PETITIONER:
S. SURJIT SINGH KALRA ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1991
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
SAWANT, P.B.
CITATION:
1991 SCR (1) 364 1991 SCC (2) 87
JT 1991 (1) 417 1991 SCALE (1)179
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958- Sections 14B to 14D;
14(1)(e), 14(6) & 7 and 25C(2)-Classified Landlords-
Landlord's right to evict tenant-Tenant's right to resist
eviction-Scope of-Whether landlord has to prove his bona
fide requirement.
Section 25B: Introduction of Sections 14B to 14D in
sub-section (1) of Section 25B-Absence of corresponding
amendments to subsections (4) and (5) as also to the form of
summons specified in the Third Schedule-Whether allows a
tenant to take up defence under Section 14 (1) (e) as
against an application under Sections 14B to 14D.
Sections 25B(5) is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3,
CPC has no role there-CPC, 1908, Order 37 Rule 3.
Interpretation of statutes-Reading words in a
statute-When permissible-Harmonious construction--Purposive
approach to be adopted by Courts.
HEADNOTE:
The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was amended by Act 57
of 1988 which introduced Sections 14B to 14D to the Act
carving out thereby classified landlords from the general
class of landlords with specified rights to recover
immediate possession of the premises let out by them if
these are required for their own residence. The released or
retired persons from armed forces or the dependents of the
member of armed forces killed in action are covered by
Section 14B, the retired employees of the Central Government
and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section 14C,
and the landlords who are widows are covered by Section
14D. These classified landlords are also given the benefit
of summary trial under Chapter IIIA by introducing Sections
14B to 14D in Sub-section (1) of Section 25B, but there are
no corresponding amendments to sub-sections (2) to (5) of
Section 25B.
The two petitioners, who are tenants, were in
occupation of the premises belonging to two Army Officers
(respondent-landlords). In the
365
action for eviction brought by the landlords on the ground
that they needed the premises for their occupation, the
tenants sought leave to contest the application which the
Rent Controller being not satisfied with the facts disclosed
by the tenants in their affidavits denied. The Rent
Controller accepted the case of the landlords and ordered
eviction of the tenants. The two tenants challenged the
eviction orders by filing separate revision petitions in the
High Court. They also challenged the validity of Section 14B
of the Act before the High Court by means of two separate
writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
High Court dismissed the writ petition and the revision
petition filed by one of the tenants who being aggrieved
moved this Court by way of special Leave Petition Nos. 7146
JUDGMENT:
Court following its decision in the first case dismissed the
writ petition filed by him, though the revision petition
filed by him was still pending. The tenant challenged the
decision of the High Court by preferring Special Leave
Petition No. 7364 of 1990 to this Court.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the
tenant’s right to contest the application for eviction on
the grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e) cannot be denied
even as against the classified landlords falling under
Sections 14B to 14D. The tenant is entitled to leave to
contest the application by disclosing such facts in the
affidavit as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order of eviction under Section 14(l)(e). This is because of
retention of sub-section (5) of Section 25B without any
amendment and absence of amendment to Section 25C(2).
It was also contended that sub-sections (4) and (5) of
Section 25B are a composite scheme and since that scheme
has been left untouched the tenant’s right thereunder
cannot be denied. It was further contended that sub-
section (6) of Section 14 is attracted to applications under
Sections 14B to 14D.
Dismissing the Petitions, the Court,
HELD: 1. Section 14B is a special provision made by the
legislature conferring certain rights to persons belonging
to Armed Forces to recover from their tenants immediate
possession of the premises for their occupation. [369E]
2.1 The Tenant cannot claim right to contest an
application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section
14(l)(e) against the classified landlords falling under
Sections 14B to 14D. Acceptance of such a claim would
practically obliterate the purpose and object of
classification of landlords under Sections 14B to 14D who
are carved out from
366
the general landlords; indeed it would render the whole
exercise of creating special classes of landlords with
specified rights to recover immediate of the premises let
out by them nugatory. [371H-372C]
2.2 The remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is available only
to landlords in general or the landlords who are not
classified landlords under Sections 14B to 14D. The
classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights
which are different from and independent of the rights under
Section 14(l)(e). [372E-F]
2.3 Sections 14B to 14D are markedly different from
Section 14(1)(e).[375E-F]
3.1 The argument that the absence of amendments to sub-
sections (4) and (5) of Section 25B preserves the tenant’s
right to contest the application of even a classified
landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14(l)(e) is
not sustainable. Sub-section (4) of Section 25B provides
that the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller “as
hereinafter provided”, which in the contest means as
provided under sub-section-(5). This is the only sub-section
under which the Controller could give leave to the tenant to
contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant
discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from
obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the
premises. [376G, F]
3.2 The form specified in the Third Schedule refers
only to application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section
14A. Therefore, when an application is filed under Section
14B, a copy of the application should be sent to the tenant
by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and
omitting the other references which are not relevant and the
summons should state that the application is filed under
Section 14B and not under Section 14(l)(e) or 14A. Likewise
if the applications are under Sections 14C to 14D, the
summons should state accordingly. That would indicate the
scope of defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred
to in sub-section (5) of Section 25B. [377G-378A]
3.3 Under sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the
application by obtaining leave with reference to the
particular claim in the application of the landlord
depending upon whether it is under Sections 14A, 14B, 14C or
14D or under Section 14(l)(e). [378B]
The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under
Section 14(l)(e) as against an application under Section
14B. There cannot be
367
any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or
right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against
our jurisprudence and would be a mechanical interpretation
of the enactment defeating its purpose. The courts have
always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation
of statutes. [378C-D]
3.4 Section 14B and other allied provisions ought to
receive a purposeful construction and sub-section (5) of
Section 25B should be so construed as to implement the
object and purpose of Sections 14B to 14D. It is the duty of
the Court to give effect to the intention of the legislature
as expressed in Sections 148 to 14D. [378E]
4. The tenant is entitled to raise all relevant
contentions as against the claim of the classified
landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word
bona fide requirement in Sections 14B to 14D do not absolve
the landlord from proving that the requirement is bona fide
or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact
every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona
fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this
construction from the title of section 25B which states
“special procedure for the disposal of applications for
eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement”. [378H-379B]
5. Section 14B and other allied provisions refer to the
premises let out and not acquired by transfer. One may
become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant
in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted
by resorting to Sections 14B to 14D. If the transferee wants
to evict the tenant he must take action only under Section
14(l)(e). Equally Sub-section (7) of Section 14 has no
application to eviction under Sections 14B to 14D, nor the
amended provisions under Section 25C(2). But that does not
mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14B to 14D are
not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the
premises. It is always left to the Controller who is a
quasi-judicial authority to exercise his discretion having
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and grant
a reasonable time to the tenant. [379E-G]
6. The Controller’s power to give leave to contest the
application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14A is
cribbed by the condition that the ‘affidavit filed by the
tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord
from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of
the premises on the ground specified’ in the respective
sections. Therefore, if an application is filed under
Section 14B or 14C or 14D, the tenant’s right to contest
the application is narrowed down
368
and is restricted to the parameters of the respective
Sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by
relying upon Section 14(l)(e). Subsection (5) of Section 25B
is self-contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no part to
play there. [38OB-C]
Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani &
Anr.,[1977] 2 SCC 835, affirmed and reiterated.
Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prem
Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, [1982] 3 SCC 270, harmonised.
7. The landlord in SLP No. 11425/90 is living in a
rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000 p.m. and
requires the premises for himself and the members of his
family. The landlord cannot be denied possession of his own
premises under section 14B when he is residing in a rented
premises. [38OD-E]
8. The contention that the concerned landlord has taken
voluntary retirement long earlier and has become a part of
the Society just like any other landlord and Section 14B was
not intended to confer such landlord the special right to
recover immediate possession of the premises is not
maintainable because Section 14B(l) states that the persons
who have already retired may within one year from the date
of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or,
within a period of one year from the date of introduction of
Section 14B, whichever is later, apply to the controller for
recovering the immediate possession of their premises. That
is the legislative wisdom. [38OF-G]
9. True it is not permissible to read words in a
statute which are not there, but “where the alternative lies
between either supplying by implication words which appear
to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a
construction which deprives certain existing words of all
meanings, it is permissible to supply the words”. Having
regard to the context in which a provision appears and, the
object of the statute in which the said provision is
enacted, the court should construe it in a harmonious way to
make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to
reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy
intended by the statute. [378E-G]
Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, P. 109; Hameedia Hardware
Stores V. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [1988] 2 SCC 513 at 524-25,
and Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of
Waqf, [1959].1 SCR 1287 at 1299, relied upon.
369
&
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 837. 838
and 839 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.5-1990 of the
Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1381, 2994 of
1989 and C.R. No. 954 of 1989.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Kapil Sibal,
Additional Solicitor General, G.L. Sanghi, Dr. Y.S. Chitale,
Harish N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma, Ravinder Nath,
V.B. Saharya, P.K- Jain, Krishna Moorthy Iyer, Prem
Malhotra, A.C. Sehgal, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, R.L. Jain, S.K.
Tredal, Ms. kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P. Dave, Mrs. Sushma
Suri, Ms. M. Biswas and Ashok Mathur for the appearing
parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Leave granted.
These appeals from the decision of the Delhi High Court
raise the question with regard to landlord’s right to evict
the tenant under Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (‘The Act’) and the corresponding right of the tenant
to resist the eviction proceedings. Section 14-B is a
special provision made by the Legislature conferring certain
rights to persons belonging to Armed Forces to recover from
their tenants immediate possession of the premises for their
occupation.
Mahendra Raj, the common petitioner in S.L.P. Nos. 7146
and 11425/90, is a tenant occupying the premises of the
respondent Col. Ashok Puri. The petitioner in SLP No. 7364
is also a tenant, but occupying the premises belonging to
the respondent Brig. V.N. Channa. In the action for
eviction brought by the respondents on the ground that they
need the premises for their occupation, the tenants sought
leave to contest the application. But the Rent Controller
was not satisfied with the facts disclosed by the tenants in
their affidavits and therefore, denied leave to contest the
application for eviction. He considered the affidavits of
the parties and accepted the case of the landlord and
directed that the tenants shall be evicted. In the case of
Mahendra Raj, the Rent Controller made an order dated 2
September, 1989 inter alia, observing that the landlord is
living in a rented house, that he is paying rent of Rs.2,000
p.m., and that he requires the premises for himself and the
members of his family. The eviction order was challenged by
the tenant by means of revision petition before the Delhi
High Court. Almost simultaneously, the tenant also filed a
writ
370
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging
the validity of Section 14-B. On 10 May 1990, the High Court
dismissed the revision as well as the writ petition. Against
the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition,
the tenant has preferred SLP No. 7146 of 1990. Against the
order dismissing the revision petition, the tenant has
preferred SLP No. 11425 of 1990.
The tenant in SLP No. 7364 of 1990 has also challenged
the order of eviction in a revision petition before the High
Court and we are told that the revision is still pending.
Like the other tenant, he has also questioned the validity
of Section 14-B before the High Court under Article 226. The
High Court dismissed that petition following the decision in
Mahendra Raj’s case.
It would be convenient to refer to the relevant
provisions of the Act ‘before dealing with the points raised
in these cases. The Act applies to premises which are
defined by Section 2(i) as meaning, inter alia, any building
or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let
separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or
for any or other purpose. Section 14 provides that
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
other law or contract, no decree or order for the recovery
of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court
or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant.
This provision is, however, subject to the exceptions
provided under several clauses of the proviso. Section
14(l)(e) allows a decree for ejectment to be passed if the
Court or Controller is satisfied that the premises let for
residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord
for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member
of his family dependent on him, provided that the landlord
is the owner of the premises and he has no other reasonably
suitable residential accommodation. The explanation
thereunder states that for the purpose of the clause
14(1)(e) “premises let for residential purposes” include any
premises which having been let for use as a residence are,
without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for
commercial or other purposes. Section 14(l)(e) is further
restricted by sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 14. Sub-
section (6) imposes a restriction on the landlord, who has
acquired any premises by transfer, not to evict the tenant
under Section 14(l)(e) within the period of five years from
the date of acquisition. Sub-section (7) imposes an
obligation on the Court where an order for eviction is made
on the ground specified in Section 14(l)(e) to give the
tenant the minimum period of six months for delivery of
possession to the landlord.
371
By Act 18 of 1976 the Legislature has introduced certain
changes in the Act with effect from 1 December, 1975.
Section 14-A was introduced in Chapter Ill providing certain
rights to a person occupying residential premises allotted
to him by the Central Government or any other local
authority. If he is required to vacate such residential
accommodation on the ground that he owns in the Union
Territory of Delhi, a house in his name or in the name of
his spouse or dependent children, he could recover immediate
possession of his premises let out by him notwithstanding
anything contained elsewhere in the Act or any other
law for the time being in force. Simultaneously, Chapter
III-A was introduced containing Section 25-A to 25-C
providing summary trial of the applications filed landlords
classified under Section 14-A and also applications filed by
any other landlord for bona fide requirement of their
premises under Section 14(l)(e).
By the Amending Act 57 of 1988 some more classes of
landlords were carved out from the class of general
landlords. Section 14-B to Section 14-D are the provisions.
The released or retired persons from armed forces or the
dependents of the member of armed forces who had been
killed in action are covered by Section 14-B. They could
recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them
if they are required for their own residence. The retired
employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi
Administration are covered by Section 14-C. They could
recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them
if they are needed for their own residence. The landlords
who are widows are covered by Section 14-D with similar
right to recover immediate possession of the premises let
out by them or by their husband. These classified landlords
are also given the benefit of the summary trial under
Chapter III-A, by introducing Sections 14-B to 14-D in sub-
section (1) of Section 25-B. The sub-section (1) of Section
25-B as it stands provides that every application by a
landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section
(1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A or under Section
14-B or under Section 14-C or under Section 14-D shall be
dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in
this Section. There are however, no corresponding amendments
to sub-sections 2 to 5 of Section 25-B.
Omission to make corresponding amendments
particularly, to sub-sections 4 & 5 of Section 25 B has
given rise to the arguments for the petitioners that the
tenant’s right to contest the application for eviction on
the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be denied
even as against the classified landlords falling under
Sections 14-B to 14-D. It
372
was also argued that the classified landlords may prove the
facts stated in their respective provisions, but the tenant
is entitled to contest the application by disclosing such
facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an
order of eviction on the grounds specified under Section
14(l)(e).
The acceptance of the submissions urged for petitioners
would practically obliterate the purpose and object of
classification of landlords under Sections 14-B to 14-D who
are carved out from the general landlords. Indeed, it would
render the whole exercise of creating special classes of
landlords with specified rights to recover immediate
possession of the premises let out by them nugatory.
Before the introduction of Sections 14-B to 14-
D, Section 14(l)(e) was the only remedy available to all
landlords except those covered under Section 14-A to
recover possession of their premises. The Controller
shall give the tenant leave to contest the applications, if
the tenant in his affidavit discloses such facts as would
disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order for
recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds
specified under Section 14(l)(e). It is but natural when
the landlord brings an action for recovery of possession of
the premises covered under Section 14(l)(e), the tenant
has the legitimate right to show that the landlord does not
qualify under or satisfy the requirements of Section
14(l)(e). But today the remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is
available only to landlords in general or the landlords who
are not classified landlords under Sections 14-B to 14-
D. The classified landlords have been conferred with certain
rights which are different from and independent of the
rights under Section 14( 1)(e). For a proper understanding,
we may set out Section 14(l)(e), side by side with Section
14-B.
Section 14 (1) (e) Section 14-B
14. Protection of tenant 14. B Right to recover
against eviction. immediate possession of
premises to accrue to members
of the armed forces etc.
(1) Notwithstanding anything (1) Where the landlord:-
to the contrary contained in
any other law or contract, (a) is a released or retired
no order or decree for person from any armed
the recovery of possession forces and the premises let
of any premises shall be out by him are required for
made by any Court on his own residence; or
373
Controller in favour of the (b) is a dependent of a
landlord against a tenant: member of any armed forces
who had been killed in
action and the premises let
Provided that the Controller out by such member are
may, on an application made required for the residence
to him in the prescribed of the family of such
manner make an order for the member,
recovery of possession of
the premises on one or more
of the following grounds Such person or, as the case
only, namely- may be, the dependent may,
within one year from the
xxx xxx xxx date of his release or
retirement from such armed
(e) that the premises let forces or, as the case may
for residential purposes are be, the date of death of
required bona fide by the such member, or within a
landlord for occupation as a period of one year from the
residence for himself or for date of commencement of the
any member of his family Delhi Rent Control
dependent on him, if he is (Amendment) Act, 1988,
the owner thereof, or for whichever is later, apply to
any person for whose benefit the Controller for
the premises are held and recovering the immediate
that the landlord or such possession of such premises.
person has no other (2) Where the landlord is a
reasonably suitable residen- member of any of the armed
tial accommodation : forces and has a period of
less than one year preceding
the date of his retirement
and the premises let out by
him are required for his own
residence after his
retirement, he may, at any
Explanation: For the time, within a period of one
purposes of this clause, year before the date of his
‘premises let for retirement, apply to the
residential purposes’ Controller for recovering
include any premises which the immediate possession of
having been let for use as a such premises.
residence are, without the
consent of the landlord, (2) Where the landlord is a
used incidentally for member of any of the armed
commercial or other forces and has a period of
purposes.” less than one year preceding
the date of his retirement
and the premises let out by
him are required for his own
residence after his
retirement, he may, at any
time, within a period of one
year before the date of his
retirement, apply to the
Controller for recovering
the immediate possession of
such premises.
(3) Where the landlord
referred to in sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) has
let out more than one
premises, it shall be open to
him to make an application
under that sub-section in
respect of only one of the
premises chosen by him.
Explanation: For the purposes
of this Section `armed forces’
means an armed force of the
Union constituted under an
Act of Parliament and
includes a member of the
police force constituted
under Section 3 of the Delhi
Police Act, 1978 (34 of
1978).”
374
To make the picture complete we may also read sub-
sections 6 & 7 of Section 14.
“14(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises
transfer, no application for the recovery of
possession of such premises shall lie under sub-
section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e)
of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five
years has elapsed from the date of the
acquisition.
14(7) Where an order for recovery of possession of
any premises is made on the ground specified in
clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) the
landlord shall not be entitled to obtain
possession thereof before the expiration of a
period of six months from the date of the order.”
Under Section 14(l)(e), the premises let out for
residence could be recovered from the tenant, if the
landlord requires the premises bona fide for his own
occupation or for any member of his family dependent on him.
The eviction could also be sought for any person for whose
benefit the premises are held. The condition being apart
from the requirement must be bona fide, there shall be no
other reasonably suitable residential accommodation for the
landlord or for whose benefit the premises are held. The
explanation to Section 14(1)(e) provides “premises let for
residential purposes” include any premises which having been
let for use as a residence are without the consent of the
landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other
purposes. That means if with the consent of the landlord the
premises let for residential purposes are used for
commercial or other purposes, the landlord will have
difficult task to evict such tenant. Sub-section (6) of
Section 14 provides protection to the tenant from being
evicted from the premises which are transferred to third
parties.The transferee landlord must wait for five years
from the date of the transfer or acquisition before he moves
the Court for eviction of the tenant already in occupation
of the premises. Sub-section (7) is again a protection to
the tenant requiring the Court or the Controller to give a
minimum period of six months to vacate from the date of
order of eviction. This is a complete code governing the
disposal of application filed under Section 14(1)(e).
Under Section 14-B the right to evict the tenant is
available to two categories of persons, (i) The person who
has let out the premises and, (ii) the dependent of a member
of any armed forces who had let
375
out the premises but killed in action. In the former case,
the premises must be required for his own residence and in
the latter, for the residence of the family of such member.
It may be noted that Section 14(l)(e) requires that the
premises should have been let for residential purposes but
the landlord who seeks eviction need not be the person who
has let out. But Section 14-B narrows down such right. It is
he who has let out alone could evict or the dependent of the
person who has let out but since killed in action. Secondly,
Section 14-B uses the expression “the premises let out by
him” unlike the expression used in Section 14(l)(e) “the
premises let out for residential purposes”. The definition
of “premises” under sub-section (2)(i) means “any building
or part of a building which is or intended to be let,
separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or
for any other purpose . . .”. It is clear that Section 14-B
does not require that the premises should have been let out
for residential purposes and the purpose of letting out
seems to be irrelevant. But he who has let out alone could
seek eviction of his tenant or the dependent of , member of
any armed forces who had let out but since killed in action.
Section 14-B also provides the period of limitation for
claiming possession of such premises, but no such limitation
is provided under Section 14(l)(e). Sub-section (3) of
Section 14-B imposes further restriction on the landlord who
is having more than one premises. Such a landlord cannot ask
for possession of more than one of the premises but he can
choose any one of the premises which he has let out. Here
again we find that there is no such restriction to a
landlord covered under Section 14(l)(e) provided the
requirement of the landlord is bona fide and he has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Section
14(l)(e) does not preclude the landlord from seeking
eviction of more than one premises provided he establishes
the need.
Similar are the provisions in allied Sections 14-C and
14-D.
It will be thus seen that Sections 14-B to 14-D are
markedly different from Section 14(1)(e).
Notwithstanding these two independent provisions with
specified rights to landlords in general and the classified
landlords, Counsel for the tenants argued that Section
14(l)(e) is the weapon of defence for the tenant even
against the applications under Sections 14-B or 14-C or 14-
D. The tenant is entitled to leave to contest the
application by disclosing such facts in his affidavit which
would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of
eviction under Section 14(l)(e). This contention is sought
to be supported first, by the retention of sub-section
376
(5) of Section 25-B without any amendment, second, absence
of amendment to SeCtion 25(C)(2). It was also
contended that sub-sections 4 & 5 of Section 25-B are a
composite scheme and since that scheme has been left
untouched the tenant’s right thereunder cannot be
denied.
The submission if taken to logical conclusion leads
to obvious anomaly which will be indicated presently. But
before we do that it will be necessary to deal with one
other contention. Sub-section (1) of Section 25-B provides
that every application for the recovery of possession of any
premises belonging to persons referred to in sub-section (1)
of Section 25-B shall be dealt with in accordance with the
procedure prescribed “in this Section” meaning thereby
entire Section 25-B. It was also the submission of Dr.
Chitale counsel for one of the tenants in these cases. Mr.
Krishna Moorthy Iyer counsel for the Union of India,
however, argued that the procedure contemplated under
sub-section (5) of Section 25-B need not be followed by the
Controller with regard to applications filed under
Sections 14-B to 14-D. According to counsel when the
tenant is duly served of the application filed under
Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D he has no right to contest the
application unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds
on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction
and obtains leave from the Controller. It is said that
sub-section (4) itself authorises the Controller to refuse
leave if he is satisfied that the grounds set out in the
affidavit of the tenant would not disentitle the landlord to
seek eviction. We do not think that this contention could
be accepted. Indeed, sub-section (4) itself provides that
the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller, “as
hereinafter provided”, which in the context means as
provided under sub-section (5) the meaning and scope of
which will be presently considered. This is the only sub-
section under which the Controller could give leave to
the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed
by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of
possession of the premises.
The argument that the absence of amendments to sub-
sections 4 and 5 of Section 25-B preserves the tenant’s
right to contest the application of even a classified
landlord on the grounds specified under section 14(l)(e)
would be basically faulty. If such argument is available in
respect of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B, it must
be equally available to sub-section (2) of Section 25-B.
There is also no corresponding amendment to the summons to
be issued under subsection (2) and the form specified in the
Third Schedule after the introduction of Section 14-B to 14-
D. Third Schedule is in these terms:
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“The Third Schedule
Form of Summons in a case where recovery of
possession of Premises is Prayed for on the
ground of bona fide requirement or under Section
14-A.
To
(Name, description and place of residence of the
tenant)
Whereas Shri _________________________________has
filed an application (a copy of which is annexed)
for your eviction from (here insert the
particulars of the premises) on the ground
specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A;
You are hereby summoned to appear before the
Controller within fifteen days of the service
hereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller
to contest the application for eviction on the
ground aforesaid; in default whereof, the
applicant will be entitled at any time after the
expiry of the said period of fifteen days to
obtain an order for your eviction from the said
premises.
Leave to appear and contest the application
may be obtained or an application to the
Controller supported by an affidavit as if
referred to in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B.
Given under my hand and seal.
This_________________ day of_____________________
19_______
Controller”
This form specified in the Third Schedule refers only
to applications filed under Section 14(l)(e) or under
Section.14A. Does it mean that the unamended form should be
used to issue notice to the tenant even in case where
application for eviction is not made under Section 14(l)(e)
or 14-A? Is the tenant entitled to claim that he must
receive the notice in the unamended form only, since there
is no corresponding amendment to the form after introduction
of Sections 14-B to 14-D? A wooden reading may furnish him
positive answers, but it would be ridiculous. When an
application is filed under Section 14-B, a copy of the
application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary
amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other
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references which are not relevant. If the application is
filed under Section 14-B, the summons should state that the
application is filed under Section 14-B and not under
Section 14(l)(e) or 14-A. Likewise if the applications are
under Sections 14-C to 14-D, the summons should state
accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defence of
the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub-section
(5) of Section 25-B. Under sub-section (5), the tenant could
contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to
the particular claim in the application of the landlord
depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C
or 14-D or under Section 14(l)(e). The tenant can not be
allowed to take up defence under Section 14(l)(e) as against
an application under Section 14-B. There cannot be any
defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right
of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our
jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended
the result for which the counsel for the tenant contended.
It will be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment
defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never
found favour with the Courts which have always adopted a
purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes.
Section 14-B and other allied provisions ought to receive a
purposeful construction and subsection (5) of Section 25-B
should be so construed as to implement the object and
purpose of Section 14-B to 14-D. It is the duty of the Court
to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as
expressed in Section 14-B to 14-D.
True it is not permissible to read words in a statute
which are not there, but “where the alternative lies between
either supplying by implication words which appear to have
been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which
deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is
permissible to supply the words” (Craies Statute Law, 7th
Edition, p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia
Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ 1988] 2 SCC 513 at
524-25 where it was observed that the court construing a
provision should not easily read into it words which have
not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context
in which a provision appears and the object of the statute
in which the said provision is enacted the court should
construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An
attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant
provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.
(See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of
Waqf, [ 1959] SCR 1287 at 1299).
The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant
contentions as against the claim of the classified
landlords. The fact that there is no
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reference to the word bona fide requirement in sections 14-
B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that
his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that
it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction of a
tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough
indication in support of this construction from the title of
Section 25(B) which states “special procedure for the
disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona
fide requirement.
It was next urged that sub-section (6) of Section 14 is
also attracted to applications under Section 14-B to 14-D.
This contention overlooks the express wordings of sub-
section (6). It refers to premises acquired by transfer and
thereby the transferee becoming the landlord. Such a
landlord cannot bring an action for eviction of tenant in
possession of the acquired premises within a period of five
years from the date of acquisition. After five years such a
landlord can ask for eviction of the tenant under section
14(i)(e). This is indeed, as we said earlier, a protection
to the tenant. The original landlord who cannot evict the
tenant since he has got many houses under his occupation
cannot use the device by transferring one of the houses to a
third party who could easily evict such a tenant. The tenant
in occupation of the transferred premises gets a protection
from eviction for a minimum period of five years. Section
14-B and other allied provisions refer to the premises let
out and not acquired by transfer. One may become an owner
of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of
the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to
sections 14-B to 14-D. If the transferee wants to evict the
tenant of such premises he must take action only under
Section 14(l)(e). Equally, sub-section (7) of Section 14 has
no application to eviction under Sections 14-B to 14-D. Nor
the amended provisions under Section 25(c)(2) would be
attracted since it applies exclusively to tenants of the
landlords covered under Section 14-A. But that does not mean
that the tenants covered under Sections 14-B to 14-D are not
entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the
premises. it is always left to the Controller who is a
quasi-judicial authority to exercise his discretion having
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The
Controller must exercise his judicial discretion in every
case of eviction and grant a reasonable time to the tenant.
There is one other aspect which requires elucidation.
In Busching Schmitz Private Limited v. P. T. Meighani and
Anr., [1977] 2 SCC 835 this Court while dealing with the
scope of Section 14-A and the corresponding right of the
tenant to resist the application thereunder, has inter-alia,
observed that sub-section (5) of Section 25-B cannot be
equated with Order 37 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The
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social setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature of
the subject-matter and, above all, the legislative diction
which has been deliberately designed, differ in the two
provisions. The Controller’s power to give leave to contest
the application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14-A
is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the
tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord
from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of
the premises on the ground specified in the respective
sections. Needless to state, therefore if an application is
filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant’s right
to contest the application is narrowed down and is
restricted to the parameters of the respective sections. He
cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon
Section 14(l)(e). We find nothing contrary to our view in
Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prem Deva
Niranjan Deva Tayal, [ 1982] 3 SCC 270. Subsection (5) of
Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no
part to play there. We, therefore, reiterate the views
expressed in Basching Schmitz Private Limited case.
The tenant, who is petitioner in SLP No. 11425/90 has
suffered an order of eviction which has been confirmed by
the High Court in revision. It is found that his landlord is
living in a rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000
p.m. and he requires the premises for himself and the
members of his family. We concur with the view taken by the
Controller as affirmed by the High Court. The landlord
cannot be denied possession of his own premises under
Section 14-B when he is residing in a rented premises.
Before parting with the case, we have to deal with one
other contention which has been specifically raised by Mr.
Sanghi. The counsel argued that the concerned landlord has
taken voluntary retirement long earlier and he has become a
part of the society just like any other landlord and Section
14-B was not intended to confer such landlord, the special
right to recover immediate possession of the premises.
Obvious answer to this contention is found in Section 14-
B(1) which states that the persons who have already retired
may within one year from the date of their release or
retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one
year from the date of introduction of Section 14-B,
whichever is later apply to the Controller for recovering
the immediate possession of their premises. That is the
legislative wisdom.
In this view of the matter, the appeals stand disposed
without an order as to costs.
D.R.L. Appeals disposed of.
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