JUDGMENT
Agrawal, C.J.
1. his appeal has been filed by S.N. Singh against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated August 5, 1982.
2. S.N. Singh was employed in the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project, Rawat Bhata, Kota. On December 11, 1974, he along with several others, took out a procession shouting “Enklab Zindabad, CITU Zindabad, Raju Zindabad, Project Allowance Katoti Vapaslo, Kala Adhyadesh Vapaslo.” An enquiry was initiated against the appellant and others for having participated in the act of indiscipline which amounted to misconduct. The Enquiry Officer found the charges established which were as follows:
“Article — I
That the said Shri S.N. Singh, T/Man ‘D’O & M Section led a procession of employees on 11th December, 1974 at about 1200 Mrs. from near the Switchyard to Old Administration Block shouting slogans. Shri S.N. Singh is, therefore, charged for leading a procession and shouting slogans thereby causing disturbance in the working of other sections in the plant side which is a prohibited/protected place.
Article — II
That the said Shri S.N. Singh on December 11, 1974 actively participated in staging demonstration and slogan shouting between Old Administration Building No. 1 and 2 from about 1215 Hrs., to 1245 Hrs. in defiance of Project Circular No. RAPP/04600/ 74/S/284 dated December 10, 1974. This misconduct becomes grave as the demonstration and slogan shouting was led in the plant site which is a prohibited/protected place. Shri S.N. Singh is, therefore, charged for actively participating and playing a leading role in staging demonstration and shouting slogans between Administration Building No. 1 and 2 which not only caused disturbance in the working of other sections but is also highly subversive of discipline.”
3. Thereafter a notice was issued by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant submitted a reply to the same. Being not satisfied with the reply to the show cause notice, the disciplinary authority, the Chief Engineer, who was the disciplinary authority, recorded:-
“AND WHEREAS the undersigned has come to the conclusion that the charges framed against Shri S.N. Singh, vide Memorandum No. RAPP/04627/74/Admn/ E/221/ S/471 dated December 14, 1974 are conclusively proved and that the charge framed against him vide Memorandum No. RAPP/ 04627/74/Admn./C/192/S/473 dated December 14, 1974 is also proved.
AND WHEREAS the undersigned has also perused the past record which in no way mitigates the gravity of misconduct for which Shri S.N. Singh was charge sheeted vide Memorandum No. RAPP/04627/74/Admn./ E/221/S/471 dated December 14, 1974 and No. RAPP/04627/74/C/192/473 dated December 14, 1974 severally and jointly on the charges. AND NOW therefore, the undersigned hereby orders dismissal of Shri S.N. Singh from service with immediate effect.”
His past record, in no way mitigated the gravity of misconduct, for dismissal of the appellant.”
4. Challenging the dismissal order, the appellant filed the Writ Petition No. 1340/76, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge negativing all the contentions raised before him.
5. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant, raised two points, one of them was that as an industrial dispute was pending for conciliation, the appellant could not be dismissed without the permission of the Conciliation Officer. Reliance had been placed on Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the submission that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer, no employer could terminate the service of an employee on the ground of misconduct.
Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 33 lays down:-
“33. Conditions of service etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings,-
(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a Board of any proceeding before (an arbitrator or) a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall,
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute,
save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.”
6. Section 33 has to be read along with Rule 9 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957. The Rule provides that where a Conciliation Officer has received a notice of a strike or lock-out he would arrange to interview both the employer and the workmen concerned for exploring the possibility of a conciliation. In a case where a notice has been given in accordance with Rule 71 or Rule 72 then Rule 9 will apply. In the instant case, admittedly no such notice as is contemplated by Rule 9 had been given. Having received some information of a turmoil, the Conciliation Officer initiated proceedings for conciliation. Since Rule 9 and the requisites of Section 33 did not apply, the Conciliation Officer did not have any jurisdiction to initiate conciliation proceedings. That being so, no permission was required for terminating the appellant.
7. Counsel for the appellant brought to our notice that the respondents’ Management moved an application to the Conciliation Officer seeking permission to dismiss the appellant under Sub-section (3) (b) of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act on May 25, 1976. This was, however, followed by an application for withdrawing the above application, which was rejected by the Conciliation Officer vide Anx. 3. On this basis, counsel contended that when the respondents’-management itself had applied for permission, it did not He in its mouth to argue that Section 33 read with Rule 9 did not apply. The submission made is untenable. There were certain pre-requisites for applying these provisions and if those requisites were wanting or were not present the moving of an application for permission was meaning-less and did not serve any purpose or entitled the appellant to argue that without permission of the Conciliation Officer, he could not be dismissed. The application for withdrawal had been inadvertently given by the respondents’-management and by that inadvertent act the appellant could not inter alia be benefited.
8. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents, urged that in view of Rule 9, the Conciliation Officer had to declare his intention to commence conciliation proceedings in writing and as this had not been done, no such intention could be inferred. Anx.1 relied upon by parties showed that conciliation proceedings would be commenced only if it was thought necessary. No deliberation or discussion took place and, therefore, the question of application of mind by the Conciliation Officer for initiating conciliation proceedings did not arise. Thus, there was no occasion for initiation of conciliation proceedings in terms of Rule 9(2). Merely because the Conciliation Officer stated in the subject of his letter about the industrial disputes, it could not be said that the conciliation proceedings were pending before him. Notice relied upon by the appellant dated June 30, 1976 (Anx. 1) did not fulfil the requirement of Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 1957.
9. The second argument of the appellant’s counsel was that the order of the Disciplinary Authority being in violation of Rule 15(4)(II)(b) of the C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1965, the impugned order Anx. 5 had been made without consideration of representation of the appellant and giving of reasons which were necessary.
10. His submission in a nutshell was that the order Anx.5 being not a speaking order the Court cannot hold that the dismissal was invalid (valid). The submission is not correct. The Enquiry Officer’s reports were detailed and reasoned and as the disciplinary authority’s impugned order showed sufficiently the agreement with the enquiry reports, the former could not be invalidated on the ground that detailed reasons had not been mentioned. We may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. A.R. Srinivasan 1966 AIR SC 1827 in para 15 of which the Supreme Court observed that it was not obligatory on the State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer when the State Government was in agreement with the report of the Enquiry Officer. It said:-
” Having regard to the material which thus made available to the State Government and which is made available to the delinquent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepts the finding of the Tribunal.”
11. The Disciplinary Authority might have been required to give reasons if he would have differed with the report but that is not so. Counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.K. Ratna and Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 537 and urged that in fairness and justice, the appellant was entitled to know why he had been found guilty.
12. In the instant case there is more than sufficient material beginning from the initiation of domestic enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority delivered the dismissal order on the ground that charge aginst him had been established. In the background of these facts, the order cannot be held invalid due to lack of reasons.
13. In the instant case in paragraph 13(v) (b) of the reply it has been mentioned clearly that the representation of the appellant and the oral submission made at the personal hearing, were duly considered by the Disciplinary Authority. Not only this, even in the impugned order Anx.5, it has been clearly mentioned that the representation of the appellant had been considered.
14. Last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the Disciplinary Authority took into account the mitigating circumstances, without any notice to him and as such, the order is liable to be quashed on this ground.
15. We are unable to accept this submission. Mitigating circumstances were looked into for purpose of finding whether the appellant was guilty or not. That was of his own advantage and benefit. The appellant could not be heard making a complaint against the same.
16. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with no order as to costs.