Bombay High Court High Court

R/At: Sidhewadi vs 4 Yahdeo Vishnu Chavan on 29 April, 2011

Bombay High Court
R/At: Sidhewadi vs 4 Yahdeo Vishnu Chavan on 29 April, 2011
Bench: V.M. Kanade
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          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY




                                                                   
                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                           
                    SECOND APPEAL NO.60 OF 2007

    Shri Namdeo Bhau Chavan            )
    Age: 76, Occ: Agriculturist        )




                                          
    R/at: Sidhewadi, Tal. Miraj,       )
    Dist: Sangli                       ) .... Appellant.

              V/s




                                  
    1 Smt. Shantabai Kundlika Chavan )
    Age: 55, Agriculturist
                        ig           )
    Occ:Household                    )
                                     )
                      
    2 Shri Mahadeo Vishnu Chavan     )
    Age : 45, Occ: Agriculturist     )
                                     )
    3 Shri Sahadeo Vishnu Chavan     )
    Age : 45, Occ: Service           )
       


                                     )
    



    4 Yahdeo Vishnu Chavan           )
    Age: 42, Occ: Service, All R/o.  )
    Sidhewadi, Tal: Miraj.           )
    Dist : Sangli.                   ) .... Respondents.





    Ms. A.R.S. Baxi for the appellant.
    Mr. S.K. Chinchlikar for Respondent No.1.





                    CORAM: V. M. KANADE, J.

DATE : 29TH APRIL, 2011

ORAL JUDGMENT:

1. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant and the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of

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Respondent No.1.

2. Following two substantial questions of law were framed

at the time of admission of the appeal:-

“1 Whether the decree passed by

courts below is sustainable u/s 36A of

Preventionig of Fragmentation Act,

1947?”

“2 Whether the courts below were

correct in issuing injunction against

Appellant who is co-owner of Gat No.

347?”

3. Appellant herein is the original Defendant and

Respondent No.1 is the original Plaintiff. For the sake of

convenience, parties shall be referred to as “Plaintiff” and

“Defendant”.

4. Plaintiff filed a suit in the Civil Court for an order of

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injunction restraining the Defendant from interfering with

her possession. Trial Court decreed the suit and injunction

was also granted in favour of the Plaintiff, restraining the

Defendant from interfering with her possession. Against this

judgment and decree, Defendant preferred an appeal before

the lower appellate court. The order passed by the trial

court was not stayed during pendency of appeal. Appeal

was finally dismissed.

5. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant has strenuously urged that the appellant had

purchased half portion of Gat No.347 and, therefore, he was

the owner to the extent of half portion of the said land and

that in the consolidation scheme an order was passed

initially in favour of the appellant herein. It is submitted that

orders passed by the Consolidation Officer in the scheme

cannot be interfered with in a suit and the effect of granting

order of injunction amounted to interference with the order

passed by the Consolidation Officer. Secondly, it is

submitted that since the Defendant, appellant herein was co-

owner of the said property, no order of injunction could be

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passed in favour of the Plaintiff. The learned Counsel has

invited my attention to the provisions of section 36A and

also the judgment and order of the trial court and the lower

appellate court. It is submitted that both the courts below

have lost sight of the fact that by virtue of Sale Deed,

appellant was owner to the extent of 50% and he was also in

possession of the suit property. It is further submitted that,

initially, suit was filed by the Defendant and the said suit

was dismissed by the Trial Court and against the said

judgment and order Defendant preferred an appeal.

However, the said appeal was allowed to be withdrawn with

liberty to file fresh suit. It is submitted that no fresh suit was

filed. However, in view of the withdrawal of the appeal, the

finding recorded by the trial court also stood withdrawn. It is

submitted that, both, the trial court and the lower appellate

court had erred in holding that the said finding recorded by

the trial court had attained finality.

6 On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing on

behalf of Plaintiff submitted that provisions of section 36A

would not create a bar for filing a suit where reliefs are not

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in the nature of challenge to the order passed in the

consolidation proceedings. In support of the said

submission, he relied upon the judgment of the learned

Single Judge of this Court in Prabhakar Kushaba Hagwane

and others vs. Yashwant Bhau Hagwane since deceased by

Lrs. Ganpat Yashwant Hagwane 1. He further submitted that,

therefore, the suit for injunction simpliciter filed against the

Defendant was maintainable and both the courts below,

therefore, had accordingly held that the suit was

maintainable. So far as the second submission of the

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Defendant/Appellant herein is concerned, he submitted that

the specific case of the Plaintiff was that she was owner of

the specific portion of the land and, therefore, there was no

question of the Defendant being co-owner of the said land.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on

behalf of the Plaintiff and Defendant.

1 1993 Mh.L.J. 1291

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8. Before considering the rival submissions, it will be

relevant to consider the provisions of section 36A of the said

Act which reads as under:-

            "36A    (1)   No     Civil     Court        or

            Mamlatdar's     Court        shall     have

jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal

with any question which is by or

under this Act required to be settled,

decided or dealt with by the State

Government or any officer or

authority.

(2) No order of the State

Government or any such officer or

authority made under this Act shall

be questioned in any Civil, Criminal

or Mamlatdar’s Court.”

9. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision clearly

reveals that Civil Court is precluded from deciding any

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question which is required to be decided by the State

Government or any officer or authority. As a natural

corollary, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted

expressly in respect of the matters which are decided by the

State Government or any Officer or authority under this Act.

A preamble to this Act reads as under:-

“An Act to provide for the prevention

of fragmentation of agricultural

holdings and for their consolidation.

WHEREAS it is expedient to prevent

the fragmentation of agricultural

holdings and to provide for the

consolidation of agricultural holdings

for the purpose of the better

cultivation thereof; It is hereby

enacted as follows:-”

The purpose behind introducing this Act was, therefore, to

prevent the fragmentation and for consolidation of

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agricultural holding. The Act lays down the procedure for

consolidation and also the powers of consolidation officer

have been enumerated in the Act. The Act also lays down

the effect of consolidation proceedings and consolidation

holdings. Therefore, any order passed by the State

Government or any Officer in respect of consolidation of

holdings or redistribution of holdings cannot be challenged

before the Civil Court or Mamlatdar’s Court. It is a settled

position in law that jurisdiction of civil court is either

expressly or impliedly excluded if the provision is so made

in the special Act to that effect and not otherwise.

10. In the present case, section 36A excludes the

jurisdiction of the civil court only to the extent of decisions

which are taken by the State Government or Officers

appointed by it for implementing the provisions of this Act.

Therefore, the suit for simpliciter injunction restraining the

Defendant from obstructing possession is not specifically

barred by the said provisions of section 36A. In my view,

ratio of the judgment in Prabhakar Kushaba Hagwane and

others vs. Yashwant Bhau Hagwane since deceased by Lrs.

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Ganpat Yashwant Hagwane 1 would squarely apply to the

facts of the present case. The learned Single Judge of this

Court in the said judgment has observed in para 7 as under:-

“7. Had Civil Court jurisdiction to try this

suit in view of Section 36A is the second

question of law, raised before me.

Section 36A mentions that no Civil Court

or Mamlatdar’s Court has jurisdiction to

settle, decide or deal with any question

which is by or under this Act required to

be settled, decided or dealt with by the

State Government or any officer or

authority. Sub-section (2) of that section

mentions that no order of the State

Government or any such officer or

authority made under the Act shall be

questioned in any Civil, Criminal or

Mamlatdar’s Court. Now, the Plaintiff had

filed this suit on the basis that he has

1 1993 Mh.L.J. 1291

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been illegally dispossessed of the

property subsequent to his acquisition of

the title under the Act. The Defendants

have disputed this fact. Quite clearly the

dispute of this nature would fall within the

jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Court. No

provision of the Act is brought to my

notice under which it could be said that

the controversy, like this, is required to be

settled, decided or dealt with under the

Act either by the State Government or

any officer or authority. Under the

circumstances, the submission that the

Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the

suit, is without any merit.”

11. The other submissions made by the learned Counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant are on factual findings

which are arrived at by the lower Courts and this Court while

exercising its jurisdiction under section 100 of the Civil

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Procedure Code cannot interfere with the said findings.

Further, the contention of the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant/original Defendant that the order was

passed by the Consolidation Officer in favour of the

appellant also cannot be accepted since it is rightly pointed

out by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of

Respondent No.1/Plaintiff that the said order was set aside

and the Writ Petition No.4924/1993 filed by the appellant

herein was also dismissed by this Court by judgment dated

21/03/2011. Hence, there is no merit in the submissions

made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant.

12. In my view, therefore, the suit which was filed by the

Plaintiff in the Civil Court for injunction was maintainable.

The first question of law framed by this Court, therefore, is

answered in the affirmative. So far as the second question

of law is concerned, both the Courts below have come to the

conclusion that the Plaintiff claimed to be the owner of a

specific portion in Gat No.347 and since there are concurrent

findings of both the Courts below there is no question of

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Defendant being declared to be the co-owner in respect of

the property. The second question therefore is answered in

the affirmative.

13 Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed.

(V.M. KANADE, J.)

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