JUDGMENT
S.K. Desai, J.
On 19th February, 1990 by a short but reasoned judgment
1. Directed summary dismissal of Writ Petition No. 748 of 1990. Counsel appearing for respective parties had taken me through the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. Shyam Co-operative Housing Society and others, as well as the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in O.N. Bhatnagar v. Smt. Rukibai Narsindas and others, . After going through the relevant passages from the said judgment and applying them, I came to the conclusion that the petitioner’s case was untenable, and summarily dismissed the said writ petition. At the time of dismissing the writ petition I had indicated in paragraph 3 of the judgment that if similar questions were under consideration by the Supreme Court and if a fresh decision is available which supports the case of the petitioner, then the petitioner was given liberty to apply for review of the said judgment.
2. On 8th March, 1990 the Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1369 of 1990 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7878 of 1989 Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., 1990(1) Bom.C.R. 796 : considered a similar question and, after extensive review of its own earlier decisions including in O.N. Bhatnagar’s case and Hindustan petroleum Corporation’s case (supra), gave a decision which, to a large extent, supports the contentions of the petitioner, which contentions had not found favour with me. Although learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 2 to 6 states that the observations are distinguishable, it is my certain conviction that had this judgment been available in February, 1990. I would have admitted the writ petition and probably, subject to guidance from the respondents’ Counsel had allowed it.
3. The present Review Petition has been taken out pursuant to liberty granted by me in my order dismissing the writ petition. However, Counsel for the respondents have opposed the review petition on the basis of the Explanation to O. XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Explanation reads as under:—
“Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”
If Order XLVII governs writ petitions, then the case of the Review petitioner falls squarely within what is contemplated by the Explanation and the Review Petition is required to be rejected, even though there may be substantial merit therein.
4. That in writ matters Courts possess inherent jurisdiction to review their orders was discussed by the Supreme Court in Shivedo Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1909. The Court was dealing with Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the observations would also apply equally to a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Both are facets of the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and there is nothing to distinguish one Article from another as far as applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is concerned. It should be borne in mind that in some other proceedings the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code have been applied substantially to representative pleas under the constitutional jurisdiction.
5. The Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was introduced in 1976 to resolve a conflict which has arisen between High Courts. Most of the High Courts had taken the decision as indicated in the Explanation, but one or two High Courts held a different view. To obviate the conflict the Explanation was added.
6. The short question to be considered in the Review Petition is whether the Explanation is to be applied to a review application in an order under the writ jurisdiction. On this question my attention was drawn to a decision given by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Padam Narain and another v. G.C. Jain and others, A.I.R. 1984 Delhi 310. In the aforesaid decision it was observed inter alia that proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was observed further that since section 141 of the Code itself exclude proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution from its operation, the position of proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution could not be different. On the other hand, in Gyan Chandra Dwivedi v. 2nd Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, , the Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code was applied to a review sought in respect of an order passed in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
7. The direct authority placed before me for my consideration is the Allahabad authority where Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, itself was under consideration. As stated earlier, the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code have been applied in terms with certain considerable modifications to representative writ petitions. Thus, although section 141 of the Code may exclude petitions under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the principles contained in the relevant provisions of the Code will have to be made applicable to writ petitions both under Articles 226 and 227. As the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court observes, principles under Order XLVII of the Code, including those embodied in the Explanation to rule (1) thereof, are salutary principles for putting a finality to a proceeding before the Court. It is not for me to consider the wisdom or otherwise of the provision. The historical genesis and the Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 as also the Report of the Law Commission must testify to the wisdom. If it is a wise provision required to be applied to civil proceedings, it cannot be unwise in its application to constitutional proceedings. Once it is conceded that it is a good provision, the principles contained therein must apply, however wrong the earlier order would be, and if that be so, the review petition will have to be dismissed, though reluctantly.
8. Once I make the observation that had the later Supreme Court judgment been made available to me I would have certainly admitted the writ petition and perhaps the petitioner’s contention would have been upheld, then sufficient time must be given to the Review petitioner (original petitioner) to go to the Supreme Court from the decision sought to be reviewed. Accordingly, the Review petition will stand dismissed, with no order as to costs. However, the order staying the execution of the eviction decree is extended till 31st July, 1990 to enable the review petitioners to approach the Supreme Court.
9. It may be mentioned that Mr. Rane on behalf of the Review petitioners had drawn my attention to several High Court Judgments which were given prior to the amendment in 1976 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in 1976. Since the Explanation to rule (1) of that order itself came on the statute-book in 1976, these judgments, in my opinion, were not very relevant and hence I have refrained from setting them out or discussing them.
10. Accordingly, the Review petition stands rejected and the Rule is discharged. Parties to bear their respective costs of the Review Petition.