JUDGMENT
Mohan, C.J.
1. All these cases can be dealt with under a common judgment since they arise out of the same proceedings relating to the appellant-workman.
2. We propose to refer to the parties as arrayed in Writ Appeal No. 3322/1986.
3. The appellant-S. Nagaiah joined the services of the 1st respondent (Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd.) on 13th January 1971 as a workman. He was promoted as an Operator in 1971 itself. A lock-out was declared on 29th April, 1980 by the Management which ultimately came to be lifted on 16th July, 1980. Concerning this lock-out an industrial dispute was raised and I.D.8/1980 was pending on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore (later transferred to the Industrial Tribunal, Hubli and numbered as I.D. 17/1983). About 30 workers including the appellant were issued the charge memos. As far as the appellant is concerned he was issued two charge memoranda dated 14th April, 1980 and 29th April, 1980. Both these memoranda were signed by one Mr. S. S. Saihgal, General Production Superintendent (Alumina). As a sequel to this, the appellant was placed under suspension on 14th April, 1980. He submitted his explanations on 16th April, 1980 and 5th May, 1980 denying the charges. Notices of enquiry were issued on 19th April, 1980 and 6th May, 1980. Both of them were signed by Mr. R. K. Bhargave, General Works Manager. The appellant represented that enquiries might be postponed till the lock-out was lifted and that he was handicapped that the witnesses were not available because of the lock-out and also in view of the prevailing tension. Thereafter the appellant fell sick and he was undergoing treatment from E. S. I. Hospital, to which effect he produced certificate to the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer did not comply with the request of the workman-appellant. He conducted the enquiry and submitted a report dated 6th June, 1980. He found that the appellant was guilty of the charges levelled against him under Standing Orders 22(ii)(d)(iii)(v)(A), (xx)(xxiv)(xxv)(xxxi) and (xiv). In respect of other charges he was acquitted. Concerning the other enquiry he found by his report dated 17th June, 1980 that the appellant was guilty of clauses 22(d) (i), v(a) and (b) and (xxiii). On receipt of these reports a show cause notice was issued on 8th July, 1980 signed by the said R. K. Bhargava, General Works Manager calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the service of the Company and whether or not there were any mitigating or extenuating circumstances by which he could re-consider the proposed decision of dismissal. On 11th July, 1980 the appellant furnished a reply stating that he was not bound by the findings of the Enquiry Officer and that he had denied the charges levelled against him. Therefore, the question of taking any action does not arise. On 14th July, 1980 a registered letter was sent to the appellant stating that the Management had finally decided to dismiss the appellant from the service of the Company with effect from 15th July, 1980. It was also mentioned therein that in view of the pendency of the industrial dispute in I. D. No. 8/1980 before the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, permission was being sought by the Management as required under Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rule made therein for dismissing the appellant as mentioned above. The appellant would be issued the dismissal order after obtaining of the permission. Consequent to this the 1st respondent-Management filed an application under Section 33(1) of the I.D. Act before the Industrial Tribunal, praying for grant of permission to dismiss the appellant. The application came to be numbered as Serial Application No. 64/1980 and renumbered as Serial Application No. 26/1983 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, which was later transferred to Hubli.
4. Before the Tribunal it was contended that the charge memos A-3 and A-4 had not been issued by the Company Authority in terms of Standing Order 33. Insofar as they had come to be issued by the General Production Superintendent, they must be deemed to be invalid. On an invalid charge memorandum enquiry could not be proceeded with and even the ultimate order of dismissal cannot prevail. Yet another point that was taken was whether a fair opportunity had been given to the workman. The Tribunal for reasons recorded in its order dated 30th June 1986 held as follows :-
“The domestic enquiry held by the Enquiry Officer against the opponent is not fair, legal and valid. The case may be posted for giving an opportunity to the applicant to justify the proposed action to be taken by 18th July, 1986.”
5. Against this order of 30th June, 1986 two Writ Petitions have been preferred. One W. P. No. 13956/1986 against the findings of the Industrial Tribunal holding that enquiry is bad because charge sheet was not issued. The appellant filed W. P. No. 17231/1986 challenging the order of the Tribunal insofar as the evidence was permitted to be let in. This Writ Petition by the appellant was dismissed by our learned brother Justice Rama Jois. Thus this appeal.
6. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the Writ Petition No. 17231/1986 by Judgment dated 14th October, 1986 was of the view that there was nothing wrong is issuing the charge memoranda insofar as the ultimate order had come to be made by the Competent Authority. Therefore, the proper course to be adopted by the Tribunal was to have let in evidence, once it is found that the domestic enquiry was not fair and proper.
7. Before us the learned Counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 3322/1986 and the workman in W. P. No. 18208/1986 urged the following points for our consideration :-
(1) In these cases the memoranda of charges had come to be issued by incompetent Officer and that person had not been properly delegated with authority. Therefore where the enquiry had taken place on a charge memo issued by incompetent authority it would invalidate the disciplinary enquiry itself;
2) The order of dismissal is a nullity;
3) The exercise of disciplinary powers extend even to the very initiation of disciplinary action. If such an initiation is bad, all further proceedings are equally bad.
In support of the submissions reliances is placed on the case of Steel Authority of India v. The Presiding Officer & Anr. (1980-II-LLJ-456) and in the case of Balai Chandra Singha Roy v. Union of India 1984 Lab. I. C. 1316 (Calcutta). The ancillary submission of this is there cannot be a ratification of any illegal order, more so in a service matter. In support of the submission reliance is placed in the case of The Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan (1989-II-LLJ-161) wherein it was held the initial action being void, it could not be ratified.
8. It is not open to the Management to rely on Exhibit A-7 though the said exhibit is dated 24th January, 1977. Because in an earlier case such a contention was urged on behalf of Mr. A. B. Kaujalgi and it failed as seen from the order of the Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, dated 11th May, 1982. This came to be produced by way of additional evidence in Serial No. 64/1980 in this case for which necessary objection was taken and it has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal. Therefore, there is no possibility for the management to rely on that delegation.
9. In so far as the charge memoranda dated 14th April 1980 and 29th April 1980 mentioned the punishment of dismissal it would amount to per-judging. Clearly the proposed dismissal must be held to be void even on this score.
10. The learned Counsel for the Management, Mr. Sundaraswamy, would meet this submission as follows. It is totally incorrect to state that the Competent Officer had not issued the memoranda of charges. One cannot have regard for Standing Order 23(d) alone. Certified Standing Order 2(ii) which defines the management must also be looked into. That talks of delegation. Such a delegation was issued as seen from Ex. A-7. That was issued anti litum motum as early as on 24th January 1977. To say that it was fabricated for the purpose of this case is uncharitable. Because in the earlier case it could not be produced, specific permission of the Tribunal was sought to produce the same. To justify the stand the Tribunal ought to have accepted it.
11. Should for any reason this Court come to the conclusion that Exhibit A-7 would not be of any assistance to the management, even as a proposition of law it is submitted that it is not necessary that the Competent Authority which should punish or inflict ultimate punishment alone must initiate disciplinary action arising memoranda of charges. Even in a case arising under Article 311, the guarantee is that there shall be no dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by an Officer inferior in rank than the appointing authority. Nowhere the law requires that it is the same authority who is vested with the power of passing the ultimate order must initiate the issue of a charge memo. In support of the submission the learned Counsel for respondents relied on State of M. P. & Ors. v. Shardul Singh and drew our attention to paragraphs-6 and 10 of the said Judgment. To the same effect reliance was placed upon Workmen of Indian Overseas Bank v. Indian Overseas Bank & Another (1973-I-LLJ-316) wherein the High Court of Delhi relying on the Supreme Court ruling had come to the same conclusion. In the case reported in Bata India Ltd., M. C. Bharadwaj & Another 1986(II) Labour Law Notes 630 in paragraph-11, it was pointed out that in such matters where even though an authority not competent to issue the charge memo as per Certified Standing Orders had issued it and enquiry had gone on in which the workman had participated and the ultimate order of dismissal had come to be passed by the Competent Authority, in the Certified Standing Orders what is to be seen is whether there is a substantial compliance of the Standing Order. If there has been such a substantial compliance there would be no case for the delinquent and it would not vitiate the enquiry nor would it affect the ultimate order. In the case of Steel Authority of India v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court (supra) the facts would disclose that two Writ Petitions were filed, one by the workman and the other by the management. The management took the stand that the Competent Officer under the Certified Standing orders had not issued the charge memo. Yet it came to be upheld. Having regard to the rules in that case the charge memorandum was held to be defective. That part of the order permitting the evidence to be led in was not interfered with though it was challenged before the High Court of Patna.
12. Lastly, it is submitted on the strength of the case reported in Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways & Ors. (1987-I-LLJ-107) that even in a case no enquiry had been conducted it would be open to the management to lead evidence. Certainly not in a case where there is a defective charge memo. In other words, the submission of the learned Counsel in the matter has to be looked at from the point of view of prejudice. In this case no such prejudice has been established. The workman understood the charge, submitted his explanation and domestic enquiry was conducted which unfortunately was held to be not in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
13. We will now consider these two point in seriatum :
1) Whether the charge memo has not been issued by the Competent Officer ? If so, whether it affects the further proceedings by way of disciplinary enquiry and the ultimate order;
2) Whether there has been a pre-judging in this case.
14. Certified Standing Order 2(ii) defines the Management as follows :-
“2(ii). “Management” means the Company’s management and includes the General Manager and delegate or delegates.”
Section 23(d) of the Certified Standing Orders states as follows :-
“23(d). A workman against whom an enquiry has to be held shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and requiring his explanation. He shall be given an opportunity to answer the charge and be permitted to be defended by another workman. The workman shall be permitted to produce witnesses in his defence and to cross examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests. A concise summary of the evidence led on either side and workman’s plea shall be recorded. The Enquiry Officer shall submit the report along with findings to the General Works Manager, who shall pass the final orders and communicate to the workman concerned in writing.”
Therefore for a casual reading it may appear that it is only the authority who had been mentioned under Certified Standing Order 23(d), Namely, the General Works Manager who will have to pass final orders. In the case reliance is placed on Exhibit A-7 in view of the defiance of the ‘management’ extracted above. That is an inclusive definition which includes the delegate or delegates. No doubt that Circular relating to delegation came to be produced after the decision in the case of another workman and therefore much is made of it saying it has been fabricated for the purposes of this case. But one thing is clear, Ex. A-7 is ‘ante litum motum’. Therefore, it is not correct to say that no reliance can be placed on this Exhibit A-7 as has been held by the Industrial Tribunal. However, we do not propose to rest out conclusion with reference to the validity of charge memos dated 14th April 1980 and 29th April 1980 which came to be issued by the General Production Superintendent by delegated authority. We would rather address ourselves to the question whether the issue of such memorandum of charges on which the disciplinary enquiry was initiated, if assuming to be bad, would vitiate the enquiry. It cannot be gainsaid that the charge memo is a charter for any disciplinary enquiry. However, even in a case where the rights of the civil servants are protected under Article 311 of the Constitution, we do not think bad memo of charge would vitiate the whole enquiry because the said Article, which throws a protective umbrella and acts as bulwark against the pressure of the executive states that no person who is a member of Civil Service of the Union or of an All India Service or Civil Service of State or hold civil post under the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The only requirement therefore is about the ultimate order of dismissal or removal. But there is no bar in initiating the enquiry. This is exactly the view that was taken in the case reported in State of M. P. & Ors v. Shardul Singh (supra). We will extract paragraphs-1 and 10 of the said Judgment which are as follows :-
“1) Scope of Article 311(1) of the Constitution comes up for consideration in this appeal by certificate. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, has opined that the power of dismissal and removal referred to in Article 311(1) implies that the authorities mentioned in that Article must alone initiate and conduct the disciplinary proceeding culminating in the dismissal or removal of a delinquent officer.
10) But for the incorporation of Article 311 in the Constitution even in respect of matters provided therein, Rule could have been framed under Article 309. The provisions in Article 311 confer additional rights on the civil servants. Hence we are unable to agree with the High Court that the guarantee given under Article 311(1) includes within itself a further guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in that Article.”
15. Following this ruling, in the case of Workmen of Indian Overseas Bank v. Indian Overseas Bank & Anr. (supra) in paras-12 and 13 it was stated as under (PP. 321-322) :
“12) The next contention raised by Mr. Chari was that the dismissal of the four workmen by the management is illegal as the proceedings against them were initiated by a person not competent to do so. It is a common case that charge sheets dated 1st September, 1965, sent to workmen, were issued under the signatures of Shri Rao, the Assistant General Manager. It is also a common case that, later on, the enquiry was held by Shri Ramachandran who himself held the enquiry, heard the concerned workmen and ultimately passed the dismissal order. Mr. Chari’s contention is that disciplinary proceedings start from the initiation of the enquiry and encompasses within its ambit the proceedings from the stage of issue of charge sheet to the final order. According to the learned Counsel the initiation of the enquiry is a very material fact and this could only be done by the Officer who had been designated to take disciplinary action, i.e., Shri Ramachandran. The contention of the learned Counsel, therefore, boils down to this that as the charge sheets were issued and the decision to hold an enquiry was taken by Shri Rao who was not the Officer designated under para 521(12) of the Sastry Award, the whole enquiry proceedings ultimately resulting in dismissal are void and are of no legal effect. It was contended that it was essential that the disciplinary authority itself must apply its mind in the first instance to the explanations submitted by the concerned workmen and it is only after it comes to the conclusion that it is not so satisfied and wants to hold an enquiry that the enquiry should be held. It was suggested that it is not possible to say whether Shri Ramachandran who was the disciplinary authority would have decided to hold the enquiry, had he considered the explanations of the concerned workmen at the initial stage. Thus, it is submitted that the charge-sheets issued by Shri Rao having been issued by a person not competent to do so, the whole proceedings resulting in the dismissal of the concerned workmen are void. This plea partly found favour with the Tribunal who was inclined to hold that the charge sheets were not issued by the Officer empowered by the bank to take disciplinary action as according to him the disciplinary proceedings start with the issue of a charge sheet. For this proposition the Tribunal relied on Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968-II-LLJ-274). But the Tribunal considered this as a mere irregularity and found that no prejudice has been caused to the workmen by the initiation of the enquiry proceedings as the dismissal had been ordered by the disciplinary authority and, therefore, negatived this contention of the workmen. Mr. Chari before me also relied mainly on this authority. Mr. Pai, the learned Counsel for the respondent, however, pointed out that the whole fabric of the argument by the petitioners is without substance as it bases itself mainly on the decisions given above. Mr. Pai pointed out that this decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh (C. A. No. 2554 of 1966, decided on 2nd December, 1969). This case has also been reported as (1970) 2 S.C.C. 108. This was a case which had come up in appeal from the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision mentioned above. Their Lordship of the Supreme Court set aside the Judgment of the High Court. The High Court had held that the enquiry by the Superintendent of Police was against the mandate of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India as he was not competent to initiate or conduct the enquiry because the dismissal order could only be passed by the Inspector General of Police. The Supreme Court did not accept the correctness of this view and their Lordships observed as under :
“Hence we are unable to agree with the High Court that the guarantee that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in that Article.”
13) Mr. Chari sought to distinguish this authority by pointing out that there the power under the Rules was given to initiate action to the Superintendent of Police. But, in my view, this distinction is without any substance. Their Lordship have clearly expressed the view that it is not necessary for the authority which is to pass the order of dismissal, to initiate enquiry itself. I am further inclined to agree with the view of the Tribunal that even if the charge sheets were issued by Shri Rao, the same is not such an infirmity as to render the whole proceedings against the concerned workmen illegal and void. It is not disputed that the enquiry proceedings were held by Sri. Ramachandran, the disciplinary authority himself. It is also not disputed that personal hearing was given by him and the order of dismissal was passed by him. It, therefore, cannot be said that the mere fact of the charge-sheets originally having been issued by Shri Rao (assuming that he was not competent to do so) would make the further proceedings void. In this connection it is also necessary to notice that in the replies sent to the charge sheets issued by Shri Rao or even in reply to the show cause notice, no grievance was made that the whole proceedings were bed because of the reason that the charge sheets were not issued to the concerned workmen by the person authorised to do so. If the grievance was made that the charge sheets were not issued by the proper person, the management might have withdrawn them and fresh charge sheets could have been issued by the disciplinary authority. The workmen not having objected to the issue of the charge sheets by Sri Rao, could not now be permitted to urge that as a ground for challenging the ultimate order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority against them. This contention of Mr. Chari, therefore, fails.”
16. Mr. Rao contended that it is to be noted that the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the charge memo because under the relevant regulation the Superintendent was authorised to issue the charge memo. As a matter of fact this very contention was repelled as seen from paragraph-13 extracted above.
17. To the same effect is the decision in the case reported in Bata India Ltd v. M. C. Bharadwaj & Another (supra), wherein it was held that even where the charge memo is defective, if there had been a substantial compliance with regard to a disciplinary enquiry, the ultimate order would not suffer.
18. Now coming to the case of Steel Authority of India v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court (supra) the facts require to be noted in para-2 are as follows (P. 457) :-
“During the pendency of the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act the respondent made an application under Section 33A of the Act praying for setting aside his dismissal and for reinstating him with consequential reliefs. The two applications were taken up for hearing together by the Labour Court and on the respondent’s prayer, the issue as to the authority of the Chief Medical Officer to frame charges and to constitute the inquiry committee was heard as a preliminary issue. On 16th November, 1976 the Labour Court held that the Chief Medical Officer was incompetent under the Rules to frame charges against the respondent and constitute the inquiry committee and accordingly held that the domestic inquiry was defective and invalid. The Labour Court was, however, of opinion that the company’s case could not be dismissed at this stage and that the company should be given an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of the action it had taken against the respondent.”
From the above, it is clear that two writ petitions came to be filed and both of them were dismissed by the Patna High Court. The workmen did not challenge it while the management did not challenge it before the Court and it was held that the charge memo, having regard to the rules, was issued by a person not authorised under the rules and, therefore, it would be bad. Even then, as seen from the concluding paragraph, it is clear that that part of the order of the High Court directing evidence be permitted was not interfered with. Therefore, this case does not in any way enable the workmen appellant to contend that the charge memo itself must be issued by a person who is ultimately competent to punish.
19. Certainly as rightly contended by Mr. Sundaraswamy, the Management cannot be penalised for having issued a charge memorandum which the enquiry is stated to be defective and for which explanation was furnished by the workman; on which the enquiry took place and which resulted in the order of dismissal. Such a case cannot be worse than a case of non-issue of charge sheet or non-conduct of enquiry at all. This is where the case of Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc. & Ors (supra) Para-10 becomes relevant. That paragraph is extracted below (P. 110) :-
“10) Retrenchment as defined in Section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as held by this Court in several cases means termination of service for any reason whatsoever other wise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action and the other exceptions indicated action and the other exceptions indicated therein. In the present case though no formal domestic inquiry had been held, the employer took the stand in the adjudication that termination was grounded upon loss of confidence and substantiated that allegation by leading evidence. The legal position firmly established is that if there has been no appropriate domestic enquiry or no enquiry at all before disciplinary action is taken, it is open to the employer to ask for, such opportunity in the course of adjudication. In the facts of the present case, the order of separation grounded upon loss of confidence has been justified before the Labour Court and the Labour Court has come to that conclusion upon assessment of the evidence.”
20. To our mind it appears that the matter has to be looked at in a proper perspective. Has the workman suffered any prejudice ? Was he in a position to understand the nature and the scope of the charges ? Was he in a position to meet the charges and therefore was he in a position to furnish a proper explanation ? If these are answered in the affirmative, we do not know how it could be contended as is urged by the learned Counsel Mr. Rao for the workman that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings is bad. We should also state at this juncture that the disciplinary enquiry is only for the purpose of establishing the guilt of a particular workman or the delinquent officer as the case may be. Beyond that there is no logic in stating that the charge memo must be issued by the competent Officer. There is no question of any competent Officer issuing a charge memo. In this case even the Certified Standing Order 23(d) merely talks of the ultimate order being passed by the General Works Manager. It cannot be contended that the initiation of the disciplinary enquiry leads on ultimately to the order of dismissal and where therefore the foundation has not been properly laid the edifice cannot remain. This argument does not appeal to us for the simple reason that initiation is one thing and the ultimate dismissal is another, though they are part of the came proceedings. It may also be recalled that before Article 311 of the Constitution came to be amended by the 42nd Amendment it was thought domestic enquiry would consist of two parts, namely, issue of charge memorandum and the findings constituting one stage and the issue of second show cause notice and the ultimate order constituting the second stage. Therefore, we are firmly of the opinion that there is absolutely nothing wrong in the General Production Superintendent issuing the charge memos dated 14th April, 1980 and 29th April, 1980. The workman understood the charge, offered his explanation on 16th April, 1980 and 5th May, 1980. He was visited with inquiry notice dated 19th April, 1980 and 6th May 1980. He participated in enquiry and as on that the Report was submitted on 17th June, 1980 and 26th August, 1980. He was issued a second show cause notice on 8th July, 1980 and he replied on 11th July, 1980 and it is thereafter on 14th July 1980 the proposed dismissal was passed and he was informed on 14th July, 1980 that the application under Section 33(1) would be filed before the Tribunal having regard to the pendency of the industrial dispute.
21. Therefore, we hold on point No. 1 that the charge memo issued by the General Production Superintendent (S. S. Saihgal) is valid and does not vitiate the further proceedings resulting in the ultimate order of dismissal.
22. The next point that we have to determine is the pre-judging of matter. No doubt both the memoranda of charges dated 14th April, 1980 and 29th April 1980 did mention about the punishment of dismissal. That by itself does not straightway led to the conclusion that there has been a pre-judging of the matter because it has been succeeded by an explanation, enquiry, findings, second show cause notice and dismissal. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that one cannot go merely by the wording of the memorandum of charges ignoring all that has taken place laboriously.
23. As far as the contention of the management that the finding of the domestic enquiry was fair and proper we are unable to deal with the finding of the Tribunal because it has been clearly stated as under :-
“The Enquiry Officer has come to the different finding that the opponent is not sick etc. Neither the Enquiry Officer nor the Presenting Officer are competent medical experts and the said certificates produced by the opponent have not been controverted by a reasonable and reliable evidence. In view of the opponent’s sickness as supported by the said E.S.I. Certificate, an opportunity could have been given by the Enquiry Officer to the opponent to have an effective defence in the conduct of the enquiry. Hence the opponent has been prejudiced by not granting time when he was sick. The Enquiry Office can no doubt proceed ex-parte in the justifying circumstances as per the rulings reported in 1978. Lab. L. C. 1335. In the justifying circumstances the enquiry could no doubt be proceeded ex-parte but in the present case in view of the E.S.I. Certificate showing the sickness, sufficient time could have been given to the opponent to become prepared in respect of the conducting of the enquiry.”
We full agree with this.
24. As far as W.P. No. 13943/1986 is concerned inasmuch as we have settled the question that the memorandum of charge issued is valid, the only question that remains for consideration is, whether the workman could be precluded from leading evidence on the finding that the domestic enquiry was fair and proper. The Tribunal would hold that the domestic enquiry was valid because there has been no victimisation or bias. Further, it is to be noted that the workman had been treated ex-parte. There was lock-out during the relevant time and as such he could not produce the witnesses. This will clearly establish that there is no victimisation or bias. Accordingly, we set aside that part of the order and direct that the evidence be let in in regard to the action proposed to be taken against the workman.
25. In the result, Writ Appeal No. 3322/1986 stands dismissed while W.P. No. 13956/1986 will stand allowed; W.P. No. 13943/1986 will stand allowed partly insofar as the validity of the charge memo is concerned, and W.P. No. 18208/1986 will stand allowed partly insofar as the Tribunal has rendered a decision against the workman that no prejudice is caused in view of the ex parte domestic enquiry.
26. Pending disposal by the Tribunal each of the workmen will be entitled to suspension allowance at the rate of Rs. 400/- per mensum from this day.