JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner which is a public limited company has challenged by this writ application a notification issued by the State Government dated the 19th January, 1972, contained in Annexure T to this application.
2. By this notification the Government constituted a Court of Enquiry under Section 6 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By the said notification it also nominated the members of the Court of Enquiry and directed the matters to be enquired into by this Court which are as follows.
(a) Whether go-slow policy was adopted by the piece rated workmen or any class or any Section of the workmen of the Raw Materials (Bamboo Yard) Department of the Rohtas Industries Limited Dalmianagar on 17th September, 1971; and other relevant dates
(b) If the go-slow policy was adopted.
(i) the circumstances leading to such go-slow the extent of reduction in the rate of daily production and the extent of losses to the establishment.
(ii) The person or persons responsible for the same.
(c)whether the go-slow policy if resorted to was proper and justified.
The Court was directed to go into the above matters and report thereon to the State Government with such recommendations as it thinks fit, as quickly as possible.
3. In order to appreciate the questions that have been raised on behalf of the petitioner some more relevant facts may be stated.
4. The petitioner employs a large number of the piece-rated workmen in raw materials bamboo yard) paper factory at Dalmianagar. It is said that on 17th September, 1971 go-slow policy was adopted in ‘C’ shift and on the 18th September 1971 in ‘A’ and ‘B’ shifts. The petitioner-company issued a notice to the workmen for bearing to practice go-slow and to resume to normal supply but that had no effect. Therefore on the evening of 18th September, 1971 the petitioner charge sheeted and suspended 38 workmen of ‘C’ shift and 34 workmen of ‘A’ shift. It is alleged that at about 9.45 on the same day 27 persons of the ‘G’ shift who were suspended, forcibly entered into the factory inspite of the order of prohibition from entering the factory premises. There-after the petitioner-company on the following day, that is, 19th September, 1971 served charge-sheet upon all the above 27 persons for their above illegal action the same day the petitioner also charge sheeted and suspended 32 employees or ‘B’ shift for their go-slow action. All the above employees were thereafter asked to submit their written explanation within 24 hours only. Twelve persons, however, tendered written apology whose suspension orders were withdrawn and the petitioner allowed them to resume their duties.
5. Thereafter the petitioner instituted three domestic enquiries with respect to all the three shifts, namely, A, B and G, separately, and in pursuance of the said enquiries, 102 workmen who were found guilty were dismissed. The date of this order has not been mentioned in the application, nor the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner could be able to give us the date. The petitioner then made three separate applications before the Industrial Tribunal, Patna for approval of the orders of dismissal as required under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Before any further development could take place, the State Government issued the impugned notification dated the 19th January, 1972 (Annexure 1). One statement out of this notification may be quoted, as that has been made the subject-matter of a long argument and it is as follows:
…And whereas the management of the said establishment had suspended 114 piece rated workmen of the said bamboo yard from the ‘C’ shift on 18.9.71, due to alleged go-slow resulting in an industrial dispute.
6. After the Court of Enquiry was constituted, some further events as stated in the petition, followed. All the 102 dismissed workmen tendered their written apology to the petitioner and the petitioner allowed them to join their duties on 12th February, 1972 and then withdrew the three applications filed for approval of the said dismissal before the Industrial Tribunal on the 3rd April, 1972.
7. Before the Court of Enquiry a long written statement (Annexure 2) was filed by the petitioner on 9th March, 1972, stating the subsequent developments that the concerned workmen had been permitted to join their duties. In view of this development, a preliminary objection was also raised on behalf of the petitioner challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Enquiry on various grounds and the Court of Enquiry by its order dated 20th April, 1972 (Annexure 4) overruled the preliminary objection. We are not concerned with in this case in going through the grounds urged before the Court of Enquiry much less the reasons given by the Court to decide the preliminary objection against the petitioner, as that order is not under challenge in this application.
8. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of any one of the respondents, although the Union, namely, the Rashtriya Karamchari Sangh (respondent No. 4) has also appeared through Mr. Capildeo Singh who is present in the Court. Mr. Kapildeo Singh, however, stated that he had now no instruction in the matter. No counsel has appeared on behalf of the official respondents, namely, the State of Bihar or the two members of the Court of Enquiry who have been impleaded as respondent No. 2 and 3. In this case, therefore, we had not the advantage of hearing the other view of the contentions that were advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner.
9. Mr. R.P. Katriar has challenged the order (Annexure 1) on various grounds, namely, (i) in absence of a separate notification under Section 10(1)(b) of the Act specifically referring the matters to the Court, the Court of Enquiry was not vested with any powers and, therefore, it could not proceed in the matter, (ii) the order has taken into action only the fact of “suspension” of the workmen and not the subsequent events that had already taken place, namely, the domestic enquiries resulting in the dismissal of the concerned workmen, and filing of the application for approval of the order of dismissal before the Industrial Tribunal, and (iii) the Industrial dispute having come to an end, the Court of Enquiry automatically ceased to have its jurisdiction to enquire into the matters which were referred to it.
10. Coming to the first ground, we do not find any substance in it. Reading the notification dated 19th of January, 1972 (Annexure 1), we feel inclined to take view that while constituting the Court of Enquiry under Section 6 of the Act, simultaneously the State Government purported to satisfy the conditions contained in Section 10(1)(b) of the Act also by referring the relevant matters connected with the dispute to the said court for enquiry, as already extracted earlier from the relevant notification, and the impugned notification which is a composite notification under Section 6 as well as Section 10(1)(b) of the Act, does not suffer from the vice of noncompliance of Section 10(1)(b) of the Act as contended by Mr. Katriar. We do not find any illegality in issuing a composite notification under both the Sections.
11. The second ground is equally devoid of any force. All that is required under Section 10(1) of the Act is that the appropriate Government must be of the opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. If this condition precedent is existing, it is open to the appropriate Government to make an order of reference by following any of the four modes provided under Section 10(1) of the Act in its four clauses, whichever may be applicable and though fit according to the circumstances of each case. The stage of the dispute, in our opinion, is not a relevant consideration, but the consideration germane for making a reference is the dispute. We fail to understand as to how it would have made any difference as to whether the dispute between the petitioner and its workmen was at the stage of their suspension or they happened to be dismissed in pursuance of the domestic enquiries that were held in the intervening time. The fact that the petitioner had proceeded in the matter of punishment, only aggravated the situation of the industrial dispute, which even if noticed by the State Government, would make the impugned, order more justified. It is not possible to appreciate as to how on that account a reference could not have been made. On these subsequent facts which had come to exist, the case, for making the reference to a Court of Enquiry constituted under Section 6, the dispute becoming all the more involved, became all the more imperative. Had there been any mitigating circumstance in the meantime which if taken into account the appropriate Government might form an opinion that the dispute in question had ceased to exist or did not deserve any adjudication, the point might have some force and relevancy. The situation, however, in the instant case is contrary. I would, accordingly, reject the second contention advanced by Mr. Katriar as well.
12. Now remains the third and the last point to answer. It is well settled that the reference once made by the State Government cannot be withdrawn, cancelled or modified. We had called upon Mr. Katriar when the case was taken up in the early hours, to cite any authority in support of the proposition that after making a reference, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the Court or any authority, as the case may be, would cease if so facto if the dispute had dissolved thereafter but inspite of granting some time to him, he could not cite any decision in support of his proposition. The proposition appears to us without any merit being in conflict with the established principle that a reference once made cannot be withdrawn.
13. Mr. Katriar, however, placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sitsilk Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1). In that case the facts were entirely different. Thereafter submission of the award by the Tribunal, a settlement was arrived at between the parties. In that circumstance, the Supreme Court observed that “where a settlement is arrived at between the parties to a dispute before the tribunal after the award has been submitted to Government but before its publication there is In fact no dispute left to be resolved by the publication of the award. In such a case, the award sent to Government may very well be considered to have become in fructuous and so the Government should refrain from publishing such an award because no dispute remains to be resolved by it. “In the present case this stage is yet to come and in our view, if the same procedure is to be followed then this may be the course to be adopted by the petitioner. The settlement said to have been arrived at between the petitioner and its workmen, can then very well be filed before the court of Enquiry and the said court after requiring into the matter referred to it, while submitting its report to the appropriate Government, as provided under Section 14 of the Act, may state its opinion to the State Government and then the Government may not publish the same under Section 17 of the Act.
14. From the uncontroverted facts appearing in this case, we would like to observe that there appears strong circumstances to take a view that the industrial dispute that was to be enquired into by the Court of Enquiry constituted by the State Government, has come to an end on account of the settlement arrived at between the parties. This may be the reason that none of the respondents have taken any interests, in this Court. But on that account it is not possible to take in favour of the petitioner on any of the questions that have been mooted before us, particularly the last one, that on account of the settlement the Court of Enquiry ceased to have jurisdiction over the matters that were referred to it. In our opinion, the petitioner cannot avoid to face the court of Enquiry. In that Court, it can file a compromise petition or the settlement arrived at with, its workmen. And if it is done, the Court of Enquiry would consider that make an appropriate report in accordance with law to the State Government stating the said fact as already observed earlier.
15. Having already discussed and rejected the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner challenging the validity of the notification dated the 19th January, 1972 (Annexure 1). We would dismiss the writ application, but as there is no appearance on behalf of the respondents, we shall make no order as to costs.
