JUDGMENT
A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 82(2) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The appeal is directed against order dated May 15, 1990, of the Employees’ Insurance Court, Chandigarh, dismissing the appellant’s petition under Section 75 of the Act.
2. The material facts, briefly stated, are that Messrs. Reshma Industrial Corporation made an application under Section 75 of the Act to the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation with the averments that Resham Singh was the principal employer and the aforesaid industrial concern carried on the work of manufacture employing or more persons and the requisite strength of the employees was reached on November 3, 1986. Form O-1 was filled in and submitted with forwarding letter dated November 4, 1986 and it was delivered in the office of the respondent-Corporation on November 14, 1986. On November 24, 1986, the respondent-Corporation asked for details of the month-wise employment position and also a certificate that no mishap/accident had taken place during the period November 3, 1986, to November 13, 1986. The information was duly supplied by the appellant. The appellant then sent through his advocate a notice on April 1, 1987, on which code number was allotted and communicated to the appellant vide letter dated April 6, 1987. It was stated in the letter that the appellant had been covered under the Act with effect from December 8, 1986. In the petition made to the Employees’ Insurance Court, the claim of the appellant was that the Act applied to it with effect from November 3, 1986, and not with effect from the later dated December 8, 1986, fixed by the respondent-Corporation.
3. It may also be mentioned that a minor accident took place in the appellant-factory on November 12, 1986. Another accident took place on November 15, 1986. Even though the accident dated November 12, 1986, was a minor one and the employee involved in the accident was not entitled to any claim either under the Act or under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it was, however, not so with regard to the other accident which took place on November 15, 1986. The Employees’ Insurance Court framed the following issues :
1. Whether the petitioner is covered under the provisions of the Act w.e.f. November 3, 1986, or November 8, 1986? OPP.
2. Relief.
The appellant appeared as PW-1 and produced the records maintained by him, including the attendance register and the register containing deductions made from the wages of the employees as contribution to be deposited with the respondent-Corporation. On behalf of the Corporation, H.K. Mehta was examined. On an evaluation of the evidence, the learned Employees’ Insurance Court came to the conclusion that there were certain overwritings and cuttings in the date of O-1. Form Exhibit P-12 and the appellant appeared to have manipulated the earlier date of November 3, 1986, so that the liability for the accidents dated November 12, 1986, and November 15, 1986, could be passed on to the respondent-Corporation. With this finding the appellant’s application was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
4. A preliminary objection was taken by K.L. Kapoor, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation , that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law and, therefore, it was not maintainable, Shri Kapoor placed reliance on Ishar Dass and Anr. v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation ( RFA No. 148 of 1986 decided in January 10, 1977) and reported in (1967-II-LLJ-550) (P&H). In the said ruling, the learned Judge made a reference to Chuni Lal Mehta and Sons Ltd. \. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 and extracted the following observations therefrom :
“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a question of law.”
Applying the above test, it was held in the facts of that case that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law. It is not necessary to go into the facts of that case. It is sufficient to point out that it was not a case where the dispute might be with regard to the date from which the particular factory was covered under the Act.
5. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that according to the scheme of the Act, the Act became automatically applicable when the requisite conditions were fulfilled. Further making of the return in Form O-l and allotment of Code number were ministerial acts which had to be performed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. These acts could not postpone the date of coverage of the factory under the provisions of the Act. The contention of Shri K.L. Kapoor, on the other hand, is that it is only after the necessary facts have been verified and the respondent -Corporation is satisfied about the truth of the statements made in Form O-1 that a Code number is allotted and it was, therefore, open to the Corporation to fix the date for coverage of the factory. Even though an issue was framed by the Employees’ Insurance Court and a finding has been recorded, to my mind the question raised is a pure question of law. The answer to the question as to from which day the factory is covered would depend upon the provisions of the Act. Section 1(4) of the Act, to the extent relevant for the present purpose, lays down that the Act shall apply in the first instance to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government) other than seasonal factories. The word “factory’ has been defined in Section 2(12) as follows :
“(12) “Factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof.
(a) Whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, or
(b) Whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 or a railway running shed;”
6. A reading together of the above provisions shows that the day the conditions laid down in Section 2(12) are fulfilled, the premises become a factory and the Act applies to such a factory by virtue of Section 1(4) of the Act. 1 have not been referred to any provision in the Act, which may empower the Insurance Corporation to determine the date from which a factory is to be covered under the Act. The aforesaid being a substantial question of law, an appeal from the order of the Employees’ Insurance Court under Section 82(2) of the Act is competent. I am supported in this view by a recent decision of this Court in Sudershan Weaving Factory, Chowk Baba Bhooriwala v. The Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation and Anr., 1909 ISJ (Banking) 265. The preliminary objection is, I therefore, decided against the respondent.
7. The trial Court has reproduced the relevant portion of the statement of Resham Singh-appellant, who appeared as PW-1. A reading of the same shows that a minor accident look place on November 12, 1986, in which one Kishore Kumar was involved. The damage suffered by him was so minor that he was not entitled to any claim either under the Act or under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Admittedly, O-l Form along with the forwarding letter had been received in the respondent-Corporation’s office on January 14, 1986. That being the admitted position, nobody could anticipate that an accident was going to take place on the next following day i.e. November 15, 1986. Any overwriting or cutting in the date in O-1 Form is, therefore, of absolutely no significance. What is more, it has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the registers Exhibits P-10 to P-20 produced on behalf of the appellant, deduction from the wages of the employees had been made on November 7, 1986. This is consistent with and supports the appellant’s case that the factory employed 10 employees with effect from November 3, 1986.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the finding of the Insurance Court on the issue is set aside and it is held that the appellant came under the purview of the Act. with effect from November 3, 1986. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.