ORDER
S.K. Dubey, J.
1. This is a reference by R. S. Garg, J. in M. A. No. 401/90 Under Section 32 of the M.P. Accommodation Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) arising out of order dated 5-7-1990, passed in M. A No. 18/88 by the IIIrd Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur, preferred against the order dated 28-7-1988, in R. C. Case No. 27-A/90(1) 87-88 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur (RCA).
2. On an application Under Section 10 of the Act for fixation of standard rent filed by the appellant/landlord the R.C.A determined the standard rent at Rs. 350/- per month from the date of application, i.e., 14-12-1987 Under Section 10(4) of the Act holding that modes prescribed in Section 7(1), (2) and (3) are not applicable. Aggrieved of that, the respondent, since deceased, preferred the appeal Under Section 31 of the Act which was allowed holding that the accommodation let was constructed in the year 1956-57 and that there are more than one Municipal assessment, one for the year 1977-78 to 1982-83 fixing annual rent on the basis of Rs. 75/- per month, and the other, for the year 1983-84 to 1987-88 fixing annual rent on letting value Rs. 120/- per month. Therefore, as the accommodation is separately assessed to Municipal assessment, Under Section 7(3)(a) the annual rent would be according to such assessment plus 15% thereon, on the basis of assessment of 1983-84 to 1987-88.
3. Appellant placing reliance on a decision rendered by G. P. Singh, J. (as he then was) in Smt. Shanti Verma v. Union of India, M. A. No. 4 of 1972, decided on 8-3-1973 = 1973 MPLJ SN 56 contended that in a case where there are two assessments, provision of Section 7(3) would not be applicable and the RCA was justified in deciding the question of fixation of standard rent in accordance with Section 10(4) of the Act.
4. The respondent placing reliance on a decision of S. R. Vyas, J. rendered in Amritlal v. Lalsingh, M. A. No. 63/74 decided on 15-7-1977 = (1978) II MPWN 104, contended that there is no mention in the provision Under Section 7(3) as to which assessment is to be taken into consideration, if there is more than one assessment before the application is made by the tenant for determination of the standard rent, ordinarily the Municipal assessment current at the time when the application is made, should be the basis of the fixation of standard rent Under Section 7(3) of the Act.
5. As there was cleavage of the opinion in the two decisions, R. S. Garg, J. referred the following question for consideration of a larger Bench :
“If there are or there has been more than one assessment, before the application for fixation of the standard rent is made, then the standard rent is to be decided in accordance with Section 10(6) of the Act in view of the judgment of Smt. Shanti Verma (supra) or the current assessment has to form basis for determination of the standard rent in view of the judgment of this Court in Amritlal (supra).”
6. We have heard Shri R. L. Swarnakar counsel for the appellant, Shri A. K. Jain counsel for the legal representative of the deceased respondent and Shri Ravish Agarwal amicus curiae.
7. “Standard rent” as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act, in relation to any accommodation means standard rent referred to in Section 7 or where the standard rent has been increased Under Section 8, such increased rent. As the case relates to “standard rent” and not to increase in standard rent Under Section 8, the relevant provisions which are to be considered in the present case, are Sections 7 and 10, which we quote :
“7. Standard Rent. – “Standard rent” in relation to any accommodation means –
(1) Where reasonable annual rent or fair rent has been fixed by a competent authority under the repealed Act or prior to the commencement of the repealed Act, as the case may be, by a competent authority under the enactment for the time being in force, such reasonable annual rent or fair rent;
(2)(i) where the accommodation was let out on or before the 1st day of January, 1948, and the reasonable annual rent or fair rent has not been so fixed, the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as was realised on the 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less; or
(ii) Where the accommodation was not let out on or before the 1st day of January, 1948, the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as could be realised on the 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less; increased –
(a) in the case of a residential accommodation and accommodation used for education purposes by thirty-five per cent of such rent;
(b) in the case of a other accommodation, by seventy per cent of such rent; and
(c) In case the tenant is not liable to pay the municipal tax and there has been any increase in municipal tax subsequent to 1st day of January, 1948, by an amount equal to such increase :
Provided that the increase specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be permissible only if the accommodation has been kept in good and tenantable repairs;
(3) in case of accommodation not falling under Clauses (1) and (2) above. –
(a) if the accommodation is separately assessed to municipal assessment, the annual rent according to such assessment plus fifteen per cent thereon;
(b) if only a part of the accommodation is so assessed, the proportionate amount of the annual rent for the whole accommodation according to such assessment plus fifteen per cent thereon;
(c) If the accommodation is not so assessed, –
(i) the annual rent calculated with reference to the rent agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant when such accommodation is first let out, and if it has been so let out, to such amount for which it could be let out immediately after its construction was completed; or
(ii) the annual rent calculated on the basis of annual payment of an amount equal to 6 3/4 per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the actual cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the accommodation on the date of the commencement of the construction;
whichever is less.”
“10. Rent Controlling Authority to fix standard rent etc. – (1) The Rent Controlling Authority shall, on an application made to it in this behalf, either by the landlord or by the tenant, in the prescribed manner, fix in respect of any accommodation –
(1) the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of Section 7, or (ii) the increase, if any, referred to in Section 8.
(2) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation or the lawful increase thereof, the Rent Controlling Authority shall fix an amount which appears to it to be reasonable having regard to the provisions of Section 7 or Section 8 and the circumstances of the case.
(3) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation part of which has been lawfully sub-let, the Rent Controlling Authority may also fix the standard rent of the part sub-let.
(4) Where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any accommodation on the principles set forth Under Section 7, the Rent Controlling Authority may fix such rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality and condition of the accommodation and the amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar accommodation in the locality, having regard also to the standard rent payable in respect of such accommodations.
(5) The standard rent shall be fixed for a tenancy of twelve months.
Provided that where the tenancy is from month to month or for any period less than a month, the standard rent for such tenancy shall bear the same proportion to the annual standard rent as the period of tenancy bears to twelve months.
(6) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation under this Section, the Rent Controlling Authority shall fix the standard rent thereof in an unfurnished state and may also determine an additional charge to be payable on account of any furniture supplied by the landlord and it shall be lawful for the landlord to recover such additional charge from the tenant.
(7) In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation under this section, the Rent Controlling Authority shall specify a date from which the standard rent so fixed shall be deemed to have effect :
Provided that in no case the date so specified shall be earlier than thirty days prior to the date of the filing of the application for the fixation of the standard rent.”
8. A bare look to Section 7 shows that for the purposes of fixation of standard rent it classifies accommodation in three categories : One, Sub-section (i) provides that where reasonable annual rent or fair rent of any accommodation has been fixed by a competent authority under the repealed Act such rent shall be the standard rent of such accommodation. Two, Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) deals with the accommodation which was let out on the 1st day of January, 1948, and where the standard rent or fair rent has not been so fixed, the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register, or as was realised on the 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 speaks of the accommodation not let out on or before the 1st day of January, 1948, the rent of the accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as could be realised on the 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less; increased to the categories of the accommodation specified in Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). Three, Sub-section (3) deals with the accommodation not falling under Clause (1) or (2) of Section 7, this is a residuary provision, which lays down the manner of determination of the standard rent of the categories of the accommodation in Clauses (a), (b) and (c). In the present case, Sub-sections (1) and (2) are not attracted as the accommodation does not fall within the class of the accommodation of Sub-sections (1) and (2). As the accommodation was constructed in the year 1956-57 and is separately assessed to the municipal assessment, therefore, the standard rent can be determined under the residuary provision or by taking recourse to Section 10(4) of the Act.
9. On behalf of the tenant it is contended that Section 10(4) would not be applicable and the standard rent is to be determined under Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 7. As there are two municipal assessments, the assessment of the time of letting the accommodation or at the time of filing of the application for determination of the standard rent should be taken into account. The standard rent should be determined in accordance with Section 7(3)(a) of the Act, which is applicable in the case. The words “such assessment” used in Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) do not speak of first assessment, therefore, “such assessment” should be construed as the “current assessment”. Hence, the word “current” should be read in between the words “such” and “assessment” which is evident from the intention of the Legislature in the context of “Municipal assessment”. Therefore, the words “current assessment” can be read so as to mean ‘such assessment’ as Under Section 10(2) in fixing the standard rent the R.C.A. must be guided by the principles as are contained in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 10 applies only where the standard rent cannot be fixed in accordance with the principles enumerated in Section 7 or 8, as the case may be, and, therefore, addition or substitution of the word “current” in between the words “such” and “assessment” would be permissible to achieve the legislative intent, that is to relieve the tenant against the unreasonable increase in rent.
10. A Division Bench of this Court, in a case of Laxmandas v. Smt. Barfi Bai, 1972 MPLJ 15 = AIR 1972 MP 73 while dealing a case of fixation of standard rent under Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 after careful examination of Sub-section (3) of Section 7, observed that RCA should determine the rent in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 7. Section 7 covers all sorts of accommodation. Sub-section (4) of Section 10 will be attracted when the criteria laid down in various clauses in Section 7 in respect of various accommodations, which provides determination of standard rent on the basis of locality, situation and condition of the accommodation and the amenities provided therein and where there are similar accommodations the standard rent payable for a similar accommodation in the vicinity. The decision was followed in Vishwanath Das Agarwal v. Premchand, M.S.R. No. 265 of 1973 decided on 25-2-1975 = 1975 MPU Short Note 80, Hafiz Noor Bux v. Dattatre Joshi, 1977 MPLJ 237, Chhogalal v. Sushil Chand, AIR 1991 MP 326 and UCO Bank v. Ramesh Chand Bhuta, (1995) (II) MPJR 128.
11. Admittedly, in the present case, there are two Municipal assessments, Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 7 does not say which assessment, that is first or last should be taken into consideration for the determination of standard rent of the accommodation falling in the category of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 7. The question came up for consideration in case of Smt. Shanti Verma (supra) before G. P. Singh, J. (as he then was). We have gone through the full decision of the case. After referring to Sub-section (3) of Section 7, the Court observed in paras 6 and 7 thus :
“6. Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) does not in terms enact as to which municipal assessment is to be taken to be the basis when the accommodation has been subject of more than one assessment at the time when the application for fixation of standard rent is made. It would be seen that Clause (c) of Sub-section (3), which defines standard rent with reference to rent agreed upon between the landlord and tenant when the accommodation is first let out, clearly uses the word “first” to show that subsequent lettings have to be ignored for the purposes of this clause. The word “first” has not been used in Clause (a). The acceptance of the construction suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent will require reading of the word “first” in between the words “such” and “assessment” as they occur towards the end of Clause (a). Similarly, the acceptance of the construction suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant will require reading of the word “last” in between the words “such” and “assessment”. I do not find any definite guidance by reading the section as a whole for addition of either of these words. Clauses (a) and (b) as they stand can be applied to cases where there is only one assessment at the time when the application for standard rent is made and there can be no difficulty in operation of the clause in these cases. Thus, it is not correct to say that unless the word “first” or “last” is added in Clause (a) the clause would be meaningless and would not be effective in any case. As the clause as it stands can be given effect to without addition of any word, it would not be proper to add words in it so as to enlarge its scope of operation. It is well settled that additional words cannot be read in any statutory enactment unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. In the instant case as Clause (a) can have some operation without the addition of any word, I am not inclined to accept either of the constructions suggested by the learned counsel, because both the constructions require reading of words in Clause (a) which are not there. I would confine the operation of Clauses (a) and (b) to those cases where there has been only one assessment at the time when the application for fixation of standard rent is made.
7. Learned counsel for the parties agree that Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 7 can apply only when the facts necessary to be determined under Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of that clause have been proved. In this case although there is evidence with respect to rent agreed upon between the landlord and tenant when the accommodation was first let out, which is required to be proved under Sub-clause (i), there is no evidence of the actual cost of construction and the market price of the land on the date of the commencement of the construction. Thus, there is no material to apply Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (c). As there is no material for application of Sub-clause (ii), according to the view accepted in this Court, Clause (c) as a whole cannot be applied. The position then is that the standard rent cannot be fixed on the principles set forth Under Section 7 and the Rent Controlling Authority should have fixed the standard rent on the principles indicated in Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act. Under Sub-section (4), the Rent Controlling Authority may fix such rent as standard rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality and condition of the accommodation and the amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar accommodation in the locality, having regard also to the standard rent payable in respect of such accommodations. It is this clause which would apply to the present case.”
12. The decision in Smt. Shanti Verma’s case (supra) was followed by R. K. Verma, J. in case of Dulichand Sharma v. Dhannalal, MA. No. 32 of 1980(1) decided on 13-7-1987 = 1988(1) MPWN 17, which is a case where accommodation let out to the tenant was not shown in the Municipal Assessment Register since the rented accommodation was only a portion of the house in respect of which the assessment was shown in the register, the Court observed that as criteria laid down in Laxmandas’ case are not proved, Section 10(4) would apply for one further additional reason that Section 7(3)(a) would not be applicable to the case because Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 7(3) apply to a case where there has been only one assessment at the time when the application for fixing the standard rent is made as has been held in Smt. Shanti Verma’s case (supra).
13. In case of Amritlal (supra) while upholding the determination of the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of Section 10(4) of the Act, S. R. Vyas, J. expressed his opinion that if on account of non-applicability of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7 standard rent has to be fixed in accordance with Sub-section (3) of Section 7 and then Municipal Assessment is the basis, but the statute does not specify which assessment is to be taken into consideration, if there has been more than one assessment before the application is made by the tenant for determination of the standard rent. Ordinarily, the Municipal assessment current at the time when the application is made, should be the basis of determination of the standard rent Under Section 7(3) of the Act. It appears that decision in Smt. Shanti Verma ‘s case (supra) was not brought to the notice of Vyas, J. which was ordinarily binding as correct judgment on the court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
14. It is well settled that it is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast of reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. See, Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96.
15. It is also well settled that additional words cannot be read in any statutory enactment unless it is absolutely necessary to do so, where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication of words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words to give effect to the intention of the legislature which is apparent from the Act read as a whole. See, Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, Sixth Edition, P. 42 and 51.
16. It was submitted on behalf of respondent that if the interpretation as suggested in Smt. Shanti Verma’s case (supra) is approved, it will cause great hardship on the tenants, which is not the object of the legislation. For that we may say only this much that the rule that a construction which results in hardship, serious inconvenience injustice has no application when the words are susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open. In that situation it is for the legislature to consider the result of hardship of an enactment as function of the Court is of construction and not of legislation.
17. We do not find that Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 7 as it stands cannot be given effect to without the additional words as suggested by the counsel and the observations made by Vyas, J. to read the word “current” or “last” in a case where there are two Municipal assessments in between the words “such” and “assessment”. Therefore, Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 7 would apply in case where there has been only one assessment of the accommodation at the time when application for fixing standard rent is made. Therefore, we agree with the view taken in Smt. Shanti Verma ‘s case (supra) followed in Dulichand Sharma ‘s case (supra) and do not agree with the observations made in case of Amritlal (supra).
18. The reference is answered accordingly. Let the record of the case be placed before the learned Single Judge.
19. Before parting with the case we place on record our appreciations to Shri Ravish Agarwal amicus curiae and counsel for the parties, who ably assisted the Court, at the time of hearing.