JUDGMENT
B.P. Das, J.
1. The petitioner in this revision application has challenged the order dated 1.12.2001 passed in M.J.C. No. 2 of 2001 by which the 1st Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Koraput at Jeypore, has dismissed the petition filed by the claimant with a prayer for setting aside the order passed by it dismissing M.J.C. No. 106 of 1997, and for restoration of the same to file for disposal in accordance with law.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of this revision application are stated thus : The present petitioner filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the 1st M.A.C.T., Koraput at Jeypore, claiming compensation for the death of her husband through an advocate named Shri Rajendra Panda. The aforesaid application which was registered as M.J.C. No. 106 of 1997 was posted to 24.8.2000 for hearing. On the aforesaid date, the counsel appearing for the claimant filed a memo, stating therein that the claimant did not intend to proceed with the case. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, when the claimant, a widow, whose husband died in a motor vehicular accident, was eagerly waiting to get compensation, all her hopes went to smoke, when she came to know that her application for compensation was dismissed on the basis of the memo, filed by her counsel. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that there was no occasion on the part of the claimant to give such an instruction to her counsel which was nothing but suicidal. The petitioner is a lady and, as per her counsel, neither she had any knowledge regarding filing of the aforesaid memo, mentoining therein that the claimant did not intend to proceed with the case nor had she given her consent or authorised her advocate to file such a memo. The sum and substance of the argument so advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this revision application is that the aforesaid memo, stating that the claimant did not intend to proceed with the case was filed behind the back of the petitioner for the reasons best known to her counsel conducting the case before the Tribunal. After the petitioner came to know about the dismissal of her claim petition, she filed an application under Section 151 of the CPC registered as M.J.C. No. 2 of 2001 before the Tribunal for restoration of her claim petition on the same ground as highlighted in this petition. The learned Tribunal has by the order impugned in the revision application rejected the application of the claimant on the finding that the petition under Section 151, CPC was not maintainable
and was also barred by limitation as the same was filed after a lapse of about five months.
3. Learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., the owner and the insurer respectively, vehemently oppose the revision application on the ground that the same is not maintainable because the Tribunal is a persona designata and not a Court and as such Section 115 of the CPC has no application.
4. Before dealing with the rival contentions raised by the parties regarding maintainability of the revision application, I may make it very clear from the out set that in a motor accident claim case when the claimant’s application is dismissed even due to the laches on the part of the applicant in prosecuting his case, those laches should not be the main decisive ground for non-suiting him once and for all. (See AIR 2001 SCW 4775 ; K. Trivikram v. Mohd. Abdul Kareem Khan).
In regard to maintainability of this revision application, my attention is drawn to a decision rendered in Orissa Co-operative Insurance Co. v. Subashini Pradhan, 1977 ACJ 283, wherein a Division Bench of this Court referring to several decisions of different High Courts as well as the Apex Court held that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was a persona designata and not a Court and, therefore, the Tribunal was not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
In the case of Smt. Darshana Devi v. Sher Singh, AIR 1978 P & H. 265, which is pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was held that –
“A Claims Tribunal performing functions under the Motor Vehicles Act has more or less the same status as that of a Court and performs functions similar to it. Rule 20 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, exclude the applicability to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal of those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which it does not specifically mention. On the other hand, such provisions would be applicable if they are in consonance with the principles of fair-play and propriety.”
(quoted from placitum).
The aforesaid decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was challenged by the State of Haryana before the Apex Court and the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1979 SC 855; State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana Devi, While affirming the judgment of the Haryana High Court held as follows :
“The poor shall not be prised out of the justice market by insistence on court-fee and refusal to apply
the exemptive provisions of Order XXXIII, CPC. So we are distressed that the State of Haryana, mindless of the mandate of equal justice to the indigent under the Magna Carta of our Republic, expressed in Article 14 and stressed in Article 39A of the Constitution, has sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court which has rightly extended the ‘pauper’ provisions to auto-accident claims. The reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order XXXIII will apply to tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court finds our approval. We affirm the decision.”
The counsel next refers to a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 Patna 40 (F.B.), which relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Darshana Devi’s case (supra), came to hold as follows :
“23. Apart from the principles noticed above, in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Smt, Darshana Devi (AIR 1979 SC 855) (supra) it must be held that the District Judge who functions as a Claims Tribunal is not only within the administrative control of the High Court but also subordinate to it under Section 115 of the Code…….”
A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1985 Karnataka 208; Mrs. Noreen P. Srikantaiah v. L. Dasarath Ramaiah, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Darshana Devi’s case (supra) as well as Bhagwati Devi v. I.S. Goel, 1983 ACC CJ 123 held that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was a ‘Court1 subordinate to the High Court within Section 24 of the CPC. A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Darshan Singh v. Ghewarchand, AIR 1993 Rajasthan 126, also followed the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Darshan Devi’s case (supra) and held that :
“25. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Darshan Devi, AIR 1979 SC 855, held that the Claims Tribunal had the trappings of Civil Court. Following the said judgment, the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Devi, v. I. S. Goel, 1983 ACC CJ 123 held that Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
26. On the basis of these decisions of the Supreme Court, it must be held that the District Judge who functions as a Claims Tribunal is not only within the administrative
control of the High Court, but also subordinate to it under Section 115, CPC.”
Same was also view in Dushyant Kumar v. R. S. R. T. Corporation, AIR 1990 Rajasthan 152.
5. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Darshan Dew’s case (supra), it must be held that motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to High Court and also subordinate to it under Section 115 of the CPC and, therefore, the present revision application under Section 115 of the Code is maintainable.
6. Now coming to the facts of the case it is seen that the counsel for the petitioner filed a memo, before the Tribunal wherein it was mentioned that the “petitioner does not intend to proceed with the case”. As I find there is nothing to indicate that there was any instruction by the petitioner to that effect. It is also not comprehended nor is there any reason as to why a helpless widow, whose husband died in a motor accident, and who was eagerly waiting to receive compensation, would have given such an instruction to her counsel.
7. This being the factual matrix of the case and following the view taken by the Apex Court in Darshan Dew’s case (supra), I set aside the order dated 1.12.2001 passed by the Tribunal in M.J.C. No. 2 of 2001 and direct restoration of M.J.C. No. 106 of 1997 to the file of the Tribunal for being dealt with in accordance with law. Both the parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 11.11.2002 and on their appearance the Tribunal shall fix a date of hearing and considering the case of the year 1997 shall dispose of the same in accordance with law by end of January, 2003.
The Civil Revision is accordingly allowed. No cost.