JUDGMENT
Tapen Sen, J.
1. The writ petitioner in the instant case has espoused the cause of one Manoj Kumar Sinha and has prayed for quashing of the Award dated 21.02.1994 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No. 1), Dhanbad (here-in-after referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Tribunal) in Reference Case No. 126/89 by reason whereof he has upheld the action of the management in dismissing the aforementioned Manoj Kumar Sinha (here-in-after referred to for the sake of brevity as the concerned workman).
2. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to some of the paragraphs of the Award for purposes of satisfying this Court that the same is perverse or that it suffers from the patent irregularity/illegality and deserves to be set aside by this Court.
3. The case of the concerned workman was that he was a permanent employee of the Bhowra Coke Oven Plant of BCCL. On the date when the aforementioned Plant was nationalized on 21.03.1983 he was in employment and after nationalization this Plant came under the administrative control of the management of Bhowra Area No. XI which also included Bararee Fire Project. The concerned workman stated that he was efficient and his services were mostly utilized as a driver under the Area Manager (Technical). The further case of the concerned workman was that he was transferred to the Bhowra North Open Cast Project (herein-after referred to for the sake of brevity as Bhowra Project) by the Personnel Manager, Bhowra area vide letter dated 10/ 11.05.1984. On being released by the Project Officer on 26.09.1984, he reported and resumed duties at Bhowra Project Office at 4-B quarry and was given temporary authorization to work as a Shovel Operator.
4. Since his services were utilized for a higher category job he, therefore, demanded higher pay scale and consequential grades and when he was not given these, he refused to work in such higher jobs. This became a source of displeasure with the management which stopped paying him wages since February, 1986. Consequently, on 16.05.1986 he approached the Labour Enforcement Officer (Central), Dhanbad, who called for comments from the agent of the Bhowra Project. Reacting the Agent issued a Charge- sheet dated 28/29.08.1986 alleging that the concerned workman had secured employment in BCCL by fraudulent means. The further case of the concerned workman was that after a perfunctory inquiry, he was dismissed by the Agent of Bhowra Project by letter dated 29.10.1987. This led to conciliation proceedings and upon failure thereof, the matter ultimately culminated in reference to the learned Tribunal for adjudication. Consequently, prayer was made before the Tribunal to hold the dismissal as unjustified and to order reinstatement with full back wages and allowances w.e.f. 29,10.1987.
5. The case of the management was that the workman had started work in the Bhowra Project through manipulations and by practicing fraud although he was never employed in the colliery. The management further stated that after promulgation of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, the previous owner entered into litigation and upon orders of the Calcutta High Court, a Receiver was appointed. Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the Nationalisation Act and the Bhowra Coke Oven Plant was ultimately handed over to BCCL by the Receiver. The management stated that it was the case of the concerned workman that he had been appointed in the aforementioned Coke Oven Plant during the subsistence of the Receiver and that the aforesaid Plant had been verbally transferred to the Bararee Colliery where he was posted in the fire project and later on released by the said Project on 08.09.1984 for joining duties at the Bhowra Project, Later on it transpired to the management that the concerned workman had entered into services by fraudulent means as a result whereof the Charge-sheet was is-sued. They also stated that since he was not a genuine workman, he was paid wages in the wage sheet prepared manually and not through the mechanized pay roll system which was applied in cases of regular workers and that was the reason why he did not get any pay slip nor was issued any appointment letter in his name nor were his details ever entered in Form-B Register maintained under the Mines Rules at the Bhowra Coke Oven Plant or at the Bararee Colliery. From a perusal of the Award and the records of this case, it appears that a domestic inquiry was conducted where the concerned workman participated. On completion of the inquiry, a report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer holding him guilty which led to his being dismissed from the services of the company by Order dated 29.10.1987 referred to above.
6. The fairness and propriety of the domestic inquiry was taken up as a preliminary issue and after considering various documents, the counsel for the workman before the Tribunal conceded that the domestic inquiry was fair and proper. This concession has been recorded at paragraph-16 of the Award. After holding that the domestic inquiry had been held fairly and properly, the learned Tribunal, thereafter, proceeded to answer the reference which had been transmitted to him for adjudication. The reference for adjudication was as follows :
“Whether the action of the management of Bhowra North OCP of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., in dismissing Shri Manoj Kumar Sinha, Fitter Helper, w.e.f. 29.10.1987 is justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman entitled?”
7. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner has, during the course of arguments placed reliance on paragraphs 18 and 21 of the Award and has submitted that the action of the Tribunal is not having relied upon the Order of the Labour Court, Dhanbad passed on 27.08.1989 by which the concerned workman had been found entitled to payment of wages, was not proper and such non-consideration caused prejudice to him because that would have conclusively proved that the workman had demanded arrears of wages under the Payment of Wages Act. and consequently, it would have been established that he was therefore, in fact, on employee.
8. This Court finds no reason to hold that the action of the learned Tribunal in not considering the aforesaid Order dated 27.10.1989 was either improper or irregular because that order related to payment of wages under the Payment of Wages Act. It has nothing to do with giving a finding as to whether the relationship of employer and employee existed between the management and concerned workman. Coupled with this, it is necessary to refer to paragraph-34 of the Award where, during the course of cross examination, the concerned workman had claimed that he could show the appointment letter and had promised to show the same on the next date before the Inquiry Officer. On the next date i.e. 28.08.1987, the workman admitted before the inquiry officer that he had no appointment letter relating to his appointment in Bhowra Coke Oven Plant and therefore, he was unable to produce that document.
9. This conclusively establishes that the concerned workman did not possess any appointment letter. Another important feature of this case and which disentitles the writ petitioner from any relief is that the management’s witness No. 3 Mr. H.C. Srivastava who is said to have sent Ext. 3 and 4 to Mr. Srivastava clearly stated that he has not signed any such release order or any such last pay certificate. Ext.-3 was the release order dated 08.09.1984 showing the concerned workman to have been released from the Bararee Fire Project for purposes of joining the Bhowra Project pursuant to an office order dated 10/11.05.1984 alleged to have been issued by the Personnel Manager, Bhowra Area. Ext-4 was the last pay slip containing alleged details about the concerned workman said to have been issued from the office of the Bararee Colliery but as stated above the management’s witness No. 3 Mr. H.C. Srivastava who is said to have sent Ext. 3 and 4 to Mr. Srivastava clearly stated that he has not signed any such release order or any such last pay certificate.
10. The concerned workman did not cross examine Mr. H.C. Srivastava. On the contrary, and as is evident at paragraph 28, the concerned workman refused to cross-examine him. Similarly yet another management’s witness namely Deepak Kumar Mitra had also given similar statements but the concerned workman also refused to cross-examine him. Yet another witness Shaktipada Chatterjee who also made similar statement to the effect that the name of the concerned workman was not there in any register etc., he was also not examined by the concerned workman.
11. Similarly, another witness of the management namely Sarmukh Singh stated that he did not know any Manoj Kumar Sinha. He also stated that the concerned workman had never worked in Bararee Fire Project nor was his name in the register or the book which either contained the attendance of the workman or through which payments are made. This Sarmukh Singh was the time keeper of the Bararee Fire Project but the concerned workman refused to cross- examine this witness. Similarly, S.K. Sinha, Senior Personnel Officer of the Bararee Colliery who was working since July, 1985 and being another management witness also stated that the concerned workman never worked either at the Bararee Colliery or the Bararee Fire Project. He also stated that he was never paid by the management or that his name was never recorded in Form ‘B’ Register, C.M.P.F. Record, Identity Card Register, or in Pay Roll. The concerned workman refused to cross-examine this witness also.
12. For the reasons stated above, the Writ Petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this Writ Application. Moreover, this Court sitting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should not upset the Award of a fact finding authority unless the same is so perverse or illegal that this Court is compelled to intervene in the matter. For the aforementioned proposition reference may be made to the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., reported in AIR 1984 SC 976. The Supreme Court has held at paragraph 4 that under Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in matters relating to awarding of relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not enjoy such power though as a superior Court it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinize the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well expected limitations and, therefore, it can in an appropriate case to quash the award of the tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and direction, if any. The Supreme Court has also held that the High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal.
13. In yet another judgment, in the case of Calcutta Port Shramik Union v. Calcutta River Transport Association and Ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 2168 the Supreme Court at paragraph 10 of the said judgment has held that :
“The object of enacting the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and of making provision therein to refer disputes to tribunals for settlement is to bring about industrial peace. Whenever a reference is made by a Government to an industrial tribunal it has to be presumed ordinarily that there is a genuine industrial dispute between the parties which requires to be resolved by adjudication. In all such cases an attempt should be made by Courts exercising powers of judicial review to sustain as far as possible the awards made by industrial tribunals instead of picking holes here and there in the awards on trivial points and ultimates frustrating the entire adjudication process before the tribunals by striking down awards on hyper-technical grounds. Unfortunately the orders of the single Judge and of the Division Bench have resulted in such frustration and have made the award fruitless on an untenable basis.”
14. In view of the aforesaid and in
view of the fact that the learned Tribunal
came to a conclusive finding on the basis
of a process of analysis of various evidences
and documents, this Court does not find
any infirmity or perversity or illegality in the
Award of the learned Tribunal. Consequently, this Court does not find any merit
in this writ application. It is, accordingly
dismissed. However there shall be no order
as to costs.