cannot even be argued that there was no pleading on the basis of which the claimant could lead evidence to establish the negligence of the bus driver.
12. For the reasons stated above, I am unable to sustain the impugned order and it is accordingly set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Godda with a direction to take up the claim case for trial and to afford opportunity to the claimants to lead evidence in support of their claim.
13. In the result, this appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.