PETITIONER:
ROOP CHAND ADLAKHA AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT26/09/1988
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
MISRA RANGNATH
CITATION:
1989 AIR 307 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 253
1989 SCC Supl. (1) 116 JT 1988 (4) 114
1988 SCALE (2)897
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 14 and l6 Services-
Appointment and promotion-State entitled to prescribe that a
candidate should have a particular qualification plus a
stipulated quantum of service experience.
%
Civil Services-D.D.A.-Engineering Cadre Promotion of
Junior Engineers to Assistant Engineers and Assistant
Engineers to Executive Engineers-Different conditions of
eligibility of Diploma-Holder and Graduates-Prescription
of-Whether violative of Articles 14 and 16.
HEADNOTE:
The Rules of the Central Public Works Department (CPWD)
adopted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) stipulate
and provide that 50% of the posts of Assistant Engineers in
DDA be filed-up by promotion from the cadre of Junior
Engineers comprising of both Graduates in Engineering and
Diploma-Holders in Engineering in the equal ratio (50%:50%)
of the promotional posts. Half of it, i.e. 25% were to be
filled up by promotion of Graduate Junior-Engineers with
three years' service experience as Junior-Engineers; the
other 25% to be filled up from Diploma-Holder. Junior-
Engineers. who had X years service experience as Junior-
Engineers. The Rules further provide that the Executive
Engineers' post in DDA were purely promotional and Graduate
Assistant Engineers with 8 years' service-experience and
Diploma-Holder Assistant Engineers with 10 years' service-
experience were eligible for promotion. No inter se quota
between the two class of officers; was prescribed.
The Diploma-Holders in the Cadres of .junior Engineers
and Assistant Engineers filed separate writ petitions in the
High Court assailing the constitutional validity of the
prescriptions made by the rules in the matter of requirement
of differential service-experiences between the Graduates
and the Diploma-Holders for promotion to the higher caders
of Assistant Engineers and Executive Engineers respectively.
They also assailed the promotion of Graduate Engineers to
the higher cadres made on the strength of the Rules.
PG NO 253
PG NO 254
The High Court allowed the writ petitions and declared
the different standards of service-experience prescribed for
Degree-Holders and Diploma-Holders in respect of both the
cadres as violative of Articles 1-1 and 16 of the
Constitution.
In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of appellants it
was contended; (l) that the view taken by the High Court is
demonstrably erroneous and opposed to well settled
principles; (2) that the High Court took an erroneous view
that in Shujat Ali's case (1975 (1) SCR 449) this Court
struck down the service rule impugned in that case; (3) that
the fundamental distinction between Triloki Nath Khosa's,
case [1974] 1 SCR 771 and Shujat Ali's case was lost sight
of by the High Court;(4) that the present case was not one
in which the Diploma-Holders, proprio vigore and without
more, were held eligible for promotion. The educational
qualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as
equivalent to a Degree for purposes of determining
eligibility. Nor the Degree itself was determinative of
eligibility for promotion. The eligibility of promotion is
based on a combination of factors which vary according to
the basic educational qualification of the two classes of
engineers; (5) that this distinction was germane to the
requirements of higher technical and academic quality for
the higher posts which involved expertise in structural
design. etc. and (6) that even where recruitment to a
particular cadre was made from different sources,resulting
in the formation of a single homogeneous cadre it was not
impermissible to make a further classification amongst the
members of such a cadre for purposes of further promotion
based on the higher educational qualification of the
candidates.
On behalf of the respondent Diploma-Holders it was
contended(1) that this Court had, more than once. cautioned
against undue accent, in the matter of promotional
opportunities, on academic-qualification alone which might
lead to elitist perferences and tend to obscure the
egalitarian principle and social justice; (2) that the
effect of the distinction is really an imperceptible
extension or magnification of insubstantial factors
subverting the precious guarantee of equality and(3) that to
discriminate between Diploma-Holders and Graduates who
belong to the same cadre and hold inter-changeable posts,
both in the present cadre and in the prospective promotional
posts, on the mere lack of some higher academic attainment
is to place a high premium on these social and economic
pursuits for the economically disadvantaged difficult.
Allowing the Appeals,
PG NO 255
HELD: l. The inherent distinction between a person with
a Degree and one who is merely a Diploma-Holder is much too
obvious. But the question for consideration, in the present
context, is whether the differences have a reasonable
relation to the nature of the office to which the promotion
is contemplated. The idea of equality in the matter of
promotion can be predicated only when the candidates for
promotion are drawn from the same source. If the differences
in the qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature
of duties and responsibilities. that go with and are
attendant upon the promotional post, the more advantageous
treatment of those who possess higher technical
qualifications can be legitimised on the doctrine of
classification. There may,conceivably, be cases where the
differences in the educational qualifications may not be
sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one class
of candidates as against another. Whether the classification
is reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend
upon facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at
the relevant time. When the State makes a classification
between two sources, unless the vice of the classification
is writ large on the face of it, the person assailing the
classification must show that it is unreasonable and
violative of Article 14. [263A-C ]
2. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees
irrespective of all distinction or qualifications, or job-
requirements is neither constitutionally compelled nor
practically meaningful. [263D]
The process of classification is in itself productive of
inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality. The
process would be constitutionally valid if it recognises a
pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of
the effects of such pre-existent inequality. The the process
cannot merely blow-up or magnify in-substantial or
microscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible.
The over-emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any
anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for
classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the
article of its precious content and end in re-placing
doctrine of equality by the doctrine of the
classification.[264C-D]
4. The presumption of good faith in and of
constitutionality of a classification cannot be pushed to
the point of predicating some possible or hypothetical but
undisclosed and unknown reason for a classification
rendering the precious guarantee of equality "a mere rope of
sand". [264E]
PG NO 256
Central Railway v. A.V.R. sidhanti, [1974] 3 SCR 207 at
214 and T.Devadasan V. The Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR at
689 & 690 followed.
5."To overdo classification is to undo equality". The
idea of similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons
to justify classification, cannot rest on merely differentia
which may, by themselves rational or logical, but depends on
whether the differences are relevant to the goals sought to
be reached by the law which seeks to classify. The
justification of the classification must, therefore, be
sought beyond the classification. All marks of distinction
do not necessarily justify classification irrespective of
the relevance or nexus to objects sought to be achieved by
the law imposing the classification. [264F-G]
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa &
Ors.,[1974] I SCR 771; Bidi Suppy Co.v. Union of India,
[1956] SCR 182, relied no; Mohammad shujat Ali v. UOI and
others, [1975]1 SCR 449; H.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and Ors., [1983]3 SCR 372 and Punjab
State Electricity Board, Patiala, and Anr.v. Ravinder Kumar
Sharma & Ors.,[1986] 4 SCC 617 distinguished; State of
Mysore v. Narasinga Rao, [1968] 1 SCR 401 and Union of India
v. Mrs. S.B. Kohli, [1973]3 SCR 117, referred to.
6. In the present case, the possession of a diploma. by
itself and without more, does not confer eligibility.
Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is not considered
equivalent to the degree. [268d]
7.If the educational qualification by itself was
recognised as confering eligibility for promotion, then the
super-imposition of further conditions such as a particular
period of service, selectively, on the Diploma Holders alone
to their disadvantage might become discriminatory. This does
not prevent the State from formulating a policy which
prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the
very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular
qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service
experience.[268G-H;269A]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.896 to
899 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. 3352 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1987 of the Delhi
High Court in C.W.P. No. 2131,2082 of 1984 respectively.
PG NO 257
G. Ramaswami, Additional Solicitor General, R.K. Jain,
P.P. Rao, M.S. Gujaral, S. Rangarajan, A.K. Sanghi,
Mrs. Madhu Kapur, Arun Kr. Vijayesh Roy, Sanjay Kr. Kaul,
Sardar Bahadur, V.B. Saharaya, R.K. Khanna, Vishnu Mathur,
Ashok Aggarwal, R.N. Keswani and R.S. Sodhi for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALIAH, J. These four Civil Appeals by Special
Leave and the Special Leave Petition arise out of and are
directed against the common Judgment dated 2.9.1987, of the
High Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No. 2132 and C.W.P. No. 2082
of 1984 in which the principal controversy was whether the
Rules prescribing different conditions of eligibility for
Diploma-Holders and Graduates for promotion from the cadre
of Junior-Engineers to that of Assistant-Engineers and from
the cadre of Assistant-Engineers to that of Executive-
Engineers in the Public Works Department of the Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) is violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution and would, therefore, require to be
declared void.
The High Court, in the writ petitions filed by the
Diploma-Holders, has held that such differential treatment
of Diploma-Holders and Graduates by the prescription of
different standards of service-experience for purposes of
eligibility for promotion to the higher cadres is
unconstitutional.
2. The D.D.A. which is the appellant in Civil Appeals
No.898 of 1988 and No. 899 of 1988 assails the correctness
of the view taken by the High Court. Civil Appeals No. 896
of 1988 and 897 of 1988 are by the Graduate-Engineers who
were respondents before the High Court and who are,
similarly, aggrieved by the decision under appeal SLP 6181
of 1988 is by the DDA Graduate Engineers Association” which
seeks to espouse the cause of the Graduate-Engineers. We
grant Special Leave in SLP. All the five appeals are heard
and disposed of by this common judgment.
PG NO 258
C.A.899 of 1988, C.A. 896 of 1988 and SLP 6181 arise out
of C.W.P. 2132 of 1984. C.A. 898 of 1988, C.A. 897 of 1988
arise out of C.W.P. 2082 of 1984.
3. The D.D.A. by its resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963
adopted, pro-tanto, the rules of the Central Public Works
Department (CPWD) in regard to the mode of recruitment-both
by direct recruitment and by promotion-to the posts of Asst.
Engineers. The rules, so adopted, in substance, stipulate
and provide that 50% of the posts be filled by direct
recruitment or by deputation and that the other 50% be
filled-up by promotion from the cadre of Junior-Engineers.
The cadre of Junior-Engineers itself comprises of both
Graduates in Engineering and Diploma-Holders in Engineering.
The two categories of officers in the cadre of Junior-
Engineers were provided with promotional opportunities to
the post of Asst. Engineers in the equal ratio (50%:50%) of
the promotional-posts. Half of it, i.e., 25% was to be
filled up by promotion of Graduate-Engineers with three
years’ service-experience as Junior-Engineers; the other 25%
to be filled-up from Diploma-Holder Junior-Engineers who
were diploma holders who had 8 years’ service-experience as
Junior-Engineers.
By resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971 the DDA similarly
adopted the relevant rules in the CPWD in the matter of
recruitment to the posts of Executive-Engineers. The
Executive-Engineers’ post in the DDA thus became purely
promotional and Graduate Asst. Engineers with 8 years’
service-experience and diploma Asst. Engineers with 10
years’ service-experience were eligible for promotion. No
inter-se quota between the two class of officers was
prescribed.
The following table delineates the effect and purport of
the rules adopted under resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963
and No. 105 dated 16.6.1971. The table also indicates the
mode of initial recruitment to the cadre of Junior-
Engineers:
PG NO 259
EXECUTIVE ENGINEERS
[By promotion]
Asst. Engrs.’ Asst. Engrs.’
[Degree] + [Diploma]
8 years +10 years
service service
ASSISTANT ENGINEERS
Graduates and Dimploma
holders
50%by promotion 50%.By
Direct
recruitment
25% 25%
Jr. Enger. Jr.Engr.
[Degree] [Diploma] +3 yrs. + 8 years service service JUNIOR ENGINEERS [Sectional Officers] Direct recruitment Graduates in Diploma- Engineering holders [No prior [with 2 experience years Prescribed] experience
In the years 1984 the Diploma-Holder in the cadre of
Junior-Engineers and in he cadre of Asst. Engineers sought
to assail, by means of two writ-petitions presented to the
Delhi High Court, the Constitutional validity of the
prescriptions made by the rules in the matter of requirement
of differential service-experiences between the Graduates
and Diploma-Holders for promotion to the higher cadres viz.
of Asst. Engineers and Executive-Engineers respectively.
They also assailed the promotions of Graduate-Engineers to
the higher cadres made on the strength of the Rules. CWP.
2132 of 1984 pertained to the resolution No. 574 dated
13.11.1963 adopting the relevant CPWD Rules prescribing 3
years’ and 8 years’ service-experience for Graduates and
Diploma-Holders respectively and the discrimination thus
brought about between them. CWP No. 2082 of 1984 pertained
to the contitutionality of the analogous provisions in the
rules adopted by resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971.
PG NO 260
The High Court heard these two petitions together and by
its common judgment dated 2.9.1987 upheld the challenge and
declared the different standards of service-experience
prescribed for Degree-Holders and Diploma-Holders in respect
of both the cadres as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.
5. The principal question that arises in these appeals
is whether, where, as here, recruitment to a particular
cadre of posts is made, from two different sources,
different conditions, based on the differences in
educational qualifications, can be prescribed conditioning
the eligibility for further-promotion to a higher cadre in
service.
The High Court, by the judgment now under appeal, has
held that such prescription of differential standards-based
even on the differences in technical, educational
qualifications-is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. In reaching such conclusions as it did on the
point, the High Court placed reliance on the pronouncement
of this Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali v. UOI and
Others,[1975] 1 SCR 449, H. C. Sharma and Ors. v. Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and Ors., [1983] 3 SCR 372 and Punjab
State Electricity Board,Patiala, and Anr. v. Ravinder Kumar
Sharma & Ors.,[1986] 4 SCC 617 and T.R: Kapur and Others v.
State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1987 SC 415. The High Court
distinguished the decision of this (Court in State of Jammu
& Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors., l1974] 1 SCR 771.
The High Court drew a distinction between the situation
where diploma-holders were wholly excluded from eligibility
for promotion to the higher cadre and the situation where,
while they were considered eligible for promotion, however,
were subjected to more onerous and less advantageous
conditions for such promotion. The High Court distinguished
Triloki Nath Khosa’s case observing:
“7. This was a case where diploma holders were found
completely ineligible for promotion to the higher post for
lack of essential educational qualification but the
considerations may vary if they are found eligible for
promotion to the higher post but still certain conditions
are laid as distinct from degree holders before they become
eligible for promotion. The question then would arise
whether such distinction can be justified and is based on
any rationality or not ..”
PG NO 261
Answering this point in favour of the “Diploma-Holders”
the High Court held:
“…The moment the diploma holders and degree holders are
considered to constitute one class for purposes of promotion
there cannot be any differentiation between the two vis-a-
vis the qualification for promotion. It could be that for
reasons of efficiency in administration the authorities may
lay down that diploma holders are not at all eligible for
promotion to the higher post and such a bar can be upheld in
view of the ratio laid down in the case of Triloki Nath
Khosa but after the authorities considered them eligible for
promotion there could be no rationale in their making any
distinction between the degree-holders and diploma-holders
for granting promotion to them to the higher post….”
(Emphasis Supplied)
The point of distinction, as apprehended by the High
Court, is that in the present case a Diploma, ipso-facto,
qualifies for promotion. The real question is whether this
assumption is correct and whether the relevant Rules
determine the eligibility for promotion on the basis of a
Diploma, or for that matter even a Degree, Or whether the
eligibility for promotion is determined not with reference
merely to the educational attainments but on the basis of
educational qualifications plus a measure of service-
experience, stipulated differently for Graduates and
Diploma-Holders.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants, contended that
the view that commended itself to the High Court is
demonstrably erroneous and is opposed to principles which,
by now, should be considered well-settled. They submitted
that the High Court fell into an obvious error in its view
that in Shujat Ali’s case ( 1975) 1 SCR 449, this Court had
stuck down the service-rule impugned in that case. Learned
Counsel submitted that the fundamental distinction between
the two sets of cases, one of which Triloki Nath Khosa’s
case is represents, and the other typified by Shujat Ali’s
case, was lost sight of by the High Court and the error
pervading the judgment is the result of overlooking this
essential distinction between the two sets of cases.
It was contended for the appellants that the present
case was not one in which the Diploma-Holders proprio-
vigore, and without more, were held eligible for promotion.
If the effect and intent of the rules were such as to treat
PG NO 262
Diploma as equivalent to a Degree for purposes of further
promotion then, the view of the High Court-that having
considered both class of officers equally eligible for
promotion on the mere strength of their educational
qualifications, any further discrimination brought about by
subjecting the Diploma-Holders alone to a more onerous and
less advantageous stipulation for such promotion would
violate, the constitutional pledge of equality-might have
some qualification. But in the present case, counsel
contended, that is not the position. The educational
qualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as
equivalent to a Degree for purposes of determining
eligibility. Nor the Degree itself was determinative of
eligibility for promotion. The eligibility for promotion is,
it is urged, based on a combination of factors which vary
according as the basic educational qualification of the two
classes of engineers; that this distinction was germane to
the requirements of higher technical and academic quality
for the higher posts which involved expertise in structural-
design etc. Learned counsel submitted that even where
recruitment to a particular cadre was made from different
sources, resulting in the formation of single a homogeneous
cadre, it was not impermissible to make a further
classification amongst the members of such a cadre for
purposes of further promotion based on the higher
educational qualification of the candidates.
Learned counsel for the respondent-diploma-holders,
while seeking to support the judgment of the High Court
urged that this Court had, more than once, cautioned against
undue accent, in the matter of promotional opportunities, on
academic qualification alone which might lead to elitist
preferences and tend to obscure the egalitarian principle
and social-justice. It was, therefore, contended that the
effect of the distinction, in the ultimate analysis, is
really an imperceptible extension or magnification of
insubstantial factors sub-verting the precious guarantee of
equality. Sri Gujral, learned Senior Counsel, sought to
impart to the situation a dimension of social-justice and
made an impassioned plea that to discriminate between
Diploma-Holders and Graduates who belong to the same cadre
and hold inter-changeable posts, both in the present-cadre
and in the prospective promotional posts, on the mere lack
of some higher academic attainment is to place a high
premium on those social and economic ills of the society
which rendered the further academic pursuits for the
economically disadvantaged difficult.
7. A large number of authorities were cited on either
side. We by first examine the cases relied upon by the High
Court in support of its conclusion. The inherent distinction
PG NO 263
between a person with a Degree and one who is merely a
Diploma-Holder is much too obvious. But the question that
falls for consideration, in the context such as the present
one, is whether the differences have a reasonable relation
to the nature of the office to which the promotion is
contemplated. The idea of equality in the matter of
promotion can be predicated only when the candidates for
promotion are drawn from the same source. If the differences
in the qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature
of duties and responsibilities, that go with and are
attendant upon the promotional-post, the more advantageous
treatment of those who possess higher technical
qualifications can be legitimised on the doctrine of
classification. There may, conceivably, be cases where the
differences in the educational qualifications may not be
sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one class
of candidates as against another. Whether the classification
is reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend
upon facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at
the relevant time. When the state makes a classification
between two sources, unless the vice of the classification
is writ large on the face of it, the person assailing the
classification must show that it is unreasonable and
violative of Article 14. A wooden equality as between all
classes of employees irrespective of all distinctions or
qualifications, or job-requirements is neither
constitutionally compelled nor practically meaningful. This
Court in Central Railway v.A.V.R. Siddhanti, [1974] 3 SCR
207 at 214 observed:
“….A wooden equality as between all classes of
employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature
of responsibility and performance of the employees is not
intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to
run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a ‘classless and
undiscerning ‘equality’ where, in reality, glaring
inequalities and intelligible differentia exist, will
deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad
classification based on reason, executive pragmatism and
experience having a direct relation with the achievement of
efficiency in administration, is permissible ….
In T. Devadasan v. The Union of India,[1964]4 SCR 680 at
689 & 690 this Court observed:
“….What is meant by equality in this Article is,
equality amongst equals. It does not provide for an absolute
equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard
PG NO 264
in every conceivable circumstance of the differences such as
age, sex, education and so on and so forth as may be found
amongst people in general. Indeed, while the aim of this
Article is to ensure that invidious distinction or arbitrary
discrimination shall not be made by the State between a
citizen and a citizen who answer the same description and
the differences which may obtain between them are of no
relevance for the purpose of applying a particular law
reasonable classification is permissible. It does not mean
anything more.
But then the process of classification is in itself
productive of inequality and in that sense antithetical of
equality. The process would be constitutionally valid if it
recognises a pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of
amelioration of the effects of such pre-existent inequality.
But the process cannot in itself generate or aggravate the
inequality. The process cannot merely blow-up or magnify in-
substantial or microscopic differences on merely
meretricious or plausible dif-ferences. The over-emphasis on
the doctrine of classification or any anxious and sustained
attempts to discover some basis for classification may
gradually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its
precious content and end in replacing Doctrine of equality
by the doctrine of classification. The presumption of good
faith in and of constitutionality of a classification cannot
be pushed “to the point of predicating some possible or
hypothetical but undisclosed and unknown reason for a
classification rendering the precious guarantee of equality
“a mere rope of sand”.
“To overdo classification is to undo equality”. The idea
of similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons, to
justify classification, cannot rest on merely differentia
which may, by themselves be rational or logical, but depends
on whether the differences are relevant to the goals sought
to be reached by the law which seeks to classify. The
justification of the classification must needs, therefore,
to be sought beyond the classification. All marks of
distinction do not necessarily justify classification
irrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects sought to
be achieved by the law imposing the classification.
8. In Mohd. Sujat Ali’s case the validity of a
prescription of the rules of the State of Andhra Pradesh
treating Graduate-Engineers, on the one hand, and engineers
with diploma or equivalent qualification, on the other,
differently for purposes of promotion arose for
consideration. Strictly speaking, the High Court was not
right in its under-standing of the actual result of the
PG NO 265
ease. The High Court, in para 8 of the judgment observed:
“The Supreme Court had then struck down this rule as
violative of fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India..”
But it is to be noticed that the writ-petitions were
ultimately dismissed by this Court. There are, of course,
certain observations which caution against too readily
resorting to the expedience of classification. After
referring to Triloki Nath Khosa’s ease it was observed:
“…..But from these decisions it cannot be laid down as
an invariable rule that whenever any classification is made
on the basis of variant educational qualification., such
classification must be held to be valid irrespective of the
nature and purpose of the classification or the quality and
extent of the differences in the educational qualifications.
It must be remembered that “life has relations not capable
always of division into inflexible compartments”. The moulds
expand and shrink. The test of reasonable classification has
to be applied in each ease on its peculiar facts and
circumstances …….. ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
This echoes what Vivian Bose, J. had earlier said in
Bidi ,Supply Co. v. Union of lndia [1956] SCR 182:
“Article 14 sets out, to my mind, an attitude of mind,a
way of life. rather than a precise rule of law ……
“…..In a given case that it falls this side of the
line or that and because of that decisions on the same point
will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of
the country and another somewhere else; one decision today
and another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered
and the structure of current social thinking is different.
It is not the law that alters but the changing conditions of
the times and Article t4 narrows down to a question of fact
which must be determined by the highest Judges in the land
as each ease arises…..”
Shujat Ali’s ease itself recognised the permissibility
and validity of such classification if the nature of the
PG NO 266
functions and duties attached to the promotional-posts are
such as to justify the classification in the interest of
efficiency in public service; but, where both graduates and
non-graduates were regarded as equally fit and eligible for
promotion,the denial of promotion to a person otherwise
eligible and due for promotion on the basis of a quota was
not justified. On this point it was observed by this Court
in Shujat Ali’s case:
“…..But where graduates and non-graduates are both
regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion,it is
difficult to see how, consistently, with the claim for equal
opportunity, any differentiation can be made between them by
laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving
preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in
the matter of fixation of such quota. The result of fixation
of quota of promotion for each of the two categories of
supervisors would be that when a vacancy, arises in the post
of Asst. Engineer, which, according to the quota is reserved
for graduate supervisors, a non-graduate supervisor cannot
be promoted to that vacancy, even if he is senior to all
other graduate supervisors and more suitable than they. His
opportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies
available for non-graduate supervisors. That would clearly
amount to denial of equal opportunity to him
In the present appeals before us, the Graduates and
Diploma-Holders were not treated equal in the mattes of
eligibility for promotion. What is, therefore, assailed is
not the aspect of the mere fixation of a quota as between
the Diploma-Holders and the Graduates in the promotional
posts, but the very prescription of different standards or
conditions of eligibility. In Shujat Ali’s case the
infirmity of the differential treatment stemmed from the
fundamental basis that, at that point, both Graduates and
Diploma-holders were equally eligible but the Rule operated
to deny promotion to a Diploma-holder on the basis of a
quota. The observations in that case pertained to a stage
which arose after the equality of eligibility for promotion
between the two classes of persons had been recognised. But
in the present appeals the different prescriptions for
conditioning eligibility are themselves questioned which
need to be decided on the basis whether the discrimination
contemplated and brought about in the matter of promotional-
opportunities between graduates and non-graduates, based on
the differences in the quality of their technical
qualifications, were relatable to, and justified on the
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basis of, the requirements of the promotional-posts. It is
relevant to mention here that the different standards and
Conditions for eligibility were prescribed with a view to
injecting a higher technical quality in the promotions-cadre
based on the recommendations of a committee, called “Vaish-
Committee”, constituted for the purpose.
H.C. Sharma’s and Punjab State Electricity Board’s cases
were also matters where Graduates and Diploma-holders were
merged into and formed part of a homogenious cadre with
equal eligibility for promotion and what fell for
consideration was the validity of the further prescription
of quotas between them. Here-again, no question of the
validity of the different standards prescribed for the very
eligibility for promotion fell for consideration. The
present cases, however, are those where, havig regard to the
requirements of the promotional-posts, different conditions
of eligibility for promotion on the differences based on the
educational qualifications and service-experience were
prescribed.
9. In State of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao,[1968] 1 SCR 40 1
higher educational qualifications were considered relevant
for fixation of higher pay-scales. In Union of India v. Mrs.
S.B. Kohli,[1973] 3 SCR 117 the requirement of a post
graduate specialisation in the particular discipline was
considered not irrelevant and a classification based on
such specialisation was upheld.
Triloki Nath Khosa’s case is more directly in point.
There, Graduate-Engineers and Diploma-Holders were in a
common-cadre of Asst. Engineers. But for purposes of
further promotion to the higher cadre of Executive-Engineers
only the Graduate were held eligible. Diploma-Holders were
barred for promotion. Repelling the challenge to this
provision made by the Diploma Holders, this Court said:
“The classification of Assistant Engineers into Degree-
holders and Diploma-holders could not be held to rest on any
unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification was made
with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the
Engineering services. If this be the object, the
classification is clearly correlated to it for higher
educational qualifications are at least presumption evidence
of a higher mental equipment.”
“Classification on the basis of educational
qualifictions made with a view to achieving administrative
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efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous
circumstances and one has always to bear in mind the facts
and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity
of a classification.”
“Though persons appointed directly and by promotion were
integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they
could, for purposes of promotion to then cadre of Executive
Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational
qualifications the rule providing that graduates
shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of
diploma-holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and must be upheld. ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Triloki Nath’s case diploma-holders were not
considered eligible for promotion to the higher post. Here,
in the present case, the possession of a diploma, by itself
and without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma, for
purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the
degree. This is the point of distinction in the situations
in the two cases. If Diploma-Holders-of course on the
justification of the job-requirements and in the interest of
maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the
cadre-could validly be excluded from the eligibility for
promotion to the higher cadre, it does not necessarily
follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the
recruitment policy is limited only two choices, namely
either to consider them “eligible” or “not eligible”. State,
consistent with the requirements of the promotional-posts
and in the interest of the efficiency of the service, is not
precluded from conferring eligibility on Diploma-Holders
conditioning it by other requirements which may, as here,
include certain quantum of service-experience. In the
present case, eligibility-determination was made by a
cumulative-criterion of a certain educational qualification
plus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot,
in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court,
that the choice of the State was either to recognise
Diploma-Holders as “eligible” for promotion or wholly
exclude them as “not-eligible”. If the educational
qualification by itself was recognised as conferring
eligibility for promotion, then, the super-imposition of
further conditions such as a particular period of service,
selectively, on the Diploma-Holders alone to their
disadvantage might become discriminatory. This does not
prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes
as an essential part of the conditions for the vary
eligibility that the candidate must have a particular
qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service-
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experience. It is stated that on the basis of the “Vaish-
Committee” report, the authorities considered the infusion
of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel
requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services
necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unless
the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to
bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should
be one of judicial- restraint. The prescriptions may be
somewhat cumbersome or produce some hardship in their
application in some individual cases; but they can not be
struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The
High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in striking
down the Rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16.
10. Accordingly, all the Appeals are allowed, the
Judgment of the High Court dated 2.9.1987 set-aside and the
Civil Writ Petitions No. 2 132 of 1984 and 2082 of 1984 in
the High Court dismissed. However, the parties are left to
bear and pay their costs, both here and below.
A.P.J . Appeals allowed.
