JUDGMENT
P.K. Babri, J.
(1) This petition is directed against order of the Rent Controller dated 6/11/1992, by which he, while refusing to grant leave to defend to the petitioner, has passed an eviction order on the ground of eviction covered by Section 14C of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment)Act, 1988.
(2) S. Gurbax Singh, Gurnam Singh (two sons of deceased ArjanSingh) and Smt. Ranjit Kaur, Smt. Gursharan Kaur and Smt. Ranbir Kaur three married daughters of Arjan Singh) had filed the petition seeking eviction of the petitioner tenant from the rooms, kitchen, latrine, bath. two.stores, as shown in red colour in plan filed Along with the petition, located inEA-32, Inderpuri. New Delhi. The eviction was sought on the ground that Gurbax Singh, the co-landlord/co-owner of -the property, who had retired from Government service as Head Clerk in the year 1979 and had vacated the Govt. accommodation and was presently residing with his son in a tenanted “house at D-5, Naraina Vihar, bonafide requires the demised premises for occupation for himself and members of his family. The property originally was owned by his parents, who had since died leaving behind only the respondents as the co-owners/landlords. It is admitted case that prior to filing of the present petition on the basis of the Delhi Rent Control(Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act 57 of 1988) which introduced this new ground of eviction covered by Section 14C, the respondents bad already filed an eviction petition on the ground of bonafide covered by Clause (e) of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in which leave to defend had been granted to the tenant, inter alia, on his plea that the premises in question had been let out to him for residential-cum-commercial purposes.
(3) The present eviction petition, thus, was based on a new cause of action which became available to Gurbax Singh on the basis of the amendment of the Act and the respondents brought a petition within the limitation prescribed under the statute.
(4) Counsel for the petitioner in challenging the eviction order has urged that as the leave to defend application filed by the tenant in the previous eviction case brought under Section 14(1)(e) was allowed and that eviction case is still pending, in the present eviction petition also leave to defend application should have been allowed and at any rate, the present petition ought to have been stayed till the disposal of the previous evictionpetition.
(5) There is no merit in this contention because the present petition is based on a new cause of action. There is lot of difference between the requirements which are liable to be proved for seeking eviction on the ground covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the requirements which are required to be proved for having eviction on the ground covered by Section 14C. A very important ingredient to be proved in the petition filed on the ground of eviction covered by Section 14(1)(e) is that the demised premises have been let out only for residential purposes which ingredient is not liable to be proved for succeeding on the ground of eviction covered by Section 14C. It is evident that this amendment which has brought about Section 14C on the statute has given a new ground of eviction to a special type of landlords who retire from Government service. So it cannot be said that the leave to defend application filed in the present case should have been allowed on me reground that the leave to defend application had been allowed in the previous case or that the present eviction petition is liable to be stayed till the disposal of the previous eviction petition.
(6) The most important contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is with regard to interpretation of Section 14C as to whether the said ground of eviction could be made
(7) The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, placed relianc on another case decided by the Supreme Court in S. Surjit Singh Kalra v.Union of India and Another, . This is a judgment again given by three Hon’ble Judges. The ground of eviction which came up for consideration by the Supreme Court was Section 14B which gives an immediate right to recover possession of the premises to the members of the armed forces who are to retire. Section 14B also has the words ‘the’ premises let out by him’. However, the question which arose for decision before the Supreme Court was not with regard to interpretation of the said words. The tenants in the said case had challenged the vires of amending Act (57 of 1988) which were brought on the statute book as Sections 14B to 14D. It appears that while bringing on statute those special provisions which give specific rights to certain classified landlords, the amending Act did not amend the provisions of Section 25B although the eviction petitions have to be tried summarily under the provisions of Section 25B. Summons which were required to be issued in accordance with Section 25B Sub-section (2) did not pertain to the new grounds of eviction covered by Sections 14B, 14C and 14D. Even the third Schedule which contains the form of the summons did not refer to the new provisions as it was not modified. The Supreme Court held that keeping in view the intention of the legislature as expressed in Sections 14B to 14D, the Court could supply the words which inadvertently were not supplied by the legislature in the relevant Section 25B and the Schedule.
So, question which has arisen for decision in the present case or which had been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kanta Goel (supra) never arose for consideration in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra while comparing the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) with the provisions of Section 14B in para 12 observed, “But Section 14-B narrows down suchright. It is he who has let out alone could evict…”.
(8) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed emphatic reliance on these observations appearing in this judgment. But the learned Counsel forgets that the Supreme Court was not interpreting the said words appearing in Section 14B in the context in which they had been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the previous case while interpreting those words specifically appearing in Section 14A. So, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court had laid down any different interpretation than what had been given by the Supreme Court in the earlier case while interpreting the similarwords.
(9) Even if assuming for the sake of arguments that there is some conflict of decisions between the two judgments even then as both the judgments are by equal strength of Judges and the subsequent judgment does not take notice of the previous judgment, the ratio laid down in the previous judgment will still hold the field and would be binding. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, , that there is hierarchy within the Courts itself here where larger Benches over-rule small Benches. In the well-known case of A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another, , it was held that the practice as developed in the Supreme Court is that a larger Bench is entitled to over-rule the decision of small Bench notwithstanding the fact that each of the decision is that of the Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited MM. Yaragatti v. Vasant and Others, , where a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court had held that if there is conflict between decisions of co-equal Benches of the Supreme Court,then the later view should be followed. I am of the view that this is not the correct proposition of law : Once it is clear that a Bench of equal strength cannot over-rule the decision rendered by Bench of same strength then obviously it is the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court which would be binding and not the later judgment particularly when the later judgment has not taken note of the ratio laid down in the previous judgment. For parity of reason, the judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibhai Laxmanbhai and Others, , could not be considered to have laid down the correct proposition of law.
(10) In Ajudhia Pershad Ram Per shad v. Sham Sunder and Others Air 1947 Lahore 13(15), it has been held that no Division Bench of a HighCourt, even if it disagreed with the decision of another Division Bench of that High Court, would be competent to overrule it. In Sashi Bhusan Ratv. Bhuneshwar Rai and Others, Air 1955 Patna 124, it was laid down that in case there are two conflicting decisions of the Division Benches of a HighCourt, the opinion expressed by the former Division Bench must prevail.
(11) At any rate, this question is only academic because that judgment given by the Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra’s case (supra) is not on the point arising for decision before this Court and which was directly subject-matter of decision before the Supreme Court in the case of Smt.Kanta Gael (supra). Same view has been expressed by a Single Bench of this Court while deciding C.M. (Main) No. 241/91, B.N. Bajaj v. Maj Gen.S.N. Puri, decided on December 12, 1991. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of B.N. Chanana v. Union of India etc. 1990 Rajdhani Law Reporter(DB) 68, also had followed Smt. Kanta Gael’s case (supra) and so also a Single Bench has given the same interpretation following the case of Smt.Kanta Gael (supra) in the case of Mrs. Sarla Luthra v. Gadore Tools (P) Ltd. 1993 Rlr 22.
(12) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has then contended that there is no proof that the respondents were heirs of the deceased owner/landlord. It is surprising that such a contention has been raised before this Court. I have gone through the pleadings and find that in the leave to defend application as well as in the affidavit filed Along with the application the petitioner has categorically admitted that the eviction petition has been brought.by the co-owners/landlords. There was no plea taken that the persons who have filed the eviction petition were not the legal heirs of the owner. The only plea taken was that there were two other legal heirs, namely, Surjit Singh andS.J.S. Narang. In the counter-affidavit it was pleaded by the owners/landlords that both of them are dead. In rejoinder the petitioner pleaded that legal heirs of the said persons have not been joined as co-landlords and coowners. It was specifically put to Counsel for the landlords/owners as to whether there are any other legal heir left by those two persons. It was stated that except the respondents landlords/owners no other legal heirs have been left by those persons. No affidavit was filed by the tenant as to who are those legal heirs, if any, of the deceased persons who have been not joined as respondents. So, I hold that there is no merit in this contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner which I hereby, negative.
(13) It was then contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Gurbax Singh had retired from the service since long and thus, he cannot take advantage of Section 14C. Similar contention was raised in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra in respect of similar ground of eviction covered by Section 14B. It was held that the statute gives a right to even the retired officer to bring a petition within a period of one year from the introduction of the said provision by the Amending Act, 1988 and the petition having been brought within one year of the date of the enforcement of the Amending Act cannot be considered not maintainable because the officer had retired long back. In the present case, the ingredients which go to consitute a newground of eviction covered by Section 14C clearly are established and in the present case the Rent Controller was fully justified in declining the leave to defend application and in passing the eviction order against the petitioner.
(14) Before parting with the case I may mention that the learned Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar and Others, 1974 RentControl Reporter 350, where the Full Bench had held that a landlord is entitled to file a new eviction petition on the strength of a new cause of action arising subsequently to the filing of the previous petition. The landlord has a choice either to seek amendment of the previous eviction petition or to bring a new eviction petition. The Full Bench held that in practice the landlord would be well advised in amending the previous eviction petition rather than filing a separate one. The Full Beach has not laid down the law that ifa separate eviction petition is brought on the new cause of action the same would not be maintainable or is liable to be stayed till the decision of the previous eviction petition. What the Full Court was considering was whether the amendment of the eviction petition already pending could be permissible or not for including a new ground of eviction arising during the pendency of the eviction petition. The Full Bench held, that such an amendment could beallowed. So, nothing mentioned in this judgment is of any help to the petitioner in the present case. Another judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is Mohammad Khalil Khan and Others v. Mahbub Ali Mianand Others . It was laid down in this judgment that the correct test in cases falling under Order Ii, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit. In case the causes of action in the two suits are the same, then the new suit cannot proceed. This ratio is not applicable in the present case where the ground of eviction covered by Section 14C is distinct and different from the ground of eviction covered by Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi RentControl Act.No other point has been urged before me.I find no merit in this petition which I, hereby, dismiss with costs.