ORDER
1. The petitioner questions the order of the second respondent dated March 25, 1986 discharging the petitioner from the service of ‘Duftry’. The petitioner joined service of the State Bank of India in the year 1972 as a Messenger. He was later promoted to the post of Duftry in the year 1981. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner by the second respondent, stating that the petitioner suppressed his conviction prior to his joining service in the respondent bank, in the declaration made by him at the time of entering into service, the further charge was that the petitioner was convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. The Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion after enquiry, that the conviction got obliterated on release of the petitioner under Sec. 4 of Probation of Offenders Act and that he is not guilty of the charges. The disciplinary authority did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and by proceedings dated April 8, 1985, held the petitioner guilty and removed him from service. The petitioner questions the said order of the disciplinary authority.
2. The contention of the petitioner is that he was convicted under Section 304-AIPC and that the offence did not amount to an offence involving moral turpitude. The further contention is that even if the offence involves moral turpitude, the conviction got obliterated as the petitioner was released under Sec. 4 of Probation of Offenders Act and that the conviction is non est in the eye of law. He further contends that he signed the typed declaration in the year 1972 when he joined service in the respondent bank and that it was not his intention to suppress any material facts and that the was not permitted to be represented by a legal counsel at the enquiry, that the impugned order was made mechanically on the basis of the legal advice taken from the legal department and was made mechanically.
3. The contention of the respondents is that the disciplinary authority assessed the evidence and came to its own conclusion and imposed the punishment against the petitioner and was competent to differ from the report of the Enquiry Officer and was not bound to accept the report. It was further submitted that the petitioner was charged with an offence under Sec. 302 IPC and was convicted under Sec. 304-A IPC, which involved moral turpitude. Inasmuch as the petitioner was found to have pointed a gun at the victim and pulled the trigger in spite of being warned by the deceased that the gun was loaded and the petitioner did not act in the manner in which he should have on being warned, and that he did not show the consideration and care that was indeed needed in respect of another fellow being. It was also contended that the petitioner concealed the fact that he was convicted of an offence in the declaration he made before he was appointed and that such an act of the petitioner amounted to gross mis-conduct in terms of paragraph 521(4)(j) of Shastri award, read with paragraph 18-28 of Desai award.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents produced the declaration signed by the petitioner at the time when he entered the service of the respondent-Bank. The declaration contains several statements which are totally irrelevant for the purpose of the petitioner. Anyone who reads the declaration would find that the signing of the said declaration is a mere formality and would affix his signature without applying his mind. The petitioner who joined service of the bank as a Messenger, would have mechanically affixed his signature on the declaration. It was therefore to be held that singing of the declaration by the petitioner did not amount to suppression or misrepresentation of facts.
5. The question which remains to be examined is whether the conviction of the petitioner under Sec. 304-A IPC amounted to conviction of an offence involving moral turpitude. From the undisputed facts, it is revealed that the petitioner who was aged about 18 years on the date of offence, was in a playful mood in the company of his friends, who just returned from a hunting expedition and playfully pointed the gun at each one of his friends demanding cigarettes. At that time, the deceased warned the petitioner that the gun was loaded, but the trigger went off and the victim died. From the said facts, the Sessions Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of an offence punishable under Sec. 304-A IPC and not under S. 302 IPC, and sentenced him to one year rigorous imprisonment. The sentence was suspended under Sec. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and the sentence was not executed on account of the good behaviour of the petitioner.
6. In G. Eswara Reddy v. P. Ramakrishna Reddy 1978(1) APLJ 266, Jeevan Reddy J., (as he then was) held that a crime will be considered as involving moral turpitude if it involves an act of baseness, vileness or depravity, when judged in the context of private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow-men or to the society in general. Every violation of law does not involve moral turpitude, nor can it be said that a particular category of crimes do necessarily involve, or do not necessarily involve moral turpitude unless of course, it is an offence inherently criminal, the very commission of which implies a base and depraved nature.
7. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Risal Singh v. Chandgi Ram had an occasion to consider the question as to what is moral turpitude and indicated the following tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence did or did not involve moral turpitude, as follows :
“(i) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general.
(ii) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one, and
(iii) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.”
D. A. Desai, J, (as he then was) succinctly summed up what is meant by the expression ‘moral turpitude’ in B. A. Khrishi v. State of Gujarat 1978(2) SLR 815 as under :-
“Connotation of word ‘moral’ differs from individual to individual at a given point of time and it has undergone change and acquired different connotation at different stages of social evolution, development and growth. It is not a static concept. That conduct is regarded as moral which conforms to the generally accepted rules which society recognised should govern everyone in his social and commercial relations with others regardless of whether these rights are enforceable as legal obligation. What is moral must be ascertained in context of time and the society in which the question is posed ….. The word ‘turpitude’ involves within its fold baseness, vileness depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general or something contrary to accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. The word ‘moral’ may also involve those very ingredients, it has been rightly said by some of the American decisions that the word ‘moral’ preceding the word ‘turpitude’ adds nothing to it; it is a pleonasm which has been used only for the sake of emphasis “…… It would appear that expression ‘moral turpitude’ involves tautology because the word moral does not seem to add anything to the meaning of the term, other than the emphasis which often results from tautological expression and served only to emphasize the nature of the wrong committed” …. The term has also been defined as meaning anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals. “It also includes wickedness, base or shameful act. As a legal term ‘moral turpitude’ is defined as a quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita ….. It was held that the term has generally been taken to mean to be conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to fellowmen or to society in general.”
The Madras High Court in G. Mohan v. Asst. Collector of Customs (1190-I-LLJ-468) held that an offence involving moral turpitude is one which invites shame on the person who became guilty thereof and that a simple conviction by criminal court would not necessarily entail disqualification to employment in public service or in a bank.
8. In “Law Lexicon-Cum-Digest by N. M. Mulchandani, 1990 Edition Vol. II, ‘moral turpitude’ is described to mean ‘the depravity or wickedness of a person whose conduct may generally mean to be conduct contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private or social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or society in general, contrary to the accepted and customery rule of right and duty between man and man.
9. Applying the above principles laid down in various decisions mentioned above, it cannot be said that the conviction of the petitioner was for an offence involving ‘moral turpitude’.
10. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to go into the other points urged on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner has been in service of the bank from 1972. The charges were framed in the year 1986 after a long gap of 14 years, for alleged supression at the time of declaration made by the petitioner when he entered the service of the bank. It should therefore, be held that the impugned order is not correct and has to be quashed and is accordingly quashed.
11. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.