JUDGMENT
O.P. Jain, J.
1. Petitioner No. 1 Rishikui Brahmacharya Ashram (hereinafter called the Ashram) has filed this writ petition through its President with a prayer to quash order dated 22nd February, 1981 (Annexure-12) and order dated 6th March, 1981 (Annexure-16) passed by the State Government whereby the State Government has ordered that the property belonging to the Ashram is vested in the Treasurer. Charitable Endowments, Uttar Pradesh. This order has been passed under Section 4 of the Charitable Endowments Act of 1890 (hereinafter called the Act) as amended by Uttar Pradesh Charitable Endowments (Extension of Powers) Act of 1950 (U. P. Act No. XX of 1950) (which is hereinafter called the U. P. Act).
2. The Ashram is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860, and its object is to Impart religious education and training and to carry on other activities mentioned in the memorandum of Association which is Annexure-1 to the petition. Various departments of the Institution are described in Annexure-2. Till 1968, the Ashram was receiving Government grant from the Education Department of the State Government and the Central Government. These grants were stopped in the year 1969. The petitioner has purchased land from time to time and it has about 125 Bighas land in its occupation. It appears that the Society was being run by funds donated by its members at Calcutta. On 26th December, 1978 a notice was issued to petitioner No. 1 to show cause why the movable and immovable properties of the Society be not vested in the Treasurer under Sections 3 and 4 of the U. P. Act. This notice is Annexure-5 to the petition and was replied vide Annexure-6 to the petition. The reply did not satisfy the Government and another notice dated 22nd February, 1981 was issued by the Government whtch is Annexure-12 to the petition and petitioner No. 1 was informed that the Government has decided to take action under Section 3/4 of the Act as amended by U.P. Act No. XX of 1950. This notice was followed by Impugned order Annexure-16 dated 6th March. 1981 by which the properties of petitioner No. 1 have been ordered to vest in the Treasurer of Charitable Endowments.
3. Petitioner No. 1 has challenged the validity of notice Annexure-12 and order Annexure-16 on various grounds but during the course of the arguments only one ground was pressed. This ground is to the effect that the impugned order is not a speaking order. It does not show as to which of the charges were found to have been proved and no reasons have been recorded for passing the order.
3A. We have heard Sri H, S. Nigam learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri Yatindra Singh, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents.
4. Learned Addl. Advocate General relied on Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others. AIR 1958 AP 773, in which it has been held that an educational purpose is included within the definition of ‘charitable purpose’. Where the property is held by a College Committee for an educational purpose, it can be the subject-matter of vesting in a treasurer under Section 4 of the Act provided the other conditions prescribed by the Act are complied with. It was further held that the members of the Society or the members of the governing body do not have any proprietary or beneficiary interest in the property which the Society holds. The Court went on to say that Section 4 of the Act provides that the appropriate Government can appoint a Treasurer if it thinks fit. Therefore, it is left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government to find whether the conditions necessary for the exercise of their discretion under that Section are satisfied in a given case. If they are satisfied that there was a valid application before them on which they could act and if they think fit to appoint a Treasurer, it is not for the High Court to substitute its opinion for those of the Government. The High Court can and will only interfere if it is alleged and proved that the Government in taking the decision or in being satisfied have been swayed by extraneous considerations or that their action has been mala fide. Where no such allegations have been made it is not within the competence of the High Court to pronounce upon the question as to whether the Government should or should not have been satisfied about the necessity for the appointment of a Treasurer.
4A. It, however, appears that the case-law on the point has undergone a vast change during the last 40 years. It has been held in Km, Neelima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others. AIR 1990 SC 1402 that an administrative order which involves civil consequences must give reasons. The same view has been taken in S. N. Mukherjee u. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 in which the following observations have been made in paragraph 39.
“For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.”
5. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that while passing an order like the one with which we are concerned, the Government was obliged to give reasons.
Realising this difficulty, the learned Addl. Advocate General sought the permission of the Court on 11th December, 1997, to file a supplementary counter-affidavit for placing the relevant material before the Court in order to meet the contention of the petitioners that there was non-application of mind to the reply given by the petitioners in answer to the show cause notice.
6. It is argued by Sri H. S. Nigam, learned counsel for the petitioners that the reasons for passing the order must be incorporated in the order itself and the Court cannot look into the “hotings in the files maintained by the Government. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners has cited Dr. (Mrs) Gyanwati Trivedi v. Dr. (Miss) Sarojini Varshney and others, 1970 ALJ 1015, in which it has been observed in paragraph 15 that the Court cannot look into the notings on the file. While making these observations the Court relied on some observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Prog Das v. Union of India, 1967 MPWR 448.
7. Learned Addl. Advocate General has, however, relied on Union of India and others v. E. G. Nambudiri, AIR 1991 SC 1216, in which the following observations have been made :
“Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons. It is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reasons. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the Court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records. Reasons are not necessary to be communicated to the Government servant. If the statutory rules require communication of reasons, the same must be communicated but in the absence of any such provision absence of communication of reasons does not affect the validity of the order”.
8. This Court has considered the above rulings in the case of Lt. Col Mahabali Singh v. Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and others, 1997 (3) AWC 1678, and has observed in paragraph 10 that if the order does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law and it is always open to the competent authority to place reasons before the Court. It was further observed that it is open to administrative authority to produce evidence aliunde before the Court to justify its action. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the material placed before this Court by the learned Addl. Advocate General can be looked into in order to determine as to whether the Government did or did not apply their mind to the reply given by the petitioners in response to the show-cause notice issued to them.
9. We have perused the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State and the Annexures thereto. It is found that complaints were being made against the Ashram by various individuals and institutions from time to time. On record, there is a complaint dated 27.9.1977 by Sri Raj Kumar Sharma M.L.A. Complaints have also been made by various other persons Including Sri Brahmacharya Ashram Haridwar Sahayak Committee located at Calcutta. The supplementary affidavit encloses a copy of the audit report which mentions various financial Irregularities committed by the Ashram. In the petition itself, it is mentioned in paragraphs 13 and 17 that one suit was filed in the year 1968 and another suit was filed in the year 1971 in which it was
alleged that there was mismanagement of the affairs of the Ashram. Annexure-3 to the supplementary affidavit shows that the reply submitted by the petitioner No. 1 was sent to the Law Department and it examined the objection raised by the petitioner to the effect that it is a religious body and, therefore, the U. P. Act No. XX of 1950. Is not applicable to it. The Law Department of the State has pointed out that the Ashram is registered under the Societies Registration Act under which only educational and charitable institutions are registered. It shows that the Ashram is not a purely religious institution. It also appears from the supplementary affidavit that the allegations levelled against the Ashram and the explanations given by the Ashram along with the remarks of the Director of Ayurved were placed before the State Government in a tabular form and after considering the allegations, reply and the comments the Deputy Secretary, Department of Health came to the conclusion that the property of the Ashram is being mismanaged and, therefore, the Deputy Secretary recommended that the property should be vested in the Treasurer under Section 4 of the U. P. Act No. XX of 1950. This recommendation of the Deputy Secretary was forwarded to the Secretary who agreed with the recommendation. The file was put up before Health Minister of the State Government who also agreed with the recommendations made by the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary. It cannot, therefore, be said that before passing the impugned orders (Annexure-12 and Annexure-16), the State Government did not apply its mind to the reply submitted by the petitioners.
10. in view of the above discussion we do not find any force in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed.
11. The interim order dated 17th July, 1981, is vacated. Parties will bear their own costs.