JUDGMENT
S.N. Jha, C.J.
1. This letters patent appeal arises from OWP NO. 1/1998. The appellants, who were writ petitioners, preferred writ petition for quashing Award No. 2266-70 dated 9.10.1976 with respect to land of khasra No. 683/221 at Mouza Talwara, Tehsil Reasi within District Udhampur, and for other consequential reliefs. The petition was disposed of with certain directions. Not satisfied, they have come in appeal.
2. The case of the appellants is that on 9.10.1975 notification under Section 4 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Acquisition Act was issued for acquisition of 1430 kanals and one marla of land for developing Talwara Colony in connection with Salal Hydro Electric Project. The notification was challenged by one Ramu, father of appellant Nos. 1 to 7 and husband of appellant No. 8, by writ petition registered as writ petition No. 181/1977, in this Court. During pendency of the case Ramu died and the petition was dismissed for want of prosecution on 2.12.1988. In the meantime, on the death of Ramu, the appellants took steps for mutation in their names and mutation was attested by the revenue authorities under Section 8 of the Agrarian Reforms Act vide mutation No. 488/86 on 15.9.1986. The appellants filed writ petition for quashing the award, which was disposed of with some observations and directions on 12.11.1998 giving rise to this appeal.
3. Learned Single Judge accepted the stand of the State that subsequent acquisition of right in the land in question does not confer any right to personal notice on the person concerned. The learned Judge however took the view that prescribed procedure had not been followed as required under Section 4 of the Act, but considering that a large chunk of land measuring over 1430 canals was subject matter of acquisition out of which the claim of the appellants was confined to only about 29 kanals of land, he held that it would not be appropriate to quash the notification under Section 4; instead, the proper course would be to postpone the deemed date of publication under Section 4(1) by three years so that the respondents could determine the market value of the land as on the date of filing of the writ petition and refix the compensation. The learned Judge gave such direction following a decision of the apex court in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v Raj Kumar Johri, AIR 1992 SC 1538.
4. Ms. Sindhu Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that notification under Section 4 or Sections 9 and 9 A of the Land Acquisition Act was not served on the appellants, muchless in the prescribed manner by beat of drums, publication in newspaper and so on, and in the circumstances the award is fit to be quashed. She placed reliance on decisions in Balkrishan Dutta v. State, AIR 1975 J&K 27, State of J&K v. Mani Ram and Anr., AIR 1994 J&K 62, and Siraj-ud-Din v. Revenue Minister and Ors., 1991 JKLR 318. She submitted that after attestation of mutation in favour of the appellants they were entitled to service of notice which was not done. In this regard she placed reliance on Vishwa Nath v. Collectors and Ors., 1982 KLJ 179. Counsel also submitted that possession was never taken over by the respondents. As a matter of fact, possession could be taken only after giving compensation, and where compensation is not received by the land owner, by depositing the amount in court, which has not been done till date in the case.
5. On behalf of respondents, Mr. A.H. Qazi, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that a large chunk of land, over 1430 kanals, was acquired and no person other than the appellants came forward with any grievance. In any view, the acquisition having become final way back in 1976 itself, the appellants’ lands cannot be segregated at this stage. The claim of the appellants is highly belated and the writ petition therefore is fit to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In the support of the submission, counsel placed reliance on Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671 =(2000) 2 SCC 48.
6. We have considered the submissions of counsel for the parties and we are satisfied that the writ petition of the appellants was/is fit to be dismissed on more than one ground. It is not in dispute that land measuring over 1430 kanals was acquired for a public purpose which culminated in award No. 2266-70 on 9-10-1976 i.e. twenty seven years ago. The writ petition was filed on 2.1.1989 i.e. after over twelve years of the award. It is true that the appellants’ father/husband had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 181/1977 but the same stood dismissed, though for non-prosecution- after the appellants’ father/husband died. It was open to the appellants to get the writ petition restored and pursue it to its logical end. Instead, they filed fresh writ petition. Though we do not propose to take narrow view of the matter and non-suit the appellants on that ground, as indicated above, the appellants filed the writ petition on the basis of attestation of mutation in respect of land in question in their favour on or about 15.9.1986 in terms of Section 8 of the Agrarian reforms Act. Section 8 of the said Act provides for vesting of ownership rights in land in favour of tiller of the land or his legal heirs. Section 4 of the Act lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of Chapter II, all rights, title and interest in land of any person, not cultivating it personally in kharief, 1971, shall be deemed to have extinguished and vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, with effect from the first day of May, 1973. Section 8 lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 14, where an ex-landlord resumes land under Section 7, the tiller, from whom land is so resumed, or his legal heirs, shall be vested with ownership rights in land left with him or his heirs after resumption, in the manner laid down. The appellants do not claim attestation of mutation as a result of inheritance, but in terms of Section 8 of the Act as prospective owners by virtue of deemed vesting, on or about 15.9.1986. The attestation of mutation not being the result of inheritance from Ramu, the fact that Ramu had earlier filed writ petition is of little help to them.
7. As a matter of fact, we have grave doubts that the land could be subjected to attestation of mutation, whether as a result of inheritance or acquisition of deemed ownership rights under Section 8 of the Agrarian Reforms Act, in view of the fact that the land had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and stood vested in the State for which award had already been prepared. As a consequence of vesting, the appellants’ father/husband ceased to possess interest and it could not be subject of mutation in favour of the appellants.
8. Be that as it may, the fact remains that more than twenty seven years have passed since passing of the award. The writ petition calling the acquisition in question was filed after more than twelve years. In Municipal Council, Ahmadnagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (Supra) while dealing with the repercussions of delay and laches in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court observed that “in any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder”. The court noticed earlier decisions in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy to the Govt. of T.N. (1997) 2 SCC 627, and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501. The observations in the former case may usefully be noticed as under: —
“It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High court has, no doubt, discretionaly powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226…”
9. In the above premises, the observation/direction of learned Single Judge regarding postponement of Section 4 (1) notification by three years so that steps may be taken by the respondents to determine the market value of the land and refix the compensation, does not appear to be in accordance with law as it amounts to interference with the acquisition which attained finality decades ago.
10. In the result, order of learned Single Judge dated 12-11-1998 is set aside. The writ petition as well as this appeal are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
