ORDER
Bellie, J.
1. This civil revision petition is preferred against an order for delivery of possession passed in E.P.No.62 of 1989 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Nagercoil.
2. In O.S.No.132 of 1976 filed by the respondent herein for eviction of the petitioner herein on the ground that he was a tenant, a decree was passed. As against that the petitioner preferred an appeal A.S.No.132 of 1983. In the appeal the parties filed a joint memorandum and recording the same, in terms thereof a decree was passed. The joint memorandum reads:
The Respondent agrees to grant time by one year from today for the appellant to vacate the suit house bearing K.N.M.C.No.10/1/77. Thilagar Street, Nagercoil. The appellant agrees to vacate the above said premises on the expiry of one year from today. Each party will bear his cost in the above appeal.
It appears the petitioner did not vacate the house within one year as stated in the memorandum and therefore the respondent filed an Execution Petition for eviction. The Execution Petition was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the decree passed by the appellate Court is silent as to the consequences if the petitioner does not vacate the premises within the time stipulated and there fore there is no executable decree, and further that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is applicable to Nagercoil Municipal limits where the suit property is situate and as per Section 10 thereof a tenant can be evicted only by an order passed by the Rent Control Court and hence the decree passed by the Civil Court is not executable. On these grounds the petitioner prayed for dismissal of the Execution Petition.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the contentions of the petitioner and ordered delivery of possession as stated above. It is against this order of delivery of possession the present C.R.P. has been filed.
4. The contentions put forth before the Subordinate Judge was reiterated before me on behalf of the petitioner. As regards the first contention that there is nothing in the appellate Court decree that enables the decree-holder to file an execution petition if she fails to deliver possession, it must be remembered that the trial Court has passed a decree for eviction and as against that the petitioner has appealed and in that appeal a joint memorandum was filed as per which the petitioner has undertaken to vacate the premises within one year and for that the respondent agreed and in those terms a decree was passed by the appellate Court. This would only amount to confirmation of the decree passed by the trial Court but with the modification that the petitioner will have one year time to vacate as undertaken by him and agreed to by the respondent. Therefore it is clear that if the petitioner fails to vacate within the time agreed to he will be liable to be evicted by executing the decree passed by the trial Court. Thus there is no substance in the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner.
5. Regarding the second contention that the petitioner can be evicted only under an order passed by the Rent Control Court and not by a Civil Court, it is no doubt true that when the Rent Control Act is operating in a place a tenant can be evicted only under an order obtained as stated in Section 10 excepting the exception contained therein and not under a decree of a Civil Court. But in this case one should not forget that in the appellate Court the tenant has undertaken to vacate the premises if he were given one year time and to that the respondent agreed and incorporating the joint agreement a decree was passed by the appellate Court. It must be remembered that it was only on the undertaking by the petitioner to vacate within one year time he was given that time, and other wise he might have been evicted earlier. Having given the undertaken and had the benefit thereof I do not think that the petitioner can now, having failed to honour his undertaking, put up a technical plea that the decree passed by the Civil Court, and not by the Rent Control Court, cannot be executed. When he has undertaken to vacate, and in consideration thereof he was given on year time, he surrenders his right as a tenant, and therefore his continuation in the premises is only permissive. Therefore if he does not vacate within the lime permitted he is liable to be evicted in execution of the decree and it is no longer open to him to contend that he can be evicted only under an eviction obtained from a Rent Control Court.
6. In this connection a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.R.P.No.2639 of 1987: S.N.Kuba v. P.P.I.Vaithyanathan shortly reported in 1988 T.L.NJ.1, along with a typed copy of the full judgment was cited by Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, learned Counsel for the respondent. In that case the trial Court passed a decree upon a joint endorsement made by the parties as follows:
Defendant: The defendant submits to a decree for possession and undertakes to vacate the premises on or before 30.11.1986.
Plaintiff: The plaintiff agrees to grant the defendant time to vacate till 30th day of November, 1986.
2. The plaintiff is not pressing his claims for arrears of difference in rent and also for dam ages/future damages as prayed for in the plaint.
3. There will be no order for costs.
4. The defendant will continue to pay the dam ages at Rs. 1,000 (Rupees one thousand only) per month till 30.11.1986.
The defendant did not vacate the premises within the time stipulated and therefore the decree was sought to be executed. It was contended that even after the stipulated time the decree cannot be executed because the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and only the Rent Control Court can pass an order of eviction. Rejecting this contention it was held that under the compromise decree the petitioner had surrendered his tenancy rights and continued to be in possession under a new arrangement embodied in the joint endorsement, and therefore the judgment-debtor cannot claim to be a tenant as defined in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and the order of the executing Court directing delivery of possession is quite valid and proper. In my view the ratio decided in the said Division Bench deci sion is applicable to the present case. In this case also the parties have entered into a compromise and the petitioner undertook to vacate the premises within one year time and to that the respondent agreed and in terms thereof a decree has been passed. Therefore it is under the new arrangement entered into by the parties the petitioner continued in possession with permission agreed to by the respondent and incorporated in the decree. Thus the second contention of the learned Counsel that the decree passed by the civil Court against the tenant, and not by the Rent Control Court, is not executable cannot be countenanced.
7. This a part on another ground also this civil revision Petition has to be rejected. Considering the circumstances of the case it would be unjust to interfere with the order of the executing Court in revisional jurisdiction on this Court. In “Chen-nichi alias Periakkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar” (1970)1 M.L.J.234 Ismail, J. laid down as follows:
Purely from a technical point of view and as a matter of law, certainly the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is well-founded. But the only question is, on the facts and circumstances, of this case, is there any justification for this Court interfering with the order of the appellate authority, under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code? The exercise of the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, is purely discretionary. The High Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and even improper, if such interference will produce hardship or injustice. The re visional jurisdiction of the Court is intended to secure and subverse and ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it. If interference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its re visional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to be one without jurisdiction.
This pronouncement of the learned Judge has been quoted and approved by the Division Bench referred to above in S.N.Kuba v. P.P.I.Vaithya nathan. The Petitioner himself has undertaken to vacate the premises and as a concession given on such undertaking he got one year’s time. But even after that one year he would not vacate and when the decree is executed he resists the same raising purely a technical point. This being the case the order of the executing Court cannot be interfered with in revision.
8. In the result, therefore the revision petition is dismissed with costs.