ORDER
K.C. Bhanu, J.
1. This criminal petition is filed challenging the order dated 25th March, 2006 made in Criminal Revision Petition No. 26 of 2004 on the file of V Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Nandyal, whereunder and whereby the order of granting maintenance in M.C. No. 1 of 2002 dated 7.5.2004 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Banganapalle was confirmed, modifying the date of payment ‘from the date of petition’ to that of ‘from the date of order’.
2. The factual matrix is not in dispute. Respondents 1 to 3 herein filed a petition under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code for grant of maintenance each at the rate of Rs. 800 per month. The said petition was allowed granting maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 each of the respondent. However, in respect of second respondent, maintenance was ordered to be paid till her marriage and in respect of third respondent till he attains the age of majority. The said application was treated by the learned District Judge as a petition under Section 3(1)(a) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
3. The only objection raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner herein is that since the first respondent herein, admittedly a divorcee, has to seek redressal under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter in short referred to ‘the 1986 Act’ for the purpose of convenience) and Section 125, Cr.P.C. has no application. He fairly stated that as per the minor respondents 2 and 3 are concerned they can maintain the application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. as well as under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act 1986. He relied on a decision in Mst. Bilkis Begum @ Jahanara v. Majid Ali Gazi and Anr. JT 2002 (Supp.) 1 SC 115.
4. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that liberty may be given to the wife so as to approach concerned Court to claim maintenance in connection with Section 3(1)(a) of the 1986 Act.
5. Though the application was filed under Section 125, Cr.P.C. the Revisional Court modified the order treating as one passed under Section 3(1)(a) of the 1986 Act. This Court in a decision in Muneer Hassan Khan v. Fareeda Khatoon and Anr. 2003(1) ALT (Cri.) 428 (A.P.) held as hereunder:
The application seeking maintenance has been filed under Section 125 of the Code. Of course, the label under which the petition has been filed is not the criterion and even if a wrong provision has been mentioned in the petition, if the petition could be otherwise maintained in any other provision it is of no consequence and the petition could be treated as having been filed under the relevant provision. Having regard to the finding given by the Court below that the petitioner is a divorcee, it becomes relevant to consider certain provisions of the Act, 1986, the constitutional validity of which has been upheld by the Apex Court very recently in Danial Latifi and Anr. v. Union of India 2001(2) ALT (Cri.) 327 : 2001(2) ALD (Cri.) 787 (SC).
No doubt, it is not a case of quoting a wrong provision, but it is quoting a separate legislation. On this aspect, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision in Mst. Bilkis Begum @ Jahanara v. Majid Ali Gazi and Anr. (supra) wherein it was held thus.
So far as the claim of maintenance for the divorced wife is concerned the proceedings under Section 125 cannot be proceeded with. She is entitled to receive her dues according to the 1986 Act, and if she has not yet received the same she has to take recourse of the proceedings under that Act and realise the amount in accordance with law.
6. In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court referred to the case of Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim , where it was held that a careful reading of the provisions of Section 125, Cr.P.C. and Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act, makes it clear that the two provisions apply and cover different situations and there is no conflict, much less a real one, between the two, whereas the 1986 Act, deals with the obligation of a Muslim husband vis-a-vis his divorced wife, including the payment of maintenance to her for a period of two years of fosterage for maintaining the infant/infants where they are in the custody of the mother, the obligation of a Muslim father maintain the minor children, is governed by Section 125, Cr.P.C. and his obligation to maintain them is absolute till they attain majority or are able to maintain themselves, whichever date is earlier.
7. Therefore, from the law laid down by the Apex Court when two Acts cover two different situations, the special enactment prevail over the general enactment. Furthermore, Section 3 of the Act will override the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Section 3(1) of the Act begins with a non obstante clause ‘notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force’ makes it clear that the provisions of the 1986 Act would apply to the divorced woman with regard to a reasonable and fair provision for maintenance of the amount of tnehar or any of the other conditions in respect of a divorced woman and is entitled for maintenance under Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, it is not in dispute before this Court that the first respondent herein is divorced wife of the petitioner herein. Therefore, her remedy is to file an application under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, but not under Section 125, Cr.P.C. in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court.
8. Therefore, grant of maintenance to the first respondent herein is quashed. However, this order will not preclude the first respondent herein to claim maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Insofar as grant of maintenance to the respondents 2 and 3 is concerned, the same is confirmed.
The criminal petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.