ORDER
1. The only ground which Mr. Poddar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has urged before us in support of his petitions is that the Recovery of Debts Due To Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (1993 Act, in short) is ultra vires the Constitution of India and therefore, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Patna, being a creation of the aforesaid Act itself being an illegal entity, the impugned judgment/award passed by the Tribunal is null and void and not enforceable under law.
2. In support of his contention. Mr. Poddar has relied on a Single Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of D.K. Abdul Khader and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. ILR 2001 Kar 1809.
3. We have very carefully gone through the aforesaid Judgment of Karnataka High Court. We find that the Karnataka High Court declared 1993. Act as ultra vires to the Constitution of India mainly and primarily on the ground that the Parliament of India did not have legislative competence to enact 1993. Act as the subject-matter of the Act did not fall within clause (2) of Article 323B of the Constitution of India and that apart from Ar-
ticle 323-B of Constitution of India the Parliament did not have any legislative power to enact any law with respect to the constitution of a Tribunal. With utmost respect, we disagree with the aforesaid view of the Karnataka High Court. We also disagree with the view of the Karnataka High Court that Entry 11A in the concurrent list of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India did not permit the Union Parliament to enact any law with respect to the subject-matter of 1993. Act. According to us. Karnataka High Court gave a very narrow interpretation to the expression, “Administration of Justice” and “consti- tutlon and organisation of all courts……” According to us, the Karnataka
High Court very narrowly interpreted the word “Courts” as occurring in the aforesaid Entry. In the case of Delhi High Court Bar Association and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 Del 323, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has given a wider and correct interpretation to both Article 323B and Entry 11A and has expressed a correct view that Entry 11A authorises the Union Parliament to enact a law on the lines of 1993, Act. Not only that, we are fortified in this view of ours by a judgment of the Patna High Court in Kedamath Gutpa v. Nagindra Narayan Slnha, reported in AIR 1954 Pat 97, where the expression “administration of justice” has very correctly and thus broadly been interpreted to be wide enough to include not merely administration of justice through courts properly so called but administrative justice i.e., justice through the machinery of Administrative Tribunals.
4. Apart from the aforesaid constitutional aspects of the matter, we find that in the present case, the writ petition is misconceived on the additional ground of the petitioner being a party to the proceeding, acquiring in the transfer of proceeding from the civil Court where this was originally filed through the medium of the civil suit and in participating in the proceedings before the Tribunal throughout, taking a chance and then, when being faced with the judgment against it, coming up to this Court by challenging the vires of the Act.
5. This petition has no merit, which is accordingly dismissed in limine.
6. Petition dismissed.