ORDER
Balakrishna, J.
1. This is a Writ Petition filed by Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd., Munirabad, represented by its Public Relations Officer, challenging the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Koppal, Raichur District, vide Annexure-G as void and illegal. The impugned order is dated 12-4-1983.
2. The short point for consideration is whether the petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity of a heaving in accordance with the principles of natural justice before the Land Tribunal which is Respondent-2 in this case passed the impugned order on 12-4-1983.
3. The material facts of the case, in brief, are as follows:
The Public Relations Officer of the petitioner factory one V.H Joshi who had been attending to these matters which were before the Land Tribunal being familiar with the case was away at Bangalore on duty at the relevant point of time and this was intimated to the Tahsildar, Koppal, and also to the Land Tribunal. The Tahsildar, acting on this information, as Secretary of the Land Tribunal issued a notice to the petitioner fixing an enquiry of the declarations filed by the predecessors in title under Section 66 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) on 11-4-1983 at about 9 A.M. on the said date. The said notice was dated actually 8-4-1983 and in fact was served on the same day evening at 5.10 P.M. after closing of the office hours of the petitioner factory. Since the Officer who was familiar with the case was the only one to represent effectively the interests of the petitioner had gone on duty elsewhere, a telegram was sent by the petitioner on 11-4-1983 to respondent-3 since 9-4-1983 was not a working day being a second Saturday and the following was Sunday, seeking an adjournment. The petitioner has produced the Tribunal’s notice as well as the copy of the telegram vide Annexures ‘C’ and ‘D’. The Public Relations Officer of the petitioner factory returned to station at 2.30 P.M. on 11 4-1983. In the District of Gulbarga division, the Tribunals work from 8 A.M. to 1 P.M. during the months of April and May. Having seen the Tribunal’s notice and the telegram issued by the factory to the Office of the Land Tribunal, he proceeded to the Office of the Tribunal on the next day morning i.e. on 12-4-1983 and presented an application along with an affidavit seeking adjournment of the case by a week’s time so as to enable the petitioner to come prepared with all the records in support of his case in order to assist the Tribunal in rendering a just decision. Copies of the said application and affidavit are produced by the petitioner vide Annexures ‘E’ and ‘F’.
4. When the petitioner’s Public Relations Officer approached the Tribunal for an adjournment on 12-4-1983 with an application and affidavit at 10 A.M, he was surprised to learn that the order was kept ready for pronouncement by the Tribunal. It is stated by the petitioner that the Chairman of respondent-2 Tribunal informed the Public Relations Officer that since the petitioner was not present on the previous day before the Tribunal, the order declaring 1971 acres of land as excess was recorded in the order-sheet on 11-4-1983 itself. On coming to know of this, the Public Relations Officer made a fervent request to the Tribunal to consider his application for adjournment and pass orders on the same. However, the Tribunal refused to even look into the application of the petitioner requesting for adjournment and said that the application would be filed along with the records. The Tribunal proceeded to pass the impugned order which runs into 78 pages and the same was given to the petitioner’s Public Relations Officer to go through. This happened on 12-4-1983. The petitioner further submits that it is relevant to note that 78 pages order was already kept ready even before the enquiry started and that this fact establishes the bias of the Chairman against the petitioner’s factory. My attention is also drawn by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the observation made by the Chairman of the Land Tribunal who has pointedly mentioned that the petitioner is influential and as such it is apprehended that the petitioner may impede the implementation of the order by seeking legal remedy before this Court and the Supreme Court. Besides this, though under the provisions of Section 67(2) of the Act, even after the decision of the Land Tribunal, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is mandatory that the Tribunal shall serve on the petitioner a notice specifying therein the extent of land which the petitioner should surrender and to do so give 30 days time. Nevertheless the Chairman expressed in the impugned order that no such notice is necessary according to common sense and that all lands declared are surplus. Thus, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that even the right of being given notice of 30 days as contemplated under the Act has been denied arbitrarily by the Land Tribunal.
5. There is no counter to meet the allegations made by the petitioner from any of the Respondents. I have gone through the annexures referred to in the contentions raised by the petitioner. Error is apparent on the face of the record. The statutory mandate under the provisions of Section 67(2) of the Act has been infracted. Further, elementary principles of natural justice require that when an application and an affidavit are sought to be filed before the Tribunal seeking an adjournment, it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to consider the same, apply its mind and pass an order by exercising discretion judiciously and fairly. However, it is found that the Tribunal has totally disregarded the application and the affidavit and has not followed a just approach inasmuch as it has simply filed the application and the affidavit without passing any order on it. On the other hand, the Tribunal has proceeded to pass an order of 78 pages which had already been kept ready and the remaining portion of the order only to be added on 12-4-1983. There is no reference even to the telegram that was sent by the petitioner factory in the absence of the Public Relations Officer to the Land Tribunal seeking adjournment on the ground that the Public Relations Officer had left the station on duty elsewhere. This conduct of the Tribunal appears to be rather strange and unusual. For the disposal of this writ petition, it is not necessary for me to go into other details. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in the absence of any material to indicate to the contrary, I am of the opinion that there has been a miscarriage of justice and the impugned order is vitiated for non-compliance with not only the principles of natural justice, but also the legislative mandate contained in Section 67(2) of the Act. This is a matter of importance and seriousness because any order passed by the Land Tribunal under Section 67(4) of the Act is to be a final order unlike an order passed under Section 48A by the Land Tribunal Particularly in the light of this aspect, the Land Tribunal ought to have given a full opportunity to the petitioner to represent its case before passing the impugned order. After considering the allegations made by the petitioner which have gone unrebutted and having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case’ I am convinced that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to explain its case and to defend the interest of the petitioner factory.
6. It is relevant to nine that under Section 67(1)(b) of the Act, it is incumbent upon the authority to hold such enquiry as may be prescribed to determine the extent of the holding and also the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area. The very purpose of this provision will be defeated if a reasonable opportunity is not given to the petitioner to explain its case and to assist the Tribunal in determining the extent of the holding and the area by which such extent exceeds the ceiling area or not. The right that is involved is a substantive one and it cannot be treated in a casual or cavalier fashion. The Tribunal is bound to act strictly in accordance with law when its action is likely to affect the substantive rights of the owner in respect of landed property. It is in this context that the Tribunal has to exercise due care and caution in conforming to due process of law.
7. Way back in 1863, Justice Byles observed in Cooper -v.- Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 143 ER 414, as follows while examining the question of reasonable opportunity :
“Although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue in Dr. Bentlay’s case (I.S.T.R. 557 : 2 Ld. Raym 1334), somewhat quaint, but it is very applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present. He says the objection for want of notice can never be got over. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any I remember to have it observed by a very learned man, upon such an occasion that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence ‘Adam’ (says God) where are thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat ?’ And the same question was put to Eve also.”
In Arthur John Spackman v. Plumsteed District Board of Works, LR 10A.G. 229, Lord Selborne observed :
“No doubt, in the absence of special provision as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word, but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law.”
In Board of Education -v.- Rice, LR (1911) AC 179, Lord Loreburn expressed the same principle slightly differently :
“In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat -such a question as though it were trial. They have no power to administer on oath, and need to examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudical to their view.”
In Union of India -v.- T.R. Verma, , Venkatarama Aiyar, J., speaking for the Court observed at page 885 :
“Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party and that no material should be relied on against him without being given an opportunity of explaining them.
If these Rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed.”
The Supreme Court had to decide what a “reasonable opportunity” is in Fedco (P) Ltd. v. S. N. Bilgrami, . It was emphasized therein by the Supreme Court that the Court was the final authority to determine whether the opportunity afforded in a given case was or was not reasonable. Dasgupta, J., observed that :
“The concept of reasonable opportunity has two elements: The first is that an opportunity to be heard must be given : the second is that this opportunity must be reasonable. Both these matters are justiciable and it is for the Court to decide whether an opportunity has been given and whether that opportunity has been reasonable.”
8. Applying the principles laid down in the above mentioned cases, I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner in the instant case was denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing and hence the impugned order is liable to be struck down.
9. In the result, rule is issued and made absolute. The Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. The case is remitted to the Land Tribunal, Koppal, Raichur District, with a direction that the Land tribunal shall fix a date of hearing and hear the case afresh after giving a reasonable opportunity of bearing to the parties concerned including the petitioner and dispose of the case on merits in accordance with law expediciously. No order as to costs.