PETITIONER: S. SANKAPPA AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CENTRAL CIRCLE II,BANGALORE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/12/1967 BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V. CITATION: 1968 AIR 816 1968 SCR (2) 674 CITATOR INFO : RF 1973 SC1010 (2) RF 1977 SC 459 (1,6) RF 1991 SC1322 (23) ACT: Income Tax Act, 1922, ss. 23, 35-Income Tax Act, 1961, ss. 155 297(2) (a) -Whether proceedings on issue of notice under s. 35 (5) of the Act of 1922 for rectification are proceedings for assessment within the meaning of s. 297(2) (a) of the Act of 1961. HEADNOTE: During the assessment 'years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61, two firms in which the six appellants were partners, filed returns declaring themselves to be registered firms and also presented applications for registration of the firms under s. 26A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Income-tax Officer refused registration of the firms and assessed the income of the firms, treating them as unregistered. The assessments of the six appellants were also made, so that their incomes from the two firms were included in their individual assessments as if they had received the income in the capacity of partners in unregistered firms. Appeals made by the firms against the order refusing registration were allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner -and, in pursuance of the appellate orders, the Income Tax Officer passed a consolidated order on 20th December, 1966, revising the assessments of the firms for all these years on the basis that they were registered firms and also apportioned the income of the firm,; between the six partners. Subsequently, the Income Tax Officer issued notices under s. 155 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, proposing to rectify the individual assessments of the six appellants in respect of each of the three assessment years, whereupon the appellants challenged the validity of the notices by writ petitions. It was conceded before the High Court on behalf of the Income Tax Officer that as the rectification proposed related to assessment years when the Income Tax Act, 1922, was applicable, proceedings for rectification could not be taken under s. 155 of the 1961 Act but only under s. 35(5) of the 1922 Act in view of the provisions of Is. 297 (2) (a) of the Act of 1961. The High Court dismissed the petitions. In -appeal to this Court it was contended, inter alia, that proceedings for rectification under s. 35(5) of the Act of 1922 cannot be held to be proceedings for assessment within the meaning of that expression used in s. 297(2)(a) of the Act of 1961, and therefore under that provision of law, the Act of 1922 could not be resorted to by the Income-tax Officer in order to rectify the assessments of the appellant; that, in any case, the provisions of s, 35(5) of the Act of 1922 are not attracted. because proceedings under that section, can only be taken when it is found on the assessment or reassesment of a firm that the share of the partner in the profit or loss of the firm has not been included in the assessment of the partner or, if included, is not correct, and, in the present cases, there was no assessment or reassessment of the firms when the income-tax Officer, in pursuance of the appellate order, proceeded to pass orders rectifying the assessments-of the firms under s. 35(1) of the Act of 1922; as there was no fresh computation of income the proceedings sought to be taken were not proceedings for assessment. HELD : Dismissing the appeal 675 (1) the word "assessment" is used in the Income-tax Act in a number of provisions in a comprehensive sense and includes all proceedings, starting with the filing of the return or issue of notice and ending with determination of the tax payable by the assessee., When proceedings are taken for rectification of assessment to tax either under s. 35(1) or s. 35(5) of the Act of 1922, they must be held to be proceedings for assessment. In proceeding under those provisions, what the Income-tax Officer does is to correct errors in, or rectify orders of assessment made by him, and orders making such correction or rectifications are, therefore clearly part of the proceedings for assessment. [678 B, G-H] The orders passed under s. 35(1) by the Income-tax Officer on 20th December, 1966 were all orders altering assessment orders made in the proceedings for assessment of the firms, while, under the impugned notices the Income-tax Officer was proposing to rectify orders made for computation of income and imposition of tax under the charging section in the case of individual partners. Clearly, therefore, in these cases, s. 297(2) (a) of the Act of 1961 permits the Income-tax Officer to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1922 and he had rightly proposed to take action tinder s. 35(5) of the Act of 1922. [679 E-G] Abraham v. Income-tax Officer, 41 I.T.R. 425; Kalawati Devi Harlalka v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 1421 of 1966 decided on 1-5-1967, relied on. M, M. Parikli, Income, Officer, Special Investigation Circle "B" Ahmedabad v. Navanagar Transport and Industries Ltd. and Another, 63 I.T.R. 663, distinguished. The provisions of s. 23 and other relevant sections of the Act of 1922 clearly show that proceedings for assessment of a firm consist of computation of the income of the firms, determination of tax payable by the firms, apportionment of the income of the firm between its partners in the case of a registered firm and, in appropriate cases, imposition of tax on the firm after including the share of the income of certain partners in, the income of the firm, even though the firm is registered. The proceedings for assessment of the firm are not completed until all these steps have been taken by the Income-tax Officer, and each of those steps must be held to be a step in the proceedings for assessment of the firm. Consequently, when the Income-tax Officer passed the orders dated 20th December 1966 and apportioned the income of the firms between the various partners, the orders which be made were clearly orders in proceedings for assessment and it was in order to give effect to these orders in the individual assessment, of the partners that the impugned notices were issued. The first condition precedent that the proceedings under s. 35(4) are to be taken on the basis of information derived from orders of assessment or re- assessment of the firm was, thus clearly satisfied. [682 B- E] V. S. Arulanandam v. Income-tax Officer, Tuticorin, 43 I.T.R. 511, it p. 517: distinguished. The second condition precedent was also satisfied as the share of each partner in the profit or loss of the firm was not included in the assessment of the partner for the purpose of assessment of that share to tax. Inclusion contemplated by s. 35(5) is for assessment to tax of the share. In fact, the inclusion was for the, limited purposes of determining the exemption to which the partners were entitled under s. 14(2)(a) and for determining the rate of tax payable in the separate assessments under s, 16(1)(a). When the assessments of the unregistered firms were set aside, the individual partners ceased to be entitled to the benefit of L2Sup.C.1/68---13 676 s. 14(2)(a), and s. 16(1) (a) also become inapplicable. What was required to be done was to add the income of each partner in his individual assessment and then impose tax on it in accordance with s. 23(5) (a) (ii) of the Act of 1922. Thus, this was a clear case where the inclusion of the share of the income of the partner in his individual assessment was not correct. [683 F-H 684 B-C] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1664 to
1681 of 1967.
Appeals front the judgment and order dated August 30, 31,
1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 354 to
371 of 1967.
K. Srinivasan and R. Gopalakrishnan for the appellants (in
all the appeals).
C. K. Daphtary Attorney-General, S. K. Aiyar and R. N.
Sachthey, for the respondent (in all the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J. These eighteen appeals have been filed by six
persons, some of whom were partners in a firm called “The
Lalitha Silk Throwing Factory”, some in another firm called
“The Srinivasa Textiles”, and some in both these firms. The
appeals brought up to this Court under certificate -ranted
by the High Court of Mysore are against the judgment of the
High Court dismissing eighteen writ petitions by these six
appellants praying for quashing notices issued by the
Income-tax Officer, Bangalore, purporting to be under
section 155 of the Income-tax Act No. 43 of 1961, proposing
to rectify the assessments of the appellants in respect of
the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61. Thus,
the notices challenged are three notices for each of these
assessment years in respect of each of the six appellants ,
so that there were 18 petitions before the High Court. The
High Court decided all the petitions by a common judgment
and, conscequently in these appeals, all of them are being
dealt with together.
During all these three assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and
1960-61, both the firms filed returns declaring themselves
to be registered firms and also presented applications for
registration of the firms tinder s. 26A of the Income-tax
Act No. 11 of 1922. The Income-tax Office refused
registration of the firms and assessed the income of the
firms, treating them as unregistered. The assessments of
these six appellants were also made, so that their incomes
from the two firms were included in their individual
assessments as if they had received the income in the
capacity of partners in unregistered firms. The firms went
up in appeal against the order,, of the Income-tax Officer
refusing registration. These appeals were allowed by the
Appellate Assistant Commis-
677
sioner by an order dated 26th November, 1966 in respect of
the Lalitha Silk Throwing Factory, and 14th December, ‘1966
in respect of Srinivasa Textiles. The Income-tax Officer,
in pursuance of the appellate order of the Assistant
Commissioner, passed a consolidated order revising the
assessments of the firms for all these years on the basis
that they were registered firms and also apportioned the
income of the firms between these six partners.
Subsequently, the notices impugned in these petitions were
issued on. 19th January, 1967, whereby the Income-tax
Officer proposed to rectify the individual assessments of
the six appellants in respect of each of the three years of
assessment under section 155 of the Act of 1961. The
appellants in the writ petitions challenged the validity of
these notices, but the High Court dismissed the writ
petitions and, consequently, the appellants have come up in
these appeals before us.
It was conceded before the High Court on behalf of the
Income tax Officer that proceedings for rectification of the
assessments of the appellants could not be taken under s.
155 of the Act of 1961, because, admittedly, the
rectifications related to assessments of tax for assessment
years when the Act of 1922 was applicable, so that
proceedings could only be taken under s. 3 5 (5 ) of the Act
of 1 922 in view of the provisions of s. 297 (2) (a) of the
Act of 1961. Before us, learned counsel for the appellants
urged that .proceedings for rectification under s. 35(5) of
the Act of 1922 cannot be held to be proceedings for
assessment within the meaning of that expression used in s.
297(2) (a) of the Act of 1961, so that, under that provision
of law, the Act of 1922 could not be resorted to by the
Income-tax Officer in order to rectify the assessments of
the appellants. On the same basis, it was further urged
that, in any case, the provisions of s. 35(5) of the Act of
1922 are not attracted, because proceedings under that
section can only be taken when it is found on the assessment
or reassessment of a firm that the share of the partner in
the profit or loss of the firm has not been included in the
assessment of the partner or, if included, is not correct;
and, in the present cases, there was no assessment or
reassessment of the firms when the Income-tax Officer, in
pursuance of the order of the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner granting registration to the firms, proceeded
to pass orders rectifying the assessments of the firms under
s. 35 ( 1 ) of the Act of 1922 on 20th December, 1966. It
was urged that no fresh computation of income of the
partners is sought to be made in pursuance of the notices
issued and, similarly, no fresh computation of the income of
the firms was made when the Income-tax Officer passed his
orders on 20th December, 1966 to give effect to the decision
of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner granting
registration to the firms. No fresh computation of income
being involved, it must be held that the proceedings now
sought to be taken are not
678
proceedings for assessment, and, similarly, no proceedings
for assessment or reassessment were taken by the Income-tax
Officer when he passed his orders on 20th December, 1966.
This submission, in our opinion, has been rightly rejected
by the High Court, because it has already been explained by
this Court that the word “assessment” is used in the Income-
tax Act in a number of provisions in a comprehensive sense
and includes all proceedings, starting with the filing of
the return or issue of notice and ending with determination
of the tax payable by the assessee. Though in some
sections, the word “assessment” is used only with reference
to computation of income, in other sections it has the more
comprehensive meaning mentioned by us above. Reference may
be made to the decision of this Court in Abraham v. Income-
tax Officer(1). The same principle has been recently
reiterated in the case of Katawati Devi Harlalka v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal & Ors. (-) where.
dealing with the word “assessment” used -in s. 297 of the
Act of 1961, the Court held
“It is quite clear from the authorities cited
above that the word ‘assessment’ can bear a
very comprehensive meaning it can comprehend
the whole procedure for ascertaining and
imposing liability upon the taxpayer. Is
there then anything in the context of S. 297
which compels us to give to the expression
‘procedure for the assessment’ the narrower
meaning suggested by the learned counsel for
the appellant ? In our view, the answer to
this question must be in the negative. It
seems to us that s. 297 is meant to provide as
far as possible for all contingencies which
may arise out of the repeal of the 1922 Act.
It deals with pending appeals, revisions, etc.
It deals with non-completed assessments
pending at the commencement of the 1961 Act
and assessments to be made after the
commencement of the 1961 Act as a result of
returns of income filed after the commencement
of the 1961 Act,”
It is clear that, when proceedings are taken for
rectification of assessment to tax either under s. 35(1) or
s. 35(5) of the Act of 1922, those proceedings must be held
to be proceedings for assessment. In proceeding under those
provisions, what the Income-tax Officer does is to correct
errors in, or rectify orders of assessment made by him, and
orders making such corrections or rectifications are,
therefore, clearly part of the proceedings for assessment.
(1) 41 I.T.R. 425. (2) Civil Appeal No. 1421 of 1966
decided on 1.5.1967.
67 9
The main stay of the argument of learned counsel for the
appellants against this view was the decision of this Court
in M. M. Parikh, Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation
Circle “B”, Ahmedabad v. Navanagar Transport and Industries
Ltd. and Another(1) in which case the Court was dealing with
the question whether an order imposing additional super-tax
under s. 23A of the Act of 1922 was an order of assessment
and held to the contrary. The decision in that case does
not, in our opinion, support the submission made on behalf
of the appellants in the present cases. It was explained
there that, under s. 23A of the Act of 1922, there was no
computation of income or determination of tax imposed by the
charging section. That section by itself empowered the
Income-tax Officer to impose the super-tax by his own order,
and an order imposing such a tax could not be held to be an
order of assessment. Further examples of similar orders
were cited in that case and reference was made to orders
under ss. 18A(l), 35(9), 35(10) and 35(11) of the Act of
1922. After referring to these provisions, the Court
clearly indicated the reason for holding that proceedings
under those provisions were not proceedings for assessment
of tax by stating :
“The salient feature of these and other orders
is that the liability to pay tax arises not
from the charge created by statute, but from
the order of the Income-tax Officer.”
In the present cases the orders, which have been rectified
or are being taken up for rectification, are all orders
under which there was assessment of incomes and
determination of the charge to tax in accordance with the
charging sections. The orders passed under s. 3 5 (1) by
the Income-tax Officer on 20th December, 1966 were all
orders altering assessment orders made in the proceedings
for assessment of the firms, while under the impugned
notices the Income-tax Officer is proposing to rectify
orders made for computation of income and imposition of tax
under the charging section in the case of individual
partners. Clearly, therefore, in these cases, s. 297 (2)
(a) of the Act of 1961. permits the Income-tax Officer to
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1922
and he has Tightly proposed to take action under s. 35(5) of
the Act of 1922 on. the basis of rectifications made in the
assessment-, of the firms under s. 35 (1) of that Act on
20th December, 1966 in pursuance of the appellate orders
granting registration to the firms.
The second point raised by learned counsel was that, in any
case, the orders actually made by the Income-tax Officer on
20th December, 1966 in the cases of these firms cannot be
held to be orders of assessment, because all that the
Income-tax Officer did
(1) 63 I.T.R. 663.
680
and was required to do in order to give effect to the orders
of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner granting
registration was to re-calculate the tax payable by the
firms under s. 23 (5) (a) of the Act of 1922, and such an
order would not be an order of assessment at all. Copies of
the orders actually passed by the Income-tax Officer under
s. 3 5 (1) in the cases of both the firms have been produced
before us. They show that the orders consist of two parts.
In the first part, the tax payable by the firms was re-
calculated on the basis that the firms were registered firms
and refund was allowed, because a larger amount of tax bad
been assessed and realised, treating the firms as
unregistered. In the second part, the share income of the
assessee firms was allocated between the various partners.
It appears to us that this composite order re-determining
the tax payable by the firms directing refund and
apportioning the income of the firms between the partners
can be held to be nothing other than an order made in
proceedings for assessment of the firms.
Under the Act of 1 922, the assessment of a firm is made
tinder s. 23 (5) which is as follows
“23(5). Nothwithstanding anything contained
in
the foregoing subsections, when the assessee
is a firm
and the total income of the firm has been
assessed under
sub-section (1), sub-section (3) or sub-
section (4), as the case may be.–
(a) in the case of a registered firm,
(i) the income-tax payable by the firm
itself shall be determined; and
(ii) the total income of each partner of the
firm, including therein his share of its
income, profits and gains of the previous
year, shall be assessed and the sum payable by
him on the basis of such assessment shall be
determined :
Provided that if such share of any partner is
a loss it shall be set off against his other
income or carried forward and set off in
accordance with the provisions of section 24 :
Provided further that when any of such
partners is a person not resident in the
taxable territories, his share of the income,
profits and gains of the firm shall be
assessed or ‘the firm at the rates which would
be applicable if it were assessed on him
personally, and the sum so determined as
payable shall be paid by the firm;
681
provided also that it’ at the time of
assessment of any partner of a registered
firm, the Income-tax Officer is of opinion
that the partner is residing in Pakistan, the
partner’s share of the income, profits and
gains of the him shall be assessed on the firm
in the manner laid down in the preceding,
proviso and the sum so determined as payable
shall be, paid by the firm; and
(b) in the case of an unregistered firm, the
Income-tax Officer may, instead of determining
the sum payable by the firm itself, -proceed
to assess the total income of each partner of
the firm, including therein, his share of its
income, profits and gains of the previous
year, and determine the tax payable by each
partner on the basis of such assessment, if,
in the Income-tax Officer’s opinion, the
aggregate amount of the tax. including super-
tax, if any, payable by the partners u
nder such
procedure would be greater than the aggregate
amount which would be payable by the firm and
the partners individually, if separately
assessed; and where the procedure specified in
this clause is applied to any unregistered
firm, the provisos to clause (a) of this sub-
section shall apply thereto its they apply in
the case of a registered firm.”
It will be noticed that., under this provision, various
orders have to be made by the Income-tax Officer. In the
case of a registered firm, the Income-tax Officer, after
computing the income, has to determine the tax payable by
the firm itself, and provision is made that, thereafter, the
share in the income of the firm of each partner is to be
included in his total income for purposes of his individual
assessment to tax. It is true that the Income-tax Officer
assessing the firm may not be the same Officer who may be
dealing with the individual assessment of the partners and,
in any case, even if he be the same Officer, the proceeding
for assessment of the partners has to be treated as a
separate proceeding; but it is also clear that the
proceedings for assessment of the firm under this section do
not come to an end merely on computation of the income of
the firm and determination of the tax payable by the firm on
that income. The Income-tax Officer, who deals with the
assessment of the firm, has also to apportion the income of
the firm, in the case of a registered firm, between its
partners and the notice of that apportionment has to be
given under s. 23 (6) ‘by him to the firm. This
apportionment is clearly treated as a part of ‘the
proceeding for assessment of the firm and that is why the
notice is to be given to the firm. The second proviso to s.
30 (1) also clarifies this position by laying down that the
right or appeal in respect of the apportionment is to be
exercised by the
682
partners by filing appeals against the order of assessment
of the firm and not against orders made in the course of
subsequent proceedings for the individual assessments of the
partners themselves. The second proviso to s. 23 (5) (a)
also brings out this position. In certain cases, after the
apportionment of the income of the registered firm, the
share of a particular partner, who is not resident in the
taxable territories, is to be assessed to tax also as if it
is the income of the registered firm. All these provisions
clearly show that proceedings for assessment of a firm
consist of computation of the income of the firm,
determination of tax payable by the firm, apportionment of
the income of the firm between its partners in the case of a
registered firm and, in appropriate cases, imposition of tax
on the firm after including the share of the income of
certain partners in the income of the firm, even though the
firm is registered. The proceedings for assessment of the
firm are not completed until all these steps have been taken
by the Income-tax Officer, and each one of those steps must
be held to be a step in the proceedings for assessment of
the firm. Consequently, when the Income-tax Officer passed
the orders dated 20th December, 1966 and apportioned the
income of the firms between the various partners, the orders
which he made were clearly orders in proceedings for
assessment and it was in order to give effect to these
orders in the individual assessment of the partners that the
impugned notices were issued. The first condition precedent
that the proceedings under s. 35(5) are to be taken on the
basis of information derived from orders of assessment or
re-assessment of the firm was, thus, clearly satisfied.
In this connection, learned counsel drew our attention to a
decision of the Madras High Court in V. S. Arulanandam v.
Income-tax Officer, Tuticorin(l), where that Court, dealing
with section 35(5) of the Act of 1922, held :-
“The respondent relied at one stage on section
35(5) of the Act. It should be obvious that
the petitioner’s case did not come within the
scope of section 35 (5). There was no
reassessment of the income of the firm; nor
was there an appeal against the assessment of
the firm. The only appeal of the firm was
against the order of the Income-tax Officer
refusing registration under section 26A. In
fact, the finality of the assessment of the
firm dated November 11, 1954, was left un-
touched all through, an aspect to which we
shall have to advert again.”
Reliance was placed on this comment, because in that case
also the firm, of which the assessee was a partner, was
first refused
(1) 43 I.T.R. 511, at p. 517.
683
registration and the assessment of the partner was sought to
be rectified when, subsequently, registration of the firm
was allowed. The facts of that case were, however,
different. In that case, there was no assessment or
reassessment of the firm subsequent to the grant of
registration. The petition filed by the assessee in the
High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution against
proceedings of rectification sought to be taken by the
Income-tax Officer was allowed on two grounds. One was that
the Income-tax Officer had given no opportunity to the
assessee before completing the proceedings of rectification
under s. 35. The other was that the income of the firm had
already been taxed as the income of the unregistered firm
and there could be no second assessment of the same income
in respect of the assessee’s share in his assessment until
the assessment of that income to tax in the hands of the
firm was set aside. What was thus set aside was the attempt
to tax the same income twice. It was in these circumstances
that the Court observed that there was no scope for the
applicability of s. 3 5 (1) or s. 3 5 ( 5 ) of the Act of 1
922. Section 35(5) did not apply, because, in fact, there
was no assessment or reassessment of the income of the firm
subsequent to the order granting registration. The finality
of the assessment of the firm had been left untouched and
while that order remained intact, the provisions of s. 35(5)
could not possibly be attracted. In the case before us,
after registration of the firms was allowed in appeal, the
Income-tax Officer in the proceedings for assessment of the
firms proceeded further to make a fresh assessment of the
tax payable by the firms and also to apportion the income of
the firms between various partners, so that the income of
the firms no longer remained taxed as income of unregistered
firms, and liability arose of the partners to be taxed in
their assessments in respect of their shares of the income.
Clearly, in these circumstances.s. 35(5) was rightly
applied.
The last point urged by learned counsel was that, in s.
35(5) of the Act of 1922, there is a second condition
precedent, on the existence of which alone proceedings for
rectification can be taken under it and that condition is
that it should be found that the share of the partner in the
profit or loss of the firm had not been included in the
assessment of the partner, or, if included, was not correct:
and there was no such finding in the present cases. The
share of each partner was not included for the purpose of
assessment of that share to tax. Inclusion contemplated by
s. 35(5) is for assessment to tax of the share. The
inclusion was for only two limited purposes. One purpose
was of determining the exemption to which the partners were
entitled under s. 14(2) (a) of the Act of 1922. The other
purpose was for determining the rate at which tax was
payable in the separate assessments of the partners under s.
16 (1 ) (a) of
684
that Act. The shares of the income of the partners were
never included for the purpose of bringing those shares of
income to tax in their ]individual assessments. The tax was
actually imposed in the assessment of the firms themselves
treating it as the income of unregistered firms. When the
assessments of the unregistered firms were set aside, the
individual partners ceased to be entitled to the benefit of
s. 14(2) (a), and s. 16(l.) (a) also became inapplicable.
What was required to be done was to add the income of each
partner in his individual assessment and then impose tax on
it in accordance with s. 23(5)(a)(ii) of the Act of 1922.
must, this was a clear case where the inclusion of the share
of the income of the partner in his individual assessment
was not correct. If the submission made on behalf of the
appellants be accepted, a curious result would ensue,
because the liability of the firms to pay tax on the basis
that they were unregistered firms would stand vacated, while
the shares of the partners in the firms would not be brought
to tax in their individual assessments under s. 23 (5) (a)
(ii) . so that the income would escape charge to tax
altogether. It is clear that s. 35(5) of the Act of 1922 is
enacted precisely to meet situations of the type that has
come up in the present cases, so that when the imposition of
the tax on the firm as an unregistered firm is set aside,
tax can be imposed on the shares of the income of the
partners in their individual assessments by rectifying them
under s. 35(5) of the Act of’ 1922. This submission,
consequently. has no force.
The appeals fall and are dismissed with costs. There ,,hall
be fee.
R.K.P.S.
Appeals dismissed.
685