JUDGMENT
Dawson Miller, C.J.
1. This is an application for extension of lime for filing an appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that he was misled by his Pleader, who informed him that the time for filing the appeal did not expire until the 12th July, the judgment having been delivered on the 1st March in the same year. Although the judgment was delivered on the 1st March, the decree was not signed in fact until the 16th March and, therefore, under the practice which hitherto has prevailed in this Court but which may be open to question, the period of limitation would not begin to run until the signing of the decree, namely, on the 16th March. It appears that before that date, namely, on the 3rd March, the appellant applied for copies of the judgment and decree. On the 26th March he was informed of the number of stamps and folios requisite and he supplied them without delay on the following day and on the 31st March the copies were ready. Under the practice prevailing, as the time for limitation did not begin to run until the 16th March and an application was at that time before the Court for copies and the copies were not supplied until the 31st March, that period up to the 31st March at all events is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Taking the period of limitation as beginning on the 16th March when the decree was signed and excluding the further period up to the 31st March, the 90 days would expire on the 29th June, but as the appeal was not lodged until the 12th July, the applicant was clearly not of time upon that computation. He now, however, puts forward the contention that not only was he entitled to deduct the period between the 6th March, when the period of limitation began to run, and the 31st March, when the copies were ready, but he contends that he is entitled to deduct the period between the 3rd March, when he made his application, and the 6th March, when the period began to run, in other words, that he is entitled to deduct from the limitation period certain days which passed before the limitation period actually began to run at all under the rule laid down in this Court, or looking at it in another way, he contends that he is entitled to deduct from the limitation period when it did begin to run certain days which had already been, deducted, in other word, that he was entitled to deduct these days twice over. It seems to me that it is only necessary to state that proposition to see that it is almost impossible to conceive that any Legal Practitioner of experience and knowledge of legal principles could make a mistake of that sort. But assuming that it is possible that a bona fide mistake of that sort might he made, the case relied upon by the appellant in asking us to extend the time in the particular circumstances of the present case was that decided by Mr. Justice Mookerjee and Mr. Justice Carnduff Sundar Koer v. Raghunath Sahai 12 Ind. Cas. 677, and the principle which was acted upon in that case was that it could not be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that in no case can the circumstance that a litigant has, under the erroneous advice of Counsel or Pleader, presented an appeal out of time, be deemed a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. And the principle upon which the Court should act in such cases was further stated to be that where the mistake is of such a description that it may arise even amongst practitioners of experience, a litigant should not be made to suffer for such an error. Accepting that proposition as a reasonable principle upon which the Court should act, it is only necessary, I think, to point out that in that very case decided in 1911 it was in terms decided that the party who was entitled to a deduction of time under the Indian Limitation Act could not ask for a deduction of the same period twice over. The same principle has been enunciated in at least one case in thin Court. How then can it be said that in the year 1920 a Legal Practitioner of experience could possibly make a mistake which it is alleged has been made on this occasion so as to enable the Court to exercise its powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act? But the matter does not really rest there because the evidence before us, which consists of the petition verified by affidavit of one of the Pleaders who was engaged, in the matter and who had to do with the preparation of the appeal and lodging it, is of a most unsatisfactory character. It does not say that he (the Pleader in question) was responsible for the mistake. It does not mention in fact who was responsible for the mistake, nor does it very clearly state how the mistake really came to be made if in fact there vas any mistake. It says the papers were entrusted to Babu Shambhu Saran, a Vakil who had been acting as the junior Vakil of the petitioner in cases pending in this Court, for the purpose of drawing up the grounds of appeal and that under the instructions of the petitioner a draft of the grounds of appeal was sent to him (when we do not know) and (hit he was informed (by whom it is not stated) that the last day for filing the appeal would be the 12th July, which was calculated on the basis that the petitioner was entitled to exclude the time between the 3rd and the 31st Marsh spent in taking copies of judgment and decree. The matter to be observed about that is this: it does not say who made the mistake or whether it was soma practitioner of experience or whether the mistake was merely made by some clerk in the Pleader’s office, and so far as the affidavit itself goes, it merely states that he was entitled to deduct the time up till the 31st March and even deducting the time to the; 31st March, the time would not expire on the 12th July, but on the 29th Jane. In these circumstances it seems to me that absolutely no case has been made out why we should extend the time under the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The memorandum of appeal is rejected. The respondent is entitled to the costs of his appearance to-day.
Mullick, J.
2. I agree.