JUDGMENT
1. In the context of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, what right vests in a wife, living apart from her husband, to claim compensation consequent upon his death in a motor accident’? Herein lies the meaningful and significant point which arises for determination in. this appeal, besides, of course, the apportionment of blame for the accident and the quantum of compensation payable to the claimants.
2. Several passengers were injured and one died too, namely. Mohinder Pratap Gupta, when the Punjab Roadways bus PUG 3720 they were travelling in was involved in an accident with the truck PBN 778 at the crossing on the Amritsar-Gurdaspur road near the outskirts of Batala. This happened on August, 15, 1981, at about 3 p.m. The bus was on its way from Amritsar to Gurdaspur while the truck had come on to the crossing from its right from the Aliwal-Jalandhar road by-pass. II was the finding of the Tribunal that both the bus driver as also the truck driver were equally to blame for the accident. A sum of Rs. 1,93,000/- was awarded as compensation to the claimants, they being the mother; widow, son and daughter of Mohinder Partap Gupta deceased.
3. There can be no manner of doubt that the drivers of both the vehicles involved in the accident must share the blame for it. A reference to the evidence on record would show that even as per the testimony of the two drivers, namely, RW 2 Santokh Singh, the truck driver, and RW 3 Sajan Singh, the driver of the bus, neither slowed down while approaching the crossing despite the fact that they had seen each other coming on to this crossing from a long enough distance t o have enabled them to do so had they so chosen. The accident itself took place in the middle of the crossing. The photographs taken soon after the occurrence clearly bring out the fact that it was the front side of the bus that hit into the left-hand side of the truck and, what is more, the truck can be seen lying off the road in a ditch. This situation is indicative or the fact that the truck must have come on to the crossing before the bus reached there and also that the bus must have been travelling at a fairly fast speed. According to AW 8 Kartar Singh, the only eye-witness to be examined other than the two drivers, the bus was coming at a very fast speed when it rammed into the body of the truck. The breach of the provisions of regulation 6 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor. Vehicles Act is thus writ large on the part of the drivers of both the vehicles and, as regards the bus driver. of those of regulation 7 too. A similar situation arose in Piara Singh v. Gian Kaur, ( 1984) 86 Pun LR 331. There it was observed that where the accident occurs at a road intersection with one of the vehicles involved therein coming on to it from the right side of the other., both regulation 6 as also regulation 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act stand attracted thereto. A duty is cast on the driver of the motor vehicle by the provisions of regulation 6 to slow down while approaching a road intersection and to enter it only in the knowledge that he can do so without endangering the safety of the persons thereon. Such persons included the driver of the vehicle himself and any other person who may be travelling in the vehicle. Regulation 7 casts a further duty on such driver on entering the intersection to give way to the traffic proceeding on the road, if any, designated as the main road and, in other cases, to that approaching the intersection from his right hand side. It was accordingly held that where an accident occurs at a crossing the negligence of the driver who contravenes both regulations 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act would be two-thirds as compared to one-third that of the driver who disregards the requirements of regulation 6 only. Following this precedent, the finding on the issue of negligence as recorded by the Tribunal is accordingly modified to the extent that the negligence of the bus driver shall be apportioned at two-thirds and that of the truck driver at one-third.
4. Next to consider is the quantum of compensation payable to the claimants. The principles governing the assessment of compensation payable to the dependants of the deceased, in such cases, are those as laid down by the Full Bench of this High Court in Lachhman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur, 81 Pun LR 1: AIR 1979 Punj & Har 50, where it was observed that the compensation to be assessed’ is the pecuniary loss caused to the dependants by the death of the deceased and for the purpose of calculating the just compensation, annual dependency of the dependants should be determined in terms of the annual loss accruing to them due to the abrupt termination of life. For this purpose annual earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident and the amount out of the same which he was spending for the maintenance of the dependants will be the determining factor. This basic figure will then be multiplied by a suitable multiplier. It was further observed that the suitable multiplier shall be determined by taking into consideration the number of years of the dependency of the various dependents, the number of years by which the life of the deceased was cut short and the various imponderable factors such as earlier natural death of the deceased, his becoming incapable of supporting the dependents due to illness any other natural handicap or calamity, the prospects of the remarriage of the widow, the coming up of the age of the dependants and their developing independent sources of income as well as the pecuniary benefits which might accrue to the dependants on account of the death of the person concerned.
5. Later the Full Bench authority referred to above came up for consideration before a Division Bench consisting of. Chief Justice S. S. Sandhawalia and Surinder Singh, J. in Asha Rani v. Union of India, 84 Pun LR 486: AIR 1982 Punj & Har 435, where it was held that the normal multiplier is sixteen and it can rise to a maximum of twenty virtually as the outer limit. It was further observed that the primary purpose of compensation to the dependencies to provide them a consolidated fund of money which would continue to yield annual financial support, which the deceased was providing to his dependants, in other words, the amount which would guarantee the availability of an equivalent annual financial income to them.
6. Applying the principles laid down in Lachman Singh’s case (supra)(AIR 1979 Punj & Har 50), there can be no manner of doubt that the appropriate multiplier to be applied here would be sixteen considering the fact that Mohinder Partap Gupta deceased was only 45 years of age when he died leaving behind his 42 year old widow Raj Anand, two minor children Jatinder Gupta aged l3.and Mamta Anand who was ten years old. Besides this, there is also a claim by his mother Vidya Wati aged 62 years.
7. Mohinder Partap. Gupta was a Sub Divisional Engineer with the Punjab P.W.D. but at the time of this accident he was on deputation with the Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Chandigarh. The total emoluments of the deceased at the time of his death were a little over Rs.2,100 per month, as is borne out by his last pay certificate, Exhibit AW9/1.
8. As regards the dependency of the claimants, after making due allowance for the amount that the deceased would have spent upon himself had he lived and the various other imponderables as set Forth in Lachhman Singh’s case (AIR 1979 Punj & Har 50)(supra) it would be fair and just to assess it at around Rs. 1,500 per month or Rs. 18,000 per annum. Computed at this rate, the compensation payable to the claimants would work out to Rs. 2,88,000 which may be rounded off to Rs.3,00,000(three lakh rupees).
9. Now arises the vexed and contentious issue between the parties with regard to the apportionment of compensation. among the claimants, i.e., the widow and the daughter on one side and the mother and the son on the other.
10. It was the plea of the mother and the son that, as the widow and the daughter had been living apart from the deceased during his lifetime and no maintenance was being paid to them, they suffered no financial loss on account of his death and were thus not entitled to any compensation. The widow and the daughter on the other hand, sought to assert an equal right to the compensation payable on account of the death of the. deceased.
11. It is no doubt true that no amount was being paid by Mohinder Partap Gupta to his wife or daughter for their maintenance or otherwise. It has to be borne in mind, however, that both the wife and the daughter had a right to claim maintenance from the deceased both under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 as also under S. 125, Criminal P.C. Indeed, it is well settled. that the father is under a legal obligation to maintain his child and the husband to maintain his wife and that the onus lies on him to allege and prove that his wife and the child are not entitled to the maintenance claimed. Not only this, S. 22, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. specifically provides that the liability for maintenance can be enforced against the estate of the deceased in the hands of his heirs. This being so, it must be held that there was a subsisting right in Raj Anand and her daughter to claim maintenance from the deceased during his lifetime and further by virtue of titling his heirs they were also entitled to succeed to his estate in their own right. It cannot, therefore, be said that they are not entitled. to any compensation. It may be mentioned here that the opposing counsel could point to no material on record to suggest that Raj Anand or her daughter had in any manner disentitled themselves to maintenance or to succeed to the property left behind by Mohinder Partap Gupta.
12. As for the computation of compensation payable to Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand, the appropriate yardstick to be applied here would be the amount that they could have received as maintenance from Mohinder Partap Gupta.. during his Lifetime. In this behalf it impertinent to note that Raj Anand is employed as a teacher at a salary of Rs. 800 per month while the salary of the deceased was over Rs. 2, t00 per month; meaning thereby that the combined income of the husband and the wife was around Rs. 3,000 per month. It would be fair to put the father and the son on one side and the mother and the daughter on the other, somewhat at par financially, meaning thereby that if maintenance had been claimed from the deceased during his lifetime he could have been called upon to pay his wife and daughter about Rs. 500 per month. It is on this basis, therefore that the compensation payable to Raj Anand and her daughter deserves to be apportioned. This would have left a balance of over Rs. 1,600 per month for father and son. Splitting up the compensation payable to the claimants on this basis, Raj Anand and her daughter Mamta Anand would thus be held entitled to one lakh rupees, the balance of two lakh rupees being payable to the mother and the son of the deceased. The sum of one lakh rupees payable to Raj Anand and Mamta Anand shall be shared by them equally while, in the other case, the son shall receive one lakh and seventy five thousand rupees and the balance of twenty five thousand rupees shall be payable to the mother of the deceased. The claimants shall in addition be entitled to interest on the amount awarded at the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date of application to the date of payment of the amount. The amounts payable to the minor claimants shall be paid to them in such manner as the Tribunal may deem to be in their best interest.
13. The appellants and respondents 4 to 7 shall be jointly and severally liable to the claimants for the entire amount awarded, but the inter se liability of the truck driver, its owner and the insurance company shall be to the extent of one-third of the amount awarded while the bus driver and the State of Punjab shall be liable for the remaining two-thirds. The appellants and the aforesaid respondents shall be entitled to rateable contribution inter se.
14. In the result cross-objections filed by the claimants and the appeals of Messrs Sachdeva Rice Mills and others are hereby accepted to the extent and in the manner irradiated above while those of the State of Punjab are dismissed. The claimants shall be entitled to the costs in this appeal. Counsel’s fee Rs. 500.
15. Order accordingly.