Supreme Court of India

Ravichandran vs State By Dy. Superin. Of Police, … on 25 March, 2010

Supreme Court of India
Ravichandran vs State By Dy. Superin. Of Police, … on 25 March, 2010
Bench: Mukundakam Sharma, H.L. Dattu
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                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 909-910 OF 2003

  RAVICHANDRAN                                      ...APPELLANT

                              VERSUS

  STATE BY DY. SUPERIN. OF POLICE, MADRAS           ...RESPONDENT


                                   WITH

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 805-806 OF 2003

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 807-808 OF 2003

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 911-912 OF 2003

               CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1515-1516 OF 2003

                                  AND

               CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1527-1528 OF 2003




                               ORDER

1. All these appeals involve similar and connected facts. Since, the

legal issues that arise for our consideration are also similar, we

proceed to dispose of all these appeals by this common judgment

and order.

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2. Before we delve into the facts of the case, it would be appropriate for

us to deal with the miscellaneous applications that have been filed in

this Court and also the statement of the learned counsel for the

appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2003.

3. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 6391 to 6394 of 2010 in

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1515-1516 of 2003 and Criminal

Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 6396-6399 of 2010 in Criminal Appeal

Nos. 1527-1528 of 2003 are applications filed by the legal

representatives of the accused No. 1 namely, Kumaraguru seeking

for substitution of their names in place of the deceased appellant-

accused No. 1. During the pendency of the appeals in this Court,

appellant-accused No. 1 died on 9th April, 2007. The present

applications have therefore been filed by his legal representatives

seeking for substitution of their names in place of the deceased

appellant accused No. 1. In support of the aforesaid prayer, the

legal representatives of the deceased appellant-accused No. 1 have

relied upon the provisions of Section 394 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, 1973. For the reasons stated in the said applications, the

applications are allowed. The names of the applicants who are the

legal representatives of the deceased-appellant accused No. 1 are,
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thus, allowed to be brought on record. The said applications stand

disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order.

4. It is pointed out that during the pendency of the appeals in this

Court, accused No. 3 namely, Tamizhselvan who was the owner of

shop No. 18 had died. In that view of the matter, so far as the

appeals against accused No. 3 are concerned, i.e. Criminal Appeal

Nos. 805-806 of 2003, they stand abated. The same are dismissed,

accordingly. The owner of shop No. 30, Kandasamy, accused No. 3

in the first appeal has not filed any appeal in this Court against the

order of conviction and sentence passed against him. It has been

stated that he has served out the sentence awarded to him.

5. Brief facts, which are necessary to dispose of the present appeals,

are that the appellants herein were charged under the provisions of

Section 120-B, Section 420 read with Section 120B, Section 477A

read with Section 120B IPC and under Section 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in SLP. C.C. No. 1 of 1985. In

C.C. No. 3 of 1985, charges were framed against the appellants

herein under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry Essential Commodities

(Display of Stocks, Price and Maintenance of Accounts) Order, 1975

read with Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
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The case of the prosecution is that the appellants herein, i.e.,

accused Nos. 1 and 2 prepared the permit for issuance of palmolein

oil and the counter foil thereof was retained in the office. Both the

aforesaid permits and the counter foil were in the handwriting of

accused No. 2 which are also initialed and signed by A1 and A2.

Subsequently, however, in the permit it was detected that there was

interpolation and forgery in respect of shop No. 30. One of such

permits indicates that the palmolein oil was meant to be issued in

favour of Shop No. 38. The counter foil retained in the office

indicates that it was meant to be issued and was in fact issued in

favour of shop No. 38 but in the permit, it was detected later on that

the same was converted and interpolated as shop No. 30. Delivery

of the palmolein oil was also taken on behalf of shop No. 30.

6. In view of the aforesaid interpolation and forgery in the said

documents, two separate cases were registered under the aforesaid

provisions. After submission of the charge-sheet, trial was conducted

and a number of witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 to P.W. 19 were examined and

several documents were also placed on record which were marked as

Exhibits P1 to P57.

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7. All the accused were examined under Section 313 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure and on conclusion of the trial, the trial

Court, in Spl. C.C. No. 1 of 1985, convicted all the accused

persons namely A1-A3 for an offence under Section 120B IPC

and sentenced each to undergo three years rigorous

imprisonment and also convicted them under Section 420 read

with Section 120B IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo

three years rigorous imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs.

500/- each, in default to undergo one month simple

imprisonment. The accused persons were further also

convicted under Section 477A read with Section 120B IPC and

sentenced each to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment.

Ravichandran, A2 and A1 were also convicted under Section

5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1947 read with Section 120B IPC and sentenced each to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a

fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to undergo simple

imprisonment for one month. Kandasamy A3 was convicted

under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 read with Section 109 IPC and sentenced

to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine
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of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for

one month. All the sentences were directed to run

concurrently.

8. With respect to Spl. C.C. No. 3 of 1985, accused Nos. 1 and 2

were convicted under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry Essential

Commodities (Display of Stock, Prices and Maintenance of

Accounts) Order 1975 read with Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Section 109 of

I.P.C. and sentenced each to undergo R.I. for 6 months.

Accused No. 3 was convicted under clause 4(a) of the

Pondicherry Essential Commodities (Display of Stocks, Prices

and Maintenance of Accounts) Order 1975 read with Section

7(1)(a)(ii) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and he was

sentenced to undergo R.I. for 6 months.

9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the

trial Court, the appellants preferred four separate appeals. Two

appeals being C.A. Nos. 181 and 184 of 1994 were filed by

accused No. 1. The other two appeals being C.A. Nos. 220 and

222 of 1994 were filed by accused Nos. 2 and 3 jointly. The
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High Court by its judgment and order dated 31.12.2003

dismissed all the appeals.

10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction

and sentences, the appellants before us filed the appeals which

were entertained. All the appeals have been listed for hearing

and we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties.

11. Counsel for the appellants have submitted before us that the

judgments are required to be set aside as none of the accused

persons could be said to be guilty of the offences alleged

against them. It is pointed out that although the aforesaid

permit as also the counter foil were prepared by accused No. 2

and were signed by both the accused no. 2 and accused No. 1,

yet there is no conclusive proof that the interpolation and

forgery was done by both the accused persons. It was also

pointed out during the course of arguments by the learned

counsel appearing for the appellants that so far as accused No.

3 is concerned, he died during the pendency of the present

appeals and he did not file any appeal himself before the Court.

So far as accused No. 4 is concerned, counsel appearing on his
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behalf has drawn our attention to the fact that although he is

the brother of A3 there is no evidence to show that he in fact

knew that the aforesaid permit which was delivered by him in

the office of the Federation was in any manner interpolated or

forged.

12. Mr. P.P. Malhotra, the Additional Solicitor General of India

appearing for the respondent-CBI tried to contend that it is the

concurrent finding of facts of the two Courts below and

therefore, the findings should not and cannot be interfered

with by this Court. He also submitted that the findings on

record fully prove and establish the guilt of the two accused

persons and that there is enough material on record to show

that the documents in question were forged at least with the

knowledge and consent of the accused persons and therefore,

the conviction and sentences passed against them are legal

and valid.

13. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, we have considered

the entire record of the case. We have carefully scrutinised the

evidence adduced in the present cases. After going through the

same, we are of the considered opinion that there is no
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evidence on record to indicate any link to prove and establish

that the interpolation and forgery was done by any of the

accused persons namely, A1, A2 or A4. Only because A4 is

the brother of A3 does not in any manner prove and establish

that he had knowledge that the permit was interpolated when

he had presented it before the office of the Federation.

14. In order to prove that the interpolation and the forgery was

done by A1 and A2, the prosecution has led evidence of P.W. 3

and P.W. 6 who have stated that they knew the handwriting,

signatures, initials and mode of writing the figures of A1 and

A2. Before we deal with the testimony of P.W. 3 and P.W. 6 on

the point of handwriting, signatures, initials of the accused

persons, we wish to refer to two judgments of this Court. In

Rahim Khan Vs. Khurshid Ahmed and Others [(1974) 2 SCC

660], this Court held as follows:

“39. There is also oral evidence identifying the
signature of the returned candidate on Exhibits P3
and PW 11/1, particularly in the deposition of Habib,
PW 23. He has not spoken to his familiarity with the
handwriting of the appellant. Opinion evidence is
hearsay and becomes relevant only if the condition
laid down in Section 47 of the Evidence Act is first
proved. There is some conflict of judicial opinion on
this matter, but we need not resolve it here, because,
although there is close resemblance between the
signature of Rahim Khan on admitted documents and
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that in Exhibits P3 and PW 11/1, we do not wish to
hazard a conclusion based on dubious evidence or lay
comparison of signatures by Courts. In these
circumstances, we have to search for other evidence, if
any, in proof of circulation of the printed handbills by
the returned candidate, or with his consent.”

In Murari Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1980 SC 531], this

Court held as under:-

“11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule
of law, nor any rule of prudence which has
crystallised into a rule of law, that opinion-evidence of
a handwriting expert must never be acted upon,
unless substantially corroborated. But, having due
regard to the imperfect nature of the science of
identification of handwriting, the approach, as we
indicated earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons
for the opinion must be carefully probed and
examined. All other relevant evidence must be
considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may
be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion
are convincing and there is no reliable evidence
throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an
handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be
any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate
analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial
weight. We have said so much because this is an
argument frequently met with in subordinate courts
and sentences torn out of context from the judgments
of this Court are often flaunted.”

15. P.W. 6 stated in his examination-in-chief that he knew the

accused persons, viz., A1 to A3 and that A2 was working in

Civil Supplies Inspector’s Office in the rank of UDC and that he

had earlier worked with him in the Finance Department. P.W.
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6 has however, nowhere stated in the examination-in-chief that

the present instance of interpolation or forgery was in the hand

of A2. In the cross-examination, P.W. 6 stated that although

he had worked along with A2 in the Finance Department, but

he was working in a different Section of the Department. He

has clearly stated that he was working in the Budget Section

called F1 whereas A2 was working in the Motor Conveyance

Section called F2 Section. It has also been brought to our

notice that in the cross-examination, it was said that the files

dealt by A2 and F2 Section in the Finance Department never

came to the F1 Section where P.W. 6 was working. Therefore,

in our considered opinion the interpolation as also the initials

appended thereto have not been proved and established to be

in the hand of A2 and A1.

16. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion

that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove and

establish that the alleged interpolation and forgery was done by

either A1, A2 or A4.

17. As earlier noted by us, Criminal Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2003

stand abated. We allow all the other appeals and set aside the
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orders of conviction and sentences passed against each of the

accused persons.

18. The bail bonds stand discharged.

……………………………………..J.
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA]

……………………………………..J.
[H.L. DATTU]

NEW DELHI
MARCH 25, 2010.