IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 17.02.2011 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G. RAJASURIA S.A.No.1028 of 2010 & M.P.No.1 of 2010 1. S.Syed Abubakkar (died) 2. Sharmila 3. Mymoonbee 4. Minor S.Omer Faruk 5. Minor S.Aiysha .. Appellants (Minor appellants 4 and 5 are represented by their mother, the second appellant, Natural Guardian) (Appellants 2 to 5 brought on record as LRs of the deceased sole appellant vide order of Court dated 07.12.2010) vs. Sardhar .. Respondent This Second Appeal is focussed as against the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2005 made in A.S.No.99 of 2003 on the file of Sub Court, Dharmapuri in confirming the judgment and decree dated 27.08.2003 made in O.S.No.6 of 1998 on the file of the District Munsif, Arur. For appellants : Mr.R.Subramanian For respondent : Mr.V.Nicholas JUDGMENT
This Second appeal is focussed by the original defendant animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2005 passed in A.S.No.99 of 2003 by the learned Subordinate Judge, Dharmapuri, confirming the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Arur in O.S.No.6 of 1998. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.
2. The merits relating to the factual matrix as stood exposited from the records lie within a narrow compass which could tersely and briefly be set out thus:
(a) The plaintiff filed the suit seeking the following reliefs:
“(i) To order specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 18.10.1997 against the defendant and direct him to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff;
(ii) In case of the default by the defendant act aforesaid prays this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for and on behalf of the defendant;
(iii) Granting permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendant from executing the sale deed or creating any encumbrance over the third parties.
(iv) For costs." (extracted as such) (b) The defendant filed the written statement resisting the suit. (c) Whereupon issues were framed by the trial Court. (d) The plaintiff-Sardar examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2-Alibaba and Exs.A1 to A9 were marked. The defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and Ex.B1 was marked.
3. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit ordering specific performance with reference to an extent of 14 feet from north to south on either side so as to make good the total extent of 1-1/4 cents as envisaged in Ex.A1. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the defendant preferred appeal for nothing but to be dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court.
4. Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below, this Second Appeal has been filed on various grounds inter alia to the effect that quite antithetical and contrary to the terms and conditions as found set out in Ex.A1 the agreement to sell, the Courts below simply decreed the suit assuming as though the plaintiff was entitled to, by all means an extent of 1/1-4 cent, despite the Agreement to sell-Ex.A1 specifically contemplated, that over and above 10 feet from north to south on either side alone was not intended to be sold.
5. The following substantial questions of law are found suggested in the grounds of appeal:
“(1) Is not the Ex.A1, is a sham and nominal document made only for the purpose of security for the loan obtained by the Appellant from the Respondent, when Ex.A1 prima facie establishes that it is a sham and nominal document?
(2) Whether the courts below were right in holding that the Respondent is entitled for relief of specific performance as per Ex.A1, when the same is affected by doctrine of non est factus.”
(extracted as such)
6. After hearing both sides, I am of the considered view that the following substantial questions of law could be framed:
(1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the description of property in Ex.A1 could be held to be bad for want of certainty and if so, whether on that ground the suit was not maintainable?
(2) Whether boundaries will prevail over extent or vice versa in this case?
(3) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by both the Courts below?
7. All the aforesaid substantial questions of law are taken together for discussion as they inter linked and inter woven with one another.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would set forth and put forth his arguments, the gist and kernel of them would run thus:
(a) At no point of time the defendant agreed to sell any extent over and above 10 feet from north to south on either side of the property concerned.
(b) Simply because the appellant/defendant is owning lands to the north of the property described in Ex.A1, he is not bound to sell over and above 10 feet from north to south on either side of the property found described in Ex.A1. But both the Courts below erroneously assumed certain principles of law and simply decreed the suit warranting interference in the Second Appeal.
Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would pray for setting aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below.
9. In an attempt to torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the appellant/defendant, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would advance his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:
Simply because there is some deficiency in the area within the boundaries as described in Ex.A1, the defendant cannot try to achieve success in the litigative process by wrongly and unjustifiably insisting upon the linear measurements as found set out in Ex.A1. In any event the plaintiff is entitled to whatever extent available within the boundaries as found set out in Ex.A1.
Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would pray for the dismissal of the Second Appeal.
10. I fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court:
(i) (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 HERO VINOTH (MINOR) VS. SESHAMMAL.
(ii) 2008(4) SCALE 300 KASHMIR SINGH VS. HARNAM SINGH AND ANOTHER.
(iii) 2009-1-L.W.1 STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS vs. S.N.GOYAL
(iv) (2011) 1 SCC 673 [VIJAY KUMAR TALWAR vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI]
A plain poring over and perusal of those decisions would highlight and spotlight the fact that the Second Appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court as per Section 100 of CPC unless there is any substantial question of law is made out from the available materials on record.
11. For proper description, I would like to extract hereunder the very description of property as found in Ex.A1:
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED
12. At this juncture, I recollect the maxim:
Id certum est quod certum reddi potest That is certain which can be made certain.
Accordingly if ex facie and prima facie the description of the property is uncertain and it is incapable of being made certain, then certainly a decree for specific performance cannot be passed. But on the other hand, here the factual position is different; the boundaries are specific.
13. No doubt, the learned counsel for the defendant would vehemently argue that simply because the defendant is owning lands to the north of the suit property described in Ex.A1, the plaintiff cannot try to grab that land at his whims and fancies. Both sides consciously with their wide open eyes and with full understanding in the cold light of the day got Ex.A1 emerged between them. No doubt it appears at the time of forging of Ex.A1, the property was not physically measured and because of that alone this error crept in. Wherefore, it cannot be stated that totally there was no consensus ad item capable of cutting at the root of the agreement itself. It is also a point to be noted that the sale consideration was specified as Rs.23,500/- per cent and they have not quantified as such in the agreement to sell the total consideration, but only the rate was found mentioned and from that it is discernible and understandable that whatever extent is available within the boundaries, the defendant should sell in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff for his own inaction in not getting the area measured before entering into Ex.A1, should bear the brunt and be satisfied with whatever extent is available within the boundaries found detailed and delineated in Ex.A1. This is a matter in which it could be held that boundaries shall prevail over extent though not in all cases.
14. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following precedents:
1. 1996(1) MLJ 542 [Mahalingam v. A.S.Narayanaswamy Iyer and others], certain excerpts from it would run thus:
“5. My attention is drawn by the senior counsel for the appellant to the following passages in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol.50.
“455. False demonstratio non nocet: It is a rule of construction, which applies to all written instruments and not to Wills alone, that if, of various terms used to describe a subject matter (whether a person or property) some are sufficient to ascertain the subject matter with certainty but others add a description which is not true, these other terms are not allowed to vitiate the gift. The rule in full is false demonstratio non nocent cum de corpore constat and the second part of this maxim is an essential part of it. The false description must merely be added into that which is otherwise clear, although it need not come at the end of the sentence. The characteristic of cases within the rule is that the description so far as it is false applies to no subject at all and so far as it is true applies to one one.
457. Limits of the rule: The rule of false demonstratio is limited by a second rule of no less importance, namely that additional words are not rejected as a false description if they are capable of being read as accurate words of restriction. If, therefore, it is doubtful whether the words of the will import a false reference or description, or whether they are words of restriction that limit the generality of former words, the court never presumes error or falsehood and the latter construction is preferred. Accordingly, where there exists some subject as to which all the descriptions are true, and some subject as to which part is true and part false, the words are considered to be words of true restriction, so that they refer to that subject only as to which all the descriptions are true.”
6. Reference is made to the judgment in Anderson v. Berkley, (1902) 1 Ch.D.936 and the following passage therein.
“It is not a rule, however, that, where the description is made up of more than one part, and one part is true but the other is false, then, if the part which is true describes the subject or object of the gift with sufficient certainty, the untrue part will be rejected, and will not vitiate the gifts.”
7. A Division Bench of this Court in Krishnamurthy v. Venkataramanappa (1947) 2 MLJ 247 extracted the above passage from Halsbury and applied the doctrine of falsa demonstratio.
8. Reliance is also placed on a judgment of mine in Madhavan v. Kannammal, (1989)1 MLJ 136, wherein I have pointed out that it is not proper for the court to adopt a construction which would lead to a redundancy of certain words used by the testator, that any construction of a document must be in such a manner that it should give a meaning to all words used by the testator and that the entire document must be taken into consideration and the language used by the testator has to be considered before the interpretation is given.
11. A single Judge of this court relying upon the aforesaid judgment held in Siviseshamuthu v. Gopalakrishna, A.I.R.1963 Mad.147, that where the property sold is part of a definite survey number and in the sale deed the exact boundaries of the part sold are given and the area mentioned is only approximate, the description by boundaries should prevail in ascertaining the actual property sold under the document.
12. Reliance is also place on the judgment of another single Judge in Church of South India v. Raja Ambrose, (1978) 2 MLJ 620. The learned Judge has however taken care to hold that the question depends upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the relevant conveyance deed.”
2. (2002) 2 MLJ 612 [State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its District Collector, Tirunelveli v. Mohamed Nagib and others], certain excerpts from it would run thus:
“4.1. In my considered opinion, it is well settled in law that the boundaries will prevail over the extent alone, but, not the Survey Number also. That apart, the said principle is applicable only in a transaction agreed and entered between the parties, but not in a case of unilateral approach.
4.3. The principle that the boundaries prevail over the extent, in my considered opinion, shall not construe boundaries prevail over the Survey Number also, when the respondents/plaintiffs themselves have stated in the plaint that they had purchased the suit property, which is located only in T.S.No.230/1 and not otherwise. It may also be noted that the respondents/plaintiffs had not chosen to seek an amendment that they had purchased the suit property located in T.S.No.234 at all.”
3. 1984(2) MLJ 306 [Dina Malar Publications, a Tamil daily, reptd., by its Partner, R.Krishnamoorthy v. The Tiruchirapalli Municipality, reptd., by its Executive Authority, the Commr., and others], an excerpt from it would run thus:
“9. The property in question bears a subdivided town survey No.371/2, with an extent of 2,400 sq.ft. The property in question is not an unserveyed area or an area in respect of which the extent is in doubt. In laying down the principle that the boundaries should prevail over the extent, in the above decisions, the learned Judges have applied the following principles:- (1) in case of doubtful or varying extents in the documents of title relating to the property, boundaries should be preferred to the extent; (2) Only in the absence of definite material to show the actual extent intended to be sold the boundaries should outweigh the doubtful extent mentioned in the document; (3) If the recitals in the documents and the circumstances of the case show that a lesser extent only was conveyed than the area covered by boundaries, and there is clear evidence as to the intention of the parties with reference to the extent conveyed, then the extent should prevail over the boundaries. Bearing in mind the abovesaid principles, we will have to examine the facts of this case.”
The law as it stood at one point of time was that boundaries will prevail over extent. But subsequently, this Court took a view that in all cases blindly such a proposition cannot be ushered in and it all depends upon facts and figures. Here the total extent is specified as 1-1/4 cents of land, whereas, specifically within the boundaries what is available is lesser, so to say an extent of 370 sq.ft. as found detailed and set out in para No.5 of the plaint. In such a case, I am of the view that boundaries shall prevail over the extent and the defendant is bound to sell whatever extent available within the said boundaries specified in Ex.A1 in favour of the plaintiff and receive the sale consideration proportionately at the rate of Rs.23,500/- per cent.
15. As such both the Courts below in my opinion went wrong in holding that an extent of 1-1/4 cent comprising of linear measurements of 14 feet from north to south direction on either side should be sold in favour of the defendant by the plaintiff. When the parties were not so careful and conscious in getting incorporated in the agreement the extent meticulously, the Court cannot grant as a largesse some remedy more than what they themselves envisaged at the time of forging the agreement.
16. I also recollect the following maxim:
Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata : It is the proper role of a judge to decide according to the allegations and proofs.
17. Accordingly, the substantial question of law No.1 is answered to the effect that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the description of property in Ex.A1 could not be held to be bad for want of certainty.
18. The substantial question of law No.2 is decided to the effect that the boundaries will prevail over extent.
19. The substantial question of law No.3 is decided to the effect that since both the Courts below failed to take into account the aforesaid points discussed supra, interference in the Second Appeal is warranted.
20. I am therefore of the considered view that the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below should be modified to the extent that the defendant is bound to sell an extent of 370 sq.ft. available within the said boundaries specified in Ex.A1 in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly the original suit shall stand decreed. The proportionate sale consideration shall be deposited in Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, if not already deposited. The Second Appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
gms
To
1. The Subordinate Judge,Dharmapuri.
2. The District Munsif,
Arur