JUDGMENT
I.D. Dua, C.J.
(1) This second appeal has been presented by the tenant under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act No. 59 of 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) against the concurrent decisions of the Rent Control Tribunal and the Additional Rent Controller directing eviction on the ground that the landlord bona fide required the premises in dispute for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent on him and that he was nto already in occupation of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
(2) I may at the outset point out that this second appeal is competent only if it involves some substantial question of law. The learned counsel for the appellant has, therefore, very rightly nto taken me through the evidence on the record for the purpose of assailing the concurrent conclusions of the two Courts below in favor of the landlord’s bona fids requirement. The only question canvassed at the bar relates to the competency of the petition for eviction on the ground that section 14(6) of the Act operates as a bar. In order to substantiate this objection, Shri N. R. Suri has submitted that the sale-deed in favor of the land- lord transferring the property in question to him was executed en 25th January, 1980 , and the application for evection was presented on 4th September, 1963, whereas according to section 14(8) of the Act, the landlord cannto apply for recovery of possession before th3 expiry of five years from the date of his acquisition.
(3) Now, it is common ground that the tenant had been residing as such in the premise’s since 1947 and continued to do so under the Custodian in whom this property gto vested. The landlord, it is again common ground, v as also residing in the premises since March, 1955, when he started paying rent to the Coustodian. Prima facie, it is true that the sale deed Exhibit A. W. 3/1 is dated 25th January. 1967 and if the acquisition is to be held to be of that date, then the application for possession presented on 4th September 1963 would be premature and section 14(6) of the Act would operate as a bar. But the Rent Controller relied on the letter Exhibit A. W 3/2 issued from the office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner (Management Wing), Ministry of Rehabilitation, and signed by the Managing Officer addressed to the tenant Shri Inder Singh intimating to him that the property in question stood permanently transferred to Shri Hari Chand and that, tharefore, the tenant was directed to pay the rent to the transferee and also deal toherwise with him direct with effect from 1st October, 1955. Inder Singh was further advised to pay arrears of the previous period, if any, to that office. Looking at the fotontoe at the buttom of the sale-deed Exhibit A. W. 3/1, which reads as under :- “NtoE:Rs. 4,535.00 have been adjusted from the alltotee’s claim, Rs. 2,554.00 adjusted from C.A.F. No. D/KM/92855 and Rs 260.00 deposited in cash vide receipt No. 244337, dated 24th November, 1959.”
The Additional Rent Controller observed that it was for this reason that the petitioner was given provisional possession with effect from 1st October, 1955. The Additional Rent Controller felt that this was clear from the letter Exhibit A.W. 3/2. The sale-deed was executed pursuant to Rule 33 framed under the Displaced Persons (Comp. & Reh.) Act, 1954. The Additional Rent Controller felt that transfer of property under Rule 33 was different from the case of auction-sale under Rule 90 of the said Rules. The transfer in favor of the landlord having been effected retrospectively to operate from 1st October, 1955, the present petition was considered to be immune from the disability contained in section 14(6) of the Act.
(4) On appeal, the learned Rent Control Tribunal disposed of this point in the following words :- ” The Transfer was declared to take effect from 1st October, 1955 and there is no dispute between the parties that the relationship of landlord and tenant has come into existence between them by operation of law and that the period of five years prescribed by section 14(6) of the Act had expired before the filing of the ejectment application.”
This observation clearly suggests that it was nto disputed in the Rent Control Tribunal that the period of five years, as prescribed by section 14(6) of the Act, had expired before the filing of the ejectment application. Shri Suri, the learned counsel for the appellant, has, however, contended that .this observation is nto quite correct. I am afraid I do nto think it is open to this Court to take the bald statement of the learned counsel at the bar of this Court to be conclusive enough to go against the express and unambiguous observation of the Rent Control Tribunal. It is nto possible at this stage for this Court to enquire into this question even if it be considered to be open to this Court to do so. In such cases, I should like to point cut, it would be a more appropriate procedure to adopt for the aggrieved party to approach the Court below and point out to it that this observation has perhaps been made under some misapprehension or by oversight. This should be done immediately after the party comes to know of the impugned observation so that the matter may be considered by the Court whn it is fresh in the mind of the Presiding Officer. To take a plea to this effect to the Court of Appeal, cannto promtoe the cause of justice and is certainly nto conducive to the healthy growth of our judicial process for reasons which are too obvious to be dilated upon on this occasion.
(5) Though the view which I am inclined to take would conclude this appeal, neverthless I have myself gone into the question because it is urged that the question is purely one of law. The sale-deed in question, as is indisputable, was executed pursuant to Rule 33 of the Displaced Persons (Com. & Reh.) Rules. Chapter V of these Rules contains Rules 22 to 34 dealing with the payment of compensation by transfer of acquired evacuee properties. Though the learned counsel for the a appellant has submitted that none of these Rules apply to the case in hand, I am, however inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that this case is covered by Rule 30 which deals with the payment of compensation where an acquired evacuee property, which is an alltoable property, is in occupation of more than one person. It is indisputable, and is indeed nto disputed before me, that at least buth the landlord and the tenant have been in occupation of the premises in question. Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Corn. & Reh.) Act, 1954, provides for the transfer of property out of the compensation pool. Rule 33 lays down that where any property is transferred to any person under Chapter V of the Rules,a deed of transfer shall be executed in form specified in Appendix Xxiv or Xxv, as the case may be, with necessary modifications. Rule 34 dealing with the deed of transfer so far as rele- vant for our present purposes reads as under : – “34.Deed of transfer-Wheie any property is transferred to any person under this chapter, the property shall be deemed to have been transferred to him:- (a)*** *. (b)*** * (e) Where compensation applications are invited before a speci- fied date, from the first day of the month following such date; (d) In any toher case, from such date as the Central Government may, by general or special order, specify.”
In a bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Mst. Ranjit Kaur v. Harbel Sing, we find a ntoification issued by the Ministry of Rehibilitation on 27th June, 1955 reading as under: – “S.R. 0. 1361.- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub- sections {i) and (2) of section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compens- ation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44 of 1954), the Central Govern- ment hereby requires all displaced persons having a verified claim, toher than those who have already applied for compensation, to make applications, in duplicate, for the payment of compensation, within three months of the date of this Ntoification, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and the Rules made there under.” According to this Ntoification, the last date for making the applications for payment of compensation by displaced person having verified claims was 26th September, 1955, with the result that according to rul” 34 (e) the property of such claim-holders would be deemed to be transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955. It was apparently in compliance with the?e provisions that the letter Exhibit A. W. 3/2 was issued to the tenant Shri Inder Singh to attorn to Hari Chand who had acquired the property in question.
(6) Shri Suri, learned counsel for the appellant has, however, sub- mitted that in Mst. Ranjit Kaw’s case, the sale-deed itself mentioned that the transfer was being effect from 1st October, 1955 and that, therefore, that decision must be distinguished for this reason. The learn- ed counsel does nto seem to me to be quite right because in addition to tliis circurntance, the Bench also expressed its considered opinion on the elfect of the ntoification issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation on 27th June, 1955 and on the basis of that ntoification held that the property sold would be deemed to have been transferred under rule 34 (e) with effect from 1st October, 1955. The reported case really is an authority on buth these points. My attention has a’so been drawn by Shri B. D. Bahl, learned counsel for the respondent, to a recent Single Bench deci- sion of the Delhi Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court in Karam Nar- ain v. Narsingh Dass”, in which it has been observed that Rule 34 of the Displaced Persons (Comp & Reh.) Rules by fiction makes the purchasers transferees of the property as owners from a given date and when section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 talks of a date of acquisi- tion, it must mean the date when the law deems the owners to have acq- uired the property. It is nto necessary to refer to this decision in detail because on behalf of the appellant, it has nto been questioned that the fiction created by Rule 34 is nto applicable for the purpose of meeting the requirement of section 14(6)of the Act, and I am, therefore, nto called upon to express any opinion on its constitutionality. Similarly it )s unnecessary to refer to Mahonar Singh v. Mfs Kanshi Ram and Sons^, in wh’ch a learned Single Judge of this Court observed that the bona fide iequirament of premises by a landlord for his use and for the use of his dependent members is a finding of fact and nto open to review on second appeal under section 39 of the Act, because the appellant’s learned counsel has nto sought to challenge those conclusions.
(7) For all the foregoing reasons, I do nto find any merit in this appeal and agreeing with the view taken by the Rent control Tribunal aid the Additional Rent Controller dismiss this appeal with costs.
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