Supreme Court of India

Reserve Bank Of India & Another vs C. L. Toora & Others on 5 April, 2004

Supreme Court of India
Reserve Bank Of India & Another vs C. L. Toora & Others on 5 April, 2004
Author: Kapadia
Bench: Cji, S.B. Sinha, S.H. Kapadia
           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  7803 of 2002

PETITIONER:
Reserve Bank of India & Another	

RESPONDENT:
C. L. Toora & Others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/04/2004

BENCH:
CJI,S.B. SINHA & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

KAPADIA, J.

This appeal by special leave is filed by the Reserve Bank
of India against the judgment and order of the High Court of
Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur dated 12.12.2001 directing the
appellant to consider respondent no.1 for promotion to grade-D
ignoring the fact that a high power Selection Board presided by
a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court had found the
respondent unsuitable for selection to the said grade.

The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows.

On 1.10.1988, the Currency Officer of the appellant
asked respondent no.1 who was Assistant Currency Officer in
Grade-C to look after, on 3.10.1988, the duties of M.S. Janagal,
Assistant Currency Officer (Grade-B), who had proceeded
suddenly on casual leave. It is the case of the appellant that
respondent no.1 herein refused to comply with the orders of the
currency officer stating that he cannot be asked to discharge the
functions of Grade-B officer. Accordingly, the said respondent
was charge-sheeted on 1.12.1989 for insubordination under
regulation 32 of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations,
1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the said regulations”). In the
preliminary enquiry preceding the charge-sheet, the said
respondent in reply to show-cause notice stated that on
1.10.1988, seven Grade-B officers were present on duty and
only one of them Mr. M.S. Janagal had applied for casual leave;
that he had never operated the vault in the past; that vault duties
were entrusted to Grade-B officers and as such, except in
emergency, a Grade-C officer was entrusted with such duties
and, therefore, he did not intend insubordination. In fact, he
pointed out that on 3.10.1988, he did all the work of Claims
Department except opening and closing of vault. By his reply
to show-cause notice, he further pointed out that he was under
mental agony on that day in the background enumerated in para
2 of his reply to the show-cause notice. The appellant however
did not accept the explanation of the respondent. In the
meantime, the appellant undertook selection process in the
matter of promotions of officers from Grade-C to Grade-D.
Respondent no.1 herein was one of the candidates. The
appellant constituted a high power Selection Board presided by
Mr. Justice A.S. Ginwala, a retired judge of Bombay High
Court. The Selection Board held several meetings at Calcutta,
New Delhi, Bombay and Bangalore, as promotions were to be
made at all India level. The Selection Board recommended
candidates for promotion in terms of the executive policy
formulated by the Management in 1983 and which was in
existence in 1989. Under the said policy, a candidate had to
secure in all 170 marks out of 300 for empanelment for
promotion to Grade-D. Respondent no.1 herein secured 162
marks and consequently he failed to qualify. At this stage, it
may be mentioned that the said respondent was interviewed at
New Delhi center on 2.6.1989, wherein he was successful but
over all he did not secure 170 marks, hence not found suitable
for the panel year 1989. On 23.10.1990, he filed writ petition
No.5483 of 1990 challenging the charge-sheet and his non-
selection. During the pendency of the writ petition, disciplinary
enquiry was completed and the competent authority imposed
the minor penalty of lowering his substantive pay by one stage
permanently, against which he filed departmental appeal, which
was also rejected on 4.8.1994. Respondent no.1 filed an
amendment application to the writ petition challenging the
enquiry proceedings as well as the order of punishment. By
impugned judgment, the writ petition was allowed on the
ground that the charge of insubordination was not proved. The
High Court also found fault with the non-selection of
respondent no.1 on the ground that the procedure and the
criteria adopted by the Selection Board was improper. It
doubted the decision of the Selection Board in awarding only
162 marks on the ground that the said respondent had obtained
the requisite 32 marks in the interview but he was given only
130 marks on performance appraisal. In the circumstances, the
entire selection was set aside and the appellants were directed to
reframe selection and consider the said respondent for
promotion to scale-D from 1989. Aggrieved, the Reserve Bank
of India has come to this Court by way of this appeal.

Two issues arise for determination, firstly, whether the
appellant was justified in imposing the above penalty of
lowering the substantive pay of the respondent by one stage
permanently; and secondly, whether the High Court was right
in setting aside the entire selection and directing the appellant to
promote respondent no.1 to scale-D w.e.f. 1989.

On the first point, we are of the view that the High Court
was right in coming to the conclusion that the conduct of
respondent no.1 was not such as to warrant disciplinary action.
As stated above, in the preliminary enquiry, respondent no.1
has given his explanation vide letter dated 12.6.1989. We have
gone through the letter, as discussed above. Regulation 32
states that every employee shall obey directions given to him
from time to time by his superiors. In the present case, we do
not find any insubordination or disobedience as alleged. He has
stated in his reply that he has no experience of opening and
closing the vault and that he did all the work of Claims
Department on 3.10.1988, except opening and closing of vault.
In the circumstances, we are in agreement with the view taken
by the High Court in the matter of disciplinary proceedings that
there was no foundation for alleged misconduct.

The second issue is whether the High Court was right in
setting aside the entire selection with the direction to the
appellant to consider the said respondent for promotion to
scale-D from 1989. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that
respondent No. 1 was interviewed along with other candidates
by the Selection Board. On 29.5.1990, respondent no.1 was
advised about his non-selection and thereafter he had appeared
in interview four times i.e. on 8.6.1990, 3.9.1991, 6.4.1992 and
5.2.1993 but was found unsuitable. It was submitted that the
Selection Board was presided by a retired Judge of the High
Court of unquestionable impartiality who had no axe to grind.
He contended that it was open to the Selection Board to
formulate its own procedure in the matter of allotment of marks
for interview, written test and performance appraisal and that
the High Court had erred in fixing qualifying marks for
interview. In this connection, it was pointed out that the
Selection Board had prescribed 100 marks out of 300 for
interview which the High Court has held to be on the higher
side. He submitted that the High Court had erred in coming to
the conclusion that non-selection of respondent no.1 was on
account of extraneous factors. He submitted that the covering
letter enclosing the mark-sheet has been signed by all the
members of the selection board. Mr. Salve produced before us
the entire record. Per contra, Mr. A.B. Rohtagi, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 submitted that
the individual members of the Selection Board have not
assigned individual marks in the mark-sheet and that all the
members have allotted equal marks and, therefore, the
procedure was faulty. He submitted that the mark list did not
bear the signatures of the members of the Board though all the
members have signed the forwarding letter. It was urged that
no merit list was prepared and no policy was produced before
the High Court on the basis of which marks came to be given.
He submitted that the respondent was successful in the
interview and for extraneous reasons, he was given less marks
for his performance and consequently he could not obtain 170
marks. It was submitted that the High Court had examined the
entire record and has given finding of fact and, therefore, this
Court should not interfere in this matter under Article 136 of
the Constitution.

We are of the view that the High Court had erred in
setting aside the selection and in directing the appellant bank to
consider respondent no.1 for promotion from 1989. The
appellant had constituted high power Selection Board presided
by a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court. The Selection
Board, as stated above, held interviews of candidates from
various centers at all India level. The Selection Board held its
sitting at Calcutta, New Delhi, Bombay and Bangalore. It
provided for 200 marks for service records and 100 marks for
interview in terms of the policy formulated by the management
as far back as July, 1983. Under that policy, the candidates
were required to obtain aggregate qualifying marks of 170 out
of 300. The Board was entitled to formulate its own procedure.
Moreover, we have perused the records and proceedings of the
Selection Board produced before us. The forwarding letter
enclosing the mark-sheets has been signed by all the members
of the Board. There is no interpolation in the marks given to
the candidates as alleged. On facts it cannot be said, as held by
the High Court, that the Board had taken into account
extraneous factors. Hence, the High Court erred in setting aside
the selection and directing the appellant bank to consider the
case of respondent no.1 for promotion to Grade-D from 1989.

For the aforestated reasons, we hold that there was no
misconduct committed by respondent no.1 and the appellant
had erred in imposing the penalty on respondent no.1 of
lowering his substantive pay by one stage permanently.
However, we hold that the High Court had erred in setting aside
the selection made by the Selection Board and directing the
appellant to reframe selection and consider respondent no.1 for
promotion to scale-D from 1989.

Accordingly, the appeal stands partly allowed, with no
order as to costs.